but upon his own. Supposing, therefore, that the one should preach, and the other should hear, as I had promised, surely it requires no logic to prove, that it was not I who fulfilled the promise. Just so with regard to the promises made to the Redeemer-the fulfilment of them, according to Arminian principles, does not depend on the will of God, but on the free will of the creature. Supposing, therefore, that every iota that God promised to his Son should actu ally come to pass, still no person could say, that God had fulfilled those promises. On the Arminian hypothesis, it would be impossible for the Deity to fulfil one of them!

From the preceding reasoning, I hope it is evident-that when any believe, repent and are saved, it is God who makes them to differ from those who continue in unbelief and impenitence-and if this be so, the doctrine of election and reprobation is established. If God makes a difference, he must have determined to make that difference. The Deity can do nothing without determining to do it. And as there cannot possibly be any new determination in the divine mind, he must have determined to make that difference from all eternity. In other words; from all eternity he must have chosen to salvation all those who shall be finally saved. This is election.-On the other hand, God does not work faith, repentance, &c. in the minds of all. He leaves some in their unbelief, impenitence, and wickedness, on account of which he finally condemns them. Of course, he must have determined so to do-determined, not in time, for there are in the divine mind no new determinations, but from all eternity — This is reprobation.--If it is just in God now in time to make such distinctions between one class of his rebel subjects and another, where was the injustice in decreeing from eternity to make those distinctions? On such principles, as well as on a multitude of express declarations of Scripture, some of which shall be afterwards quoted, I rest the doctrine of predestination.

SECTION III.

Election and Reprobation more formally defended; and the attacks of the most eminent Anti-Calvinists repelled. The decrees of election and reprobation are stigmatized by Arminians, Socinians and Arians, with the most opprobrious epithets. Dr. Bruce, Dr. Millar, Dr. Graves, and

Bishop Mant, scarcely ever mention them without prefixing such epithets as the following-arbitrary and irrespective, cruel and unrelenting, severe and terrific, gloomy and horrible! These epithets are generally prefixed in couples, as if one of them would be too little to excite in the minds of men a suitable degree of horror and disgust.

As an abusive epithet, the adjective arbitrary is admirably adapted for exciting an odium. It conveys the idea of something capricious and tyrannical. If, however, there is nothing capricious or tyrannical in divine providence, neither can there be any thing of a capricious or tyrannical nature in the divine decrees; for the latter are an exact copy or counterpart of the former. The decrees of God, being the dictates of infinite wisdom, and being infinitely opposed to every thing capricious or tyrannical, are designated, in Scripture—“THE COUNSEL OF HIS WILL.

The epithet irrespective is also well calculated to excite an odium against the doctrine of divine decrees.—In a qualıfied sense it may indeed be admitted, as applied to election. We have no objection to the term, if it is only meant to convey the idea, that election was not founded on foreseen faith, or good works, or any other virtuous qualification or disposition of its object. In this sense we fully admit that election is irrespective. The Arminian doctrine, that election was founded on foreseen faith and good works, has its foundation neither in Scripture, nor in reason, nor yet in the standards of the Church of England. It has no foundation in Scripture, Election, in Scripture, is described as an election of grace, and if it be of grace, it is no more of works. In Scripture we read, not that those who were foreseen to believe were ordained to eternal life, but that as many were ordained to eternal life believed.

Dr. B. boasts of the simplicity of his system, and wishes his hearers to believe, that, in the support of it, there is no necessity for a deviation from the received version. The reverse, however, is the fact. New translations and verbal criticisms are constantly necessary. Acts xiii, 48, affords

a striking example. Our translation, "As many as were "ordained to eternal life believed," is so clear a proof of predestination, that, in order to subvert it, all the powers of verbal criticism have been roused to action. Socinians, Arminians, and Arians, all attack our version. As the case

is desperate, the opposition is determined. When the assailants fail in argument, they increase in confidence, and,

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by pouring contempt on their Calvinistic opponents, they vainly hope to drive them off the field. Dr. Adam Clarke represents the text as pitifully misunderstood by the Calvinists, and the Bishop of Down and Connor quotes with approbation Pyle and Grotius, who pronounce those blind who cannot see the propriety of their new version. Dr. A. Clarke very properly observes, that we should be careful to examine what a word means, before we attempt to fix its meaning. He then proceeds thus : « Whatever τεταγμένοι << may mean, which is the word we translate ordained, it is “ neither προτεταγμένοι nor προορισμένοι, which the Apostle uses, but τεταγμένοι, which includes no idea of preordina"tion or predestination of any kind." What! Has the Doctor forgotten his favorite maxim, that with the De it past knowledge and present knowledge are the same?Or does he need to be told, that with God to destine and to predestinate, to ordain and to preordain, are all one? The Doctor's criticism, made with so much pomp, depends upon the absurd hypothesis, that there are in the divine mind new thoughts, purposes, and determinations! Grant that any were ordained to eternal life, and—unless there be in the divine mind variableness and shadow of turningthe conclusion inevitably follows, that they were pre-ordained. The word translated ordained, our opponents render. disposed, well disposed, or possessed of good dispositions. On this translation I would make the following remarks :

1. It substitutes a far-fetched meaning (if any meaning at all) for an ordinary one. Whether is that system more likely to be true, which takes words in their common acceptation, or that which constantly needs the aid of farfetched meanings?

