Art. 6.-DESPATCHES OF SIR DOUGLAS HAIG.

1. Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches.

Edited by Lt-Col J. H. Boraston, with an Introduction by Marshal Foch. Two vols. London: J. M. Dent & Co., 1919.

2. Les Principes de la Guerre. By Marshal Foch. Paris: Berger-Levrault. 3rd edition, 1911.

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THE practice of publishing in the London Gazette' despatches in which our commanders by sea and land describe the operations of their forces is of old standing, going back at least to the days of Queen Anne. might have been feared that traditional usage would succumb to the exigencies of modern war, and that the necessity of concealing from the enemy particulars of the organisation and distribution of our forces would compel the withholding of these narratives from the public. So drastic a step did not prove necessary, even if identifications of units and individuals had to be almost completely suppressed; and, as a result, we have in the British official despatches something no other belligerent has put forward. The French have published a brief official narrative of the first six months of the war; Belgium has issued some similar reports; and the German General Staff embarked on a series of short monographs narrating different operations in some detail but intended mainly for the general reader.* Still, taken all round, there is no parallel to the narrative provided by the collected British despatches. Between them they cover the story of practically every theatre of war in which our troops have fought; and, till such time as the Official History can be produced, they must serve as the basis for would-be historians of the war.

But, as a substitute for history, official despatches have their drawbacks. They are written in circumstances which preclude the telling of the whole truth, for publication on the morrow of the events they narrate

One only of these monographs deals with operations in which the British were engaged; and this, a narrative of the battles of Ypres and the Yser in 1914, has recently been published in a translation (Constable) by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence with an introduction and notes. It is of special interest as presenting the version which the German General Staff in 1917 wished their country to believe.

-normally before there has been time or opportunity for full investigations of facts, when what they say, even what they do not say-may affect the reputation and position of individuals or units still engaged with the enemy. Necessarily, therefore, despatches give but one-sided impressions. Those who judge Wellington's powers from a study of his hastily written and inadequate Waterloo despatch will form an entirely erroneous conception of the capacities which are revealed in so many trenchant and luminous appreciations not intended for the public eye. Our commanders in this war had perforce to withhold much that would have increased the lucidity and historical value of their despatches. Just as names were cut out, so methods could not be explained, reasons for success or failure set forth, or lessons expounded. Sir Douglas Haig's Somme despatch, which mentioned no one under the rank of an Army Commander, and did not identify units even to the extent to which the daily communiqués had lifted the veil, made in its original form rather hard reading. The troops who forced their way on July 1, 1916, through the strong defences from Montauban to La Boisselle, who stormed the crest of the watershed in the great attack of July 14, who endured the horrors of the awful struggle for Delville Wood, figured in the despatch like phantoms lacking flesh and blood. There was nothing to help the reader to form a living picture, nothing to add warmth or colour to the sober severity of the story. The despatches of 1917 relaxed this rigorous concealment; and in the two despatches which tell the wonderful story of 1918 so vividly, reticence altogether disappeared. Divisions were identified by their numbers; their commanders' names were given; a few individual units were singled out for mention for some outstanding gallantry in defence or attack. These two despatches stand by themselves. Lucid, well-proportioned, giving enough detail to lend life and character to the outline yet keeping the outline distinct, restrained and sober in tone yet the more effective by reason of their simplicity, they fit their theme.

But if, as originally published, the earlier despatches left the inquirer still mainly in the dark, this can no longer be said of them in the form in which they have

now been made available. Field-Marshal Lord Haig has been well advised to republish in collected form the eight despatches in which he has told the story of the 'three momentous years of crowded incident,' during which he commanded the British Armies in France and Flanders. Furnished with an Introduction by Marshal Foch and with a short Preface by Lord Haig himself, and splendidly illustrated by a couple of dozen excellent sketch-plans and by a portfolio of ten large and elaborate maps, the volume forms a handsome and welcome addition to the literature of the war; and, as Lord Haig says, the Despatches make a wonderful tribute to the valour of the British soldier and to the character of the British nation.' In thus republishing them it has been possible to identify divisions, to name their commanders, to append some valuable explanatory notes on points such as the effects of the German submarine campaign, which at the time it was well to keep obscure. Colonel Boraston, the Field-Marshal's private secretary, to whom the editing of the book has fallen, has done his work admirably; the details which are now revealed make all the difference in the lucidity and interest of the despatches dealing with the Somme and the events of 1917. Their full excellence is now apparent.

