founded upon the checks, guaranties and self-government of the Anglican race. The following features are, however, peculiar to American liberty: republican federalism, strict separation of the church from the State, greater equality, and acknowledgment of abstract rights in the citizen, and a more popular or democratic cast of the whole polity. With reference to the last two may be added these further characteristics: We have everywhere established voting by habit. The executive has never possessed the power of dissolving or proroguing the legislature. The list of States has not been closed. We admit foreigners to the rights of citizenship, and we do not believe in inalienable allegiance. There is no attainder of blood. We allow no ex post facto laws. American liberty possesses also, as a characteristic, the enacted constitution-distinguishing it from the English polity, with its accumulative constitution. Our legislatures are, therefore, not omnipotent, as the British parliament theoretically is; but the laws enacted by them may be declared by the courts to conflict with the constitution.

Liberty sought for by the French, as a peculiar system, was founded chiefly in theory, on the idea of equality and the abstract rights of man. (Rousseau's Social Contract.) Bouv. Law Dict. (15th ed.)

1. Anderson's Law Dict. 619; 1 Black. Com. 125; Cooley Elements of Const. Law 225.

"Moral liberty" or "natural liberty" is the right which nature gives to all mankind of disposing of their persons and property after the manner they judge most consonant to their happiness, on condition of their acting within the limits of the law of nature, and that

they do not abuse it in any way to the prejudice of any other man. Snyder v. Warford, 11 Mo. 515.

2. Anderson's Law Dict. 619; Black. Com. 6, 125.

"Civil liberty" is the power of doing whatsoever we will, except when restrained by just and equal laws. "Political liberty" is that condition in which a man's civil liberty is fully secured. I Shars. Black. Com. 6.

"Civil liberty" exists only where every individual has the power to pursue his own happiness according to his own views, unrestricted, except by equal, just and impartial laws. Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., III U. S. 758.

Every member of a political community must necessarily part with some of his rights which as an individual, not affected by his relation to others, he might have retained. Such concessions make up the consideration he gives for the obligation of the body politic to protect him in life, liberty and property. Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 536.

Political liberty is an effectual share in the making and administration of the laws. Bouv. Law Dict.; citing Lieber Civil Lib.

Civil liberty is the greatest amount of absolute liberty which can in the nature of things be equally possessed by every citizen in a State. Bouv. Law Dict.

Civil liberty is the result of the restraint exercised by the sovereign people or the more powerful individuals and classes of the community, preventing them from availing themselves of the excess of their power to the detriment of the other class. Isaac L. Rice in 136 North Am. Rev. 52. 3. Anderson's Law Dict. 620; Bouv.

Law Dict.; 1 Black. Com. 134; 2 Black. Com. 127.

1. Religious liberty, as recognized and secured by the constitution, does not mean a licence to engage in public acts having a tendency to disturb the public peace under the form of religious worship, nor does it include the right to disregard those regulations which the legislature has deemed reasonably necessary for the security of public order. A reasonable measure of prevention to avoid disturbance is not an infringement of constitutional rights. (The statute in this case forbade the beating of drums in the street, etc.) State v. White, 5 Atl. Rep. (N. H. 1886) 830.

It is only when political, religious, social or other demonstrations create public disturbances, or operate as nuisance, or create or manifestly threaten some tangible public or private mischief that the law interferes. And, when it interferes, it does so because of the evil done, or apparently menaced, and not because of the sentiments or purposes of the movement, if not otherwise unlawful; and things absolutely unlawful are not made so by local authority, but by general law. All may be capable of legal mischief by perversion, or by circumstances. It is lawful to provide for dealing with the mischief, but it is not lawful to go beyond reasonable measures and precautions in anticipating it. Private liberty and public tranquillity and security must be kept in view.

