Among the flain was General Nafh, and feveral others officers of all ranks; 54 officers were taken prifoners. In this action the Americans acted upon the offenfive; and though repulfed with lofs, fhewed themfelves a formidable adverfary; capable of charging with refolution, and retreating with good order. The hope therefore entertained, from the effect of any fair action with them as decifive, and likely to put a speedy termination to the war, was exceedingly abated. The taking of Philadelphia was not attended with all the advantages expected from that conqueft. The rebel army, however ftraitned, fill kept the field; and until the Delaware could be cleared, it was obvious, that the army could not fupport itself in that town for the winter. Therefore, as the whole effect of the campaign depended upon that operation, about a fortnight after the battle, the King's army removed from German-Town to Philadelphia, as being a more convenient fituation for the reduction of Mud, or Fort Ifland, and for co-operating with the naval force in opening the navigation of the river. The enemy had returned, after the action at GermanTown, to their old camp at Skip pach Creek, where they still conti nued. Measures being concerted between the General and Admiral for removing the obstructions of the river, the former ordered batteries to be erected on the western fhore, or Penfylvania fide, in hopes of affifting in diflodging the enemy from Mud Ifland, the difficulty of accefs to which, was found to render its reduction a much more tedious and difficult operation than had been expected. He alfo detached a ftrong body of Helfians across the river at Cooper's Ferry, oppofite the town, who were to march down and force the redoubt of Red Bank, whilt the fhips, and the batteries on the other fide, were to carry on their attacks against Mud Ifland and the enemy's marine force. The Heffian detach. ment was led by Colonel Donop, (who had gained great reputation in various actions of this war) and confifted, befides light infantry and chaffeurs, of three battalions of grenadiers, and the regiment of Mirbach. The American force at Red Bank was estimated at about 800 men. Oct. zzd. Though nothing could exceed the good difpofitions made for these feveral attacks, nor the exertions of vigour and courage difplayed both by the land and naval force on their different elements, yet this enterprize not only failed of fuccefs, but was in every respect unfortunate. Colonel Donop attacked the enemy's entrenchments with the utmost gallantry, and, after a very fharp action, fucceeded in carrying an extenfive out-work; but he found the enemy better covered in the body of the redoubt, and the defence more vigorous than he expected. The brave Colonel was there mortally wounded and taken prifoner. Several of his best offcers were killed or disabled, and the Heffians, after a defperate engagement, were repulfed with great lofs. Colonel Mingerode, the next in command, being likewife dangerously wounded, the detachment was brought off by LieutenantColonel Linfing, having fuffered much in the approach to and retreat from from the affault, by the fire of the enemy's gallies and floating batteries. The lofs of the Heffians, whether as to private men or officers, was never particularly authenticated; it was, however, known to be very confiderable; probably not less than four or five hundred men. The men of war and frigates deftined for the attack, having made their way with difficulty through the lower barrier, took every poffible difpofition that the nature and fituation of the river would admit for the deftruction of the upper works and defences, where they commenced their affault at the fame time that Colonel Donop was engaged at Red Bank. Fortune was not more favourable here than afhore. The fhips could not bring their fire to bear with any great effect upon the works. The extraordinary obftructions with which the enemy had interrupted the free courfe of the river, had even affected its bed, and wrought fome alteration in its known and natural channel. By this means, the Augufta man of war, and Merlin floop, were grounded fo faft at fome distance from the chevaux-defrize, that there was no poffibility of getting them off. In this fituation, though the kill and courage of the officers and crews of the feveral veffels, prevented the effect of four fire-fhips which the enemy had fent to deftroy the Augufta, fhe unfortunately took fire in the engagement, which placed the others under a neceffity of retiring with the utmost expedition, to get beyond the effect of the explosion. In thefe urgent and difficult circumtances, the Merlin was hastily evacuated, and laid in a train of deftruction, and the greater part of the officers and crew of the Asgufta faved; but the fecond Lieutenant, Chaplain, and Gunner, with no inconfiderable number of the common men, unhappily perifhed. The ill fuccefs of this enterprize, by no means damped the refolution of the commanders, in profecution of the abfolute neceffary work of opening the navigation of the Delaware. New ground was taken, new measures adopted, and every preparation made that could infure fuccefs to the defign. Nor were the enemy idle on their fide. They well underflood the great confequence it was of to them to keep the naval force feparated from the army, and to render the communieation between them tedious and difficult. They accordingly left nothing undone to ftrengthen their defences. The officers and feamen of the fleet were inceffantly employed in conveying heavy artillery, provifions and ftores, up the river, by a difficult channel on the weft fide, to a fmall moraffy ifland, where they erected batteries, which greatly incommoded the enemy's works on Mud land. Every Nov. 15th. thing being prepared for an attack, the Ifis and Somerfet men of war paffed up the eaft channel, in order to attack the enemy's works in front; feveral frigates drew up against a fort newly erected on the Jersey fide, near Manto Creek, which was fo fituated as to flank the men of war in their flation; and two armed veffels, mounted with 24 pounders, fuccefsfully made their way through the narrow channel on the western fide at the back of Hogg Island;,a matter matter of the greatest importance with refpect to the fuccefs of the attack, as these two veffels, in concert with the batteries newly erected in Province Ifland, enfiladed the principal works which the enemy had erected on Mud Iland. A heavy fire was fupported on both fides. At length, the vigorous attack made by the Ifis in front, and by the two armed veffels and the batteries in other quarters, fo overpowered the enemy in the fort and works on Mud land, that towards evening their artillery was entirely