Lord Haig's Preface, which gives a brief but interesting account of the methods of collecting and collating the information contained in the despatches, explains clearly his purpose in publishing them-not that explanation or justification was needed. But it is to Marshal Foch's Introduction, given both in the original French and in a translation, that we fancy people will turn with the liveliest interest. It is a great tribute not only to the British forces but still more to their Commander-inChief. The Marshal, after speaking of the great achievement of fashioning the new armies of Britain into ‘a magnificent instrument of war,' reminds his readers that the instrument needs the hand which knows how to use it,' and that, if the Despatches have a short-coming, it is that all mention of the hand which guided the instrument is omitted.' He points out how, in the critical moment of March 1918, disaster might have overtaken even armies of the finest quality like the British' had they not possessed a Higher Command capable of

dominating the situation and controlling the turn of events, able to take the troops in hand again' and so bring the enemy to a standstill. He goes on to show how in the final and victorious offensive it was 'the wise, loyal, and energetic policy' of the British Commander-in-Chief that 'made easy a great combination'; while, in the crisis which resulted in the establishment of unity of command, Sir Douglas Haig's own personal intervention played a leading part in bringing about that measure. Historians in future who are seeking for an example of loyal and cordial co-operation will do well to place Sir Douglas Haig and Marshal Foch alongside of Marlborough and Eugène.

From some points of view it is the last of these eight despatches which is the most interesting and suggestive of all. Dated March 21, 1919-it cannot be imagined that the coincidence of date is accidental-it sets forth the sequel of the victories, the march into Germany, and the setting up of the new Watch on the Rhine.' It bestows a deserved meed of praise on many of those responsible for the stupendous and successful organisation into which the little Army of 1914 had developed; above all, it gives a reasoned summary of the main features of the war and of the great lessons to be drawn from this tremendous experience. A mighty volume of hard thinking is compressed into this summary, with much solid food for thought; some assertions, perhaps, will give rise to controversy in professional circles, but the main lessons stand out clearly, and their truth will not be shaken by the attacks of those to whom the truth will be unpalatable.

If any one feature has differentiated this war from all previous struggles, it has been the establishment in the principal theatre of war of a continuous front along which the combatants were in permanent contact, practically in unceasing conflict. In former wars battles usually ended with the retreat of the defeated army out of the reach of their victors. It was an axiom that beaten troops could retreat faster than victorious troops could pursue. Sometimes, as at Ulm and Sedan, the defeated troops have been captured en masse and a whole army has been wiped off the board; but in general it may be said that loss of close contact between the

opponents used to follow and mark the end of every battle. Since 1914, however, battles have usually ended because the combatants had temporarily come to the end of their resources in men and munitions, or because the assailant found it unprofitable to renew his attacks, while the defender judged it better to cut his losses than to try to regain them by fresh counter-attacks. Thus battles have ended-so far as any definite end can be assigned to a modern battle-with the opponents in as close proximity as before, in what may be called 'entrenched battle outposts.' The end has consisted in the cessation of heavy bombardments and of definite attempts to gain or retake ground; even when a battle might be said to be over, bombing, rifle-fire, machinegun fire, and some amount of shelling, continued briskly enough all along the battle-front. In short, the 'end' of a battle is a relative not an absolute term, and can only be fixed arbitrarily. The battle of Loos may be said roughly to have ended on Oct. 13, when the British launched their last attempt to master the Hohenzollern redoubt, but for another week at least that portion of the battle-front remained the scene of great local activity and of more than one sharp local counter-attack.

But it is not the ends of battles only which are hard to fix in 'continuous-front warfare'; there is no little difficulty about the beginning. On April 10, 1917, the British public read the communiqué which told how, at 5.30 o'clock on the previous morning, Sir Douglas Haig had launched against the German lines east of Arras that brilliant assault which wrested from the enemy the much-disputed Vimy Ridge with many lines of strongly fortified positions on a broad front astride the Scarpe. It was obvious to take April 9 as starting a 'battle of Arras'; and, unless the historian of the war adopts that date, it is hard to see where to fix the beginning of the Allied offensive of 1917. But without the preliminary bombardments, without all the work of preparing assembly positions, without much local fighting to secure good jumping-off places for the attack-work which had been in progress for days, for weeks, perhaps for months before April 9-what success could have been achieved? There is force in this objection, but for practical purposes a battle' begins with the launching of the infantry