Art. 4.-A PROJECTED JACOBITE INVASION.

1. Anciennes Archives historiques du Ministère de la Guerre, vols. 3151-3154. Ministère de la Guerre, Paris. 2. Journal et Mémoires du Marquis d'Argenson. Par E. J. B. Rathery. Nine vols. Paris: Renouard, 1859-67. 3. Une famille royaliste irlandaise et française. By the late Duc de La Trémoïlle. Nantes: Grimaud, 1901. English translation by A. G. Murray MacGregor. Edinburgh: Brown, 1904.

WHEN the late Duc de La Trémoïlle published, some ten years ago, a collection of the family papers of his mother, Mademoiselle Valentine Walsh de Serrant, he included in his work some of the correspondence between Louis XV's Ministers, on the one hand, and Anthony Vincent Walsh, first Earl Walsh of James III's creation, on the other. These papers deal with a projected invasion of England, to support Prince Charles Edward, in 1745. The King of France had decided on creating a diversion in the Prince's favour by sending to England eighteen battalions of infantry, including the six regiments of the Irish Brigade, who were to be supported by the Fitzjames regiment of cavalry and a regiment of dragoons, and had given Walsh instructions to superintend their embarkation. These instructions, which were most detailed and precise, leave no doubt that some such expedition had not only been planned but fully organised.

The Marquis d'Argenson, who was then Minister of War to Louis XV, might have thrown a good deal of light upon this scheme, as he played a considerable part in the Jacobite policy of the French Government. He was Lord Sempill's chief correspondent in all that related to the preparations for Charles Edward's original expedition; and it was to him that the Prince's chief representative in Scotland addressed most of his appeals for help. He induced Voltaire to write in favour of the Jacobite cause; and it was he again who, according to Amédée Pichot's 'Histoire de Charles Édouard' (ed. 4, vol. II, p. 331), signed on October 24, 1745, a secret treaty with O'Brien, Lord Lismore, James III's agent in France, by which Louis XV fully acknowledged Charles Edward as Prince Regent of England and Scotland. Finally,

when the Prince had returned to France a beaten man Argenson loyally advocated his cause both in and out of season at the French Court, so much so that he compromised his own future by his efforts to save the lives of the unfortunate victims of the Rising.

M. Rathery, the editor of Argenson's Memoirs, was only able to put together four pages relating to this expedition; and he deeply deplores the loss of so much original material. It is therefore all the more important to point out that a great deal of unpublished evidence is to be found in the French War Office, in the four volumes of letters and other manuscripts relating to the affairs of Scotland in 1745-6. These documents are not absolutely complete, but they throw much light on the inner history of the expedition, and the causes of its delay and ultimate failure. They tell us, however, little about its origin or about the remarkable man to whose energy and enterprise it was due, and to whom we also owe the departure of Charles Edward from St Nazaire and his successful landing at Loch-na-nuagh in 1745. It is more than doubtful whether the rising would have ever taken place if it had not been for the help of Antony Vincent Walsh, the wealthy Nantes shipbroker who placed his two vessels the Doutelle' or 'Du Teillay' and the 'Elizabeth' at Charles Edward's disposal, and himself accompanied the Prince in the former. The Elizabeth was so severely mauled in her encounter with the 'Lion,' a British man-of-war, that she was unable to continue her voyage; but Charles Edward, with Walsh, MacDonald, Sheridan and Kelly, safely reached Scotland in the Doutelle.' Walsh soon afterwards returned to France. The Duc de La Trémoïlle published all he was able to find of Walsh's cipher correspondence with the Prince, whem he addressed as Douglas and Johnson; but it must have been far more considerable, as Walsh was for nearly twenty years the Prince's confidential agent at the French and Spanish Courts. The remainder was probably either scattered or destroyed on the death of his last two descendants in the direct male line, Theobald and Edward, 4th and 5th Earls Walsh, in 1881 and 1884.

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Antony Walsh's family had already given conclusive proof of their loyalty to the House of Stuart. His grandfather, James Walsh, is said to have been captain of the

privateer on which James II fled from Kinsale to France after the battle of the Boyne. His father, Philip Walsh, was baptised at St Catherine's, Dublin, on December 6, 1666, and followed the grandfather to France, where he took up his residence at St Malo. Philip remained loyal to the Jacobite principles which he had inherited, and became one of those privateers who endeavoured to serve the dethroned king by harassing his enemies wherever he could find them. He subsequently entered the French East India Company's service, and went to the Red Sea. He established business relations with Mocha, whence he introduced coffee into France, but was taken ill and died on his way home in September 1708.

