the selfish good of the passions, asks, what is the true aim of being, and prescribes the highest good, as the end of human activity. Thus, we are brought to the third state of humanity; first, the period of impulses; secondly, of self-interest; thirdly, of rational aims, or the pursuit of the highest good, which produces real morality. In the best sense of the word, selflove is true morality; not, indeed, the love of following one's passions and low interests, but the desire to fulfil the true aim of one's being, and to govern self according to the idea of that universal order, which has been ordained by God.

The three states, mentioned above, are not found separately in any of the periods of life, but they coexist. Sometimes the impulses, self-interest and morality, prompt to the same action. Sometimes morality wars for a time with passion and self-love, and is victor or vanquished. The passions usually are first to show themselves, then self-interest appears, and reason gives the crown of completeness to the character. But these different states are found, more or less, in all minds.

They, who deny the existence of moral obligation, may be divided into three classes. One class maintains, that there can be no law of moral obligation, while a second asserts, that there really is none. These two classes deny the possibility of ethical science. A third class destroys the law, by mutilating it, and giving a false or imperfect representation of its foundation and extent. These deniers of moral obligation are to be met by an appeal to facts, in answer to the question, “Is there a law of moral obligation, or is there not? The appeal to the facts of human nature proves, that reason reveals to us an imperious law of action, superior to passion and self-interest,

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a law, which has witness of its sanctity in every human soul. They, who deny such a law of obligation, may do so; first, by asserting, a priori, and as a necessary result of a general principle, that there can be no such law; secondly, by not seeing among the facts of human nature the foundation principles of this law; and lastly, by mutilating the facts, although recognising them; thus substituting a false law of obligation for the

true one.

I. Now there are four systems, that belong to the first class, and deny the possibility of a law of moral obligation. These are pantheism, mysticism, skepticism, and necessity, or the system that denies the freedom of the will.

Pantheism, by denying the separate existence of man, and

1840.] Systems, that deny Moral Obligation.

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attributing all actions to God, destroys the doctrine of freewill.

Mysticism, by maintaining that it is impossible to do good in this world, and the human soul is powerless, while on earth, recommends the passive state, as the only reasonable one, and prevents the holding any rules of moral obligation.

Skepticism denies that there can be any certain knowledge, either on the ground of the contradictions of human opinion, or of the little trust-worthiness of the human faculties, even in cases where human judgments might not differ.

The doctrine of necessity, which, more or less, runs through the three other systems, is sometimes brought forward by itself, and must deny the possibility of a law of moral obligation.

A lecture is devoted to a consideration of the system of necessity, especially as expounded by Hobbes and Hume. If the author's refutation of this system cannot boast the merit of originality, it may surely be recommended to all such as are not yet freed from perplexities regarding "fixed fate and freewill," as being the clearest known statement of the arguments for moral freedom. The remarkable article in favor of the doctrine of necessity, by the author of "Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions," has surely no more than Jouffroy's clearness, and far less breadth of vision.

The lecture on the system of Mysticism is a noble theological essay, as well as a beautiful piece of philosophy. It conclusively shows the pernicious results of the doctrine, that condemns this life as worthless and aimless, and as, of course, no sphere for real morality. The consequence, however, which the logician may draw from the mystic's denunciations of the world and contempt of life, is not always actually deduced by the mystic devotee. Sad, indeed, as have been the results of mysticism in dens and cells, both by encouraging idle dreaming and licentious surrender to the passions, the system has produced some noble fruits. All, who are acquainted with a Kempis, will love his mystic piety, and not deny its morality; and, doubtless, many contemplations, sublime as the Imitatio Christi, have taken place in cell of monk, and not been saved from oblivion.

Spinoza is taken as a representative of the Pantheistic system, and is considered at some length. This part of Jouffroy's work will be most novel to our philosophical inquirers. Very

little is known of Spinoza ; and since attention has of late been drawn to his works by a recent controversy, it is fortunate, that Jouffroy's survey of his system comes in aid of the very able pamphlet, just issued, regarding it. Our author brings the whole power of his transparent style and clear method to the elucidation of Spinoza, and yet does not profess fully to understand him. He thinks, that the Jewish Pantheist does not carry out his system to its logical results, but virtually gives the lie to his system, by asserting a law of moral obligation.

Next the system of Skepticism is considered. One lecture is given to a statement of it; another to its refutation; and a third to the Skepticism of the present age. This third lecture has already appeared in our journal.

II. Now closes the consideration of the four systems, that deny the possibility of moral obligation, and the author proceeds to the next class, and considers those, who destroy moral obligation, by overlooking the moral facts upon which it is based. He begins with the selfish system as represented by Hobbes, and then takes up that of Bentham. He gives to Hobbes the praise of perfect consistency with his main principle, but triumphantly refutes the assertion, that the love of pleasure is the sole motive of human actions. Without going so far as to vindicate the reality of disinterested virtue, it must be obvious to all, that many of our indifferent, or even inferior actions, are performed without any deliberate pursuit of pleasure or self-interest, and the baser passions blindly seek their own ends, without any reference to self-interest, or calculation of consequences.

