property that would otherwise be unmarketable"; also the redemption of Leaseholds, Lifeholds, and Mortgages; and to discharge rev. for immediate annu. Accident assu. and railway passengers' accident assu. granted. "Under T. specially computed, the directors will grant pol. not simply guar. compensation in the event of accident, and a fixed sum at death arising from accidental causes only, but connecting ordin. L. assu. with this highly important and extending branch of bus."

There was yet another batch of "advantages": Half-credit prems., Industrial Ins., Deposit Ins. "One life exchanged for another of equal or different value by arrangement." Protective assu. and whole-world licenses granted. Assu. against sickness, paralysis, blindness, insanity, and accident. "The D. of Sett. gives to the assu. in Scotland all the advantages offered by the Scotch offices; and by the alliance of the two systems, it is believed that a large and extensive bus. will accrue to this Asso." "Claims settled in the Colonies or at home." The cap. was to be returned to the shareholders "out of a fund created from the reservation of one-tenth of the surplus profits, as soon as the same shall double the subs. cap." Special T. had been prepared for ins. lives in the Colonies, and the East and West Indies.

The Asso. in fact became as it were smothered in the plethora of advantages it offered. Its man. did not know which branch to push first. Finally, after a lingering existence of about twelve months, it died out. The few pol. it had issued were taken over by the Emperor L. in 1857. CONSTITUTIONAL.-Inherent or bred in the constitution of the body or the mind; exercise for health; consistent with the fundamental laws.-Worcester.

CONSTITUTIONAL DISEASES.-These rank as Class II. in the Reg.-General's classification of the causes of death. They are divided into two orders-Diathetic and Tubercular; these again are subdivided into nine minor divisions. Dr. Farr says:

These diseases have this in common with zymotic diseases, that they are diffusive; they work changes in several parts of the organism, and it has recently been shown by Villemin [Gazette Hebdomadaire, 1865, p. 795] that human tubercle is, even when introduced by inoculation, capable of inducing tubercular deposits in the organs of animals. These experiments have been repeated, and the results are decisive. 28th Rep.

Again :

Constitutional diseases are of variable and uncertain seat. They are characterized by the production of matters, not its natural constituents, from the elements of the body, which they deteriorate or destroy. Cancer is a type. . . . . Mortification occurs still later in life, and is more fatal to men than to women. The Tubercular order occurs in some of its forms in early childhood. Then supervenes hydrocephalus, with tubercles on the brain and its membranes; or tabes mesenterica, with similar deposits in the mesenteric glands; or scrofula, with deposits in the bones and the integumentary system. Phthisis is the most fatal not only of this order, but of all the forms of disease. It is especially the disease of youth and early manhood.

This latter subject will be followed up under CONSUMPTION.

Dr. Farr says in 33rd R. of Reg. Gen.-returns for 1870-under "Constitutional Diseases":

These are very fatal forms of disease, by which the health of the pop. is greatly impaired; they are of long duration, and in their attacks very fatal; Cancer and Consumption are the typical forms of the two orders of this class, which was fatal to 88,766 in the year. It is the class of diseases especially attaching to men and women in their prime, eating up their full lives, as the canker eats the rose.

It was not the practice in the early days of life ins. to make specific inquiries regarding "Constitutional Disorders." A general declaration that the person proposing to be insured was in good health at the time of the ins. being granted was all that was required. This state of matters continued down to about 1780, when, in consequence of the numerous cases which had come before the Courts, of fraud or concealment in some form in relation to life ins., the practice of demanding more specific information became general. It has gone on now in this more exact form for nearly a century; and on the whole the more modern system works better than the more lax system of former times. [CONCEALMENT] [GOOD HEALTH.] [LIFE INS. PROPOSALS.] CONSTITUTIONAL DISEASES, DEATHS FROM. - The number of ann. deaths in this class in England varies but slightly, increasing with the pop. In 1858 they were 82,416; 1859, 81,788; 1860, 82,088; 1861, 84,987; 1862, 83,024; 1863, 84, 393; 1864, 87, 190; 1865, 88,504; 1866, 89,907; 1867, 89,423. For 15 years ending 1864, the average ann. deaths of this class to each 1 million living was 4368.