We cannot accede to the suggestion that religious liberty includes the right to introduce and carry out every scheme or purpose which persons see fit to claim as part of their religious system. There is no legal authority to constrain belief, but no one can lawfully stretch his own liberty of action so as to interfere with that of his neighbors, or violate peace and good order. The whole criminal law might be practically superseded if, under pretext of liberty of conscience, the commission of crime is made a religious dogma. It is a fundamental condition of all liberty, and necessary to civil society, that all men must exercise their rights in harmony, and must yield to such restrictions as are necessary to produce that result. It is not competent to make any exception either for or against the

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body of which petitioner is a ber, because of its theories concerning practical work. In law it has the same right, and is subject to the same restrictions, in its public demonstrations, as any secular body or society which uses similar means for drawing attention or creating interest. Frazee's Case, 63 Mich. 405; 30 N. W. Rep. 75.

The appellant was found guilty of having violated the provisions of section 1988, Rev. Stat. 1881, by disturbing a collection of persons, kown as the "Salvation Army," who were met together for religious worship. It is insisted that the evidence does not sustain the verdict. A number of witnesses testified that the appellant entered a room where persons adhering to the above-named society or organization were assembled for the purpose of conducting religious services according to their accustomed method, with a cigar in his mouth, and without removing his hat, and that he persisted in conducting himself in this offensive manner after he had been courteously requested to desist. The evidencetends to show that his conduct was such as to divert the attention of the audience from the services then in progress to himself, and members of the assembly testified that they were disturbed by his behavior. There was conflict in the testimony, but it is manifest that the jury believed that which tended to establish the foregoing statement. Such conduct as that above described is wholly indefensible, and was well calculated to disturb an assemblage of worshippers. McLain v. Matlock, 7 Ind. 525. It makes no difference that the method of worship of those assembled was singular or uncommon. protection of the statute is extended to all, irrespective of creed, opinion, or mode of worship. Persons who meet for the purpose of religious worship, by any method which is not indecent and unlawful, have a right to do so without being molested or disturbed. Whart. Crim. Law, § 1556a; Gillett Crim. Law, § 381; Hull v. State, 22 N. E. Rep. (Ind. 1889) 117.

The

The town of N, in 1804, passed a vote that certain persons (naming them) "shall have liberty to make a road from, etc., over the public land, provided they give a deed to the town of

uals.1

their own lands two rods wide." The deed was given accordingly in due season, but nothing of importance towards the execution of this vote was afterwards done. It was held that the vote was a mere licence and must have been executed and the road made in a reasonable time and manner, for public travel, or the vote would cease to have any efficacy. Curtiss v. Hoyt, 19 Conn. 154. See Blundell v. Catteral, 7 C. B. (5 B. & A. 268) 107, where liberty is used synonymous with privilege or permission.

Discrimination Against.-The constitutionality of a statute cannot be sustained which selects particular individuals from a class or locality, and subjects them to peculiar rules, or imposes upon them special obligations or burdens from which others, in the same locality or class, are exempt. Cooley, Const. Lim. 391. The imposition of special restrictions or burdens, or the granting of special privileges to persons engaged in the same business under the same circumstances, is in contravention of the equal right which all can claim in the enforcement of the laws, and in the enjoyment of liberty, and the right of acquiring and possessing property. If the statute had declared that its provisions should not apply to persons practicing their profession in the city of Concord, such an arbitrary discrimination would be clearly repugnant to the principle of constitutional equality. The exemption of all physicians, surgeons, and dentists residing and practicing their profession in Concord from the burden of procuring and paying for a licence, and the subjection of all other persons practicing the same professions elsewhere in the State to the expense of purchasing a licence, would be a palpable violation of constitutional rights. The exemption

of the statute, of persons who have resided and practiced their profession in the town or city of their present residence during all the time since January Ist, 1875, or during all the time from January 1st, 1875, to January 1st, 1879, from its operation, is no less in conflict with constitutional provisions. By an arbitrary test, having no reference to skill, learning, or fitness for the practice of the profession, certain persons are exempted from the payment of a licence fee to which others of equal and perhaps superior requirements and experience are subjected. It is a discrimination founded solely upon the accidental circumstance of residence, or of a change of residence, and falls within the prohibition of the constitution. State v. Hinman, 18 Atl. Rep. 195 (N. H. 1889).

