reinforcements to the forces under his immediate command, from the victorious troops of the north. He therefore deputed one of his aids, Colonel Alexander Hamilton, to wait on General Gates, and communicate his wishes to that officer. In his letter of instructions to Hamilton, General Washington writes as follows, under date of October 30, 1777 :— "It has been judged expedient by the members of a council of war held yesterday, that one of the gentlemen of my family should be sent to General Gates, in order to lay before him the state of this army, and the situation of the enemy, and to point out to him the many happy consequences that will accrue from an immediate reinforcement being sent from the northern army. I have thought proper to appoint you to that duty, and desire that you will immediately set out for Albany. "What you are chiefly to attend to is, to point out to General Gates the absolute necessity that there is for his detaching a very considerable part of the army, at present under his command, to the reinforcement of this; a measure that will, in all probability, reduce General Howe to the same situation in which General Burgoyne now is, should he attempt to remain in Philadelphia. "I have understood that General Gates has already detached Nixon's and Glover's brigades to join General Putnam.* If this be a fact, you are to desire General Putnam, to send the two brigades forward with the greatest expedition, as there can be no occasion for them there." To the president of Congress, Washington also wrote on the first of November as follows: "I can not conceive that there is any object, now remaining, that demands our attention and most vigorous efforts so much as the destruction of the [British] army in this quarter. Should we be able to effect this, we shall have little to fear in future." And on the seventeenth of November, he wrote to the same functionary thus: "I am anxiously waiting the arrival of the troops from the northward, who ought to have been here before this. The want of these troops has embarrassed all my measures exceedingly." Instead of promptly seconding the desires of Washington, when com municated to them by Hamilton, Generals Gates and Putnam were unwilling to part with a sufficient number of the troops under their respective commands to effect the object designed. The former general was then contemplating an expedition to Ticonderoga, and the latter an attack on the British forces in New York. After considerable delay, those generals, at the urgent request of Colonel Hamilton, finally sent on about five thousand men to the aid of General Washington; but in the meantime, Sir Henry Clinton, who commanded the British forces stationed at the city of New York, detached about six thousand men to the aid of General Howe in Philadelphia. Thus, will it be seen, that the well-formed plans of General WashingGeneral Putnam then commanded the troops on the Hudson river, below the Highlands. ton, to follow up the capture of the British army under Burgoyne, by that of the forces under Howe, were frustrated by the want of cordial cooperation on the part of Gates and Putnam. Had Washington succeeded. by their prompt aid in effecting his purposes at Philadelphia, he would doubtless have moved upon New York, and by an attack upon that city, with the whole American forces, have either compelled the surrender of the forces under Sir Henry Clinton, or the evacuation by them of that point; and thus the campaign of 1777 would have been closed by a succession of American victories and British reverses, from which the latter could not have recovered. Is it too much to say, that in that event, Great Britain would have sought for peace in 1778, as she did afterward in 1782, and that the American alliance with France, would have thus been rendered unnecessary? This view is confirmed by the correspondence of Washington, who evidently was of opinion that a protracted war for years was unnecessary. In a letter to John Parke Custis, dated, February 28, 1781, more than three years after the fall of Philadelphia, he says, "We have brought a cause, which might have been happily terminated years ago by the adoption of proper measures, to the very verge of ruin," &c. The following extract of a letter from Washington to Patrick Henry, dated November 13, 1777, soon after the British had entered Philadelphia, throws farther light upon the state of affairs at this period; and shows particularly that Washington's army had been weakened by reinforcements sent to the aid of General Gates. "I was left to fight two battles, in order if possible to save Philadelphia, with less numbers than composed the army of my antagonist, while the world has given us double. "How different is the case in the northern department. There the states of New York and New England, resolving to crush Burgoyne, continued pouring in their troops till the surrender of that army. Had the same spirit pervaded the people of this and the neighboring states, we might before this time have had General Howe nearly in the situation of General Burgoyne. "My own difficulties in the course of the campaign have been not a little increased by the extra aid of continental troops which the gloomy prospect of our affairs, immediately after the reduction of Ticonderoga,* induced me to spare from this army." The campaign of 1777 having closed, Washington communicated in general orders his intention of retiring with his army into winter-quarters. He expressed to his officers and soldiers his high approbation of their past conduct; gave an encouraging statement of the prospects of the country, and exhorted the men to bear the hardships inseparable from their condition. Valley Forge, about twenty miles northwest from Philadelphia, was selected by Washington for the winter-quarters of the Ticonderoga was taken by Burgoyne, on the 5th of July, 1777. * army. This position was preferred to distant and more comfortable villa ges, as being calculated to give security to the country from the enemy. In the latter end of December, the troops were compelled to build huts for their own accommodation, and during the winter, which was unusually severe, their sufferings were great, from want of both clothing and food, Washington was compelled to make seizures from the inhabitants, as he was authorized by Congress to do, for the sustenance of his army. The commander-in-chief and his principal officers sent for their wives, from the different states to which they belonged, to pass the winter with their husbands at headquarters. To the other vexations and troubles which crowded on General Washington at this time, was added one of a peculiar nature. This was the formation of a cabal among members of Congress, and a few officers in the northern division of the army, the object of which was to supersede him in the command of the army, or to induce his resignation. This intrigue is known in American history under the name of Conway's cabal. Generals Gates, Mifflin, and Conway, are the only officers of note who were known to have been engaged in it. The former of these generals was proposed to supersede Washington. of war was created by Congress, of which General Gates was appointed president. About the same time a board These machinations did not abate the ardor of Washington in the common cause. His patriotism was too solid to be