The deaths of 1867 were thus divided-males, 42,960; females, 46,463. Of the males 4490 died under 1 year and 9187 under 5; 1421 between 5 and 10; 3922 between 20 and 25; 4648 between 45 and 55; 2392 between 65 and 75; and 2 over 95. Of the females 3496 died under 1 year and 7687 under 5 years; 1307 between 5 and 10; 4394 between 20 and 25; 4880 between 45 and 55; 2814 between 65 and 75; and 15 over 95. CONSTITUTUM LEGIS ET CONSTITUTUM USUS.-The two statutes of Pisa, enacted respectively 1156 and 1160; the latter containing important rules of maritime law, which are quoted in this work.

CONSTRUCTION OF INS. CONTRACTS.-Where there is ambiguity in the terms of a pol. of ins., the maxim verba chartarum fortius accipiuntur contra proferentum (the words of an instrument shall be taken most strongly against the party employing them) applies as a rule of construction. This was specifically so held in the case of Notman v. Anchor Ins. Co. in 1858.

In the case of Tierney v. Etherington, 1743, Chief Justice Lee is reported to have said: "It is certain that in construction of pol., the strictum jus, or apex juris, is not to be laid hold on, but they are to be construed largely for the benefit of trade, and for the ins."

In the case of Jefferies v. Legandra, tried in the reign of William & Mary, and cited by Style, it was held,-A pol. of ins. is but a parol contract, and must be construed according to the minds of the parties, and not according to the strict sense of the words. This ruling we shall see has since been modified.

Lord St. Leonards, in the case of Anderson v. Fitzgerald (United Kingdom L.), 1853, said: "The Courts, observing how very often cos. of this nature have been subjected to frauds, will carefully guard them against fraud, and will give effect to any part of the contract which has this object. Nay, more, it is from the very advice given in the Courts of Law that the cos. have endeavoured to protect themselves, by those stringent provisions which we so usually find in pol. of ins. But, however severe the terms, there should be no ambiguity upon the instrument itself."

Arnould, writing upon the construction of pol. of marine ins. (3rd ed. 1866), says: The principles which govern the construction of sea-pol. do not vary from those applicable to all other mercantile instruments. The language of sea-pol. is frequently indeterminate, ambiguous, or technical. When this is so, parol evidence, as in the case of other contracts, is admissible to explain it. The language of sea-pol. is frequently incomplete as an expression of the meaning of the parties, because it is employed, and is understood so to be, with reference to the usages of trade. In this latter class of cases (and they are very numerous), the meaning of the contract embodied in a sea-pol., even where the language of the pol. is on the face of it unambiguous, may, nay must, be explained by parol evidence of those usages, a knowledge of which in such cases forms the only available key to the real intention of the parties.

In these cases "the question," says Lord Mansfield, "is, whether the usage has not explained the generality of the words. If it has, every man who contracts under a usage does it as if the point of usage were inserted in the contract in terms." The notion, however, which appears at one time to have prevailed (favoured unquestionably by certain reported expressions of the earlier Judges), that sea-pol. were not amenable to the rules of construction generally applicable to all other mercantile contracts, but were to be interpreted so as to carry out the assumed intentions of the parties, even though repugnant to the terms in which their intentions purported to be expressed on the face of the instrument, must now be regarded as erroneous. Parol evidence, whether of usage or otherwise, can in no case be admitted to contradict or materially vary the plain and express terms of a sea-pol. The same rule may now be said to apply to all other branches of ins. bus.

Mr. Bunyon, in his Law of Fire Ins., 1867, gives the following summary of the modern ruling in construction of ins. contracts:

In arriving at the meaning of any particular clause or expression, due weight must be given to the context, and if there has been any proposal in writing to the Co. for the ins. referred to in it, to the terms of that proposal, which may control or enlarge the words of the pol. itself; and of course the conditions will affect and modify the terms used in the body of the pol. It will be observed that it is the province of the Court to decide questions of construction, and thence as to the effect of the contract between the parties, although when a question arises as to the meaning of any particular term of a technical kind, or requiring the explanation of mercantile usage, on such points the jury must decide, and the Court will construe the pol. accordingly.

