Art. 12.-A STRATEGICAL RETROSPECT.

1. General Headquarters, 1914-1916, and its Critical Decisions. By General Erich von Falkenhayn. Hutchinson, 1919.

2. My War Memories, 1914-1918. By General Ludendorff. Hutchinson, 1919.

PART I

THE purpose of this article is to supplement the series which appeared in the Quarterly Review' during the war by discussing some phases which, as we look backward, appear as landmarks in the general perspective. It is concerned more with the conduct of the war than with the strategy of campaigns. Thus, while we shall again traverse some ground already trodden, we shall endeavour to view it in a different aspect-that in which it was seen by the supreme directing authorities at the time, whose point of view could then only be conjectured. It is fortunate that, while the events are still comparatively fresh in the memory, enough can be gleaned from authoritative sources to serve our purpose.

Of the two, Falkenhayn is the more straightforward, the clearer thinker, and, perhaps, the more able soldier. His main object is to justify his decisions by describing the view of the situation, and the line of reasoning, on which each was based. Ludendorff wishes, in addition, to impress his version of the lessons of the war on the German people, that they may learn how to win the next war; for they share with the Government the responsibility for failure. With the Government Falkenhayn was always at loggerheads, because it would not conform to his dictation. While there may have been some ground for his complaints against successive Chancellors, his obvious animus makes one suspect that he exaggerates their remissness in supplying the needs of the army. He certainly makes small allowances for their difficulties. His narrative is often hard to disentangle from the jumble of miscellaneous reminiscences and political and propagandist digressions, with which it is interwoven ; and there are occasions when one suspects him of being

'wise after the event.' His conceit is remarkable; and in the effort to magnify himself he does not show to advantage. A gloomy situation he paints black; he is weighed down with anxiety and responsibility like any weakling, only that he may emerge the one man of indomitable resolution. Hindenburg, his chief, he only mentions casually. No doubt Ludendorff's was the directing intellect; perhaps also the controlling will.

In Germany the conduct of the war, as regards plans and operations, was vested in the General Staff, which, being directly under the Emperor, was independent of the Chancellor. But in practice the Staff found its freedom somewhat restricted. The preparations which had been expected to cover all the requirements of the war proving inadequate, huge demands had to be made on the national resources; so that the Government, because it controlled the means of war, acquired an unforeseen influence on its conduct. In fact, the wardirecting machinery came to approximate in character to that of the democratic belligerents. Much depended on good relations being maintained between the Staff and the Government. In this respect Ludendorff failed. Still, within the limits indicated, the freedom of the General Staff seems to have been unquestioned. Hence the German operations were usually characterised by promptitude and vigour; and they were, for the most part, confined to one object at a time, on the attainment of which all available means were concentrated. For the rest, the General Staff had direct relations with the General Headquarters of Germany's allies, and, in a great degree, influenced their plans. It may be said, broadly, that it really, though informally, directed the war for the Quadruple Alliance.

Russia conformed in principle to the German model. Between the French system and our own there was no fundamental difference. The Chief of the (British) Imperial General Staff was ostensibly the responsible adviser of the Government on military questions. It was his duty to prepare plans of operation; but these might be modified or rejected' by the Government. The Commander-in-Chief in the field was charged with the execution of the plans, as adopted; but he, again, was subject to such orders as he might receive from the

Government.' Thus the Government was entitled both to set aside its 'responsible adviser,' and to interfere at any stage of the operations. The system was a compromise between military and constitutional requirements. It purported to place the direction of war in the hands of the body of officers which had studied and prepared for war, while affirming the ultimate responsibility of Government by reserving to it the right to assume the direction itself. Clearly much would depend on how the system was worked.