On Antony Walsh's return to France in 1745, his services in successfully conveying Charles Edward to Scotland were duly recognised by James III, who raised him to an Irish earldom. Louis XV has been much condemned by Jacobite historians for his treatment of the Prince; but there can be no doubt that at this period he was far keener in his support than has been generally recognised, and was determined to do all he could to help him. The four volumes at the Ministry of War go a long way to show his earnestness; but, to grasp their full importance, they have to be supplemented by that portion of Maurepas' and Argenson's correspondence which was published by the Duc de La Trémoïlle ten years ago. Taken together, these documents show that at this comparatively early period of his reign, the French king had already initiated that private foreign policy of his own which was to reach its full development later, as has been shown by the Duc de Broglie in his 'Secret du Roi.'

The King originally intended to assemble and equip in the various ports which line the coast of Flanders and Picardy all the frigates, privateers, boats and men-of-war needed for this service, and had, so early as November 15, 1745, nominated Wailsh' as one fully qualified to carry out all the necessary preparations for this expedition. In the order which he issued on this date, he directed the commissaries, classed clerks' and other officials of the French Admiralty for the policing of his coasts to obey Walsh's orders. Walsh was to ascertain the number of troops available, as well as the quantity of baggage, artillery and ammunition that would have to be trans

ported, and to determine the number of vessels that would be required, to examine their quality and capacity, and to see how many of them should be allocated to each port. It would then be his duty to deliver to the authorities of each port a list of the vessels selected, whether for the embarkation of the men or for the transport of artillery, baggage, etc., so as to enable them to take these vessels for the King's service and provide for their equipment accordingly. He was also to determine the number of privateers required to convoy the transports across the Channel. In short, he was entrusted with all the preliminary organisation necessary for success.

By December 11, Argenson was able to give the necessary instructions to Count d'Aunay, who was then in command at Dunkirk. The embarkation must be simultaneous; and, with this object in view, all the men must arrive on the same day. The two cavalry regiments, Fitzjames and Septimanie, were to leave their horses on shore and were to embark only their bridles, saddles and other equipment. The Royal Chabrillan was also to follow the same course, as it was thought that horses would encumber the transports unnecessarily, and that any number could be purchased when they reached England. Every precaution was to be taken to keep the secret; and therefore no parade or demonstration of any kind was to be made, either at Boulogne or Calais, for fear the enemy might get wind of the preparations. In like manner, the Duke of York's arrival at Amiens to accompany the expedition was to be kept dark. He was to have no escort of any kind, and was to be accompanied by only a very few intimate friends. Chauvelin, who was to meet him there, was forbidden to show him any outward marks of respect that might lead to the suspicion that a royal prince, the brother and next heir of the Prince Regent of England and Scotland, had arrived. It was also at first proposed to find lodgings for him in a small village near Boulogne; and he was only to arrive at the port of embarkation at the very last moment.

Of course, it was necessary that some persons not directly concerned should be made acquainted with the scheme. Marshal Saxe, who had himself formed a similar project in 1744, and was then in command of

the French army in Flanders, had naturally to be informed about the movements and despatch of the troops under his orders, so as to be ready to fill up the gaps caused by those who were leaving Flanders to take part in the expedition. The Duc de Fitzjames, who was then under orders to join Charles Edward in Scotland, had also to be told that his services would not be required there, as the Prince was then in England; but that he was to hold himself in readiness to join this expedition. On the whole the secret was well kept for the first few weeks. There were few English men-of-war or cruisers to be seen in the Channel; and it is quite possible that a crossing might have been effected without exciting the suspicion of the British Admiralty if only everything had been ready in time.

At last the preparations were so far advanced that the War Office considered itself entitled to order the Duc de Richelieu, the grand-nephew of the great Cardinal, who had been chosen to take command, to join his forces at Boulogne. He had just distinguished himself, according to some authorities, by turning the fortune of war at the battle of Fontenoy in favour of the French. He had not only himself strongly urged but actually led the charge which, it was believed, had finally won the day. It is, however, extremely doubtful whether he was the best selection that could have been made. He was then in the prime of life, but, although a man of great courage and resource on the field of battle, he lacked the capacity for organising an invasion which required not only the most elaborate preparations, but the decision to seize the favourable moment when it arrived. Marshal Saxe, though he was often described as a slow and heavy German, and possessed neither the brilliant wit nor showy talents of Richelieu, might possibly have succeeded where the other failed. As Argenson himself said, Saxe saw the situation from only one point of view, and that was the right one. The art of war was a much simpler thing than one thought; and Saxe had mastered its principles. He did not, like his more brilliant rival, get discouraged by adverse circumstances, and abandon one policy for several others in turn.

Richelieu had always had a remarkable career, for he got himself talked about at the age of twelve, and had