Further, it is a rule that where the written part of the pol. is inconsistent with the printed conditions, the former must prevail, inasmuch as the written words are the immediate language and terms selected by the parties themselves for the expression of their meaning, and the printed words are a general formula, adapted equally to their case and that of all other contracting parties upon similar occasions and subjects; but if possible a construction will be adopted which will reconcile both.

In the U.S., where, as we have elsewhere said, the contract of ins. is regarded with much more strictness than is usually the case in the U. K.,-that is to say, where the offices stand much more upon their strict legal rights,—there has been a series of most instructive decisions, some of which we proceed to notice.

In construing a pol., a particular description, which is clearly false, will be rejected in order to give effect to other descriptive words, when such words are sufficient to define the building intended to be described. In such a case the false description may be rejected as surplusage.-Heath v. Franklin Ins. Co., 1848.

Where a pol. provided that "if the assu. or his assigns shall hereafter make any other ins.," etc.:-Held, that the word "assigns" referred only to one who had acquired an int. in the property ins., and had the pol. assigned to him, with the consent of the Co.Holbrook v. American Ins. Co., 1852.

Where the by-laws prohibited the ins. from altering the building, and provided against any increase of risk, by the act of ins. :-Held, that the words "insured" and "assured" applied to the party whose interest was orig. ins., and not to a lessee under him, nor to a party to whom, in case of loss, the pol. was made payable.—Sandford v. Mechanics Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (Mass.), 1853.

In application for ins., in reply to questions as to distance of other buildings ins., "house and woodhouse connected. No other buildings within four rods except the icehouse." It appeared in evidence that in the rear of the ice-house was a small building, 3 feet high in rear, and 6 feet high in front, divided by a partition of boards, and called "hog-house" and "hen-house":-Held, that they were not buildings within the meaning of the application, and evidence as to the increase of risk from them was not competent. White v. Mutual Fire Assu. Co. (Mass), 1857.

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A pol. of ins., in respect to the rules by which it is to be construed, and the principles

by which it is to be governed, does not differ from other mercantile contracts. It is a contract of indemnity, and the right to that indemnity, vested by the contract, can be taken away only on principles alike applicable to other instruments of that character.— Miller v. Western Farmers Ins. Co. (Ohio), 1854.

An indorsement on a pol., of receipt of an add. prem. for "carpenter's risk," in extending a store-room adjacent to the building in which the property ins. was situated, cannot be construed into an engagement to ins. goods in the extended store-room, although a portion of the building orig. ins. was removed, and its place occupied by the extended store-room.-Lycoming County Ins. Co. v. Updegraff (Penn.), 1861.

The law of the relation between insurers and the assured is the pol. of ins., with all its clauses, conditions, and stipulations, by which their mutual rights and liabilities are defined and measured.- West Branch Ins. Co. v. Helfenstein (Penn.), 1861.

Where a pol. is entirely consistent with the terms of the application, free from ambiguity, and susceptible of a consistent construction in all its parts, although there be a mistake in the ins. effected not attributable to the insurers, the Court will not look beyond the terms of the pol. in ascertaining its meaning and legal effect.—Baltimore Fire Ins. Co., v. Loney (Ma.), 1862.

For a proper understanding of the rights and obligations of the parties to an ins. effected by a mut. ins. co., the charter of the co., a pol. issued by it, and the conditions annexed thereto, must be read together.-Hyatt v. Wait (N.Y.), 1862.

A vote by the directors of an ins. co., indefinitely to postpone the subject of a loss, will be construed as a refusal to allow anything on account of it.-Patrick v. Farmers Ins. Co. (N.H.), 1862.

A clause in a pol. of ins., that it should “cease at and from the time the property hereby ins. shall be levied on or taken into possession or custody under any proceeding at law or equity," is to be construed as meaning an actual levy and change of possession under it. A mere notice of levy by the officer charged therewith, to the defendants at their store, without his taking the goods ins. into possession or custody, though good as a levy, will not defeat the pol. —Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Berger (Penn.), 1862. So in the case of Philadelphia F. and L. Ins. Co. v. Mills (Penn.), 1863-a wrongful levy would not apply to such a condition.

