say that the supreme Being has a power of acquiring knowledge, is the same as to say, that at one period of his existence he may be comparatively ignorant, and at another period more knowing that his knowledge may increase with his years, and that he may become wiser as he grows older ! If the deity is capable of any accessions of power, he is not omnipotent; in like manner, if he is capable of any accessions of knowledge, he is not omniscient. To say that God is omniscient, and yet deny that he must know all things, is a contradiction in terms. It is as great a contradiction, as to maintain that he is omnipotent, and yet deny that he must be possessed of all power. To say that the deity is not possessed of all power, is to deny his omnipotence; to say that he is not possessed of all knowledge, is to deny his omniscience. The Doctor, therefore, denies the omniscience of God-he acknowledges the name, but denies the thing.

But still farther, by denying that the Deity has the actual knowledge of all things, and maintaining that he has only the power of knowing all things, Dr. Clarke has gained just nothing at all. The difficulty remains the same. The question still recurs: How can the Deity, on Arminian principles, be possessed of such a power? How can he foreknow things which are contingent? things which may never come to pass? As knowledge pre-supposes the certain existence of the thing known, so foreknowledge presupposes the certainty of the future existence of the thing foreknown. If the Deity knows that Dr. Clarke is at present a believer, it is certain that Dr. Clarke is a believer. If it is possible that Dr. C. is no believer, whilst the Deity knows him to be a believer, then it is possible for the Deity to be mistaken. So, in like manner, if the Deity foreknew from all eternity that Dr. C. would be a believer, it was certain from all eternity, that Dr. C. would believe. If it was possible that Dr. C. might never believe, though the Deity foreknew that he would believe, then it was possible for the Deity to be mistaken!

Every person must see that it is impossible for the Deity to know that a thing exists, if it does not really and certainly exist. Equally impossible is it to foreknow that a thing will exist, if its future existence is not certain. That these things are equally impossible, the Doctor himself must acknowledge; for, according to his own doctrine, fore knowledge, after knowledge, and present knowledge,

are all the same. With the Deity there is nothing, strictly speaking, but present knowledge. To say, therefore, that the Deity knows that a thing exists, and yet that it is pos sible that it does not exist, is to say that the Deity has a certain knowledge of its existence, and yet has no certain knowledge of it. In like manner, to say that the Deity foreknows those things which will exist, and yet that those things may never exist, is the same as to say that the Deity has a certain foreknowledge of their future existence, and yet that he has no certain foreknowledge of it!

Again, to say with Dr. Samuel Clarke, Mr. Bird, and others, that God foreknows necessary events as necessary, and contingent events as contingent, is to say, nothing at all to the purpose. The question still recurs: How is it possible that contingent events should be foreknown. Mr. Bird illustrates his reasoning by the following example: We see the sun shining over our heads, and at the same time we see a man walking upon the earth. The one we see as voluntary, the other as natural. He grants, however, that both must be done, or we could not see them at all; but he denies that they were both necessary before they were done-it was only necessary that the sun should shine; but not that the man should walk. Now, in opposition to this I contend that if it was necessary that the man should walk, in order that he might be seen walking, it was equally necessary that he should walk, in order to be foreseen as walking. The walking of the man is an event which must certainly and infallibly come to pass, (as well as the shining` of the sun,) in order to be either seen or foreseen. As knowledge and foreknowledge are the same with the Deity, he can no more foreknow what will not certainly and infal libly exist, than he can know what does not at present certainly and infallibly exist. Mr. Bird asserts that God neces sarily foreknows all that will come to pass. Dr. A. Clarke

asserts that God is not obliged to know all that he can know. This flat contradiction in the principles upon which these gentlemen proceed, does not prevent the Doctor from de claring that Mr. Bird's argument is a good one, and that his own is better. The Doctor must pardon me for thinking that Mr. Bird's argument is no argument at all, because ftaffords no solution of the difficulty; and that his own is still worse, because it fails in solving the difficulty, and in

volves, besides, not only a plain contradiction, but also the denial of a divine perfection,*

Some of the most penetrating Arminian divines and philosophers have given it as their opinion, that no man will ever be able to reconcile the contingency of future events with the foreknowledge of God. In this opinion I heartily acquiesce. I firmly believe these things will never be re conciled, because I believe they are irreconcileable. If any man is able to prove that it is possible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time-if he can prove that it is possi ble to know a thing, and at the same time not to know it, then he may prove that it is possible for the Deity to fore know those events, which may possibly never come to pass.

