The reason being, that as in the latter case the owner receives no freight for the time during which the ship is detained, he does not owe the services of his crew during such time to the freighters, and his providing such service is, therefore, an extraordinary expenditure for the general benefit.-Arnould.

Emerigon considers that the detention of ships in port after declaration of war against the country to which they belong, or by way of reprisals, rather resembles a capture than an arrest. Marshall expresses the same view. [ARREST.] [CAPTURE.] [EMBARGO ] [PRIZES.]

DETERIORATED LIVES.-See DISEASED Lives.

DETERIORATION OF HUMAN RACE.-This subject will be noticed under HUMAN RACE. DETERMINABLE FREEHOLDS.-Estates for life, which may determine upon future contingencies before the life for which they are created expires. As if an estate be granted to a woman during her widowhood, or to a man until he be promoted to a benefice; in these and similar cases whenever the contingency happens-when the widow marries, or when the grantee obtains a benefice-the respective estates are absolutely determined and gone. Yet while they subsist they are reckoned estates for life; because the time for which they will endure being uncertain, they may by possibility last for life, if the contingencies upon which they are to determine do not sooner happen.-Blackstone's Commentaries. DETRITUS (from detero, to waste away).-The waste of a tissue or organ; that which remains after disorganization.

DEUCHAUR, DAVID, Joint Sec. and Act. of Edinburgh L. since 1869. He entered the Standard in 1858, and, after passing through the various departments of that office, he became, in 1866, Assistant Act. of the Caledonian. From that office he passed to his present position. This name is destined to become more familiar in Ins. circles. DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIES AND RACES.—This subject will be treated of under HUMAN RACE.

DEVELOPMENTAL DISEASES.-These stand as Class IV. in English Diseases.

They are

divided into four Orders-(1) Developmental Diseases of Children; (2) Developmental Diseases of Adults; (3) Developmental Diseases of Old People; (4) Diseases of Nutrition; and subdivided into nine forms, each of which we speak of under its separate head, viz. PREMATURE BIRTH; CYANOSIS; SPINA BIFIDA; MALFORMATIONS; TEETHING; PARAMENIA; CHILDBIRTH; OLD AGE; ATROPHY AND DEbility.

Dr. Farr says in 32nd Rep. of Reg.-Gen. pub. 1871 :

The reproduction and growth of the human race are interrupted in various ways, and the interruption proves fatal in a certain number of cases. The first order of fatal causes concerns children. Stillborn children are not regis., but many of the infants that are born before term are born alive, and some survive. In the year [1869] 8666 children born alive prematurely died, and are so returned, without any reference to any specific disease; 1454 deaths are referred to malformations. The teeth are cut with pain and difficulty, and in weakly children the consequent irritation is sometimes fatal; but it is prob. that some of the 4083 deaths referred to teething are due to latent causes at work during the period of teething. Of women, 122 are stated to have died of paramenia; while 2102 died of childbirth, exclusive of 1181 who died of metria.

The deaths of children will be fully considered under INFANT MORT. The deaths from CHILDBIRTH are already treated of. The following, from Dr. Farr's Letter in 30th Rep. of Reg.-Gen., may be taken as supplemental thereto:

There were 1066 deaths in the year 1867 referred to metria (puerperal fever), and 2346 to the other dangers of child-bearing, including, specifically, miscarriages, 55; abortion, 75; puerperal mania, 85; puerperal convulsions, 366; phlegmasia dolens, 65; extra-uterine fœtation, 11; retention of placenta, 34; breast abscess, 9; flooding, 483; placenta prævia, 149; rupture of uterus, 41; deformed pelvis, ro; operation for craniotomy, 1; Cæsarian operation, 4; the particular causes of 958 deaths being unassigned. In addition to these deaths by childbirth, the particulars of 521 deaths by other diseases after child-bearing are given, as these other diseases were the main causes of death. Then 16 other deaths by diseases are specified as having occurred to pregnant women. There are about 576,262 women [equal to three-fourths of the ann. births] with child, and the deaths among them would amount to 6339, at the rate common to their age. It is not likely that early pregnancy is mentioned in the certificates, unless it had a direct connexion with the death; so as 3949 of the deaths are here accounted for, the deaths from other diseases must have been less than the deaths among men from those other diseases at the corresponding ages. Smallpox, scarlet fever, enteric fever, typhus, cholera, are almost invariably fatal to the women with child attacked; but whether they enjoy a certain immunity from attacks of disease, well deserves inquiry.

