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annals. The time was short, for Germany had passed her first Navy Act in 1897 *; and considerable progress had already been made in creating and training the fleet of her ambition.

Lord Fisher's first decision was to cancel practically all that Germany had done in naval design, construction, and equipment, and in canal, harbour, and dockyard extension. The introduction of the 'Dreadnought '-the all-big-gun ship of high speed-wiped out, to all intents and purposes, the German Fleet, upset the future plans of the naval administration, and led to an immense sum of money which would otherwise have been spent on naval power, being devoted to bricks and mortar,' dredging shallow harbours, enlarging the narrow Kiel Canal, and remodelling the dockyards. The appearance of this revolutionary ship not merely arrested naval construction in Germany for eighteen months, but set back the progress of the German Fleet by five or six years. Time was necessary to give effect to the naval reforms which Lord Fisher was carrying out, and it was obtained by this expedient. Lord Fisher then worked to a time table. He foresaw that, owing to the enlargement of the Kiel Canal, which he had compelled them to undertake, the Germans could not be ready strategically until the summer of 1914,† and he laid his plans accordingly, building new ships which eventually formed the Grand Fleet, perfecting the nucleus crew system for the older vessels, planning combined manœuvres, training the personnel, and improving the gunnery. If the chief credit is his, it must be added that he was well supported by a small group of other officers, conspicuous among them being Admiral of the Fleet Lord Jellicoe, whom he selected in 1912 as the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet which did not then exist except on paper, Admiral Sir R. Bacon, and Admiral Sir Percy Scott.

In these circumstances the British Fleet was rebuilt and its officers and men were trained to a new and higher standard of efficiency. The character of the

This measure was superseded by the Navy Act of 1900.

In conversation with Sir Maurice Hankey in 1910, he foretold that

the war would come in 1914 ('Records ').

work achieved during the ten years preceding the outbreak of the war can only be adequately appreciated if we turn to the autobiographies of the outstanding seamen of the Victorian era. Evidence is provided in these volumes that until Lord Fisher came on the scene the British Fleet was in no condition for war. It still preserved the fine traditions of a thousand years, but it had failed to respond to the wonderful advance of physical science; it was content to live on the prestige of the Napoleonic struggle; and its ships were widely distributed over the oceans of the world, 'showing the flag.' Its influence rested not on its efficiency as a fighting machine, but on its past achievements. A new order had to be evolved; and, very naturally, strenuous opposition was offered by naval officers reared in the old, easy-going school of naval thought and action.

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Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, busy in Berlin on his plans for seizing the trident, was encumbered by traditions, constrained by no internal political struggles, and embarrassed by no financial considerations. His propaganda was so successful that he was able to obtain as much money as he desired. Both he and William II had had many opportunities of studying the British Fleet; and it is apparent from his recent confessions that he was convinced that a German Navy of inferior strength could be trained to a higher standard than had then been approached by any of the great Sea Powers, thus achieving by sea a position of ascendency corresponding to that which the German Army had achieved on land.

It has often been declared by critics of Lord Fisher that some of the methods by which he achieved his purpose of converting the British Fleet from a series of yachts into a great war machine were open to grave criticism. He might urge that, whatever may be thought of some things that he did, the end justified the means. It has been suggested that he was 'ruthless, relentless and remorseless' towards individuals as well as customs, and that he destroyed the spirit of the Fleet, its sense of brotherhood. He undoubtedly made many enemies, as has been the misfortune of most naval reformers from the time of St Vincent onward. It may be, however, that the historian who reviews the war

preparations of 1904-14, and, with full knowledge, studies the events which afterwards happened at sea, will be tempted to take a different view of the fierce controversies of those years. Can the statement that Lord Fisher killed the camaraderie of the Navy be maintained in the light of all that has happened since Aug. 4, 1914-when Lord Jellicoe was suddenly called upon to supersede Sir G. Callaghan in command of the Grand Fleet-events crowned by the lower-deck supper at Portsmouth over which Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty presided, and by the great gathering of admirals and other officers at the Navy Club dinner on Trafalgar Day, 1919? There is evidence that the Navy has passed successfully through its trials of reform and its ordeals of war, and that its spirit, far from being killed, has been refined. Lord Fisher is content, at any rate, to leave the dead past to bury its dead; he makes no defence; he mentions no enemies. He has, on the contrary, produced two volumes redolent of many cherished friendships. He is generous and forgiving, humorous if truculent, and, above all, reflects the pride he takes in looking back over past years.

