me a sympathetic understanding of the administrative problems of Government.

My understanding of the necessary interrelationships between the branches of government was sharpened during my service on the Presidential Commission on Intergovernmental Relations during the Eisenhower administration, and my association with the judiciary occurred when I was a young attorney serving as referee for a probate court.

My years as a White House staff member taught me certain lessons about administration of the executive branch, and I am reminded of something that Jesse Unruh, California's long-time Speaker of the House, said to me during a conference in which I sided with the Executive. Jesse commented, "Brooks, you have been out of Congress too long." But I have not been out of Congress long enough to blind me to the grave dangers of further erosion in the legislative branch's authority under the Constitution.

I strongly favor the underlying principles of Senator Ervin's bill which is cosponsored by a majority of his colleagues. Congress should act at once to set up these or comparable procedures to prevent distortions growing out of the assertion of power by the executive department which the Constitution never intended that it have.

There had been infractions, of course, prior to the recent actions of this administration which have focused public attention upon the problem. Actions by the Executive to which I believe Senator Ervin and other members correctly object are not inspired by an alien, and sinister, or new influence in the Government. But just as a snowball becomes larger the longer it rolls, so the invasions of legislative authority become more menacing with neglect. Something must be done about it. I hope that the White House will cooperate with the Legislature in seeking a solution.

This and other administrations have tended to forget an elementary principle of Government; namely, that the White House function in the giant operations of the National Government is to coordinate, counsel with, and sometimes command but not continually to regiment. The departments must not be regarded a feifdom by the White House staff, some of whom are always novices.

Back in 1947 there was an abortive movement toward a democratically-constructed congressional budget. It is regrettable that the plan was effectively abandoned, due largely to the reluctance of so many congressional leaders, both Senators and Representatives, to do away with familiar practices. Such a movement should redevelop today, for more than 20 years ago there was overwhelming evidence that the present fragmented committee handling of the budget often leads to ridiculous results.

As Harold D. Smith, former Director of the Budget, once observed in an address before the American Political Science Association on December 28, 1939:

The wall of formality which the separation of powers theory has erected between the Executive and the Congress needs adjustment where it separates the budgeting and appropriating process. This process must in its very nature be a joint enterprise of the Executive and the Congress.

The activities of the legislative-when I speak of the legislative, I am speaking of the jurisdiction of the substantive Legislative-and

Appropriation Committees must be better coordinated if we are to develop improved substantive decisions. Likewise, there should be better coordination of action by the separate Senate and House committees.

As I walked out of the House Office Building one day with the late Representative Preston of Georgia, we met a delegation from the Pentagon, a dozen generals and admirals on their way to the Armed Services Committee. They were accompanied by aides who carried books and documents. "Here," said my colleague. "Is something symbolic of a significant aspect of the American Government, the preeminence of the civilian authority and the importance of the legislative process. We must not permit it to be lost."

"You see," he added, "they are coming to us; they must ask us for the power they wield."

But there are no built-in guarantees, Mr. Chairman, that this relation will continue. Without intelligent handling of the processes of Government, the system can become weakened.

It is unfortunate, Mr. Chairman, that the Congress is often illequipped to maintain its authority, chiefly because Congress does not vote its committees the funds that are essential to build a professional service with adequate facilities and skills that can match that of the executive department. Congress should amend the Reorganization Acts and thereby help to bring the Legislature into a more viable relationship with the Executive.

We might profit by having a symbolic meeting place. Presently, the Executive comes to Congress to propose or inform and, on the occasion of delivering a veto message, to scold.

The White House may or may not be getting its way. The Congress may or may not be getting its way. The mile from the Capitol to the White House often looks like a very long mile. Maybe Charles L'Enfant should have included a halfway house between the two where differences might be resolved without the agonies of a power struggle which sometimes leaves one side with a gloating victory and the other an unnecessary loss of prestige.