I have endeavoured to show in the Tables 19-25 the mort. of child-bearing women at different ages during the 7 years 1848-54, and 13 years 1855-67. In the former period 531, in the latter period 483 women in 1000 delivered died. The mort. was lowest in the middle of the child-bearing age (25-35): then about 4 in 1000 died; at the earlier age (15-25) the mort, was 6 or 7 in 1000; so at the later age (35-45) it was 6; and at the extreme age of 45-55 it ranged up to 7 or 9.

The other branches of the subject will be treated under their appropriate heads. DEVELOPMENTAL DISEASES, DEATHS FROM.-The number of ann. deaths in this class in England fluctuates but little. In ten years they were as follows: 1858, 69,895; 1859, 69,708; 1860, 70,311; 1861, 71,948; 1862, 68,842; 1863, 71,467; 1864, 75,660; 1865, 77,805; 1866, 76,873; 1867, 78,090. For 15 years ending 1864, the average number of deaths to one million living was 3595.

The deaths in 1867 were thus divided: Males, 37,563; Females, 40, 527. Of the Males, 19,770 died under 1 year and 22,915 under 5; 131 between 5 and 10; 29 between 20 and 25; 158 between 45 and 55; 3316 hetween 65 and 75; and 163 over 95. Of the Females, 15,791 died under 1 year, and 18,863 under 5; 154 between 5 and 10; 392 between 20 and 25; 352 between 45 and 55; 4108 between 65 and 75; and 362 over 95.

DEVEST [or Divest].-To deprive, to take away; opposite to invest, which is to deliver possession of anything to another.

DEVEY, F. W., pub. 1867: Speculations on the Method of Extinguishing Fires without Water. [FIRE ANNHILATORS.] DEVIATION OF SHIP'S VOYAGE.-By deviation is understood to mean a voluntary departure, without necessity, or any reasonable cause, from the regular and usual course of the voyage insured. Whenever this happens, the voyage is, as regards the risk of ins., determined, and the insurers are discharged from any responsibility. The reason of this is because the ship goes upon a different voyage from that against which the insurer undertook to indemnify. It is necessary to insert in every pol. of marine ins. the place of the ship's departure, and also of her destination. Hence it is an implied condition, to be performed on the part of the insured, that the ship shall pursue the most direct course, of which the nature of things will admit, to arrive at the destined port.-Park.

In our art. BOTTOMRY, we have shown how in Athens some 400 years B.C., it was a part of the contract that vessels upon which Bottomry loans had been made were limited in regard to their course of sailing much as vessels are now; and that any deviation from the recognized and stipulated course was punishable by a fine of twice the amount of the money orig. advanced! From that period down to the present, whatever form the contract of Marine Ins. may have assumed, we suspect the stipulations regarding Deviation, as also regarding other essential points, have remained the same. We might cite many authorities in support of this view. We must be content to quote one or two writers who have most largely drawn upon the Civil Law for the principles they lay down. An insurer is understood to incur no risk but for the voyage agreed upon; for if the ship alters its course, or deviates from the direct track of its voyage, the insurer is no longer bound: unless, indeed, the master alters his course from motives of necessity, such as to refit his vessel, escape a storm, or to avoid an enemy; in which cases, notwithstanding the alteration of the ship's course, the insurers remain fully bound.-Roccus, 1655.

Real and imminent danger of shipwreck, or stranding, or of falling into the hands of enemies or pirates; contrary winds, storms, a necessity of obtaining a port to stop a leak, or repair damages;-these are just and reasonable causes of deviating from the direct course of the voyage.-Stracca; Kuricke; Casa Regis; Valin.

In an early case, reported by Salkeld, it was held:-If after a pol. of ins. granted a damage happens, and afterwards in the same voyage a deviation, yet the assured shall recover for what happened before the deviation; for the pol. is discharged from the time of the deviation only.