It has also been suggested that, when the storm burst, the Navy was not in all respects ready. The revelations made by Lord Jellicoe and Sir Percy Scott, have, it is stated, shaken public confidence. If that be the case, public confidence is easily shaken, and the public eye is singularly blind to events which have won the admiration of the world. There were many things which might have been done if time had permitted. The rebuilding of the British Fleet to the Dreadnought' pattern-battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines -and the changing of our naval front from southern to northern waters, were operations which might well have engaged the best brains of the country for a quarter of a century; and even then, if ample funds had been poured out, who will suggest that nothing would have been overlooked? War is a matter of hazards; its every development cannot be foreseen. Germany possessed a Naval Staff, occupied in planning the naval strategy of the future; yet, as von Tirpitz, in the bitterness of defeat, has admitted, everything that he planned came to failure. The High Seas Fleet was from

the first thrown back on the defensive, and throughout the war served no purpose that would not in its absence have been fulfilled by Germany's coastal fortifications, elaborate mining system, and numerous mosquito craft. Events were to show, as the Germans were driven to confess in their councils at the end of 1914, and in their later declarations, that the submarine offered the one and only hope of staving off defeat. To what extent had the German Naval Staff, concentrating its thoughts on the problems of war in the North Sea, to the practical exclusion of every other sea, foreseen this development? In 1913 two submarines were laid down; between Jan. 1 and Aug. 4 in the following year only one vessel of this type was begun!

The history of the naval war cannot yet be studied with full knowledge and in proper perspective. We can form a correct judgment on British naval policy before and after the outbreak of hostilities only when we possess authentic details of what happened on the other side, first, of the veil of diplomacy, and, then, of the fog of war. But the prophecy may be hazarded that, when all things are known, Lord Fisher and those who worked with him and brought to completion the tasks he began will not be condemned by the historian. The evolution of the British Fleet in the ten years which preceded the bursting of the storm will be regarded as an administrative achievement conspicuously marked by energy, zeal, and foresight.

ARCHIBALD HURD.

Art. 12.-CHURCH UNION IN SCOTLAND.

A Scor who discusses a Scottish ecclesiastical topic in pages that circulate south of the Tweed must be careful to take very little for granted. It is not merely that Scotland is a comparatively small corner of the Englishspeaking world, with a peculiar ecclesiastical history and system of its own. The Scot has an inborn aptitude or predilection for ecclesiastical topics, which is not shared by the majority of his southern neighbours. I have never been fortunate enough, though I have sometimes tried, to find an English layman who could explain satisfactorily what a Prebendary is, or what are the exact status, powers, and duties of a Rural Dean. We have neither prebendaries nor rural deans in Scotland, but, if we had, these things would be as familiar to an intelligent Scot as are the position and duties of 'cover point' or stroke' to an intelligent Englishman. I think it well, therefore, to begin with what to a Scot would seem a somewhat elementary statement in regard to the present ecclesiastical position in Scotland.

The contemplated union is that between the Established Church of Scotland and the United Free Church. The United Free Church was itself formed in 1900 by a union-that of the great majority of the Free Church with the United Presbyterian Church. A minority of the Free Church, very small numerically, except in certain Highland districts, stood out against this union because the 'Establishment principle' was not adhered to but was to be left an open question in the United Church. There was something touching, heroic, and thoroughly Scottish in the conduct of this minority, who, for sixty years, had enjoyed none of the privileges of establishment but were willing to face the loss of all things (as it seemed) for the ' establishment principle.' As things turned out, however, they were found by the House of Lords, in the celebrated Free Church case of 1904, to be the legal Free Church; and only the interposition of Parliament secured to the majority, who entered the union, the retention of a great part of the property of that Church.

The United Presbyterian Church had been formed by the union of several small communions which at

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