Mr. Chairman, I am speaking impersonally and in a nonpartisan spirit. Perhaps President Nixon feels that there is a vacuum into which functionaries under his command should move. I would insist, however, that Congress should take notice of the Executive's occasional unwarranted assertion of power and, at the same time, become less tolerant of its own procedural errors.

In other words, the procedural distortions at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue must be met by procedural clarifications at this end of the avenue. Only Congress can meet this situation, and it will require a boldness equal to that with which past and present Executives have invaded the authority of Congress.

On the question of impoundment. I want to acknowledge the admirable desire of Presidents to avoid waste. There seems to be validity to claims that this has been the purpose of some impoundment actions. But if Mr. Ehrlichman's comments on various television shows are to be accepted at face value, there have been less acceptable motivations behind recent impoundment actions.

The Executive has substituted its judgment about priorities and disbursements for that of the Congress. Mr. Ehrlichman defended

impoundment by comparing the position of the Executive to a customer in a grocery store who was given too much money to spend and too brief a period in which to spend it. He argued that it was not possible to spend the money intelligently, so there was no longer any duty to spend it.

The analogy is weak. An appropriation is not a mandate to spend every cent by a given date on articles chosen by the executive branch. The mandate is to purchase specific things or services at the best price and this legislative direction, in the form of an appropriation statute, is beyond the arbitrary power of the Executive to change. He is expected only to exercise the standards of good stewardship.

It seems to me that this is basic in the constitutional pattern. However, I recognize that unless the finest craftsmanship is practiced, we will bog down in legalisms at the expense of economy.

If I may make one suggestion regarding the language of S. 373, Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that, as drawn, the bill only permits the Congress to vote the impoundment "up or down." There is no provision for partial approval.

It would be wise, I believe, to recognize that there might be appealing reasons for allowing executive impoundment of some portion of

an amount.

I believe the Congress should focus on two courses of action: (1) A clear legislative delineation of the limited Executive powers with reference to impoundment; and (2) Improved communications between the Executive and the Congress so that the wisest and best course can be laid out, and the public interest be conserved, without resort to a power struggle.

The second is as important as the first.

If the frailties of human nature produce dubious determinations by the Executive and intransigent responses by the legislative branch, we can also assure that the latent concern for the public conscience can be so stimulated that technical considerations of power will give way to mutually acceptable courses of actions and the tensions be avoided.

One illustration comes to mind. In 1959, the two Houses of Congress sent to the President an historic piece of legislation designed to relieve the TVA of annual bickerings over financing, and to fix precisely the geographical boundaries for that agency.

I was one of the three directors, the others being Brig. Gen. H. D. Vogel and Mr. Arnold Jones. President Eisenhower asked us to meet him in the White House to discuss a phase of the legislation which raised strong reservations in his mind regarding his approval of the bill. His objection was based on the possibility of an impairment of executive power which, as President, he was determined to prevent. "I will not permit the authority of the Presidency in this vital area to be eroded. Unless my fears are dispelled, I will have to veto this bill."

Those fears were not fully removed after a long discussion, and the Board members decided to contact the leadership of Senate and House, both Republican and Democratic, and if they would agree to put through a clarifying bill to allay Presidential fears, the landmark measure would be signed immediately by President Eisenhower. This was agreed upon.

The Speaker and the other House leaders promptly agreed, as did the Senate leaders, and the President signed the bill when the gentlemen's agreement was conveyed to him. The promises were immediately carried out.

This demonstrates, may I say to the committee, the wisdom of cooperation as an adjunct of strict respect by both the legislative and executive branches of Government. Thus I firmly believe that many of the confrontations now brewing between the two branches can be avoided by exercising a very elemental human characteristic-cooperation and human respect.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHILES. Senator Ervin.

Senator ERVIN. I wish to thank you for stating that the actions by the Executive, to which I and other members object, are not inspired by an alien and sinister or new influence in the Government.

