this is a dangerous experiment. For even fuppofing good fenfe, good temper, and internal merit of every fort, which is a very favourable fuppofition, yet a new connection upon these qualifications is rarely formed. It generally or rather always happens, that fuch qualifications, the only folid foundation of an indiffoluble connection, are rendered altogether invisible by fatiety of enjoyment creating difguft.

One effect of custom, different from any that have been explained, muft not be o→ mitted, because it makes a great figure in human nature. Custom augments moderate pleasures, and diminishes those that are intense. It has a different effect with refpect to pain; for it blunts the edge of every fort of pain and diftrefs great and fmall. Uninterrupted mifery therefore is attended with one good effect. If its torments be inceffant, cuftom hardens us to bear them.

It is extremely curious, to remark the gradual changes that are made in forming habits. Moderate pleasures are augmented gradually by reiteration till they become

habitual;

habitual; and then are at their height. But they are not long stationary; for from that point they gradually decay till they vanish altogether. The pain occafioned by the want of gratification, runs a very different course. This pain increases uniformly; and at last becomes extreme, when the pleasure of gratification is reduced to nothing.

-It fo falls out

That what we have we prize not to the worth,
Whiles we enjoy it; but being lack'd and lost,
Why then we rack the value; then we find
The virtue that poffeffion would not fhew us
Whilft it was ours.

Much ado about nothing, att 4. fc. 2.

The effect of custom with relation to a fpecific habit, is difplayed through all its varieties in the ufe of tobacco. The tafte of this plant is at firft extremely unpleasant. Our disgust leffens gradually till it vanish altogether; at which period the plant is neither agreeable nor difagreeable. Continuing the use, we begin to relish it; and our relish increases by ufe till it come to its utmost extent. From this ftate it gradually decays, while the habit becomes stronger

and

and ftronger, and confequently the pain of want. The refult is, that when the habit has acquired its greatest vigor, the pleasure yof gratification is gone, And hence it is, that we often fmoke and take fnuff habiStually, without fo much as being conscious of the operation. We must except gratification after the pain of want; because gratification in that cafe is at the height when the habit is strongeft. kind with the joy one feels upon being delivered from the rack, the caufe of which is explained above*. This pleasure however is but occafionally the effect of habit; and however exquifite, is guarded against as much as poffible, by preventing want.

It is of the fame

With regard to the pain of want, I can difcover no difference betwixt a generic and fpecific habit the pain is the fame in both. But thefe habits differ widely with refpect to the pofitive pleasure. I have had occafion to obferve, that the pleasure of a fpecific habit decays gradually till it become imperceptible. Not fo the pleasure of a ge

neric habit. So far as I can discover, this pleasure fuffers little or no decay after it comes to its height. The variety of gratification preferves it entire. However it may be with other generic habits, the obfervation I am certain holds with refpect to the pleasures of virtue and of knowledge. The pleasure of doing good has fuch an unbounded scope, and may be fo variously gratified, that it can never decay. Science is equally unbounded; and our appetite for knowledge has an ample range of gratification, where discoveries are recommended by novelty, by variety, by utility, or by all of

them.

Here is a large field of facts and experiments, and several phenomena unfolded, the causes of which have been occafionally fuggefted. The efficient cause of the power of custom over man, a fundamental point in the prefent chapter, has unhappily evaded keenest search; and now I am reduced to hold it an original branch of the human conftitution, though I have no better reafon for my opinion, than that I cannot refolve it into any other principle. But with respect VOL. II.

my

to

to the final caufe, a point of ftill greater importance, I promise myself more fuccefs. It cannot indeed have efcaped any thinking perfon, that the power of cuftom is a happy contrivance for our good. Exquifite pleafure produceth fatiety: moderate pleasure becomes ftronger by cuftom. Bufinefs is our province, and pleasure our relaxation only. Hence, fatiety is neceffary to check exquifite pleasures, which otherwife would ingrofs the mind, and unqualify us for bufinefs. On the other hand, habitual increase of moderate pleafure, and even conversion of pain into pleasure, are admirably contrived for disappointing the malice of Fortune, and for reconciling us to whatever course of life may be our lot:

How ufe doth breed a habit in a man!
This fhadowy defert, unfrequented woods,
I better brook than flourishing peopled towns.
Here I can fit alone, unfeen of any,
And to the nightingale's complaining notes
Tune my diftreffes, and record my woes.

Two Gentlemen of Verona, at 5. f. 4.

The foregoing distinction betwixt intense

and