In the case of Cock v. Townson, the ship George was bound from Cork to Jamaica with a convoy in time of war. The captain, in concert with two other vessels, took advantage of the night, and being ships of force, cruised and thereby deviated out of the direct course of their voyage, in hopes of meeting with a prize. Lord Camden and the jury held, that clearly from the moment the George deserted or deviated from the direct voyage to Jamaica the policy was discharged.

In the early case of Salisbury and others v. Townson, a ship insured from Liverpool to Jamaica put into Douglas Bay in the Isle of Man. It appeared there were some instances of the Liverpool ships putting in there, but it was not the settled, established, common, and direct course of the voyage and trade; therefore it was held a deviation, and discharged the underwriters from any loss that happened subsequent to the deviation.

In the case of Fox v. Black, tried at Exeter, 1767, the plaintiff was a shipper of goods in a vessel bound from Dartmouth to Liverpool. The ship sailed from Dartmouth and put into Loo, a place she of necessity must pass in the course of her insured voyage. But as she had no liberty given her by the policy to go into Loo, and notwithstanding that no accident befel her by going into or coming out of Loo-for she was lost soon after she got to sea again-yet her going into Loo was a deviation, and a verdict was found for the underwriter.

There are, as might be expected, numerous cases in the law-books arising out of disputed cases of deviation as affecting the contract of ins. So numerous indeed are the cases that we do not propose to follow them in detail, but must be content-on the ground of space alone-with a summary of the leading points of law and practice, as deduced from the decided cases, ranging over several centuries; and as based upon and embodying the principles handed down to us by the Civil Law. For this summary we are mainly indebted to Park [Marine Ins. 8th ed., 1842, by Hildyard].

1. It is not material whether the loss be or be not an actual consequence of the deviation; for the insurers are in no case answerable for a subsequent loss, in whatever place it happen, or to whatever cause it may be attributed.

2. Neither does it make any difference whether the insured consented or did not consent to the deviation.

3. If a master of a vessel put into a port not usual, or stay an unusual time, it is a deviation.

4. The time a ship is detained in port for necessary repairs, the ins. being "at and from," is not to be considered unnecessary delay, so as to avoid the pol.

5. An ins. on ship and freight is not vitiated by the ship taking in goods at a place into which she was forced by necessity, although there was no liberty to trade given by the pol.

6. If several places are named in the pol., the ship must go to those places in the order in which they are named, unless some usage or some special facts be proved to vary the general rule.

7. From the moment there is a wilful deviation from the due course of the voyage, the contract between the insured and underwriter is at an end. If the deviation be but for a single night, or for an hour, it is fatal.

8. If a merchant ship carry letters of marque, she may chase an enemy, though she may not cruise, without being deemed guilty of a deviation.

9. Liberty given to a merchant ship with a letter of marque to "chase, capture, and man prizes," does not justify her in lying to for the purpose of protecting a prize as a convoy into port.

10. Liberty to a merchant ship "to see prizes into port" does not authorize her to stay till they receive necessary repairs, which they could not otherwise procure.

II. Wherever the deviation is occasioned by absolute necessity, as where the crew forced the captain to deviate, the underwriter continues liable.

12. If a ship is decayed, and goes to the nearest port to refit, it is no deviation.

13. Wherever a ship, in order to escape a storm, goes out of the direct course; or when in the due course of the voyage is driven out of it by stress of weather; this is no deviation.

14. If a storm drive a ship out of the course of her voyage, and she do the best she can to get to her port of destination, she is not obliged to return to the point from which she was driven.

15. A deviation may also be justified if done to avoid an enemy, or to seek for convoy at the place of

rendezvous.

16. Whenever a ship does that which is for the general benefit of all parties concerned, the act is as much within the spirit of the pol. as if it had been expressed; and in order to say whether a deviation be justifiable or not, it will be proper to attend to the motives, end, and consequences of the act, as the true ground of judgment.

17. A ship may go out of her course to relieve another in distress, without being guilty of a deviation. 18. If a ship deviate from necessity, she must pursue such voyage of necessity in the direct course, and in the shortest time possible, otherwise the underwriters will be discharged. And in such a case nothing more must be done than the necessity requires.

19. In an ins. upon a trading voyage, such trade must be carried on with usual and reasonable expedition.

20. A deviation merely intended, but never carried into effect, does not discharge the insurers. 21. If it can be shown that the parties never intended to sail upon the voyage insured; if all the ship's papers are made out for a different place from that described in the pol.; the insurer is discharged, though the loss should happen before the dividing point of the two voyages.

