before the end of the term; and the term was yet existent; and that clause 13 above only affected the Lessee's rights at the end or other sooner determination.

On Appeal this was unanimously reversed; and it was held that clause 13 operated to deprive the Lessee of the right to remove Trade Fixtures.

The rule of Law applicable to the subject as laid down in Clunie v. Wood.19 was cited and relied upon by the Court of Appeal; and it also explained Lambourn v. McLellan,20 which at first sight appeared to be contradictory, but was on closer examination quite in harmony with Clunie v. Wood.

Beneficiaries taking as Joint Tenants or Tenants in

Common.

Partridge v. Hoare-Ward is the case of a devise and bequest of property upon Trust "for all and every the brothers and sisters of Ellen Hoare living at the time of her death, the issue of any one or more of them who shall die to take his, her or their deceased parents' share." Then there was a power to the Trustees during the minority of any minor entitled to "pay or apply all or any part of the rents and profits or the dividends, interest and annual income arising from any property. . . to which such minor shall be entitled . . . in or towards the maintenance .. or advancement of such minor.”

It was held by Astbury, J., on the authority of L'Estrange v. L'Estrange,22 and Re Dunn,23 that a discretionary power of advancement was utterly incompatible with a joint tenancy, for that that power itself involves or implies the reduction of the several parts of the property into possession so as to make the individual advancement. Because "if a sum . . were advanced to one child it would be right to debit

19 1868, L. R. 3 Ex. 257; 1869, L. R. 4 Ex. 328, 329.

20 1903, 2 Ch. 268.

21 (1920), 1 Ch. p. 334.

22 1902, 1 I. R. 467.

23 (1916), 1 Ch. 97.

that sum against his or her share, and that debit could not be worked out if the beneficiaries were joint tenants, and could only be done if they were tenants in common."

So that is the rule of construction.

Other cases referred to were: Robertson v. Frazer,2* In re Woolley.25

Gift to Specified Persons or their Heirs.

In Re Whitehead v. Whitehead,20 it was held that as by section 28 of the Wills Act, 1837, a devise of real estate without words of limitation is effectual to pass the whole estate and interest, the words "or their heirs" were to be given their natural substitutionary meaning, and were not as before the Act to be construed as words of limitation.

A useful restatement and review is made by Sergeant, J., of the Law both before and since the Wills Act and he adopts the views expressed on the subject by Hawkins, Jarman and Theobald, though there are apparently contradictory cases such as Read v. Snell" and Wingfield v. Wingfield, Harris v. Davis," and in Re Clerke.30

These however are fully explained, and harmonized by the present decision which admirably states the Law; and the decision is valuable in Canada to show that the forced construction of the disjunctive "or" into "and" can not in future be relied upon as it had been formerly; and instead of turning "or" into "and" as a limitation of an Estate to the first beneficiary, in future they would be deemed words of purchase to the substitutionary heirs in case of the death of the original beneficiary.

24 L. R. 6 Ch. 696.

25 (1903), 2 Ch. 206.

26 1920, L. J. R. Ch. p. 155.

27 2 Atk. 642.

28 47 L. J. Ch. 768, and 9 Ch. D. 658.

291 Coll. C. C. 416.

30 (1915), 84 L. J. Ch. 807, and 2 Ch. 301.

Solicitor's Neglect-Statutory Limitation.

An important case for Solicitors is Fletcher v. Jubb,31 where the Court of Appeal has laid down a rigid rule of conduct and liability for them. It was a case of damages for negligence through a collision of the Plaintiff's waggon with a tram-car of the Bradford Corporation.

There is a City Act limiting actions for negligence to six months after the event. The Solicitors were instructed to apply for compensation. They did so. Some negotiations ensued and Defendants made to them an offer of compromise. They transmitted this to the Plaintiff asking for further instructions. No reply was received for months. During this period the six months limit of time was running out. Once the Solicitors reminded their client of their letter asking for instructions. The Solicitors did not, however, apprize their client of this limit of time; and it ran out before the Plaintiff replied to their letter asking instructions, and of course before the action was brought. Then the Corporation relied on this statutory defence, though it had been virtually waived by the negotiations which admitted the claim, in esse, but disputed it only as to the amount. The Solicitors no doubt were misled by this attitude and Judge Lawrence on the first trial held they were not guilty of negligence, seeing that they had in ample time for an action asked for instructions and got none.

The Court of Appeal has reversed this and laid it down:

(1) That it was the duty of the Solicitors to know this limit of time;

(2) To guard against its lapse by apprising the plaintiff of it;

(3) That they should not have contemplated the Plaintiff's claim from any attitude other than that of ultimate proceedings, and the necessity of bringing them within 6 months.

31 89 L. J. K. B. 237.

It certainly looks an extreme case; for so far as the report shows, the Solicitors were not instructed to sue till after the 6 months had expired. Their first instructions were to make a claim and negotiate; and when they did this and got an offer they sent it forward and asked for further instructions, which they did not get till after the six months' period had expired. See Colonial Securities v. Massey.32

Gaming Debts.

33

Dey v. Mayo is a most important case, for I do not think that gaming or gambling is unknown in Canada; and some of the Provinces at least are governed by the English Gaming Acts, while Ontario for instance has simply reproduced them as per R. S. O. 1914, c. 217.

Gaming debts are irrecoverable at law, and before 1835 any security for them was absolutely void. In that year it was enacted that instead of such security being void, it should be deemed to be given for an illegal consideration. This did not make any change as between the immediate parties; but it affected the rights of a bona fide holder or endorsee of the security without any knowledge or notice of the consideration for which it was given. And the Act of 1835 itself specially enacted (though this was no more than the effect of the change I have stated) that any Bill or Note or other security given for a gaming debt which was paid by the maker or giver to any Endorsee or holder other than the original payee, the money so paid should be deemed to be paid by the maker on account of the original payee and, as a debt due to him from such payee, recoverable by action. To restate this: (1) The original payee could not himself recover by action on the security, but if the giver of the security paid him the money was not recoverable back. (2) When the giver of the security paid a holder or endorsee of the security, other than the

original payee, he could recover what he paid from the original payee.

Now the case of Dey v. Mayo was a case of cheques given for Gaming debts. They were endorsed by the payee and paid into the Bank to the credit of his wife's account. When presented to the maker they were honoured or paid, and he sued the original payee for the amount under the section of the Gaming Act, 1835, to which I refer.

The Trial Judge held the account of the wife was the account of the husband, the payee, so that the maker had paid the payee himself and could not recover the amount.

On Appeal this was unanimously reversed, the Court holding that the Bank was endorsee and holder of the cheques and the money was paid to it, and as such was recoverable.

It laid down this: That the holder, under the Act, was any person other than the original payee who was in physical possession of the security, whether he knew or did not know the nature of the security.

34

The Cases cited were: Lynn v. Bell, Golding v. Bradshaw, Nicholas v. Evans.38

35

This is the concentration of 12 pages of a Law Report.

Sale of Goods-C. I. F. Contract.

Wilson Holgate Co. v. Belgian Grani, is an important mercantile case. It was what is known as a C. I. F. Contract, which provided that payment was to be made "net cash in London against shipping documents on arrival of goods at port of discharge." The question arose: What were the necessary shipping documents.

The buyers refused to accept the documents tendered because they did not contain a Policy of Insur

34 Ir. R. 10 C. L. 493.

35 (1919), 2 K. B. 238.

36 (1913), 83 L. J. K. B. 301.

37 89 L. J. K. B. 300.