from all eternity foresaw whatever comes to pass, the future existence of every thing that comes to pass was from all eternity certain.

To say that God foresaw any thing as future which yet never come to pass, is an evident contradiction. It is to say that God foresaw it, and yet did not foresee it for that which never comes to pass could never be the object either of sight, or foresight of knowledge, or foreknowledge. Arminians sometimes labour hard to prove, that foreknowledge could have no influence on future actions; but they labour in vain they labour to prove what we do not deny. We do not say, that foreknowledge renders future events certain; but we contend, that it pre-supposes their certainty. Foreknowledge does not constitute, but it proves the certainty of future events. This is what we assert.*

Now, if all things that come to pass were from all eternity certain, what rendered them certain? To bring things out of a state of mere possibility of existence into a state of certain futurition, is an effect; and every effect must have a cause. In this case, what was the cause? The cause must have either been the things themselves, or the decree of the Deity. It could not be the things themselves that rendered their own future existence certain; for nothing can produce an effect before it exists: it follows then, by necessary consequence, that it was the will or decree of the Deity. Thus, the doctrine of divine decrees, notwithstanding the contempt with which it is loaded, appears to me capable of the strictest demonstration. The steps are extremely simple, God from all eternity foreknew all things that come to pass; therefore, all those things were from all eternity certain. Again: What rendered the future existence of those things certain ? Was it the will of God-or was it the things themselves ?-It must have been either the one or the other of these causes. It could not be the

* Dr. Dwight (Theol. p. 199) says, "Foreknowledge renders the future existence of that which is foreknown certain; therefore the actions of the agent supposed are all rendered certain and will of course "exist." And again (p. 200), " God's foreknowledge of voluntary ac"tions does in no respect lessen or affect their freedom, although it "renders their future existence absolutely certain." Aliquando dormitat bonus Homerus."-The Doctor here has expressed himself quite inadvertently and inconsistently with what he has elsewhere maintained. He elsewhere maintains, that foreknowledge can have no influence whatever on the nature of actions.

things themselves; for no cause can produce an effect before it exists. It must therefore have been the will of the Deity-or, in other words-the divine decree.—(See Edwards' Remarks,)

Doctor Adam Clarke maintains that there is, strictly speaking, no foreknowledge nor afterknowledge with the Deity that his knowledge is all present knowledge—that, past, present, and future, are with the Deity one eternal now. To this opinion Archbishop Tillotson, one of the ablest defenders of the Arminian system, was quite opposed. He poured upon it the utmost contempt. To me, the opinion appears quite rational.-I agree with the Doctor, rather than with the Archbishop. I AM is one of the names of the Deity; and our Saviour says, not before Abraham was, Į was, but, Before Abraham was, I AM. It appears to me, that past, present, and future, are all equally present with the Deity. With him, past knowledge, and present knowledge, and future knowledge, are all the same. I therefore perfectly agree with Dr, Clarke, Mr. Drew and others, in this view of the knowledge of God. It is in my mind both more scriptural and more philosophical than that of the learned Prelate. At the same time, I perfectly agree with the Archbishop, in wondering that men should "call this "explaining things." It gives no explanation at all of the Arminian difficulty. On the contrary, it exibits the difficulty in a more striking point of light. It renders the contradiction of foreseeing contingencies more apparent. Does not God's knowledge of past events prove the certainty of those events?-does not his knowledge of present events prove the certainty of those events ?-On the same principle, does not his knowledge of future events prove the certainty of those events? If, with the Deity, foreknowledge, present knowledge, and after knowledge, are all the same, then they all equally presuppose and prove the certainty of their object.-As nothing can be otherwise than God sees it to be; so nothing can be otherwise than he foresees it. If, with the Deity, foreknowledge and present knowledge are the same, then what is true of present knowledge is also true of foreknowledge; but present knowledge presupposes and proves the certainty of the thing known; and, therefore foreknowledge must also presuppose and prove the certainty of the thing foreknown. No Arminian in the world can possibly refute this reasoning, nor evade the force

of it, withont trampling under his feet the very first princi-· ples of argumentation.

