lative situation of the two armies, on the 22d of August, 1808, it is your opinion that an armistice was advisable, and if so, whether the terms of that armistice were such as ought to have been agreed upon; and whether upon a like consideration of the relative situation of the two armies subsequent to the armistice, and when all the British forces were landed, it is your opinion that a convention was advisable, and if so, whether the terms of that convention were such as ought to have been agreed upon.I am the more desirous that you should resume the consideration of these two points, the armistice and convention, as it appears upon the face of your report, that a differApprove. Lt.-gen. Nicolls. Lt.-gen. Sir G. Nu

gent.

Earl of Pembroke.
Lord Heathfield.

General Craig.

Gen. Sir D. Dundas.
Approve.
Lt.-gen. Sir G. Nu-
gent.

Gen. Lord Heathfield.
General Craig.
Gen. Sir D. Dundas.

(Signed)

ence of opinion exists among the members of the board, which may probably produce a dissent from the majority upon these very questions. You will be pleased, there. fore, to desire such of the members as may be of a different opinion from the majority upon these two ques. tions, to record upon the face of the proceedings their reasons for such dissent, I am, Sir, yours, (Signed) FREDERICK, "Commander in Chief. General Sir D. Dundas, K. B.

The board met this day at the judge-advocate-general's office, when the said letter having been read, they agreed that the follow. ing questions should be put to each of the members of the board: Disapprove. Earl of Moira,

My reason for considering the armistice as advisable on the 22d of August was, because the enemy had been able to retire after the battle of the 21st, and take up a strong defensive position.

OL. NICOLLS, L. G.

I think, considering the great increase of our force from the first suspension of hostility to the definitive signing of the convention,

Disapprove, Lt.-gen. Nicolls. Earl of Pembroke, Earl of Moira,

DAVID DUNDAS, President. added to the defeat the enemy had suffered, sir II. Dalrymple was fully entitled to have insisted upon more favourble terms.

OL. NICOLLS, L. G.

I approve of the armistice, after a due consideration of the relative situations of the two armies on the evening of the 22d of August, but I cannot fully approve of the whole of the convention, after a due con, sideration

sideration of the relative situation of the two armies at that time; because it does not appear to me that, in the progress of the negociation, sufficient stress was laid upon the great advantages which had resulted, or were likely to result, from the former successful operations of the British army in the field-from the considerable reinforcements which had joined it, subsequent to the commencement of the negociation-from the cause in which the British army was engaged being the cause of Portugal, which gave good reason to reckon upon the good will, if not upon the active assistance, of the majority of the inhabitants; and also, from the unusual readiness which, as it appears to me, was manifested by general Junot to enter into negocia tion, and by the French negociator to accede to terms as they were proposed, and to such construction as lieut.-gen. sir Hew Dalrymple put upon them in some instances, where they might have borne a dif ference of interpretation. I therefore think it probable, for the above reasons, that if less favour. able terms to the French army had been insisted upon, they would have been acceded to.

PEMBROKE, Lieut..gen,

I feel less awkwardness in obey. ing the order to detail' my senti. ments on the nature of the convention, because that I have already joined in the tribute of applause due in other respects to the officers concerned. My opinion, therefore, is only opposed to theirs on a question of judgment, where their talents are likely to have so much more weight, as to render the profession of my difference, even

on that point, somewhat painful. The duty is, however, imperious on me not to disguise or qualify the deductions which I have made during this investigation.-An armi. stice simply might not have been objectionable, because sir Hew Dalrymple, expecting hourly the arrival of sir John Moore's division, might see more advantage for himself in a short suspension of hostilities, than what the French could draw from it; but as the armistice involved,, and in fact esta blished the whole principle of the convention, I cannot separate it from the latter.-Sir A. Wellesley has stated, that he considered "his force, at the commencement of the march from the Mondego river, as sufficient to drive the French from their positions on the Tagus. That force is subsequently joined by above 4000 British troops, under generals Anstruther and Ackland. The French make an attack with their whole disposable strength, and are repulsed with heavy loss, though but a part of the British army is brought into action. to conceive that the prospects which sir A. Wellesley entertained could be unfavourably altered by these events, even had not the certainty of speedy reinforcements to the British army existed-It is urged, that had the French been pushed to extremity, they would have crossed the Tagus, and have protracted the campaign in such a manner as to have frustrated the more important view of the British generals-namely, sending succours into Spain. -This measure must have been equally feasible for the French if no victory had been ob. tained over them; but I confess that the chance of such an attempt