2. I do not conceive that it has ever been satisfactorily proved, that the word has any such meaning as that assigned to it by our opponents. The instances adduced by Whitby, to prove that the word signifies persons internally disposed, and not outwardly ordained-though relied on with great confidence by the Lord Bishop of Down and Conner, and other Anti-Calvinistic writers-appear to me altogether unsatisfactory. If I am not much mistaken, they completely fail in establishing the point. In affixing to a word a meaning which has not been generally received, and which is disputed, it is necessary to quote instances which cannot be explained on the principle of any of its ordinary significations. I lay down this as a canon, which

I flatter myself no candid critic will controvert. On the principle of this canon, I proceed to examine Whitby's instances. His first is, "Acts xx. 13, St. Paul went on foot to Assos “ έτω γαρ ην διατεταγμένος, for so he was disposed to do." Now, I appeal to every candid critic, if the Doctor's translation be not quite gratuitous, and if the words would not be more naturally translated thus-for so he was appointed according to mutual arrangement. The preposition dia shows that an arrangement had been made between Paul and the ship's company.

The Doctor's second instance is Ecclus. x. 1, ηγημονια συνετον τεταγμένη εσται, “ The government of the wise man "will be well ordered or disposed." But this refers not to the internal dispositions of the mind, but to the external administration of government. It is, therefore, totally inapplicable.

His third instance is Philo's address to Cain, "Thou "needest not fear being killed by them who are av on << τεταγμένοι Συμαχία, "ranked on thy side," i. e. of the "same dispositions and affections." Now, to say that this Greek phrase is designed to express the internal dispositions, and not the external hostilities of the enemies of the church, is nothing but a mere begging of the question.

His fourth instance is the words of Philo respecting "those children, who, having had vicious parents, have "themselves proved virtuous." He says that they are aμEIVU TETAYμEVOI Tags," placed in a better rank." And, speaking of Esau and Jacob, he represents Esau as fierce, subject to anger and other passions, and governed by his brutish part; but Jacob as a lover of virtue and truth, and 50 εν τη βελτίονι τεταγμένον τάξει, " placed in a better rank "of men, or one of a better temper and disposition." Jacob was placed in a better rank; but who placed him? was it God or himself? The children mentioned above were placed in a better rank, but who placed them? was it God or themselves? To say that either Jacob or those children wrought in themselves good dispositions, and by this means placed themselves in a better rank, is a barefaced begging of the question, and contrary to the whole tenor of Revelation. (Rom. ix. 11-13, ("For the chil"dren being not yet born, neither having done any good or "evil, that the purpose of God according to election might "stand, not of works, but of him that calleth ;) It was

"said unto her, The elder shall serve the younger. As it "is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated."

His fifth instance is still less to the purpose. Samuel was Terayuevos Asw," one well disposed towards God.". This I regard as a complete mistranslation-ew is the dative of the agent. The clause should be translated, “Samuel was ordained, appointed, or placed By God" (according as the context may require.) The rule of syntax which warrants this translation is the following: Agens aliquando effertur in dativo ; sic, τι πεπρακται τοις αλλοισ ; Quid ab aliis factum est ?

Whitby's last instance would induce one to think, that he had abandoned the meaning for which he was contending, and had completely come over to the Calvinistic camp. It is the words of Epictetus, από θεου τεταγμενος εις ταυτην την Tağıv, being by God placed in that rank. The person here is represented as placed in a rank, not by his own inclinations or dispositions, but by God, or in other words, by divine ordination and appointment-God exciting him, as Simplicius interprets. -Now, surely this instance, so far from overturning, completely establishes, the received version. On the whole, we deny the word rerayusvo has-in any one of those instances—the meaning which our oppo nents attempt to impose upon it. The most learned lexicographers and philologists acknowledge no such meaning. Schleusner does not recognise it-his translation of the text is, "Quot quot destinati erant a Deo felicitati Chris"tianorum æternæ."-And the learned Morus, though a decided Anticalvinist, translates it thus: "Atque eam (doctrinam) amplexi sunt fide quicunque felicitati æternæ destinati erant. Whether Dr. A. Clarke's charge of prejudice do not recoil upon himself, and on Anticalvinists in general, the learned reader is now left to judge. Should criticism fail, the Lord Bishop of Down and Connor imagines he can make his escape, by alleging that God ordained to eternal life the persons mentioned, on the foresight of their good dispositions-but the evasion will not do.-From the beginning of Genesis to the end of Revelation-from the creation of the world down to the present day, his Lordship will not find one single person possessed of good dispositions till implanted by the Almighty. In Scripture we read, not that those who were foreseen to be holy, or possessed of good dispositions, were chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world, but that " we