is being influenced by parties who do not want to see the ICC strengthened or made more effective. But for whatever the reason they have impounded these funds, it certainly cannot be for "sound fiscal management," and the impounding definitely runs contrary to policy enacted by Congress and signed into law by the President.

Nor can I see how "sound fiscal management" plays a role in a conflict which arose over a proposed basin-wide study of the Colorado River in Texas. The river is a large one, touching or passing through 52 Texas counties and serving as the sole source of water for much of its basin. The study was ordered by the Environmental Protection Agency. The quarrel which arose with the OMB was not over spending the funds, but over the manner in which the funds were to be spent. Congress passed an appropriation for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to conduct a study to be funded 90 per cent by the federal government and 10 per cent by the state. The OMB insisted that EPA conduct the study and that it be funded on a 50-50 matching basis. I won't go into the delays and negotiations-we have all gone through similar ordeals. In the end-9 months later it was agreed that the Corps of Engineers could conduct the study but that it would be funded on a 50-50 matching basis. And I found myself in the interesting position of having to persuade my folks back home to act contrary to a law I had specifically requested-just in order to get anything done.

The OMB acted as judge and jury-not on fiscal concern, but on a jurisdictional approach. The OMB decided who was to do the study and how it was to be done; the question of money hardly entered into it.

According to testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, the OMB ignores not only the mandates and laws of Congress, but also the advice of experts within the Executive Branch itself. The specific instance I refer to here concerns the guidelines the EPA had drawn up (as it was required to do under the law) for states to follow on establishing and fulfilling air and water pollution standards. The OMB revised these guidelines, and, according to witnesses, revised them to reflect industry's point of view rather than the public point of view. It is not a question of whether we as Members would favor industry or the public, but rather that OMB decided these questions of law.

There was a further interesting instance, reported in the February 2, 1972, issue of The Washington Post. It concerned a comprehensive plan by the Environmental Protection Agency to save our mighty Great Lakes. The Congress, it appears, shall not have an opportunity to discuss the merits of this proposal because the article relates that the OMB has already vetoed it.

Thus we have the OMB substituting its own views for that of the Congress on matters of legislation and substituting its own views for those of the experts in EPA on matters of environmental protection.

These are specific examples of how the OMB ignores the Congress and dictates its own priorities and policies. The scope of these actions comes clear when we take a look at the full range of frozen funds.

We can look at the $58 million for rural sewer and water grants and realize that this represents some 2,000 pending applications from small communities whose hopes for water and sewer facilities stand stagnant.

We can look at the hundreds of millions of funds for the Department of Housing and Urban Development being withheld and realize this means people are going without adequate housing in the richest country on earth. And we can realize that aid for acute and almost incomprehensible urban problems are to be delayed yet another year, and another year, and another.

We can look at the $50 million being withheld from the Farmers Home Administration farm operating loan fund and we can make all the speeches we want praising the family farm-but those farms will go right on dying all the faster without those funds.

We can look at the terrible damage the OMB has done to the Model Cities Program, the Food Stamps Program, water and sewer programs, mass transportation projects, urban renewal, and the Environmental Protection Agency— but I think we can agree that nowhere can we look at a more callous disregard of the Congress and the people by the President and the OMB than in the action they have taken to gut the nation's health care programs.

In no other area has the need been shown so clearly. In no other area has the Congress expressed its policy and intent more emphatically. Yet we find that although the Congress has authorized more than $1.3 billion for health care programs in fiscal 1973, the OMB budget calls for only $438.7 million. Al

though the Hill-Burton authorization is $417.5 million, the OMB budget calls for no, I repeat, no money for construction of hospitals and public health centers. As one distinguished colleague, the Honorable Paul Rogers, pointed out in the May 10, 1972, Congressional Record, it simply is false economy not to provide a $2 measles vaccination to prevent an unborn child from suffering possible mental retardation that will cost $100,000 for a lifetime of care. I think the gentleman from Florida expressed the sentiments of us all when he said, "I am weary and I think the Congress is weary of this usurpation of the powers of the Congress to legislate by accountants who view human suffering in terms of dollars and cents and the intentions of the Congress as minor considerations." That, my colleagues, is what the OMB is doing to this, the efforts of the Congress, to provide for the general welfare of the country. The violence this agency is doing to the separation of powers in this government-and what these experiences should teach us that can mean for the future-honestly frightens me, honestly makes me angry.