S 4

It is difficult

seems

bility. Sir Hew Dalrymple notices what he calls the critical and embarrassed state of Junot," before that general has been pressed by the British army: and, in explana. tion of that expression, observes, that the surrender of Dupont, the existence of the victorious Spanish army in Andalusia, which cut off the retreat of the French in that direction, and the universal hosti, lity of the Portuguese, made the situation of Junot one of great distress. No temptation for the translation of the war into Alentejo presents itself from this picture; nor does any other representation give ground to suppose that Junot could have contemplated the mea. sure as holding forth any prospect but ultimate ruin, after much pre. Jiminary distress and disgrace. The strongest of all proofs as to Ju. not's opinion, arises from his sending the very morning after the battle of Vimeira, to propose the evacu-. ation of Portugal; a step which sufficiently indicated that he was satisfied he could not only make no effectual defence, but could not even prolong the contest to take the chance of accidents. He seems, indeed, to have been without any real resource. It appears in evidence, that of the troops left by him in Lisbon and the forts, a considerable proportion were of very doubtful quality. Those troops on whose fidelity he could confide, had been dismayed by a signal defeat, and they were sensible that they had no succour to look to from abroad. To the British generals it was known, when the armistice was granted, that 10,000 men under sir J. Moore, as well as the 3d and 428 regiments of foot, with the 18th

reckoned upon; and although much advantage had not been drawn from the Portuguese troops, their support and the general vio, lence of the country against the French, cannot be laid out of this calculation.

The disparity of force and of circumstances was, then, such as could leave no doubt that the issue must be favourable to us. I do not omit advertence to the difficulties urged as possible to occur in furnishing the British army with bread. But, putting aside the obvious solution, that such a temporary privation is not ruinous to an army where cattle can be procured in the country, this difficulty can.. not be well pleaded, if admission is to be given to the speculation, that the heavy cannon necessary for battering forts St. Julien and Calcaes were to be got ashore in the Bays of the Rock of Lisbon. The question then comes to this: whether the convention did (as has been asserted) secure all the objects which were proposed in the expedition? If it did not, it was not what his majesty was entitled to expect from the relative situation of the two armies.

I humbly conceive it to have been erroneous to regard the eman. cipation of Portugal from the French, as the sble or principal object of the expedition. Upon whatever territory we contend with . the French, it must be a promi nent object in the struggle to destroy their resources, and to narrow their means of injuring us, or those whose cause we are supporting. This seems to have been so little considered in the convention, that the terms appear to have extricated

extricated Junot's army from a situation of infinite distress, in which it was wholly out of play, and to have brought it, in a state of entire equipment, into immediate cur. rency, in a quarter too where it must interfere with our most urgent and interesting concerns.

Had it been impracticable to reduce the French army to lay down its arms unconditionally, still an obligation not to serve for a specified time, might have been insisted upon, or Belleisle might have been prescribed as the place at which they should be landed, in order to prevent the probability of their reinforcing (at least for a long time) the armies employed for the subju. gation of Spain. Perhaps a stronger consideration than the merit of those terms presents itself. Opi