One of the first steps taken on the declaration of war threw our war-machinery into confusion. One unversed in British methods might have thought that, in war, the 'brain of the army' would assume increased importance; but, from the first, it began to recede into the background. As pre-arranged, the Chief of the General Staff became Commander-in-Chief, and many of his subordinates also took the field. We copied the letter of the German system, but the spirit was wanting; our wars were directed from Downing Street, not from General Headquarters. The vacant places were filled by experienced officers, who had been ear-marked for the purpose; but the change of personnel doubtless impaired the prestige, and to some extent the efficiency, of the Staff. These measures did not affect the system; but a new departure was involved in the replacement of the civilian War Minister by a distinguished soldier, who became virtually Commander-in-Chief. Lord Kitchener's strong personality, and the reputation he enjoyed with the public, were undoubted assets to a Government conscious both of the need for firm guidance in its counsels, and of the advisability of winning public confidence. These objects were achieved; but the constitutional status of the new Minister did not satisfy his thirst for responsibility. With characteristic energy and distaste for advice, he attempted to unite in himself the functions of the Chief of the General Staff, and of the heads of the Administrative Departments-a task beyond the capacity of any man, even in normal times.

Thus it happened that, for some months, the counsels of the Cabinet were dominated by the personal views of

See Field Service Regulations, Part II, ch. 1.

the War Minister, whom years of absorption in other questions had given little leisure to study and reflect upon the problems of a great war. Later, wisdom was sought in a multitude of counsellors, some of whom, however excellent in their individual lines, were unfitted either by training or by special study, to advise on large questions of strategy. In the conflict of opinions which resulted, the Cabinet found itself in a sorry plight. Small wonder that 'expert' advice should have been discredited, or that the Government should sometimes have decided to follow its own counsels or to take the middle course of compromise.

Such, in rough outline, were the systems of wardirection with which the belligerents began the war. Our readers will remember the changes made by the Allies, as they realised the need of combination, in order to secure the degree of unity of command, and the promptitude of action conferred by the German system. The latter stood the test of war in the sense that it remained unaltered to the end. It had the weakness which every system must have which involves concerted action by a number of individuals with different responsibilities and different points of view. The Government, not being responsible for the conduct of the war, may have been less alive to the needs of the army than ours became when it awoke to realities. But the success of any system must depend on the men who work it. Germany lost the war (so Ludendorff says) for want of a Roon and a Bismarck. Falkenhayn, when appointed Chief of the General Staff, retained his post of War Minister for some time, to start his successor on the right lines. Again, it seems open to question whether it was sound practice for the Chief of the General Staff to assume direct command of the principal operations for the time being; it might not have been better had he restricted himself to the general conduct of the war.

Neither Falkenhayn nor Ludendorff makes more than incidental allusion to the German plan of war; but its development is easy to trace, and the considerations which determined its final form may readily be conjectured. War being the final instrument of policy, a European war became likely when, Bismarck's policy

having been abandoned, German aspirations began to run counter to Russia's interests. When the treaty with Russia lapsed, the German General Staff had to consider the problem of a war on two fronts-a problem which leaped into importance on the conclusion of the FrancoRussian alliance in 1895. From that time onward the war-plan developed in conformity with the changing situation, and the preparations deemed necessary for its effective execution continued to receive attention. Of these it will suffice to notice two-railways and fortification-which unmistakably define the trend of German military policy since the Franco-German war. Believing in the offensive, and knowing the importance of gaining the initiative, Germany preferred to put her money into the field-army, and the railways for transporting it rapidly to the frontiers, rather than into fortifications. The result was the creation of a comprehensive railway system, and the dismantling of the French fortresses in Lorraine (except Metz and Strassburg) and most of the works on the Vistula. The latest measures before the war are especially significant. The Vistula defences were restored in modern form, and supplemented by additional works; and arrangements were made for the establishment of a great military base at Aix-la-Chapelle, where the abnormal growth of railway sidings could hardly escape the notice of the least observant traveller.

It is evident that these latest preparations were associated with a change in the general situation which may be described briefly as the estrangement of Italy from the Triple Alliance, the rapprochement between France and England, and the military reorganisation of Russia as a result of lessons learnt in Manchuria. The Germans, so long as they could count on Italy and Austria, were not anxious as to the issue of a war with France and Russia alone; but the changed conditions made it advisable to prepare for a strategical defensive on one front. The preparations at Aix-la-Chapelle marked the decision to throw large forces against France on a front overlapping the defences of the French eastern frontier; while the Vistula fortifications provided for a possible withdrawal in East Prussia; the essence of the plan being to eliminate France before Russia should become dangerous.