shaken, either by envy or ingratitude. Nor was the smallest effect produced in diminishing his wellearned reputation. Zeal the most active, and services the most beneficial, and at the same time disinterested, had riveted him in the affections of his country and the army. Even the victorious troops under Gen. Gates, though comparisons highly flattering to their vanity, had been made between them. and the army in Pennsylvania, clung to Washington as their political savior. The resentment of the people was generally excited against those who were supposed to be engaged in, or friendly to, the scheme of appointing a new commander-in-chief over the American army. The sufferings of the army while encamped at Valley Forge, are memmorable in the history of the war. They were not only greatly in want of the necessary supplies of food, but of blankets and clothing. "Naked and starving as they are," says Washington in one of his letters, "we can not enough admire the incomparable patience and fidelity of the soldiery, that they have not been ere this excited by their sufferings, to a general mutiny and desertion." Although the officers were better provided than the soldiers, yet none were exempt from privations and hardships. When the encampment was begun at Valley Forge, the whole number of men in the field was 11,098, of whom 2,898, were unfit for duty," being barefoot and otherwise naked." Much of the suffering of the army was * Ramsay. attributed to mismanagement in the quartermaster's department; while reforms on this subject were proposed in Congress, the distresses of the troops approached their acme. General Washington found it necessary to interpose his personal exertions to procure provisions from a distance. In a few days the army was rescued from the famine with which it had been threatened. It was perceived that the difficulties which had occurred, were occasioned more by the want of due exertion in the commissary department, and by the efforts of the people to save their stock for a better market, than by a real deficiency of food in the country. The impression made on the British nation by the capitulation of Burgoyne, at length made its way into the cabinet, and Lord North brought into parliament two bills, which were adopted, having conciliation for their object. The first surrendered the principle of taxation, and the second empowered the crown to appoint commissioners to treat for peace with the United States. This movement was prompted by the apprehension that France would acknowledge the independence of America, and join in the war against England. The terms held out by these bills were such as would have been accepted by the Americans in the early stages of the controversy, but they now came too late. It was no part of the plan of the British ministers to treat with the American states as an independent power. They were to go back to their old condition as colonies, favored with certain privileges; but having declared their independence, and shed their blood, and expended their means to sustain it, these new offers of the British government were not likely to gain the confidence or change the sentiments of those who had taken the lead in the cause of American liberty. Washington, in a letter to a member of Congress, after he had learned the purport of the conciliatory bills, expresses himself thus: "Nothing short of independence, it appears to me, can possibly do. A peace on other terms would, if I may be allowed the expression, be a peace of war. The injuries we have received from the British nation were so unprovoked, and have been so great and so many, that they can never be forgotten. Our fidelity as a people, our gratitude, our character as men, are opposed to a coalition with them as subjects, but in case of the last extremity." The subject appeared in the same light to Congress, and they unanimously resolved, that no advances on the part of the British government would be met, unless, as a preliminary step, they either withdrew their armies and fleets, or acknowledged, unequivocally, the independence of the United States. On the second of May, 1778, ten days after Congress had passed their resolves respecting Lord North's bill of conciliation, a messenger arrived in the United States, bearing treaties of amity, commerce, and alliance, between France and America, signed at Paris, on the sixth of February, 1778, by which the independence of the United States was formally ac knowledged by the former power. This intelligence was received with joy by the Americans, and the army participated in the rejoicings of the people on the occasion, and a day was set apart by the commander-inchief for a public celebration in camp. The British kept possession of Philadelphia through the winter and the spring following; and although Washington's camp was within twenty miles of the city, yet no enterprise was undertaken to molest him in his quarters. Foraging parties were sent out, and committed depredations on the inhabitants; but they were watched by the Americans, who sometimes met them in fierce and bloody rencontres. The British army in New York and Philadelphia, amounted to nearly thirty thousand, of which number 19,500 were in Philadelphia, and 10,400 in New York. There were besides 3,700 at Rhode Island. The American army on the eighth of May, 1778, did not exceed 15,000 men, including the detachments on the North river, and at other places. The number at Valley Forge was 11,800. The new establishment agreed upon by a committee of Congress at Valley Forge, was to consist of forty thousand continental troops, besides artillery and horse; but it was not supposed by a council of war, held on the eighth of May, that it could soon be raised higher than twenty thousand effective men, while the British army in the middle and eastern states, amounted, as above stated, to upward of thirty-three thousand.* Sir William Howe, having at his own request been recalled, resigned the command of the British army to Sir Henry Clinton, and embarked for England. About the same time, orders were received for the evacuation of Philadelphia. The great naval force of France rendered that city a dangerous position, and determined the British cabinet to withdraw their army from the Delaware. On the morning of the eighteenth of June, Philadelphia was evacuated by the British army, which crossed the Delaware, and landed on Gloucester point. Their line extended nearly twelve miles, and as they were encumbered with numerous wagons, and compelled to stop and build bridges over the streams in their route, their progress was slow. It was the first purpose of Sir Henry Clinton to proceed to the Raritan, and embark his troops at Brunswick, or South Amboy, for New York, but finding Washington with his army in motion in that direction, he turned to the right and took the road leading to Monmouth and Sandy Hook. A council of war, called by Washington, to discuss the best mode of attacking the enemy on their march, was divided in opinion. Gen. Lee and others advising to avoid a general battle, but to harass the enemy upon flank and rear. Washington determined to act according to his own judgment, and sent forward a detachment to commence an attack, while he with the rest of the army followed to support the advance corps. Sir Henry Clinton, with the British army encamped near Monmouth court |