was appointed before July 7th, 1919, may elect to have the benefit of such exemption from taxation, instead of any increase in salary that he would otherwise be entitled to.

By section 12 a new section has been added to "The Judges' Act," sub-section 2 of which is as follows:(2) Every Judge who may be nominated for the purpose by the Governor in Council or the LieutenantGovernor in Council, shall execute without additional remuneration, any commission or enquiry for which he may be appointed as commissioner under the authority in that behalf exercisable by the Governor in Council or the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, including the discharge of the duty of arbitrator in any case in which he may be named to act by the competent authority. Provided, however, that any such Judge while acting as commissioner or arbitrator at the nomination of the Governor in Council shall be entitled to his moving or transportation expenses and living allowance at the rate and upon the conditions provided by section 18 of this Act, and such Judge when employed under the authority of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council may be paid by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council his moving or transportation expenses and a living allowance not exceeding the amount he would be entitled to under the said section 18." (See a lengthy article on "Judges and Royal Commissions," by J. B. Coyne, K.C., of Winnipeg, in THE CANADIAN LAW TIMES, Volume 37, pp. 416 to 437.)

Apparently the above provision does not apply to the case of an appointment of a Judge as arbitrator by private individuals, against which there is no direct prohibition, as there is in England. Neither presumably does it affect section 5 of the Ontario Act, 1919, which, after providing for the amount of fees to be paid to County and District Judges, contains the following provision in sub-section (4):-" Nothing in the foregoing sub-sections shall apply to or affect the payment of any allowance or fees to the Judge of any County or District Court . . in the performance of

his duties as an arbitrator or referee under the Municipal Act, the Public Works Act, the Ontario Railway Act, the Arbitration Act, or any other statute designating him by his name of office as an arbitrator or referee."

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As regards the fees payable to the Judges under the Ontario Act of 1919, and which I discussed in THE CANADIAN LAW TIMES in May, 1919, I therein expressed doubt as to whether sub-section (5) of section 5 that Act preserved to junior Judges in districts, the benefit of the provision of $500 per annum contained in section 17 of The County Judges' Act." I am, however, informed by the Deputy Attorney-General that "the present practice is that the junior Judge receives what was paid him before the said Act came into force." The wording of this sub-section is by no means clear, in which respect it does not differ from several other provisions of that Act, but fortunately for these Judges, it has been officially interpreted in their favor. I might add that the whole Statute bears evidence of haste and lack of care, indicating that it was hurriedly put together to meet the demand of the Federal Government for a decrease of the number of County Judges, as a condition precedent to the increase of salaries. I consider that it was unwise for the late Government to have brought that Act into force by proclamation before it had been revised and simplified, and I doubt whether they would have done so, if they were not going out of office. I trust that the present Attorney-General will be able to give it his attention next session.

Ottawa.

M. J. GORMAN.

Some one has said that the whole establishment of King, Lords and Commons, and all the laws and statutes of England, have for their one great object the bringing of twelve men into a jury-box. From a practical standpoint, the statement is not an exaggeration. Governments are instituted for the purpose of securing and perpetuating the inalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and both in this country and in England the twelve men in the Jury box are the great Court of Appeal, for the humblest as well as the most exalted, when any of those rights are violated or assailed.

Trial by Jury is not only the distinguishing feature of our legal fabric, as compared with that of other nations, but it is the crowning masterpiece of our jurisprudence. Evolved through the weary length of many centuries, and gradually superseding older forms of trial that were far more popular in the earlier periods of their contemporary existence, it has developed into an institution of marvelous efficiency, and is regarded by many as the apotheosis of the judicial investigation and determination of disputes.

The Jury system appeals with peculiar force to the great masses of the common people. To them, it is something more than a mere means for enforcing criminal statutes and settling private controversies. Inspired by the rich heritage of the common law, and by the history of the long struggle of the English people for civil liberty, they revere the jury organization as the very Ark of the covenant, which not only contains the Tables of the Law, but brings those laws down to the level of their own comprehension, and makes them speak, so far as their interpretation and execution is concerned, through the voice of the "country-side," the voice of the people themselves. Trial by Jury, therefore, is justly prized as the corner

stone of our free institutions. It shields individual rights from the encroachment of governmental power; it imbues the ordinary citizen with the principles of magistracy, and gives him an important part in the administration of governmental affairs; and it makes the people of a state the keepers of the conscience of the laws of that state, for a law can only be enforced according to their conception of its justice, goodness and moral strength. But above all, the Jury system is especially dear to the heart of the masses, because service on the jury is the simple but transfiguring ceremony in which the shoulder of every citizen, whatever the accident of his birth or station, tingles with the accolade of that matchless precept of the law that all men are born free, equal and independent.

It is an interesting fact that while trial by Jury is the pride of the English Law, and is esteemed by the people as the palladium of their liberties, it is, in its origin, not English, but Frankish, not popular but royal. The development of the jury furnishes one of the most conspicuous instances in history of the gradual transformation of the offensive sword of royal prerogative into the defensive excaliber of popular rights.

When Charlemagne had wearied of Conquest, after making himself the master of almost the whole of continental Europe, he undertook the higher emprise of constructive statesmanship, and it was his genius in this respect, rather than as a soldier, that made his life an epoch in universal history. The means employed by him for keeping in touch with local conditions throughout his vast dominions was the germ which, through the slow process of political evolution, eventually expanded into trial by jury. The plan was to send commissioners at stated intervals to every community in the realm, whose duty it was to procure full information from the inhabitants of all matters pertaining to the administration of public affairs. The connection between these commissioners and the jury may be attenuated, but it is none the less real.

After the death of Charlemagne, the part of his empire which lay west of the Rhone and the Meuse, then occupied by the Franks and destined to become France, was allotted to his second son, Charles. He and the Frankish kings who succeeded him accomplished so little of note that it might be said of them, as Napoleon said of the Merovingians, "What an effort for half a page of History!" And yet, they contributed an important process in the evolution of trial by jury. This was through the development of the inquisito, or the Inquest of twelve men in each community who were compelled to furnish on oath the same information which, under the system inaugurated by Charlemagne, itinerant commissioners had formerly been appointed to obtain.

The inquisition was a very vigorous and searching exercise of kingly power. The practice was to summon together by public authority a group of people who were most likely, as neighbors, to know and tell the truth, and to call for their answer under oath. The inquest, which was really a jury of twelve men, was required to declare what rights the king had or ought to have in the district; what lands belonged to him, and what return he should receive from them; and what services were due from the inhabitants to the crown. The inquest was also required to inform the king whether any of his officers were guilty of misconduct, and whether there had been any murders, robberies or other crimes which threatened the King's peace, and, if so, what parties were suspected of them. In these and similar matters of public administration, the Frankish king placed himself outside the formalism of the old folk-law, and claimed, as a royal prerogative, the right to rely on the verdict of neighbors, instead of on the battle, or on trial by ordeal.

It must not be imagined, however, that the Frankish inquisition, though the parent of trial by jury, had any connection with the ordinary procedure of the Frankish courts. Those courts knew only such antique modes of trial as the battle, the ordeal, and the