Of course, the OMB and the President claim to justify impounding of funds under the guise of holding down deficit spending and fighting inflation. The words "massive cutbacks in federal spending" swing back and forth like the pendulum in Poe's pit. And I am as concerned as the President or anyone else about the massive deficits we are facing these days.

I understand the predicted deficit for fiscal 1973 already runs between $35 and $38 million.

But the surprising thing about "massive cutbacks in federal spending" is that the total amount impounded last year was surprisingly small compared to the deficit in the budget. Some $11 billion was impounded—at least some of which was legitimately impounded for financial administration. But the deficit last year was $40 billion. The OMB claims $9.4 billion of this $11 billion was held in reserve for routine financial administration. That leaves $1.5 billion "to carry out broad economic . . . objectives."-$1.5 billion compared to a deficit of $40 billion makes all the headlines and speeches over massive cutbacks pale a little. It appears it's not how much is cut back, but where it is cut that is the real crux of this matter. The Administration's anti-inflation cuts might ring a little truer if at the same time he was impounding funds for loans to farmers he wasn't releasing loan funds for Lockheed Aircraft. His claims would ring a little truer if at the same time he was impounding funds for health care and food stamps, he wasn't requesting and fighting desperately for funds to build a Super-Sonic Transport. His claims would ring a little truer if at the same time he was impounding funds for water and sewer systems he wasn't costing the Treasury hundreds of millions of dollars by giving big busineses new tax breaks.

No, I am concerned as much as anyone about the large deficits we face, but that is not the issue here. The issue here is who shall determine the priorities, the Congress or the President through the OMB.

ALTERNATIVES

If we, the Congress, are to remain a viable, democratic body in this government, then some soul-searching is in order.

Some have suggested that we make our appropriations mandatory. Mandatory appropriations can, however, create a direct confrontation with the President.

President Kennedy, in the battle over the B-70 bomber, managed to get mandatory language removed from the appropriations bill. President Nixon vetoed the Hospital Construction Bill because of language prohibiting the impounding of authorized funds. There is nothing to guarantee that a President wouldn't impound funds in spite of mandatory language. However, it would appear that such a situation would give affected individuals the opportunity to sue and bring before a court this whole issue of a President's constitutional power to impound funds. I am aware of Congress' reluctance to take such a measure and I do not actively advocate it at the present time. However, we should certainly discuss and explore the possibilities. It may well become necessary.

Especially in conjunction with a mandatory appropriation, it must be recognized that the major source for the abuse of impounding is the lack of an item veto for the President. Rather than veto an entire appropriation because he disagrees with part of it, the President instead impounds the items he finds offensive. In doing so, he neither bears the political consequences for the veto

nor faces the possibilitiy of the Congress overriding his action. It may be that if the President's practice of impounding is to be curtailed, some form of item veto should or could be considered.

Several of my able colleagues, including Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina and Congressman William Anderson of Tennessee, have suggested we require the President to submit a statement to Congress whenever he impounds any funds. The Congress then would have 60 days to approve the impounding or the funds would have be released. Or-the Congress might have a certain number of days to overrule the impounding or else the action would stand as though approved. Either certainly would give us more control than we presently have. Of course, just giving Congress notice of any impoundment would be an improvement over the present situation. As you all are aware, just getting information out of OME is a problem in itself.