Thus, Sir, it appears that predestination cannot be founded on foreseen faith and good works; because, upon Arminian principles, it is absolutely impossible that either faith or good works should be foreseen. It appears that the doctrine of our Westminster divines, with regard to predestination, is not only sanctioned by the word of God; but the absurdity of the opposite opinion is capable of a demonstration, as strict as any contained in Euclid's elements. Calvinistic principles stand upon a proud pre-eminence they rest upon the immoveable basis of Divine Revelation, and are consistent with the soundest principles of philosophy. Our moral philosophy class-room and divinity halls do not now resound with the doctrine of the self-determining power of the will: the salt is now cast into the fountain. For more than half a century past, Calvinistic principles have been gaining ground, both among the learned and illiterate. At present they are rapidly progressing. If I can rely on the testimony of one of themselves, a young gentleman of great respectability, the students of the Synod of Ulster have, for some time past, been almost universally Calvinists. From the new wine they are turning with list

*If the denial of one of the attributes of Deity, and the belief of a contradiction, which is capable of the strictest demonstration, be necessary to free Calvinists from the gross absurdities and blasphemies charged upon them by Dr. C.; I am fully of opinion, they will universally agree with me in thinking, that the remedy is incomparably worse than the disease-they will regard the Arminian cause as desperate indeed, when in defence of it, a gentleman of the learning and talents of Dr. A. C., is reduced to such extremities.

less apathy, with the general exclamation, "The old is better." That the general Synod are retracing their steps

that they are returning to the Calvinistic principles of their ancestors, is a fact which I believe admits of little doubt. The unanimity displayed in their judicious appoint ment of a divinity professor, speaks volumes on this interesting subject. And, indeed, from my inmost soul I congrat ulate them on their return to what I conceive to be the true

and genuine principles of the gospel. “I have no greater joy than to see" Christians of every denomination "walking In truth.'

I am, &c.

LETTER VII.

My Rev. and dear Presbyterian,

I flattered myself that the vengeance you had taken on your enemies in your hard-fought Battle of Dialogues, would have fully gratified your" exasperated indignation." I flattered myself, that after the battle was over, the Westminster divines would find in the Rey. Presbyterian a generous foe. It never once entered my mind that so illustrious a warrior would return again to the field of battle, for no other purpose than to insult and abuse the wounded and the dying! In this it appears I have been mistaken. In your Battle of Dialogues, having knocked down, (or thought you had knocked down,) your enemies, you return, in your appendix, to kick them for falling. You assure us that the Westminster confession is not only inconsistent with the scriptures; but that it is many times inconsistent with itself." To es tablish this charge, you give a garbled account of the 3d Sec. of the 9th chapter; after which you exclaim, "How miserable then is the state of this unregenerate man, since, if he pray to God it is a sin, and since if he pray not it is a greater sin !"

In the section referred to, the Divines teach that the works of unregenerate men, though they may be materially good, being done according to the divine command, and useful both to themselves and others, are nevertheless sin ful, on a variety of accounts,-because they do not proceed.

from faith; for without faith it is impossible to please God's --because they do not proceed from love; for though we give all our goods to feed the poor, and have not charity, profiteth nothing, &c. The Divines also teach us that the neglect of these works is still more sinful, and displeasing to God. This they establish by irrefragable evidence. I we give our alms to be seen of men, we have no reward. Without charity, giving all our goods to feed the poor, profits nothing; and yet, at the judgment of the great day, men shall be condemned for neglecting acts of charity.

was an hungered, and ye gave me no meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me no drink, &c. Inasmuch as ye did it not to the least of these, ye did it not to me, &c." Instead of laying before your readers this appropriate proof, you foully suppress it, and quote only the introductory verse, which you are pleased to hold up to ridicule. "Then shall be

say unto those on his left hand: Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." This you style a singular proof; but did you not know, my dear friend, that this is no proof at all? Was it ignorance, or was it a fraudulent design, that induced you to represent it as a proof? Did you not know, that it was only the in troduction to a proof; and that the proof itself was contained in the subsequent verses, which I have already quoted, but which you have disgracefully suppressed? You pre tend to lay before the public the proofs which the divines have advanced in support of their paradox. Instead of this, you only bring forward two garbled texts, in proof of the one part-the other part you leave entirely destitute of proof. Of the two texts brought forward, the one you re present as quoted for a purpose quite the reverse of that for which it was really adduced-the other you represent as a proof when it is only the introduction to a proof. Such management needs no comment; the only observation I would make, is, that you acted wisely in concealing your

name.

To support their paradox the Divines produce a multitude of appropriate texts, which the reader may consult at his leisure. That an action may be sinful, and the neglect of it more sinful, is a paradox consistent both with scripture and reason. "The ploughing of the wicked is sin," and yet I trust you will readily acknowledge, that not to plough would be a greater sin. The conduct of Henry VIII. m promoting the reformation, considering the abominable mo