To corroborate your statement in that respect, I would point out again, as I have pointed out before in these hearings, that in his wonderful farewell address to the American people, George Washington said that occupants of public office have a love of power and a proneness to abuse it, and he proceeded to say that it was just as necessary to preserve, as it was to establish originally, the division of separation of powers of Government among the three branches of Government: the executive, legislative, and judicial. He said that the Founding Fathers made that division or separation because they believed that each branch of the Government would resist encroachments upon its constitutional domain by other branches of the Government, and in that way, the Constitution itself would be preserved and carried out.

I think that is absolutely true. That is the reason that some of us in the Congress are opposed to the recent action of the President of impounding funds which were authorized to be expended by appropriation acts which Congress had passed, and which the President, in most every case, had signed into law, and thereby manifested his approval.

Now, I think there was an orderly way for the President to do this, and that was to do what he attempted to do in the budget for the fiscal year of July 1 of this year, and that is to recommend the elimination of programs which he deems undesirable, by an act of Congress, not by executive power. He should recommend a curtailment of, or elimination of, any appropriations which he thinks are not necessary or warranted, and give the Congress the benefit of his advice and let the Congress take its own course of action with reference to appropriations.

To me it is a great tragedy that the President saw fit to impound so many of these funds right in the middle of a fiscal year. I do not yield to the President in my desire to see the Federal financial house in order. That has been put in disorder for many years by the combined irresponsible financial actions of the Presidents and the Congress, both of them.

I am proud to say I have cosponsored a proposed constitutional amendment to these things, I have voted for decreasing the debt limit, because I think the debt limit should be kept down. We will either have to take an honest course of action and eliminate some Government

spending, or we will have to leave enough taxes to take care of our expenditures.

I think it is irresponsible for a President to recommend that Congress make appropriations which he knows can only be carried out by deficit financing, or for Congress to pass bills provided for expenditures without providing taxes to cover those expenditures.

To my mind there is something fundamentally irresponsible about that, and I am glad I have not participated to a very large extent in that.

Now, for example, the President proposed last year to merge the school bills. I voted against it. I knew we did not have any money, and I thought the bill provided for too much interference by HEW in the schools of the States. So I voted against it. But it was recommended by the President, and after the President had recommended passage of that bill over my vote, HEW went to the public school authorities in North Carolina, and urged them to take advantage of the Federal funds which Congress and the President, by their joint making of that law, had assured them would be available for the current fiscal year. So they went out and hired hundreds of teachers under this bill, and other personnel, and then right in the middle of the fiscal year, after these teachers were under contract to carry on to the end of this year, the meat ax descended and those funds were cut off.

Well, I voted to uphold the President's veto of the Environmental Protection Agency provision, because I thought, being not used to such large dollar figures, I thought it was too big to offer and there were some provisions in there I did not like, those in regard to the appropriation process, because I believe it is good for Congress to look at everything twice.

I voted to sustain the President's veto, but it was overruled by an overwhelming majority and I felt it was then the duty of the President under his oath to support the Constitution, and also his duty to make sure the laws were faithfully executed, to carry out the provisions of that authorization and contract, made by the appropriation

act.

But the President impounded a large amount of those funds.

I do not think there is any way under the Constitution for the President to express his disapproval of appropriations but to veto them. I think when the veto is overridden that his constitutional power is exhausted, and the usurpation-thereafter refusal, to carry out appropriations is unconstitutional unless exclusively given by law by Congress to exercise discretion in the matter.

So I resist these things because I have always heard that every journey to a forbidden end starts with a single step, and if this Congress sits supinely by and does not resist this encroachment on its authority over the purse, then the kind of republic which the Constitution was ordained to create, will be destroyed, and we will be in the situation of which Benjamin Franklin warned, that we might not be able to keep the republic the Constitution gives us.

We had a lot of startling testimony by a very distinguished man yesterday, the present occupant of the Office of Deputy Attorney General. About the only thing he would concede, if I interpret his remarks correctly, in respect to appropriations, he said if Congress directed the President to spend a particular sum to pay a particular