The Works of John Locke, Volume 2

Front Cover
Thomas Tegg, 1823 - Philosophy, Modern

From inside the book

Contents

Personal identity
9
Consciousness makes personal identity
10
Or at least to be thought false
11
Whereof there are probably numberless species
12
And why 13 As referred to real existences none of our ideas can be false but those of substances
13
First simple ideas in this sense not false and
14
Though one mans idea of blue should be different from anothers
15
Of the coexistence of powers a very little
16
Secondly modes not false
17
Thirdly ideas of substances when false
18
Truth or falsehood always supposes affirmation or negation
19
Ideas in themselves neither true nor false
20
But are false first when judged agreeable to another mans idea without being
21
Secondly when judged to agree to real existence when they do
22
Thirdly when judged adequate without being
23
Fourthly when judged to represent the real essence
24
Ideas when false
25
More properly to be called right or wrong
26
But not so arbitrary as mixed modes
28
Though very imperfect
29
Which yet serve for common converse
30
But make several essences signified by the same name
31
The more general our ideas are the more incomplete and partial they
32
This all accommodated to the end of speech
33
SECT
34
Men make the species Instance gold
35
Though nature makes the similitude
36
And continues it in the races of things
37
Each abstract idea is an essence
38
Terms leading the mind beyond the subjects denominated
41
Personal identity in change of substances 1215 Whether in the change of thinking substances
57
Consciousness makes the same person 17 Self depends on consciousness
62
1820 Objects of reward and punishment
63
Difference between identity of man and person
64
2325 Consciousness alone makes self 26 27 Person a forensic term
69
The difficulty from ill use of names 29 Continued existence makes identity
71
Conclusion
85
Proportional
94
Natural 3 Instituted 4 Moral CHAPTER XXVIII
96
SECT
125
SECT
136
How in substances
147
CHAPTER XXXIII
148
Something unreasonable in most men 2 Not wholly from selflove 3 Nor from education 4 A degree of madness
149
CHAPTER II
161
SECT
172
CHAPTER IV
186
SECT
195
SECT
248
CHAPTER X
268
1012 Instances
269
Ideas some clear and distinct others obscure and confused 2 Clear and obscure explained by sight
276
How in modes and relations
287
Seventhly figurative speech also an abuse of language
288
CHAPTER XI
289
But yet necessary to philosophy 4 Misuse of words the cause of great errors 5 Obstinacy 6 And wrangling
291
Instance bat and bird
292
First remedy to use no word without an idea 9 Secondly to have distinct ideas annexed to them in modes
294
And distinct and conformable in substances 11 Thirdly propriety 12 Fourthly to make known their meaning 13 And that three ways
296
First in simple ideas by synonymous terms or showing 15 Secondly in mixed modes by definition 16 Morality capable of demonstration 17 Definitio...
299
Ideas of the leading qualities of substances are best got by showing
300
The ideas of their powers best by definition 23 A reflection on the knowledge of spirits 24 Ideas also of substances must be conformable to things 25...
306
SECT
317
SECT
329
Because of their minuteness
375
Hence no science of bodies
377
Much less of spirits 28 Secondly want of a discoverable connexion between ideas we have
378
Instances
379
Thirdly want of tracing our ideas
381
Extent in respect of universality
383
SECT CHAPTER IV
384
Answer not so where ideas agree with things
385
As first all simple ideas do 5 Secondly all complex ideas except of substances 6 Hence the reality of mathematical knowledge 7 And of moral 8 Exist...
388
cerning them is real
391
In our inquiries about substances we must consider ideas and not confine our thoughts to names or species sup posed set out by names
392
Objection against a changeling being something between man and beast answered
393
1416 Farther instances of the effects of the association of ideas 17 Its influence on intellectual habits 18 Observable in different sects 19 Conclusion
395
Words and species 18 Recapitulation
397

Other editions - View all

Common terms and phrases

Popular passages

Page 78 - Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die. And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain ; it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain. But God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him ; and to every seed his own body.
Page 333 - For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts ; even one thing befalleth them : as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath ; so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast : for all is vanity. All go unto one place ; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again.
Page 357 - Who also hath made us able ministers of the new testament ; not of the letter, but of the spirit: for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.
Page 74 - For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad.
Page 55 - I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places...
Page 158 - Conceptions; and to make them stand as marks for the Ideas within his own Mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the Thoughts of Men's Minds be conveyed from one to another.
Page 159 - It may also lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and knowledge, if we remark how great a dependence our words have on common sensible ideas; and how those which are made use of to stand for actions and notions quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence, and from obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations, and made to stand for ideas that come not under the cognizance of our senses...
Page 162 - Words in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them, how imperfectly soever, or carelessly, those ideas are collected from the things which u2 they are supposed to represent.
Page 55 - For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal Identity, ie the sameness of a rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person...
Page 334 - Haec ubi dicta dedit, lacrimantem et multa volentem 790 dicere deseruit, tenuesque recessit in auras. Ter conatus ibi collo dare bracchia circum ; ter frustra comprensa manus effugit imago, par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno.

Bibliographic information