Bentham's system of utility our author treats at great length, and shows plainly an inconsistency in the system, by the confounding individual utility with general utility. Bentham takes it almost for granted, that every individual seeks his own utility; and although this position is unwarranted, he goes on to assume, moreover, that the general utility is the true law of moral obligation. Whence this abrupt transition from individual utility to general utility he does not show.

III. Having disposed of the selfish systems, the author proceeds to the third class, those, which neither deny the possibility of moral obligation, nor place it in mere selfishness, but recognise the fact of disinterestedness, and yet mistake its true foundation.

The first systems of this third class are the sentimental. Of

these, Smith asserts the foundation of morality to be in sympathy; Hutcheson, in an instinctive sentiment, or moral sense; Shaftesbury, in benevolent affection; Butler, in a natural conscience, whose perceptions are immediate; Hume, in an instinct we have of what is useful; Rousseau and Jacobi, in feeling; Mackintosh, in a factitious love of ultimate good. Jouffroy does not quarrel with these authors for asserting the reality of moral sentiment, but because they make moral principle entirely dependant upon vague sentiment, and do not allow its foundation in the ideas of absolute reason. We could wish, that he had made his researches more complete upon these points, and considered more fully the German sentimentalists. Little is said of Jacobi, and nothing of Fries, whose philosophy makes great account of the sentiments.

The survey of the third class of imperfect systems closes by a view of the rational systems, which, the author deems, approach very nearly the truth. Price places the origin of moral obligation in the immediate perception of the qualities of action by the intellect, and is evidently the favorite moralist of Jouffroy. Price, however, is declared defective in this one point. He does not refer moral judgments to absolute ideas of the reason, but merely to the qualities of actions immediately perceived. Whereas, Jouffroy deems that there is an absolute good made known by the reason, and with reference to which all particular actions are judged. Hence, different moral judgments may be explained, without denying the immutability of moral good. If moral judgments are immediate perceptions, all minds ought to judge alike; but if they proceed from a reference of individual actions to an absolute law, there is full room for difference of opinion in regard to the application of the law to different circumstances, and all ground for denying the immutability of the absolute law is taken away. The mistakes of the calculator do not impeach the principles of arithmetic.

The system of Price is held virtually by Reid and Stewart. Jouffroy closes his review of rational systems of ethics, by applying his doctrine of the origin, in reason, of the law of absolute good to the system of Wollaston, who maintains virtue to consist in conformity to truth; to that of Clarke and Montesquieu, who define morality, as acting according to nature; to that of Malebranche, who refers virtue immediately to God; to that of Wolf, the disciple of Leibnitz, who has resolved the idea of good into that of perfection.

Thus ends the survey of ethical systems. A noble charity, as well as singular lucidity, pervades the whole. That element of truth, from narrow and exclusive attachment to which all false and partial systems spring, is always pointed out. So much justice is done to the authors whom Jouffroy most opposes, as to make us fear in the outset, lest he will be unable to meet the enemy, whose forces he has himself marshalled in the most advantageous array. A better era will dawn upon philosophy, and upon every controverted science, if this fair eclectic spirit is carried out, and men make due allowance for the truths and merits of opposing systems, without suffering charity, as is too often the case, to degenerate into indifference. To remarkable tolerance of all warring systems Jouffroy adds the most earnest faith in absolute truth and hearty attachment to his own mode of philosophizing, and its results.

With two comments we bring this cursory article to a close.

No one, who is the least conversant with the state of our community, will deny the great need of a work like that before us, or question its practical importance. There is not a single form of error combated by Jouffroy, which has not many representatives among us. With us, there are necessitarians of every kind; some phrenologically, some sensually, some religiously so; mystics, despising practical understanding and active virtue, and idolizing a vague ideality, that gives such intimations of better worlds, as to make the present life contemptible; pantheists, both of the materialist and spiritual schools; skeptics, some laughing at the follies of human judgments, others deploring the uncertainty of all knowledge, and the impossibility of absolute truth. There are, also, representatives of the selfish systems, in great abundance; Hobbists and Benthamites; the former taking a devilish joy in reducing all motives to the very lowest possible; the latter very benevolently declaring worldly utility as alike the motive and criterion of moral obligation. Indeed, there is pretty good reason to believe, that although Hobbism, whenever it should show its naked front, would be hooted at by our people, Benthamism would stand in no liability of the honors of martyrdom from the American nation.

We have also sentimentalists in plenty, -alike of the school of Rousseau and Byron, of Smith and Hutcheson, not to say anything of Richter and Carlyle. We have heard preach