rebelled against the acts of James as King. The American colonists in 1776 did not rebel against the appointment of Lord North, but against restrictions on their trade and inroads on what they conceived to be their inalienable rights of self-government, and against taxation without representation-and they, too, succeeded. The Southern States, on the contrary, did rebel on the election of Lincoln, without waiting for its results; and they lamentably failed.

We are not concerned with the justice, or the injustice, of these or other rebellions; we are merely concerned to enforce, by such illustrations, the general truth of the contention advanced above. Now what is the application of this conclusion, if verifiable, to the particular question at issue? This, namely, that in the case of Ulster, a rebellion against the evils apprehended as likely to flow from Home Rule, when they appear, would have better hope of success than a rebellion against an Act of Parliament which made them possible. After all, we cannot be certain that they would emerge. It is, as we have said, highly probable; it is not inevitable. The Nationalist leaders are not for the most part, we must repeat, fools or knaves; they can have no desire to alienate the sympathies of even their Liberal friends. New sentiments may be engendered; new wisdom may be developed ; new moral principles may prevail; there may yet be harmony in that fretful land. We have the gravest doubts; but we cannot be sure. The Conservative leaders have assured the Ulstermen that they will have not only their personal support, but that of the Unionist party in their projected rebellion. We may be quite certain that, were the apprehended evils actually in evidence, they would receive support from a much wider field. Were a Dublin parliament to act as is feared, it would promptly seal its own death-warrant, and Home Rule-in the sense approved by Nationalists-would be extinguished for ever. If oppression actually occurred, both Liberals and Conservatives would come to the aid of the oppressed. Short of that, whatever Mr Bonar Law may say, we take leave to doubt it.

We do not seek to minimise the importance of the feelings of Ulstermen against the mere transference of their allegiance; those feelings are deep and real and

justifiable, and they have our full sympathy. But, after all, the real ground of resistance to a Home Rule Act, we must insist, is the fear of its hypothetical, if probable, consequences. Put the case of an Act setting up an Irish parliament in which Ulster has a clear majority. Would Ulster rebel against such a transfer of allegiance? We hardly think so. Well, then, it is rather the anticipated consequences of the Home Rule Bill, as framed, than the coming into force of such a Bill, that have raised all this pother. The mere passing of the Bill would be a grievance which we have no right to inflict, but it would not be a grievance comparable to the wrongs which may flow from it; would it then be a grievance, in itself, sufficient to justify rebellion? At any rate, while rebellion against oppression under the Act would stir public opinion to its depths, it is at least open to doubt whether rebellion against the Act will have the same result.

Taking all these considerations into view, we cannot help doubting whether the Conservative leaders have not been somewhat rash in publishing their full adhesion to the movement at this stage. It is, no doubt, a very difficult question. They, for the most part, are tried and experienced politicians; they have acted, we may well believe, on full information and on the highest motives. Nevertheless, error is possible to the best and wisest of men; and we cannot help doubting whether, in this case, an error has not been committed. Their action amounts to the sanction of rebellion in a hypothetical case, a case only too likely to become actual. This is the most serious step which has been taken by the leaders of one of the great parties in the State since the day when those parties were formed. Have they and their followers fully grasped what it implies? Their action may so impress the nation as to enforce a compromise, or even to defeat the Bill outright; on the other hand, it may have a different result.

We cannot honestly blame Ulster for what she has done; but public men, the accredited representatives and trustees of a great party, are in a different position. Their conduct is at least open to one serious tactical objection. Tactics are not everything in politics, though some people act as if they were; they have often been ranked too high; but political wisdom must at least

assign them some importance. These very leaders may, no long time hence, be called on to hold office, and to bear sway, among other things, over an Ireland disappointed of Home Rule. What will be the consequences in Ireland if Home Rule is uncompromisingly put aside? Have we not, in that case, another organised rebellion to fear, and that, not from one-fourth, but from three-fourths of the population? And with what arguments will the Conservative leaders, who have sanctioned the rebellion of Ulster, meet the rebellion of the rest of Ireland? We do not mean to imply that a rebellion of Ulster against Home Rule and a rebellion of Ireland against the Act of Union would be on all fours; nor need we here emphasise the differences. But, whatever defence may be made for the suppression of a rebellion in the second case, it will be hard to convince the man in the street that Ministers who engaged in such a task, after sanctioning rebellion in Ulster, were men of consistency and honour. In any case, we must venture to doubt whether, from this point of view-not to mention the more serious objections raised above-they were right in committing themselves, still more in committing their party.

However, wise or not, the thing has been done; and armed rebellion against the authority of the Imperial Parliament is in plain prospect. It is a grievous and a hazardous situation. What, then, is the upshot of all this? We hope, on every ground, that the Home Rule Bill will be defeated; but the defeat of the Bill will not settle the Irish question. Steady, continuous and benevolent government of Ireland for twenty years, according to the late Lord Salisbury's recipe, would do much, no doubt, to attain that end; but what chance is there of twenty, or even ten years of such government? And even after it. would the Irish question be really settled? Would the demand for self-government-in some respects a thoroughly intelligible, even admirable sentiment-be appeased? We do not think so. A compromise of some sort must eventually be found. Surely such a problem is not insoluble by the combined wisdom of British legislators, or of the English-speaking race, which has solved more difficult problems in Australia, in South Africa, in Canada, in the United States, and has slowly built up in these islands a political system till lately the most just, the most firm,

and at the same time the most flexible and the most capable of continuous development, which the world has ever seen. If the country has found it insoluble so far, it is because the party system, carried to the lengths which it has now reached, has made the solution of such questions by common action, by common consent, in short by compromise, impossible.

It is obvious that at least one form of compromise is open, on the most dangerous point of all, that of Ulster. The four counties, at least, should be omitted from the operation of the Bill; and the Imperial Exchequer should boldly and generously face the question of supplying the deficiency which such an omission would cause in the Irish Exchequer. That is the least that we can do; and we could not employ our enormous wealth better than in thus supplementing the needs of a poorer country. Mr Dillon and other fanatics might object; but, if the British Parliament were united on the point, their objections, which would thenceforth have no material basis, might safely be ignored. If this suggestion turn out to be impracticable, some other solution must and doubtless can be discovered. Things cannot be allowed to go on as they are, or to grow worse. The present situation is the most difficult and dangerous in which the country has found itself for the last two hundred and fifty years. Is it too late to hope that, even now, these accursed party feuds may for a little space be laid aside, and that, by conference and common deliberation, some solution of the difficulty, some way of avoiding the impending danger, may be found?

CORRIGENDUM.

P. 368, line 20, delete 'living.'

INDEX

TO THE

TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH VOLUME OF THE

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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