characteristics of a gentleman; but, with great deference to his Lordship's authority, I cannot subscribe to the doctrine that bad morality and good taste are in any degree compatible in the same action. An individual may act very improperly in many parts of his conduct, and show considerable refinement in other instances; and this is easily understood; for the higher sentiments may coexist with great animal propensities, and one occasion may call forth the former, and another excite only the latter, and the conduct may thus assume different aspects at different times; but the question is, Whether the same action can be characterized both as immoral and as possessed of good taste? In my opinion it cannot. It is good taste to restrain the expression of our opinions or views in society, when an opposite conduct would cause only dissensions and broils; but this is good morality also. Chesterfield, however, goes farther, and allows an expression of sentiments, which we do not entertain, if they be pleasing to those to whom they are addressed, as perfectly compatible with good manners; and this is a breach of candor. This practice is an insult to the person who is the object of it; and if he saw the real motives he would feel it to be such. Nothing which, when examined in all its lights, and its true colors, is essentially rude, can possibly be correct in point of taste; so that it has only the appearance, and not the true qualities, of politeness. In short, purity in the motive is equally requisite to good taste as to sound morality; for the motive constitutes the essence of the action.

The sources of good taste may now be adverted to. The nervous and sanguine temperaments, by giving fineness to the substance, and vivacity to the action of the brain, are highly conducive to refinement. All authors and artists whose works are characterized by great delicacy and beauty, have fine temperaments combined with Ideality. The most exquisite mental manifestations are those which proceed from a favorable combination of the whole faculties, in which each contributes a share of its own good qualities, and is restrained by the others from running into excess or abuse. Thus, I conceive the very admirable taste of Campbell the poet, to arise from a great endowment of the higher sentiments,

Reflection and Concentrativeness; so that, on any feeling or image occurring to his mind, these faculties judge by an intuitive tact of its fitness, and modify it to the point at which it pleases them all. If a favorable developement of this kind be possessed, the higher that Ideality rises, not to run into excess, and the finer the temperament, the more perfect will be the taste. At the same time, and for the same reason, there may be much good taste, of a simple kind, with moderate Ideality, if the other faculties be favorably balanced.

As Taste arises from fine quality of brain, and a favorable combination of organs, the explanation is simple, how it may be possessed without genius. Genius arises from great vigor and activity, depending on large size, and a high temperament: these are greater endowments than equability, and an individual may be deficient in them, and yet be so favorably constituted, with respect to the balance of the powers, as to feel acutely the excellences or the faults of genius manifested by others. Hence many persons are really excellent critics, who could not themselves produce original works of value; hence also, many original authors, of great reputation, display very questionable Taste.

In applying these principles to actual cases, I find them borne out by numerous facts. Dr. Chalmers occasionally sins against taste, and in his head Ideality and Comparison are out of due proportion to Causality, and some other organs. In Mr. Jeffrey's bust, on the contrary, there is a very beautiful and regular developement of Eventuality, Comparison, and Causality, with a fair balance between the propensities and sentiments; and his taste is generally admirable.

As good taste is the result of the harmonious action of the faculties, we are able to perceive why taste is susceptible of so great improvement by cultivation. An author will frequently reason as profoundly, or soar as loftily, in his first essay, as after practice in writing for twenty years; but he rarely manifests the same tact at the outset of his career, as he attains by subsequent study, and the admonitions of a discriminative criticism. Reasoning depends on Causality and Comparison, and lofty flights of imagination on

Ideality; and if the organs of these faculties be large, they will execute their functions intuitively, and carry the author forward, from the first, on a bold and powerful wing; but as taste depends on the balancing and adjusting, the suppressing and elevating, the ordering and arranging, of our thoughts, feelings, and emotions, so as to produce a general harmony of the whole; it is only practice, reflection, and comparison with higher standards, that enable us successfully to approximate to excellence; and even these will do so only when the organs are by nature equably combined; for if the balance preponderate greatly in any particular direction, no effort will produce exquisite taste.