Ambiguous words in a pol. of ins. may be construed by extrinsic evidence of accompanying circumstances, and the usages of the bus. in which property ins. was employed. New York Belting and Packing Co. v. Washington F. Ins. Co. (N.Ý.), 1863.

A clause in a F. pol. which provided that if gunpowder or other articles subject to legal restrictions should be kept in greater quantities or in a different manner than was provided by law, the pol. should be void :-Held, to have reference only to articles of an intrinsically dangerous nature, as liable to cause injury accidentally or by carelessness, and not to refer to liquors, the traffic in which was made illegal by statute.-Niagara F. Ins. Co. v. De Graff (Mich.), 1863.

Conditions and provisos in pol. of ins. are to be construed strictly against the underwriters, as they tend to narrow the range and limit the force of the principal obligation.— Hoffman v. Etna F. Ins. Co. (N.Y.), 1865.

Pol. of ins. are to be considered and construed as a whole, and particular clauses or passages are not to be wrested from their context, so as to destroy the unity of the contract, and create conflict where there should be agreement; but one part is to be elucidated by the other, so as to reconcile them, if practicable, to one common intent or design, present to the minds of the contracting parties.—Merchants Ins. Co. v. Edmond (Va.), 1866.

Where the underwriters have left their design doubtful by using obscure language, the construction will be most unfavourable to them.-Merrick v. Germania F. Ins. Co. (Penn.), 1867.

CONSTRUCTION OF MORT. TABLES.-See MORT. TABLES, CONSTRUCTION OF. CONSTRUCTIVE (from the Spanish constructivo).-In law, a matter of interpretation; something not expressed, but inferred; as constructive trust, constructive treason, CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSS, etc.

CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSS.-This term is used in the law of Marine Ins. to denote a loss which entitles the assured to claim the whole amount of his ins., on giving to the insurers notice of abandonment. Generally there is a constructive total loss when the subject-matter insured has not actually perished, or lost its form or species, but has, by one of the perils insured against, been reduced to such a state, or placed in such a position, as to make its total destruction, though not inevitable, yet highly imminent, or its ultimate arrival under the terms of the pol., though not utterly hopeless, yet exceedingly doubtful. In such a case the assured, by giving notice within a reasonable time to the assurers of abandonment, i.e. the relinquishment of all his right to whatever may be saved, is entitled to recover against them for a total loss. - Arnould.

In the 1st vol. of Assu. Mag. is a very interesting paper by Mr. Manley Hopkins, On the Doctrine of Constructive Total Loss.

The considerations attaching to this subject occupy a very wide range. deal with it in outline here.

We can only

A constructive total loss takes place when it may reasonably be construed or inferred from the disadvantageous circumstances in which property is placed, that it cannot be rescued from absolute total loss by any endeavour to repair the ship or continue the adventure, unless at a cost greater than the value of the property would become in the event of such expenditure being incurred. In illustration of this species of loss, we may refer to the common case of a vessel condemned and sold on account of her having sustained injuries so extensive that she is not worth the cost of repairs; or to the case of cargo landed at an intermediate port in such a sea-damaged condition, that if re-shipped and forwarded to its orig. destination, it would become entirely worthless before arrival. — McArthur.

We now note a few of the more recent cases.

In an action on a marine pol. for a constructive total loss, the defendant is entitled to an inspection of all papers in the possession of the plaintiff relative to the matters in issue, including letters between the captain and the plaintiff.—Raynor v. Ritson, 1865.