Divines of the first-rate learning and talents are sensible of this: they decline the controversy, and resolve the whole into faith.-Socinians, finding that they must either give up the contingency of future events or the foreknowledge of God, adopted the desperate alternative of making a sacrifice of this divine attribute.-Dr. A. Clarke, following their steps, has chosen to give up the omniscience of Deity rather than his Arminian tenets. Dr. Millar and Doctor Graves, with a modesty more becoming Christian Divines, confess the weakness of their own faculties, and, finding demonstration against them, endeavour to make their escape by taking refuge in faith. Arminian writers of an inferior class, with less reason but more effrontery, pertinaciously adhere to their principles, not only in the face of demonstration, but in contempt and defiance of those self-evident truthsthose axioms on which demonstration is founded.*

From my Defence of Creeds and Confessions, Mr. M'Afee quotes the following words: Every person must see, that it is impossible for the "Deity to know that a thing exists, if it does not really and certainly "exist. Equally impossible is it to foreknow that a thing will exist, if its future existence is not certain." On this quotation he makes the following remark: "The first proposition in this quotation is evidently "true; but the latter appears to me, not only to be erroneous, but con"trary to that timidity and modesty which should accompany all our "disquisitions concerning the unsearchable God."-Now, if the knowledge and foreknowledge of the Deity are the same, is it not a self-evident truth-is it not an axiom-that what is true of the knowledge of God, must be also true of his foreknowledge? Yet the timid and modest Mr. M'Afee, in defiance of this axiom, modestly affirms of the divine knowledge, what he denies of the foreknowledge of Deity!-Such is that champion of Arminianism whom Mr. Drew, editor of the Imperial Magazine, dignifies with the epithet of an "able antagonist." If continuing to reason after one is defeated-if continuing to argue in the face, not only of demonstration, but of axioms-if this constitutes an able antagonist, Mr. M'Afee has certainly strong claims to that title.

"In reasoning, too, the parson owned his skill;

"For, even though vanquished, he could argue still." But will the reader believe that this same "able antagonist," who, even in the face of self-evident truths, reasons against the certainty of future events, has, in the very same pamphlet, fully admitted that certainty ? "The espousers of liberty are well aware of an objection "urged against their scheme by the advocates for necessity and "Calvinisin. Why (it is triumphantly asked,) is there so much "stress laid upon the freedom of the will? Are not the good and evil actions the same, in point of certainty, as if they had been all decreed? and will not the number of the saved and lost be as definite

4. With regard to whatever comes to pass, God must either be willing that it should come to pass, or unwilling. If he is unwilling that it should come to pass, and yet it does come to pass, then his will is crossed, and he is unhappy.

"at the last, according to the doctrine of liberty, as according to that "of necessity? Granting the certainty of the actions and the definite"ness of the numbers spoken of, we only say that things are just as they "really are.-Again-The number is definite by that certainty which "always accompanies contingent actions.' He afterwards admits, that the number of the saved would be actually as great, and finally certain, as if Deity had passed Calvinistic decrees concerning them. Thus, it appears, that this able antagonist gives up the whole controversy, and surrenders to the Calvinists at discretion. If the certainty of an event does not destroy liberty, how could that liberty be destroyed by the decree of God, which rendered the event certain? If apprenticeship does not forfeit the freedom of a corporation town, no man can forfeit that freedom by being bound an apprentice. If the apprenticeship itself cannot deprive him of Iris freedom, the binding him an apprentice-or that act by which he was bound-cannot deprive him of it: so, in like manner, if certainty cannot destroy liberty, the decree of God constituting that certainty cannot destroy it. By admitting certainty of event, Mr. M'A fee has given up the Arminian cause. All the necessity we plead for is a necessity consisting in certainty of event. A natural necessity, a universal necessity, a necessity of compulsion, coaction, or constraint, is unjustly and injuriously charged on the Calvinistic system by its ignorant or prejudiced opponents. Mr. M'Afee quotes President Edwards, strongly disclaiming, and decidedly condemning the doctrine of a universal necessity: and yet this "able "antagonist," with his characteristic timidity and regard for truth, modestly charges Edwards, and Calvinists in general, with holding that same universal necessity! Absurdly confounding the laws of mind with those of matter, he even attempts by a diagram to demonstrate the absurdity of the Calvinistic system! Had I considered Mr. M'Afee's pamphlet worthy of an answer, my motto would have been, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour."