In recognition of the lack of fiscal information from OMB, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 contained a requirement that the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of the Treasury develop standard classifications of programs, activities, receipts, and expenditures of federal agencies and a standardized information and data processing system for budgetary and fiscal data. The Comptroller General was required to ensure that the interests and needs of Congress be taken into consideration in the establishment and operation of the information system. In February of this year, the Office of the Comptroller General released its document on the Budgetary and Fiscal Information Needs of the Congress. This document needs to be studied and steps taken to implement its suggestions. Unless we have detailed and impartial information on the activities of OMB, we cannot effectively cope with its abuse of power. Our distinguished colleague from California, Mr. John Moss, has proposed the creation of a Select Committee on the Office of Management and Budget. The purpose of the committee would be to make a complete investigation and study of OMB. The creation of this committee appears to have a great deal of support and would go a long way toward providing the information we need to cope with OMB.

This approach should reflect a serious non-partisan attempt to recapture the lawful rights of Congress in matters of appropriations. This committee should be composed of the leadership of the Appropriations Committee and other senior chairmen of related committees, and should set as its goal any criteria necessary as to who has the final word on the spending of taxpayers' money.

Perhaps OMB should have some latitude, but this give and take must be expressed in guidelines that are clear enough to eliminate some of the vagueness that has been associated with the freezing of expenditures.

It has been suggested that the Government Accounting Office be given authority over impounding by OMB to determine if an impoundment is done legally and for fiscal purposes. Although this would not give Congress any greater control, it could lessen the abuses of OMB and is worth looking into.

Greater authority over OMB might be given to the Appropriations Committees. Perhaps the committees should be given authority to approve all impoundments. Perhaps the committees could be given more economists, accountants, and computer technology for greater budget oversight and control.

The OMB has about 650 employees. The House Appropriations Committee has 47 staff members. It is easy to see why the odds are lopsided. I think we should seriously consider equalizing the odds a bit.

It seems that we are quick to call for reform of many of our institutions, but more at a turtle's pace in our own House.

As it stands now, the authorization and appropriation process is a bit lackadaisical and couched in strategy plays.

The authorizing committees, more often than not, simply plug in an X-figure in some programs and processes-second-guessing that the funds will be reduced somewhere in the appropriations process.

Appropriation committees routinely, or nearly so in many instances, accept the expertise and economic justification of the authorizing committee-with one eye toward OMB half-heartedly thinking that OMB will cut back overexpenditures.

This loose-jointed approach serves no good purpose, and, at best, is an exercise in fiscal buck-passing.

I don't want to leave the opinion that the Appropriation Committees loosely considers appropriations. Normally the appropriations are less than the authorizations and this is because the members of the Appropriations Committees try to recommend a minimum amount or certainly not a maximum amount. We can be

thankful that the Appropriations Committee operates in this manner. But even so, the Appropriations Committee really doesn't know what money absolutely is needed whether the money previously appropriated has been or is being wisely spent. The Appropriations Committee generally has to take the word of the agencies down the street. Somehow there ought to be an accountability of all the programs we have created. Somehow each agency or department ought to have to prove that the programs already passed are effective. I have the feeling that we take somebody's word and by and large continue ad infinitum programs that have become outdated or have lost their usefulness or principal thrust.

The Congress should assert its own control over the financial matters of this nation.

It may be that none of the alternatives I have mentioned are either possible or practical. I mention them only as food for thought and a foundation from which to begin. I certainly welcome others. My main purpose today is to create a dialogue that hopefully might lead to an end to encroachment by the President and OMB on the constitutional duties and powers of Congress.

In the process of establishing different procedures to control expenditures the Congress has reached a new plateau in the OMB. The Congress has attempted in the past to control its own budget and budget limitations, but has failed to do so. This does not mean that the present system is the perfect answer. Obviously it gives all the prerogatives to the President and the OMB. That responsibility should be in the hands of the Congress.