nion relative to the British arms was of the highest importance, as it might influence the confidence of the Spaniards, or invite the nations groaning under the yoke of France, to appeal to this country, and co-operate with it for their deliverance. The advantages ought, therefore, to have been more than usually great, which should be deemed sufficient to balance the ob.. jection of granting to a very inferior army, hopeless in circumstances, and broken in spirit, such terms as might argue, that notwith standing its disparity in numbers, it was still formidable to its victors. No advantages seemed to have been gained that would not have equally followed from forcing the enemy to a more marked submission. The gain of time as to sending succours into Spain cannot be admitted as a plea, because it appears that no arrangements for the reception of

our troops in Spain had been un. dertaken previous to the conven tion; and this is without reasoning op subsequent facts. The convention in Egypt, which has been ad vanced as a parallel case, appears to me inapplicable. No object be yond the dislodgment of the French from Egypt was there in question, In the present instance, the operation of the convention upon the affairs of Spain was a consideration of primary interest; and in that view the inevitable effect of some of the articles offers itself to my mind as liable to material objec tion. I trust that these reasons will vindicate me from the charge of presumption, in maintaining an opinion contradictory to that professed by so many most respectable, officers; for, even if the reasons be essentially erroneous, if they' are conclusive to my mind (as f must conscientiously affirm them to be), it is a necessary consequence, that I must disapprove the convention. MOIRA, General.

December 27, 1808.

Convention of Cintră.

THE following formal declara, tion of his majesty's disapprobation of the armistice and conven, tion in Portugal, has been officially communicated to sir Hew Dalrym. ple:

THE King has taken into his consideration the report of the board of enquiry, together with the documents and opinions thereunto annexed. While his majesty adopts the unanimous opinion of the board, that no farther military proceeding is necessary to be had upon the transactions referred to

their

their investigation, his majesty does not intend thereby to convey any expression of his majesty's satisfaction at the terms and conditions of

the armistice and convention.

When those instruments were first laid before his majesty, the king, reserving for investigation those parts of the definitive convention, in which his majesty's

immediate interests were concerned, caused it to be signified to sir Hew Dalrymple, by his majesty's secretary of state, that his majesty, nevertheless, felt himself compelled at once to express his disapproba. tion of those articles, in which stipulations were made, directly affecting the interests or feelings of the Spanish and Portuguese nations.

At the close of the enquiry, the king, abstaining from any observations upon any other parts of the convention, repeats his disapprobation of those articles; his majesty deeming it necessary that his sentiments should be clearly understood, as to the impropriety and danger of the unauthorised admis. sion, into military conventions, of articles of such a description, which, especially when incautiously framed, may lead to the most injurious consequences.

His majesty cannot forbear far. ther to observe, that licutenant-ge. neral sir Hew Dalrymple's delaying to transmit for his information the armistice concluded on 22d Au. gust, until the 4th September, when he, at the same time, trans. mitted the ratified convention, was calculated to produce great public inconvenience, and that such inconvenience did in fact result therefrom.

Bonaparte's Speech to the Cor

regidor of Madrid.

AN Address from the Corregidor and Magistracy of Madrid was presented to Bonaparte on the 9th December, 1808.

In this document the inhabitants are made to thank the conqueror for his clemency, and to solicit the favour of seeing king Joseph at Madrid. In his answer to this ap plication, Bonaparte makes his consent to depend upon the 30,000 citizens Madrid contains, making a declaration of their fidelity, and setting an example of submission to the provinces. By the 30,000 ci. tizens we suppose householders are meant, for the Moniteur states that registers had been opened at Madrid, and that 30.000 fathers of

families had rushed to them in crowds to sign the required suppli cation. The answer which Bonaparte returned to the address of the corregidor contains so many remarkable traits, that we think it necessary to give it at length, as it appears in the Paris papers, in the following terms:

"I am pleased with the senti. ments of the city of Madrid. I regret the injuries she has suffered, and am particularly happy that, under existing circumstances, Í have been able to effect her deliver ance, and to protect her from great calamities. I have hastened to adopt measures calculated to tranquillize all ranks of the citizens, knowing how painful a state of uncertainty is to all men collectively and individually. I have preserved the spiritual orders, but with a limitation of the number of monks. There is not a single intelligent per.