The case of Klingender v. Home and Colonial Assu. Co., in the Court of Exchequer, 1866, was an action on a pol. as for a total loss of freight, to be earned in carrying a cargo of coals from Rio to San Francisco. On the voyage the ship received damage from heavy seas, which compelled her to put into Monte Video, having previously, for safety's sake, thrown overboard some portion of her cargo, and landed another portion at the Falkland Islands. On the ship being surveyed at Monte Video, she was found to be incapable of pursuing the voyage with the cargo on board, and no other vessel could be found to take the cargo on. The cost of warehouse-room was so great at Monte Video, that in a few months it would have equalled the value of the cargo; and owing to the town being in a state of siege and political revolution, it was unsafe to land the cargo and leave it unwarehoused. Under these circumstances, the captain, being in want of money, sold the cargo, and applied the proceeds to the ship's purposes, and afterwards brought her back in ballast to Liverpool for repairs. At the trial the Judge left two questions to the jury-1. Was there a constructive total loss of the ship? 2. Was there a constructive total loss of the goods? The jury answered both questions in the negative :-Held, that there was no misdirection, and that the two questions submitted to the jury were, under the circumstances, proper for the determination of the case.

The rule is, that to entitle the insured to recover upon the pol., the loss must be the direct and immediate consequence of the peril ins. against, and not a remote one.

It appears to be a condition of constructive total loss, that notice must be given to the underwriters within a "reasonable time." Thus, in the case of Potter v. Rankin, 1868, an owner of a vessel chartered to sail from Glasgow to New Zealand with cargo, and there discharge; thence to proceed to Calcutta and load cargo, and therewith proceed to Lond.; effected a pol. on the chartered freight from Calcutta to Lond., to attach only during the preliminary voyage to New Zealand. The vessel received injuries in its voyage to New Zealand, which would have justified abandonment or sale, but neither took place within a reasonable time, and the owner partially repaired the vessel at New Zealand, and sailed it to Calcutta. No notice of the abandonment of freight was given within a reasonable time :-Held, that there was neither an actual nor a constructive total loss of the freight. [ABANDONMENT.] [CAPTURE.] CONSUL.-An officer appointed by competent authority to reside in foreign countries, to facilitate and extend the commerce carried on between the subjects of the country which appoints him and those of the country or place in which he is to reside. The office appears to have originated in Italy, about the middle of the 12th century, and was generally estab. all over Europe in the 16th century. [CONSULAR COURTS.]

British Consuls were formerly appointed by the Crown, upon the recommendation of great trading cos., or of merchants engaged in trade with a particular country and place. But they are now directly appointed by Gov., without requiring any such recommendation. The right of sending Consuls to reside in foreign countries depends either upon a tacit or express convention.

The office of "Conservator," created by an Act of the Scotch Parl. in 1503, appears analogous to that of the Brit. Consul.

Among the varied duties of British Consuls is that of claiming and recovering all wrecks, cables, and anchors belonging to British ships, found at sea by fishermen or other persons; to pay the usual salvage, and to communicate a report thereof to the Navy Board.-Mc Culloch's Com. Dict.

The Consuls and Vice-Consuls of Gt. Brit. are by enactment of 1806 (46 Geo. III. c. 98, s. 9) empowered to administer oaths in all cases respecting quarantine, in like manner as if they were magistrates of the several towns and places where they respectively reside. [QUARANTINE.] It is also laid down that a Consul is to attend, if requested, all arbitrations where property is concerned, between masters of British ships and the freighters, being inhabitants of the place where he resides. Consuls estab. in England have no judicial power.

In Turkey, and in Alexandria, English Consuls enjoy several peculiar privileges: among them that of holding Consular Courts. This right is conferred by ancient treaties, confirmed by that signed at the Dardanelles in 1809, wherein it is stipulated and agreed

upon-That if there happen any suit or other difference or dispute among the English themselves, the decision thereof shall be left to their own Ambassador or Consul, according to their custom, without the judge or other governors intermeddling therein. The Brit. Consular jurisdiction in Turkey is now regulated by Orders in Council.

In China Consular jurisdiction was estab. in 1845, after the first Chinese war; and is administered by a Consul General, subject (in certain cases) to the interposition of the Supreme Court of Hong-Kong.

The earliest notice as to Foreign Consuls exercising any control in regard to English commerce occurs in 1347, and is thus stated in Anderson's Hist. of Commerce: "In consequence of an application by the Consul of the Venetian merchants at Bruges, and an English merchant, the King now took all the merchants of Venice now trading in England, Ireland, and his other dominions, under his protection during one year.” CONSULAGE.-A duty or tax paid by merchants for the protection of their commerce in a foreign place.