1. People v. Crosswell, 3 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 393.

2. Cooley, Const. Lim., ch. 12.

The liberty of the press consists in printing, without any previous licence, subject to the consequence of law. Root v. King, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 628.

The liberty of the press consists in a right, in the conductor of a newspaper, to print whatever he chooses without any previons licence, but subject to be held responsible therefor to exactly the same extent that anyone else would be responsible for the publication. Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 182.

The liberty of the press consists in being free to publish anything, true or false, without previous restraint, subject only to the control of the law for the abuse of that liberty. Com. v. Buckingham, Thatcher's Crim. Cas. 39.

It is said to consist in this: "That neither courts of justice, nor any judges whatever, are authorized to take notice of writings intended for the press, but

are confined to those actually printed." DeLorme, Const. 254.

Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity. To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licensor, as was formerly done (to 1694), is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man. But to furnish dangerous or offensive writings, which, when published, shall, on a fair and impartial trial, be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundation of civil liberty. Thus the will of the individual is left free, the abuse only of that free will is the punishment. 4 Black. Com. 152.

Any man is free to speak or write and publish whatever he chooses of another, subject only to this, that he must take the consequences, should a jury deem his words defamatory. This is what is meant by "the liberty of the press." (Com. v. Blanding, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 313.) “The liberty of the press" says LORD MANSFIELD, in R. v. Dean of St. Asaph, 3 T. R. 431, n., "consists in printing without any previous licence, subject to the consequences of law."

LORD ELLENBOROUGH says, in R. v. Cobbett, 29 Howell's St. Tr. 49: "The law of England is a law of liberty, and consistently with this liberty we have not what is called an imprimatur; there is no such preliminary licence necessary; but if a man publish a paper, he is exposed to the penal consequences, as he is in every other act, if it be illegal." LORD KENYON shortly puts it thus, in R. v. Cuthall, 27 Howell's St. Tr. 675. "A man may publish anything of which twelve of his countrymen think he is not blamable." Odgers on Libel, 10. Text book series, where is given a history of this doctrine.

But though the law be solicitous to protect every man in his fair fame and character, it is equally careful that the liberty of speech, and of the press, should be fully preserved. The liberal communication of sentiment, and entire freedom of discussion, in respect to the character and conduct of public men, and of the candidates for public favor, is deemed essential to the judicious ex

ercise of the right of suffrage, and of that control over their rules which resides in the free people of the United States. It has accordingly become a constitutional principle in this country, that "every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and that no law can rightfully be passed to restrain or abridge the freedom of speech or of the press. 2 Kent's Com. (12th ed.)

17.

Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. Const. Am., art. 1.

Provisions of like import are to be found in the constitutions of all the States. Thus the constitutions of Ohio provides, "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. (1) and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press." § II, art. I. This is exactly similar to the provision in the New York constitution. Art. 1, § 8.

That a legislature may not pass such law applies to all citizens in private or public official relations. Louthan v. Com., 79 Va. 196.

The liberty of the press, properly understood, is not inconsistent with the protection due to private character. It has well been defined as consisting in "the right to publish with impunity the truth, with good motives, and for justifiable ends, whether it respects government, magistracy or individual. Whilst a full, impartial and correct account of a trial in a court of justice, unaccompanied by defamatory comments, may, in general, be published with impunity, yet this privilege does not extend to the publication of preliminary proceedings merely, which are purely of an ex parte character, such as a statement in detail of the contents or substance of an affidavit, made before a police magistrate, with a view to the arrest of the party thereby charged with crime. Such publication can only be justified by showing the truth of the charge. Cin. Com. Gazette v. Timberlake, 10 Ohio St. 548.