22. But where the termini of the voyage continue the same, an intention to go to an intermediate port, though that intention should be formed previous to the ship's sailing, will not vitiate it till actual deviation. Whatever damage happens before actual deviation will fall upon the underwriters.

23. The justifications for a deviation seem to be these: (1) to repair the vessel; (2) to avoid an impending storm; (3) to escape from an enemy; (4) to seek for convoy.

24. What a captain justifies a deviation by the usage of a particular trade, there must be a clear and estab. usage-not a few vague instances only.

25. The doctrine of Deviation is applicable to an ins. on freight, as well as on ship and merchandize. 26. Subject to the rules already advanced, deviation or not is a question of fact to be decided according to the circumstances of the case.

27. In cases of deviation the prem. is not to be returned.

All these points are supported either by cases or by the opinions of the most learned writers upon the subject of Marine Ins. and Maritime Law. [DEPARTURE.] [DESTINATION.] [DETENTION.] [VOYAGE.]

DEVISE. A gift by a last will and testament. The giver is called the devisor, the person to whom it is given the devisee. This word is properly only applied to real property, but in wills it transmits personal property, as well as the word bequeath-the proper term; and vice versa.- Wharton.

DEVISEE. A person to whom property is devised or bequeathed. [If the property be personal, he should be called the legatee.] An expectant devisee has no insurable interest; but it appears that the purchaser of such a devise has. This was determined in the case of Cooke v. Field, 1850, in an action upon an assignment of a pol. in the United Kingdom Life. The circumstances of the case were peculiar, and will be fully stated in our art. INSURABLE INTEREST.

With regard to Fire Ins., a devisee may, under various circumstances, have to seek its protection. Thus in the case of Gregg v. Coates, 1856, there was a direction by a testator that his devisee might occupy a mill at a rent of £100, he, nevertheless, keeping the premises in good and tenantable repair. Upon the acceptance of the gift by the devisee, and the subsequent total destruction of the mill by fire, it was held, that he was bound to reinstate the damage, and pay the rent in the mean time.

Again, when a person insured under a fire pol. dies after a fire, but before payment of the claim, the right to sue is complete, and vests in his personal representatives, and the ins. money will form part of the personal estate, unless where the amount insured is on buildings: and in that case the heir or devisee can intercept it, by requiring its expenditure in reinstating the premises, under the provisions to this effect in the Building Act.-Bunyon, Law of Fire Ins.

DEVIZES FIRE INS. Co.-A co. under this title appears to have been founded in the town of Devizes early in the present century; but at present we have not succeeded in obtaining authentic details concerning it.

DEVON (SOUTH) FIRE INS. Co.-Founded in 1824, and discontinued bus. in 1827. Its fire duty returns were as follow:-1825, £408; 1826, £507; 1827, £290. [We shall be glad to obtain further details regarding this Co., and how its business was disposed of.] DEVONPORT.-In 1840 a tremendous conflagration occurred in the Gov. Dockyard here. The Talavera, 74 guns, and the Imogene frigate, 28 guns, together with stores, the naval museum, and a great quantity of valuable naval relics, were destroyed. Loss estimated at £200,000.

DEVONSHIRE COLIC [COLIC OF POITOU].-A species of colic occasioned by the introduction of lead into the system, and named from its frequent occurrence in Devonshire

class of cotton and woollen mill rates delivered herewith." The first class comprised buildings containing, among other things, "stoves not having more than two feet of pipe leading therefrom into the chimney." The second-class buildings having stoves with more than two feet of pipe. The mill contained a stove with more than two feet of pipe, and the pol. was held void. The claimants endeavoured to show that there was no greater risk in a second than in a first-class mill; but Lord Eldon remarked, "If the Court of Session was of opinion that the danger and risk were not greater in mills of the second than of the first class, or though that was sworn to by 500 witnesses, it would signify nothing; the only question is, what is the building, de facto, which I have insured?”`

In Scott v. Quebec F. Ins. Co., 1821, it was stated in the pol. that the dwelling-house of insured was "built of stone, and covered with tin, gables through the roof and plafond, iron doors and shutters." The fire destroying the building began in an adjoining house, and spread from thence to a wooden building on the premises of the insured, from which it was communicated through a doorway of the dwelling-house, which was open, although it had an iron door, to the interior of the last-mentioned edifice :-Held, that the description, iron "shutters and doors," whether regarded as a representation or warranty, was substantially true, and did not include by implication the duty of keeping them closed. Held, further, that the fact of their being open in the middle of August at 8 P.M. was no proof of negligence.