CONSULAR COURTS are tribunals associated with the history of commerce in the Mediterranean. The first record we now have of them dates from A. D. 1162, when the Emperor Frederick, among other things, gave permission to the Genoese to have one or more of their citizens reside in every country to which they traded, in order to dispense justice according to his laws and good custom !

In 1283 Peter III. (the successor of James I.) created consular jurisdiction in Valencia, and he authorized these judges to pronounce: inter homines maris et mercatores, juxta consuetudinem maris, prout est in Barchinona, fieri consuetum.

In 1343 there were regulations for the procedure of these Courts; and one of such regulations was that the Consuls should judge after the written rules of the sea. [CONSOLATO DEL MARE.]

During the 14th century the decision of maritime disputes was separated from the ordinary jurisdiction, and special courts of the "Consuls of the Sea" were instituted by the King of Arragon at Barcelona, and in Valencia. They afterwards extended to Venice, Pisa, Genoa, etc. Ultimately, Courts of Appeal from the sentences pronounced by these Consuls were established; and thus their jurisdiction became tolerated.

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The origin of English Consular Courts in the East appears to date from 1485. We fall back upon Anderson, who considers it pretty certainly the first appointment of a consul for the merchants of England in any of the countries within the Mediterranean :" As some English merchants intended to trade to foreign countries, and especially Italy, with their own chartered vessels and their merchandize, King Richard, observing from the practice of other nations the advantage of having a magistrate appointed for settling disputes among them, and also understanding that the city of Pisa was most convenient for the residence of English merchants, he, at the request of the merchants trading, or intending to trade, to Pisa and the adjacent countries, appointed Lorenzo Strozzi, a merchant of Florence, to be Consul of the English merchants in those countries, and delegating to him the power of hearing and summarily determining all disputes between English subjects in those parts, and doing all other things pertaining to the office of a Consul.

The Ins. Ordin. of Philip II. of Spain, promulgated 1556, contains the follow passage: 1. We ordain and command that all underwriters of risks to and from the Indies, who declare that they sign for another person, either by virtue of his power or commission, shall first show the powers or commissions to the Prior and Consuls, that they may examine their validity, and if found sufficient, give the underwriters leave to sign; but they shall not grant this license if the powers or commissions are not satisfactory, and to their liking; and he that signs without shall incur a penalty of 20,000 maravedis, half for our Chamber, and half for the charges of the Consulado [Consular Court]; and authentic copies of the powers that shall be approved before a notary of the Contratacion House, or one of the Consulado, shall remain in the Consulado, according to custom.

Magens, reviewing this passage [in 1755], says:

It is known that ins. in those times were mostly practised at Antwerp, where the greatest number of wealthy merchants then resided, who, on shipping goods to foreign markets, used to send their own supercargoes or agents, furnished with letters of attorney, to act on behalf of their principals; and some might often be empowered to insure for their constituents' account, and others not; for which reason it seems this law prescribed that the powers should be lodged in, and approved of by, the Consular Court.

The Consular jurisdiction (which has descended to the present time), of one country over its merchants residing in another, has of late years caused much dissatisfaction; but it is difficult to see how, in the interests of Brit. commerce, Consular Courts can be suddenly abolished.

CONSULES MARIS.-A title which we owe to the Latinity of the Middle Ages, and by which the Judges of the Consular Courts were, in the 13th century, designated. In the 14th century the title of Tractatores Mercantia appears to have been substituted; and in the 15th century Officium Mercantiæ.

CONSULS OF THE SEA.-Judges of the Consular Courts estab. in the 14th century. [CONSULAR COURTS.]

CONSUMMATION OF CONTRACT.-Some very nice questions have from time to time

occurred regarding the completion or otherwise of contracts of Ins. It is of the utmost importance alike to the office and the insured to understand when the contract may be regarded as complete. We shall endeavour to illustrate this by means of a few caseschiefly from the U.S.

In the case of Christie v. North British Ins. Co., before the Courts of Scotland in 1825, the circumstances were as follow: S., desirous to insure his wire-mill, applied for