Mr. M'Afee admits that the number of the saved and the lost "is "definite by that certainty which always accompanies contingent "events-that is to say-the certainty which accompanies uncertain events! Who can doubt that such a writer is an "able antagonist ?” Again-Mr. M'Afee declares (p. 24,) that, as a compensation for that death incurred by the fall, a decree is passed, which determines the resurrection of every man; and that God immutably purposed to raise all men from the dead. He also admits, that the number of the saved and the lost is as definite as if fixed by a Calvinistic decree. Take these doctrines in connexion, and the amount of them is, That God has passed a decree, and immutably purposed, to raise to the resurrection of damnation a definite number of the human family-and all this as a compensation for that death which they incurred by the fall! By such mild and sensible doctrine, our "able antagonist" proposes to mend Calvinistic decrees! How appropriate the modest title of his pamphlet," A Rational and Scriptural Investigation!"

No man can rationally maintain that God is unwilling that sin should have a place in his works. If he maintains this, he must run into the gross absurdity of maintaining, that

Mr. M'Afee, in his preface, informs us-not that his design was to answer the arguments of his opponent; no, this might be troublesome; but he informs us-that his plan was" to advance a system as forcibly "and argumentatively as possible, which, if true, necessarily proves that of the Rev. Gentleman he opposes to be false. Now, one would suppose that this "able antagonist" would grant his opponent the same privilege. One would think, that, according to the law laid down by Mr. M'Afee, the Calvinist, by proving his own system true, at the same time proves Mr. M'Afee's to be false. But-no such thing. This "able antagonist" explains the laws of war quite differently. Page 30, he states them thus: "Before it can be proved, Sir, that we "sinned in Adam as a federal head, from the words now in question, "the absurdity of the above conclusions must be clearly shown, and the "various arguments advanced throughout these epistles fairly and "rationally answered." So then, Arminians are not bound to answer the arguments of Calvinists; but Calvinists are indispensably obliged to answer all the arguments of Arminians! The Arminian has only to prove his own system true, in order to prove Calvinism false; but the Calvinist must prove Arminianism false before he can prove his own system true!

Such is the logic of Mr. M'Afee; and the editor of the Imperial Magazine assures us, that Mr. M'Afee is "au able antagonist."

In this miscellaneous note, I should have taken some notice of the efforts of Mr. Drew, editor of the Imperial Magazine, to reconcile contingency with forcknowledge. Of metaphysics, when used on the Arminian side of the controversy, he appears very fond-and is himself no contemptible metaphysician-but when used by Calvinists, he does not seem to like them at all. He discovers a particular dislike to the metaphysical" fastnesses," from which President Edwards and some of his successors cannot easily be dislodged. Could Mr. Drew raise as many Arminian troops as would storm those fastnesses, I am convinced he would do an essential service to the Arminian cause. For his own part, he uses every effort in his power; but, in my humble opinion, without success. In attempting to reconcile the contingency of human actions with divine foreknowledge, he soars so high in the regions of metaphysics, that, to my feeble sight, he becomes quite invisible. I find it impossible, and, I am happy to say, unnecessary to follow him in his flight-I see him when he rises, and recognise him when he descends. He represents the Deity-I write from recollection-as penetrating duration, and looking back, as it were, at contingent events, looking at them as if they were past. He seems, however, strangely to forget, that his seeing those events proves their certainty-no matter whether he looks backward at them, or forward at them: If he sees them at all, their existence must be certain, and Arminian contingency must be overthrown! An Arminian writer in the Imperial Magazine-a writer of very respectable talents, Mr. Tucker, of Belfast, has abandoned the absurd doctrine of contingency. I am decidedly of the opinion, that Dr. Clarke, Mr. Drew, and all Arminians whatever, would discover their wisdom by imitating his example.