In the case of Dobson v. Sotheby, 1827, some timber-built agricultural buildings had been ins. under the inaccurate description of a barn, but at the same rate of prem. as would have been charged by the office had they been accurately described. They were burnt down in the operation of heating some tar to repair them. It was held, that the office was responsible for the loss.

In Columbian Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 1829, a rule annexed to the pol. stated that persons desirous of making ins. on buildings should state in writing the following particulars, to wit: "of what materials the walls and roofs each are constructed," etc.; "and if any person shall cause the same to be described in the pol. otherwise than as they really are, so as the same be charged at a lower prem. than would otherwise be demanded, such ins. shall be of no force:"-Held, that a misdescription would not avoid the pol. unless a lower rate of prem. was charged in consequence of it; and whether such misdescription reduced the prem. which would otherwise have been demanded, was a question of fact which the jury alone could decide [2 Pet. U.S. 25.]

In the case of Friedlander v. Lond. Assu. Corp., 1832, goods insured were described as being in the dwelling-house of the insured. The insured had only one room as a lodger, in which the goods were:-Held, to be correctly described, within the condition that "the houses, buildings, or other places where goods are deposited and kept shall be truly and accurately described,"—such condition relating to the construction of a house, and not to the interest of the parties residing in it.

In the case of Shaw v. Robberds, 1837, the facts were as follow:-The plaintiff insured his premises in the Norwich Union Office by the description of a granary, etc., and “a kiln for drying corn in use" communicating therewith. By the conditions the pol. was to be forfeited unless the buildings were accurately described, and the trades carried on therein specified; and if any alteration were made in the buildings, or the risk of fire increased, the alteration, etc., was to be notified, and allowed by indorsement on the pol.; otherwise the ins. to be void. The plaintiff carried on no trade in the kiln except drying corn; but a vessel laden with bark having been sunk in the river near the kiln, the insured allowed it to be dried gratuitously in the kiln, and this occasioned a fire, by which the premises were destroyed on the third day after the drying of the bark commenced. It was proved in evidence that drying bark was a distinct trade from drying corn, and more hazardous: the ins offices charging a higher prem. for bark kilns than for corn kilns: -Held, that the insured was not precluded from recovering, either on the ground of an alteration of risk, or (in the absence of fraud) because the fire arose from his negligence. It might be a question for the jury if the drying the bark had been undertaken for profit. In the case of Pim v. Reid, 1843, the ins. was in the Imperial upon the machinery and fixtures of a paper-maker. The defendants pleaded that the insured had, after the issue of the pol., permitted another person to carry on upon the premises the trade of a cleaner and dyer of cotton waste, for the purpose of making cotton wadding, and had introduced large quantities of cotton waste upon the premises. It was shown in evidence that the manufacture of cotton wadding was much more hazardous than that of paper, and that cotton waste was liable to spontaneous combustion; but was, it was admitted, exclusively used in the manufacture of paper. The pol. contained a condition for the correct description of the property to be insured; and that "if the assured should misrepresent or omit to communicate any circumstance which should be material to be known to the Co., to enable them to judge of the risk which they had undertaken, or were required to undertake, such ins. shall be of no force." Also another condition to this effect: "In the ins. of premises which contain any steam engine or other implement by which heat is produced (common fireplaces excepted), the construction and circumstances must be particularly described at the time of effecting the ins., or, if subsequently introduced, due notice must be given to the Co., and the same allowed by them; otherwise the

T

pol. will be void." There was no other condition requiring the notice and allowance of alterations materially affecting the risk.

The Court considered that the first condition only related to the premises at the time of ins., and did not reach any subsequent alterations. The change in the risk was not reached by the second condition quoted. It was further held upon general principles, that an alteration, without fraud, by the introduction of the more hazardous trade, did not avoid the pol.; but that the Co. must in such a case pay the loss, unless they chose to provide for it by an appropriate condition.

