gotten that the assurance had been signed, not only by himself, but by Sir J. French and Sir J. S. Ewart, and that they might take a very different view as to what their honour demanded under the circumstances. This was discovered next morning; and, in spite of the most desperate and persistent efforts to find some formula which would induce them induce them to stay-including the announcement to the House of Commons on the Friday of a perfectly meaningless new Army Order, and the delivering by the Prime Minister of certain sentences which it was hoped would imply no coercion of Ulster' to the soldiers while implying coercion to the Housethe two generals persisted in resigning. It was the only thing they could do. But it obviously made Colonel Seely's position impossible. On Monday, March 30, he resigned; and the Prime Minister announced that he meant to act as Minister of War himself. The dramatic manner of the announcement raised, in the Government ranks, an enthusiasm for which neither the circumstances nor Mr Asquith's own drifting temperament afford much justification. So far as General Gough and, indeed, the Army at large are concerned, the definite assurance given by the Army Council still holds good, all Parliamentary repudiations notwithstanding; and the attempt to assert the policy of armed coercion in practice will inevitably renew a crisis which Mr Asquith will be no more able to cope with than was Colonel Seely.

Not the least deplorable feature of the whole crisis has been the entire abandonment by Ministers of that traditional straightforwardness in dealing with Parliament which is so essential to the successful working of the constitutional machine. Not even over the Marconi affair was Parliament the victim of such an orgy of sheer prevarication. From the Prime Minister downwards all the Ministers declared at the outset that absolutely no orders of any kind had been given to General Paget beyond the instructions contained in the War Office letter of March 14. The facts themselves disproved this contention, which was finally belied when Sir A. Paget's answer to those instructions-suppressed in the White Paper which professed to publish all the relevant correspondence-slipped out in answer to a written question. Again and again the Prime Minister

stated that there had been no naval movements whatever, on the last occasion after the actual facts had been admitted by Mr Churchill an hour before. The whole story with regard to Colonel Seely's addition of the two 'peccant paragraphs,' as told in the House of Commons, teemed with inherent impossibilities.

More amazing still, while Colonel Seely made no reference whatever in his statement to Lord Morley's collaboration in the peccant paragraphs,' and Mr Asquith immediately afterwards stated, in answer to Mr Balfour, that no colleague of the War Minister's had ever seen those paragraphs, it subsequently became known that Lord Morley had actually read out the reference to that collaboration from the written text of Colonel Seely's statement. Is it credible that Colonel Seely never submitted his statement to Mr Asquith, or at least informed him of Lord Morley's share in the business? If he did either, then Mr Asquith must have been guilty of a direct misstatement of fact. And if the direct 'yes' and 'no' of Ministers cannot be trusted, all political discussion becomes impossible. Disingenuousness of statement was matched by equal disingenuousness in action. Lord Morley's refusal to follow Colonel Seely's resignation and his shuffling defence of that refusal, Lord Haldane's 'cooking' of the record of his speech against coercion so as entirely to reverse its meaning, and, above all, the flat repudiation of the assurance on the strength of which General Gough accepted reinstatement, are things of which no real explanation has been offered.

On March 31, the debate on the Second Reading (for the third time) of the Home Rule Bill began, and continued till April 6, in the absence of the Prime Minister, who was conducting his uncontested election in East Fife. For a moment it seemed as if the Government might be prepared to make some advance towards meeting the Opposition on the main issue of submitting the Home Rule Bill to the verdict of the electorate. Sir E. Grey suggested that, while the Bill itself must go on the Statute Book first, it might be under some arrangement which might be perfectly fair as between both parties, whichever won the subsequent election, and that there could be no coercion of Ulster before such an election. The obvious inference was that he contemplated the inclusion

in the Bill of some proviso whereby it would lapse automatically unless confirmed by a resolution of the House of Commons after the election. This would mean saving face as regards the Home Rule Bill, and still passing Welsh Disestablishment and Plural Voting under the Parliament Act. But the power behind the throne evidently scouted the idea; and on the next day Sir E. Grey had to undergo the humiliation of being present at his public repudiation by Mr Samuel. Once more the Government attitude stiffened. An offer by the Unionist leaders to insure that no obstacles should be placed in the way of the immediate passage of the Bill, if confirmed at a General Election, elicited no response; and the passage of the Second Reading by a majority of 80 has left the deadlock more complete than ever.

It is true that on both sides during this debate members on the back benches freely discussed the desirability of a settlement by consent based on the adoption of some sort of federal or devolutionary system for the whole United Kingdom. Even Sir E. Grey toyed with the idea that, if Ulster accepted the Government proposal, the six years might be devoted to exploring the federal question-presumably with the same determination to achieve a positive result as has been shown in regard to the question of Second Chamber reform since the passing of the Parliament Act. Mr Redmond, however, threw a most effectual douche of cold water on all the federalist talk, by explaining that he had no objection to federalism, so long as it did not involve the possibility of Ulster forming a separate federal unit, or so long as none of the powers granted to Ireland under the Home Rule Bill were whittled down-in other words, so long as it did not interfere with separatism. His utterance was illuminating, for it made it palpable beyond dispute that the idea of a settlement by consent on federal or quasi-federal lines is out of the question so long as he can exercise a controlling influence-that is to say, so long as the present Government exists.

That, indeed, is the crux of the whole situation. There is probably a substantial majority in the House of Commons to-day who would agree readily to the setting up of a non-party convention to discuss and settle the whole question of the constitution of the

United Kingdom and the working of Parliament-the only method by which a true settlement by consent can be attained. But those who share this view on the Liberal side are in a position of great difficulty. They cannot push the policy of conciliation to its conclusion without destroying the Government. And the destruction of the Government, in their belief, will involve the loss not only of the pending measures of its programme, but of all that the Liberal Party has secured since 1910. The idea of a return to the political conditions of 1909, or the creation of a Second Chamber reformed on Tory lines and made stronger in the process, and the prospect of a generation of renewed effort to alter the situation so created, or even to abolish Plural Voting, are to them intolerable. If the desperate cohesion of the Liberal ranks, even in the face of civil war, is to be broken up, that fear must be clearly and definitely dispelled.

The Unionist Party has already given ample guarantees to its opponents in the event of an election being decided in favour of the present Government. It has given no guarantees in the event of a Unionist victory. And yet to give such guarantees would be the part not only of sound tactics for the present, but of true wisdom for the future. Whatever the majority by which a Unionist Government may be returned, it will be crushed and rendered utterly sterile for all fresh constructive effort, if it has to attempt the superhuman task of dealing with the Irish problem and the Parliamentary problem on party lines. That those problems can only be dealt with successfully as a single whole and on national lines will be as true then as it is to-day. If the Unionist leaders gave a guarantee to-morrow of their intention, if returned at an election, immediately to refer the whole constitutional and Parliamentary problem to a free and equal national convention, they would not be tying their hands for the future, they would only be announcing the inevitable conclusion of a far-sighted view of the problem. But they would at the same time have undermined the whole moral fabric upon which the Coalition now rests, and have done the one thing within their power and consistent with their honour to avert the appalling catastrophe of civil war.

INDEX

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TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTIETH VOLUME OF THE
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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