No man can be held responsible in a civil proceeding for publishing the truth; but he is responsible for publishing a falsehood, unless he shows a justification in the occasion or circumstances. To publish that which is false and injurious to another must be

deemed an abuse. So, if the first publication of false and injurious matter be an abuse of the right of speech, or of the liberty of the press, and a wrongful act, it can confer no right on another to repeat or republish. This is also an abuse, for which the party repeating or republishing becomes responsible. And it is now well settled that this responsibility cannot be escaped by giving the name of the author or first publisher. Cin. Com. Gazette v. Timberlake, I Disney (Ohio) 322.

Publishing Matters Casting Reflection on a Court. The freedom of speech and liberty of the press have been appealed to, and the contention has been made that, if the defendant should be punished upon this charge, it would be an infringement upon that provision of the constitution guaranteeing those rights. The court is not unmindful of those great rights. But freedom of speech and licentiousness of speech are not synonymous. Freedom of speech and liberty of the press are not absolute. They are like all other rights, subject to regulation and restraint of law. As MR. WIRT said in the Peck impeachment case, the freedom of speech and liberty of the press, like all other human blessings, require the purifying and conservative principle of restraint: "The right to criticize courts and judges and their actions in respectful language, either by way of argument, comment or ridicule, is undeniable. But criticism and ribaldry are not equivalent. And upon the subject, as to what constitutes the liberty of the press, I refer to a passage from page 403 of 16 Arkansas. In that case the court said: 'Any citizen has the right to publish the proceedings and decisions of the court, and, if he deem it necessary for the public good, to comment upon them freely, discuss their correctness, fitness or unfitness of the judges for their stations, and the fidelity with which they perform the important public trusts reposed in them. But he has no right to attempt, by defamatory publication, to degrade the tribunal, destroy public confidence in it, and encourage the community to disregard and set at naught its orders, judgments and decrees. Such publications are an abuse of the liberty of the press, tend to sap the very foundations of good order and well being in society, by obstructing the course of justice. If a judge is really corrupt and unworthy of the station which he holds,

the constitution has provided an ample remedy by impeachment or address, where he can meet his accusers face to face, and his conduct may undergo a full investigation. The liberty of the press is one thing, and licentious scandal is another. The constitution guarantees to every man the right to acquire and hold property by lawful means, but this furnishes no justification to a man to rob his neighbor of his lands or goods."

Quoting from MCCLEAN, C. J., in the Oswald case (Penn.), the court said: "The true liberty of the press is amply secured by permitting every man to publish his opinions; but it is due the peace and dignity of society to enquire into the motive of such publications. and to distinguish between those which are meant for use and reformative, and with an eye solely to the public good, and those which are intended merely to delude and defame. To the latter description it is impossible that any good government should afford protection and immunity; it was a contempt case in which these doctrines were expounded. . . In Cooley on Constitutional Limitations,I find the following language as used by Gen. Hamilton: 'The liberty of the press consists in publishing the truth, from good motives and justifiable ends, though it reflects on governments or magistrates. A man who speaks in a newspaper has no greater right than he who speaks out of it. A newspaper is no sanctuary behind which a person can shield himself for breaking the law.' What CHANCELLOR WALWORTH said on this subject is appropriate: 'It has been urged upon you that conductors of the public press are entitled to peculiar indulgences, and have special rights and privileges. The law recognizes no such peculiar rights but such as are common to all. They have just the same rights that the rest of the community have, and no more. They have the right to publish the truth, but no right to publish falsehood, to the injury of others, with impunity.' King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113. But the whole of this argument about the liberty of the press, and the freedom of speech might be disposed of by simply reading the qualification of the constitutional right, in the language of the constitution itself, namely, that the respondent is responsible for the abuse of this right. He is not charged here with exercising the right of freedom of speech,