This case was regarded as an authority upon the point for some time; but the F. Offices gradually altered their conditions in the direction needed; and then came the decision in Sillem v. Thornton, presently to be noted, which showed that the offices had succeeded in moulding their conditions into the right form to meet such difficulties.

In Hare v. Barstow, 1844, the pol., in the Yorkshire F., mentioned a building, oil-mill, of one floor only, stone and tile, occupied by for crushing of linseed and grinding of dyewood, but no refining oil therein, 1000; on fixed machinery and millwrights' works, including all the standing and going gear therein, 1000; one engine-house adjoining the mill, 200; one steam engine therein, £300; one logwood warehouse, in which chopping dye-wood is performed, communicating with the mill, 200; one warehouse on the other side of the mill, to the east side, merely for the storing of goods, £300-Held, that there was no ambiguity in the pol., and that evidence was not receivable to show that it was intended to insure the machinery and gear in the logwood warehouse.

In Barrett v. Jermy, 1849, the plaintiffs were insured, in the Norwich Union, as varnish and colour makers. The following conditions were contained in the pol. :

Thirdly. That the pol. shall be void unless the nature and material structure of the buildings and property insured are fully and accurately described, and the trades carried on therein correctly shown; and unless it is stated whether any hazardous goods are deposited, and whether there is any stove or apparatus for producing heat other than common fireplaces.

Fourthly.-If any alteration or addition be made in or to any building insured, or in which any ins. property is contained, by which the risk of fire may be increased, or if such risk is increased, either by any means adverted to in the third condition, or in any other manner, or if any property insured be removed into any other premises, such alteration, or addition, or increase of risk, or removal, must be immediately notified to the Co., in order to its being allowed on the pol.; otherwise this pol. will be void.

The ins. was made in March, 1846. At that time there were two boilers in the open yard (adjoining a building marked No. 7 on the plan) used for boiling oil. In May, 1846, the plaintiffs removed these two boilers from the yard to the inside of building No. 7. In May, 1847, a fire broke out in that room during the time that varnish was being heated in the oil boilers, by which much damage was done to the building and to the stock-in-trade and movable utensils. The plaintiffs alleged that they had sent notice of the alterations to the office, and that one of the officers of the Co. had inspected them. The jury found for the defendants on all the issues. A new trial was granted, on the ground of misdirection of the Judge; but the case never came before the Courts again.

In Casey v. Goldsmid, 1852, the pol. described the premises as a house, bounded in rear by a stone building covered with tin, and by a yard in which yard there was being erected a first-class store, which would communicate with the building ins. :--Held, to be incorrect, and therefore null, it being proved that there was between the house and the stone building a brick building covered with shingles, communicating to both by doors. On appeal (1854), this was reversed, and judgment given for the insured, on the ground that the omission to mention such doors in the description was not proved to have been a fraudulent concealment; and inasmuch as it was not estab. that the fire had been occasioned and had extended by means of such apertures. [4 Lower Canada, Q.B., Appeal side, 107.]

In Perry Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 1852, the description of the building to be insured was made by an agent of the Co., who gave a written description of the property to the Co., including a kitchen which applicant intended to build, and which was built after issue of pol. and before the fire:-Held, that if objection be taken by the Co. that the description of the kitchen building was erroneous, the insured may show by verbal testimony that it was in contemplation at the time of making the pol., and was therefore included in it, and may recover for the loss of it; and if it appear by the evidence that the add. building did not conform to the intention of the insured, as communicated to the agent of the Co. at the time of application, the variation would not of itself avoid the pol. It stands upon the principles of an alteration, and avoids the pol. only in case the risk is thereby increased, which is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. [19 Penn. St. 45.]

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In Glen v. Lewis, 1853, the plaintiff, a cabinet-maker in Hull, effected an ins., in the West of England, upon his business premises. At the foot of the pol. a description of risks and terms of ins." was given in several classes. In class 4, described as "specially hazardous," cabinet-makers were included; also "and any other risks of more than ordinary hazard, by reason of any steam engine, stove, kiln, furnace, oven, or other fire heat, used in the process of any manufacture." The first condition indorsed on the pol.-after requiring the insured to give an accurate description of the buildings, erections, etc.,