Much has been written about a standard of Taste; and in considering this question, a distinction requires to be made. If, by fixing a standard, we mean determining particular objects, or qualities of objects, which all men shall regard as beautiful, the attempt must necessarily be vain. A person possessing Form, Size, Constructiveness, and Ideality, may experience the most exquisite emotions of beauty from contemplating a Grecian Temple, in which another individual, in whom these organs are very deficient, may perceive nothing but stone and lime. One individual may discover, in an arrangement of colors, beauty which is quite imperceptible to a person deficient in the organ of Coloring. Or one may be delighted with music, in which another, through imperfection in the organ of Tune, may perceive no melody. Thus no object, and no qualities of objects, can be fixed upon, which all mankind, whatever be their original constitution, will acknowledge to be equally beautiful, and in this view no standard of Taste exists.

But degrees of Beauty may be estimated, in which sense a scale at least, if not a standard, of Taste, may be framed. The more favorable the original constitution of an individual is, and the greater the cultivation bestowed on his powers, he becomes the higher authority in questions of Taste. The existence of a sentiment of Justice has been denied, because individuals are found in whom it is so weak, as scarcely to influence their conduct; but Phrenology, by pointing out their defect, shows that these persons

form exceptions to a general rule, and then no one thinks of appealing to them, to determine whether an action be just or unjust in any particular case. In like manner, men deficient in the faculties which give the perception of Beauty, are not authorities in Taste; but that individual is the highest judge in whom large Ideality is combined with a fine temperament, and the most favorable developement of the organs of propensity, sentiment, and intellect; and who, besides, has exercised his faculties with the greatest assiduity. His determinations in regard to degrees of beauty in objects, will form the best standards of Taste which our imperfect nature is capable of attaining.

EFFECTS OF SIZE IN THE ORGANS ON THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE FACULTIES.

THE reader is referred to the distinction between POWER and ACTIVITY in the mind, as stated on page 95 of the present work. Cæteris paribus, size in the organs is the measure of power in the manifestations of the faculties. The practical application of this doctrine remains to be stated; and it will be understood now, after the functions and modes of activity of the primitive faculties have been elucidated.

As size in the organs in an indispensable requisite to power in the mind, no instance ought to occur of an individual who, with a small brain, has manifested clearly and unequivocally, great force of character, animal, moral and intellectual, such as belonged to Bruce, Buonaparte, or Fox; and such accordingly phrenologists affirm to be the fact. The Phrenological Society possesses casts of the skulls of Bruce, Raphael, and La Fontaine, and they are all large. The busts and portraits of Lord Bacon, Shakspeare and Buonaparte, indicate large heads; and among living characters no individual has occurred to my observation who leaves a vivid impression of his own greatness upon the public mind, and who yet presents to their eyes only a small brain.

The European head is distinguished from the Asiatic and native

American, not more by difference of form than of size; the European is much the larger, and the superior energy of this variety of mankind is known. The heads of men are larger than those of women, and the latter obey; or to bring the point to the clearest demonstration, we require only to compare the head of an idiot with that of Burke, or of a child with that of a full grown man, as represented on p. 72. If, then, size is so clearly a concomitant of power in extreme cases, we are not to presume that it ceases to exert an influence where the differences are so minute that the eye is scarcely able to detect them. The rule, Extremis probatis

media præsumuntur, is completely applicable here.

The doctrine, that power is a characteristic of mind, distinguishable at once from mere intellectual acumen, and also from activity, is one of great practical importance; and it explains a variety of phenomena of which we previously possessed no theory. In society we meet with persons whose whole manner is little, whom we instinctively feel to be unfit for any great enterprise or arduous duty, and who are, nevertheless, distinguished for amiable feeling and good sense. This springs from a small brain favorably proportioned in its parts. Other individuals, again, with far less polish, inferior information, and fewer amiable qualities, impress us with a sentiment of their power, force, energy, or greatness; we instinctively feel that they have weight, and that, if acting against us, they would prove formidable opponents. This arises from great size. Buonaparte, who had an admirable tact in judging of human nature, distinguishes between mere cleverness and force of character, and almost always prefers the latter. In his Memoirs, he speaks of some of his generals as possessing talents, intellect, book-learning, but as still being nobody, as wanting that weight and comprehensiveness which fit a man for great enterprises; while he adverts to others as possessing limited intellect and little judgment, but prodigious force of character; and considers them as admirably adapted by this qualification to lead soldiers through peril and difficulty, provided they be directed by minds superior to their own. Murat was such a man; and Buonaparte appears on the whole to bave liked such officers, for they did not trouble him with thinking