We come to focal point in the whole question: Who should have the final word in appropriating money or in the expenditure of funds? Either the OMB or the President has the final authority or responsibility, or the Congress has it. It is constitutionally clear that the Congress, the people, were not only intended, but designated, to perform this responsibility. Therefore, the Congress ultimately must face this responsibility or else by acquiescence, direct and indirect, we relinquish the rights that were intended under the Constitution. The Congress must face this issue honestly and forthrightly.

Briefly, in that special order, I said if matters continued on their present course that we "might as well make paper airplanes out of the laws we pass." I urged that we not be lulled by the slow steps of executive power-that we realize honest and crucial constitutional issues are at stake that we realize unless the Congress maintains its power over the purse it is nothing.

I asked that we realize the day may come when our constituents asked us for aid and we could do nothing.

That day is here, fast bearing down upon this Congress. The steps this Executive has taken have not been slow-and neither must be those of the Congress.

It would be humorous, if it were not so serious, but I am hard pressed just to keep up with what congressional programs are being abolished daily with the stroke of an Executive pen.

Unless we take steps this year to restore Congress as an equal branch in the Government we may disappear from the halls of actual

Government.

We will not be able to maintain the faith that those who elected us entrusted to us. We will not be able to offer them hope for a better life. We will not be able to extend charity to those who are needy. Our words and our actions in the Congress might become as "sounding brass and tinkling cymbal"-and maybe little else.

There is an old Taoist saying inscribed in the great Audience Hall of the Forbidden City in Peking. It reads, "Through not doing, all things are done." Perhaps all things will be done-but not by the U.S. Congress unless we resume our proper role in this Government. The matter of Executive impoundment at its heart is far more than a matter of congressional prerogatives. That fact cannot be emphasized enough.

At the heart of the matter is what kind of Government we shall have-one-man rule-or a republic.

At the heart of a republic is the issue of who shall control the spending of that government's tax moneys.

It's just that simple-at the heart.

In the whole spectrum of things, however, it is not so simple. The President believes he has the voice of the people behind him bcause he is working to cut Federal spending and everyone except the person affected wants to cut Federal spending.

To decide where to cut, the President has ordered his Office of Management and Budget to go over every Federal program.

But that is just the point. To oppose the specific cuts the administration recommend is neither inflationary-nor irresponsible. For it is the constitutional right and duty of the Congress not of a star chamber government composed of the President and his OMB-to make the final decision on where Federal funds shall be spent.

Let me make it clear that I do not advocate wholesale spending. I think the Congress has a clear duty to maintain spending controls upon itself.

It is a duty we have, frankly, failed in the past. We must meet it now or get out of the ball game. This confrontation was an inevitable as it is timely. It is good that we have this confrontation-and it should be approached on a nonpartisan basis.

Nor do I think the President has no role at all in the determination of where to spend our tax revenues. Indeed, he has a very great role. His views and his expertise and that of his staff are invaluable assets in shaping our Federal programs and Federal budget.

For instance, the new budget which the President sent to the Congress this week contains the abolishment of several programs and is bound to raise a hue and cry in the Halls of Congress.

But I do not discard his proposals out of hand. I think it is well that he has made his proposals. I trust he presents a strong case for his proposals before the Congress.

But let us not get so caught up in the problems and rhetoric of too much Government spending that we forget the basic constitutional problem of impounded funds-which is to say the final word over which programs are to be funded must-constitutionally come from the Congress.

I think that whether a program finally lives or dies is a matter to be settled in hearings before the elected representatives of the people here in the Congress not in a back room of the Executive Office Building far from public view.

That is why the legislation we consider today is the very essence of the present constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of this Government.

If the President can send a budget here, the Congress makes amendments and lawfully passes the final appropriations, and then the President spends money only as he originally intended to, then something is

amiss.

A budget drawn up by the OMB seems to carry here the force of law. And an act of Congress signed by the President does not.

If the President goes on to cut off in midstream programs which even he has requested, then something is drastically wrong.