painful discussions arising touching persons near the throne, as in 1854 respecting the prince consort, and even concerning all the acts and arrangements of the court, particularly so far as they regard the expenditure. Thus in 1777, Burke, in the course of the debate, directly referred to the royal table. The discussion relative to the provision to be allowed for the princess royal in 1857, was not conducted in the most delicate manner possible. The debts of George III. and the bed-chamber question led to acrimonious debates not very loyal in character.

A very interesting phase of English political life is afforded by the fact, that the three Princes of Wales, who afterwards became George II., III., and IV. found themselves continually in the opposition against the measures of their respective fathers, and against those ministers who specially enjoyed their confidence.

The actual conditions of the prerogative are, it is obvious, continually fluctuating, depending greatly on the individuals who are called to exercise it, hence absolute rules as to the virtual extent of the prerogative cannot be laid down. Should England ever find a ruler possessed of not merely monarchical aspirations, but also the far-sighted views and native talent necessary to a great sovereign, kingship would attain to a much higher significance in the realm,

CHAPTER XI.

PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT.

Share of the Several Estates in Parliamentary Government.-Septennial Parliament. -Frequent Dissolutions of late years.-Bribery of Members.-Walpole and Fox on Bribery.-Less Bribery under Pitt the Younger.-The case of Private Bills. -Unpopularity of Parliament.-Importance of the Upper House.-Preponderance of the Commons.-The Lords without Initiative.-The Lower House delegates its Power to the Cabinet.-Junto.-Cabal.-Act of Settlement.-No Responsibility in the Cabinet.-Vote of "Want of Confidence.”—Walpole's Overthrow.-Defective Control.-Dictatorship of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. -Government of India.—Dangers arising from the Dissolution of the Company. -Hurtful Influence of Parliament on Indian Affairs.-Chatham on India.-Premiers since 1830-Composition of the Cabinet.-The First Lord of the Treasury not always the Leading Minister.-Downfall of the Cabinet.-Governments without a Majority in their favour in the Commons.

THE almost absolute power exercised by parliament since the accession of the house of Hanover, has been variously apportioned at different periods between the upper and the lower house as represented by the parliamentary section styled the "cabinet." Macaulay points out, as a consequence of the Revolution,* "that the commons, by the annual discussion of the budget, determines peace and war, makes and unmakes ministers." The house of commons itself was, however, for a long time chiefly in the hands of the aristocracy, and was led by a small oligarchy of whig family connections, in regard to whom Chatham maintained, that they would involve the country in ruin.† The claim asserted by the Long Parliament, that the house of commons ought to represent the nation was deferred to in words during the last century. For more than sixty years the house of commons was ostensibly submitted to the Hanoverian princes, but the members were really nominated by a small and exclusive party, holding complete sway in the upper house. The house was responsible to no one, and did not allow itself to be intimidated by the crown. Publicity of debates was strictly excluded; the members of the

Essay on Sir James Mackintosh's

Hist. of the Revolution.

+ Mahon, vii.

rotten boroughs had only to court the favour of the aristocrats who returned them; thus, with the increase of the formal power of the commons, the power of the people over the commons daily diminished.* By the agency of this vast ascendancy the enactment for the Septennial Parliament was mainly brought about. Two long parliaments under Charles I. and Charles II. had established, although transiently, parliamentary power. Triennial parliaments followed, but, for parliament to achieve real power, it was needful that it should be either permanent or of longer duration; hence, in 1716, triennial parliaments were abolished, and septennial introduced. Parliaments now last, in fact, about six years, but the first five under Georges I. and II. were of seven years' duration. This period is sufficient to impart a certain stability to the house, and the necessary esprit de corps to give unity and fixity to parliamentary government. Septennial parliaments,† instead of those party oscillations which prevailed under Queen Anne, presented, under the first two Georges, tolerably even features.

In the elections of 1722, 1727, 1734, the government achieved the victory. In 1741, Walpole only gained a majority of sixteen votes, and was soon after defeated; in 1761, Pitt obtained a very large majority. The Reform Bill has, in this particular, disturbed the old routine, and dissolutions have, of late years, become more frequent. In 1834, 1841, 1852, 1857, 1859, dissolutions were resorted to for the purpose of appealing to the nation; five dissolutions in the lapse of twenty-five years! expedients which, in the last century, were seldom recurred to, and only under exceptional circumstances.

The exclusive parliaments of the last century would have been completely in the hands of the oligarchy or of corporations with vested interests, if the government had not succeeded, by bribery, and occasionally, also, by the intervention of the aristocracy, in ruling the house of commons. Bribery of members, as an established thing, came into vogue in 1673. The parliament, then led by Danby, went by the name of the "pensioned parliament." The

Macaulay's Essays, ii. Essay on Horace Walpole. Disraeli, Sibyl, b. i.

Junius says in the dedication of his Letters:-" With regard to any influence of the constituent over the conduct of the representative, there is little difference between a seat in parliament for seven

years and a seat for life; although the last session of a septennial parliament is usually employed in courting the favour of the people, consider that, at this rate, your representatives have six years for offence, and but one for atonement."

leaders of the opposition, Sir Robert Howard and Sir Richard Temple, were appeased by obtaining places, and hence acquired the sobriquet of "placemen."* Walpole was only able to maintain himself by corruption; he even went so far as publicly to declare, that "every man had his price." The sums made use of for this purpose were taken from the secret fund, from which ample source, during the last ten years of his government, more than £100,000 sterling was expended. Chesterfield complained (February 22, 1740) of the manner of the bribery, on the ground of the secret pensions taken from this fund. Walpole never bought up opponents, asserting, in broad terms, that "for one mouth stopped up, fifty others would gape at once."+ When, in 1727, he wished to carry his excise bill, even the familiar expedient failed him; his followers told him that he was paying them only at the rate of ordinary follies, but that the present project could not be carried out by any bribery in the world. Even in the time of the American war, bribery was in the ascendant. Horne Tooke declared that in the commons, seats were publicly hired for legislation, just as at the fairs stalls are hired for cattle.§ In 1780, Fox exclaimed: "The government has not in the whole realm a single man who supports its measures from inner conviction, and, as the members of parliament walk through this room to take their places, you may ask each one of them what he thinks of the measures of the ministry, of their honourable character, or their wisdom, and he will answer, that he despises and abominates them ;' one may rest assured that no sooner has the member taken his seat, than he votes in favour of a question for which the minister seems to interest himself. This bribery increases every moment the influence of the crown, an influence so much the more dangerons because it surrounds itself with constitutional forms, in order thereby to inflict surer blows upon the constitution." At the time of the French Revolution, bribery was less rife, as the terrors of the democracy drove the aristocracy to Pitt's standard; later on, when the war became more popular, the public voice of parliament was needful for the support of the leading statesman.

Few will maintain that the tone of public morality in England

*Hallam, Const. Hist., ii. 398.

+ Macaulay, Essays, ii.

Friedrich ii., Geschichte seiner Zeit

in der Ausgabe seiner Werke in einem Bande, p. 89.

§ Archenholz, v. 25.

has been improved by the Reform Bill, for experience shows that many convictions allow themselves to be modified by an assured participation in the parliamentary spoil. Open bribery on the part of the government, by the gross means of money, is not so rife as in Walpole's time, simply because the government has not such large funds at its command. By the agency of private bills, however, and the forced outlay of moneys for the ostensible purpose of defeating hostile opposition, parliamentary support is inevitably created.

That parliament, as the governing power of the country, should share all the unpopularity which ordinarily attends governing bodies would seem to follow as a matter of course. Every grievance that an Englishman experiences is straightway ascribed to the tyranny or the negligence of the ruling body; a merchant appeals from the courts of law at Rio and St. Petersburg to parliament; an historical painter complains to parliament that his branch of art does not meet with due encouragement (Macaulay).

Previous to the Revolution the parliament was frequently a demagogic assembly, seeking to anticipate every popular question; since it has taken the goverment in hand it follows every movement with lagging steps and at distant intervals; hence, it has become unpopular, mainly because the mischief which proceeds from it strikes the eye more than the good which it seeks to effect (Macaulay).*

The constitutional centre of gravity has been displaced through the instrumentality of the Reform Bill, and though the influence of the peers upon the composition of the lower house is still power

"If England does not share the same fate, it is because we have better resources than in the virtue of either house of parliament." -Junius, Dedica tion. "For the last 150 years the public power is in parliament, and since then it has become more and more unpopular; in 1830 it endeavoured, by an innovation, to uphold the public wellbeing, but, in truth, the more powerful parliament has become, the more is it fated."-Disraeli, Coningsby, b. iv., c. 13. In alluding to the trial of Hardy, and the powerful pressure against which he had to contend, Erskine thus characterized the house of commons:der all this, I could have looked up for protection in other circumstances: I could, as defending one of the people in a fear

"Un

ful extremity, have looked up to the people's representatives; to that mighty tribunal, above all law, and the parent of all the protections which the law affords to the subject: I could have looked up to the commons of England to hold a shield before the subject against the crown; but in this case, I found that shield of the subject a sharp and destroying sword in the hands of the enemy; the protecting house of commons was itself, by corruption and infatuation, the accuser, instead of the defender of the subject: it acted as an Old Bailey solicitor, to prepare briefs for the crown, and that in a case which the judges declared to be so new that they were obliged to try experiments in the legal constitution to find a way of trying it."-Hughes, c. 37, 1794.

M M