filenced. And they perceiving that measures were taking for forcing their works on the following morning, and being alfo fenfible that, in the prefent fate of things, they were not defenfible, they fet fire to every thing that was capable of receiving it, and abandoned the place in the night. The lofs of the enemy in men was faid to be very confiderable; that of the fleet, was more trifling than could have been fuppofed. Their artillery and fome ftores were taken at Mud Island. In two days after, Lord Cornwallis paffed over with a detachment from Chefter to Billing's Fort, where he was joined by a body of forces just arrived from New York. They proceeded all together to Red Bank, which the enemy abandoned at their approach, leaving their artillery with a confiderable quantity of cannon-ball and ftores behind them. The works were demolished. The enemy's fhipping having now loft all protection on either fide of the river, feveral of their gallies and other armed veffels took the advantage of a favourable night, to pass the batteries of Philadelphia, and efcape to places of fecurity farther up. The difcovery of this tranfaction occafioned. the fending an officer with a party of feamen to man the Delaware frigate lately taken, and lying at Philadelphia, and the taking of fuch other meatures, as rendered the efcaping of the remainder impracticable. Thus environed, the crews abandoned and fet fire to their veffels, which were all confumed to the amount of feventeen of different forts, including the two floating batteries, and firefhips. With all these advantages, the feafon of the year, and other impediments, rendered the clearing of the river, in any confiderable degree, impracticable; fo that the making or difcovering of fuch a channel, as might admit the paffage of tranfports and veffels of eafy burden with provifions and neceffaries for the ufe of the army at Philadelphia, was all that could be obtained at prefent. General Washington being reinforced by 40co men from the northern army, advanced within 14 miles of Philadelphia, to a place called White Marth, where he encamped in a very strong pofition, with his right to the Wiffahichon Creek, and the front partly covered by Sandy Run. As this movement feemed to indicate a difpofition to adventure, General Howe was not without hopes, that the late reinforcement would encourage them to hazard a battle for the recovery of Philadelphia. If fuch was their intention, he was determined that they fhould not cool in it, for want of an opportunity of bringing it into action; or if they ftill adhered to their ufual fyftem of of caution and defence, it was fill reasonably to be hoped that upon a clofe inspection of their fituation, fome part of their camp would be found fo vulnerable as to admit of a fuccefsful impreffion. fuccessfully performed. In the mean time, Washington removed his camp from White Marth to Valley Forge, upon the Schuylkill, about 15 or 16 miles from Philadelphia, in a very strong, and confequently fecure pofition. Nothing could afford a stronger proof, to whoever confiders the nature and difpofition of those people, of the unbounded influence on the minds both of his officers and men which that General poffeffed, than his being able, not only to keep them together, but to fubmit to the incommodities and diftreffes inci. dent to living in a hutted camp, during the fevere winter of that climate, and where all his fupplies of provifion and stores muft come from a great distance, at much expence and no small hazard. It was alfo a proof, with many others, of the general strong difpofition of America, to fuffer all things rather than fubmit to force. Upon thefe grounds the General marched the army from Philadelphia on the 4th of December at night, and took poft on Chefnut Hill, in the front of the enemy's right, on the next morning. Finding that their right afforded no opening for an attack, he changed his ground before day on the 7th, and took a new pofition oppofite to their center and left. Some fir mishes happened, in which the enemy were conftantly defeated, and their flying parties purfued home almost to their works. The General, at length, after continuing above three days conftantly in their fight, advancing within a mile of their lines, and examining their works with the clofeft attention, finding that nothing could provoke Such was the iffue of the cam. or entice them to action, and that paign upon the Delaware. A camtheir camp was in every part inac-paign which affords much room for ceffible, gave up the profecution of a defign which was evidently fruitlefs. The army alfo fuffered greatly from the feverity of the weather, both officers and foldiers being totally deftitute of tents and field equipage. The General accordingly began his march to Philadelphia on the afternoon of the 8th, in full view of the enemy, without being pur. fued, or in the fmalleft degree in commoded on his return As the fealon was now too far advanced, to admit of any other attention than what related to the accommodation of the army, a grand decachment was fent out to procure forage for the winter, which was the moft ferious reflection. The British arms were crowned with the most brilliant fuccefs, Two very confiderable victories were obtained. In all leffer actions, bating the affair at Red Bank, they were equally triumphant. Yet with all this tide of fuccefs, all the fruit derived from our victories at the clofe of the campaign, amounted to no more than simply a good winter lodging for our army in the city of Philadelphia; whilst the troops poffeffed no more of the adjacent country than what they immediately commanded with their arms. It was fill more difcouraging, that the enemy had given repeated proofs, that however he might engage them when he thought it to his advantage, it was impoffible for the royal army to bring him to action against his confent. This gave occafion to much uneasiness in England; where the news of the first fucceffes had caused the greatest exultation, which was now fucceeded with very gloomy reflections on the peculiar and fatal circumstances, which, from the nature of the country, and other co-operating caufes, had diftinguished this war, from all others in which we had ever been concerned; and in which victory and defeat were nearly productive of the fame confequences. CHAP. VII. Canada. Conduct of the northern expedition committed to General Burgoyne. Preparations made by General Carleton. Line of conduct pursued by him apon the new arrangement. Different opinions upon the utility and propriety of employing the Savages. State of the force under the command of General Burgoyne. Canadians obliged to contribute largely to the fervice. Expedition under Colonel St. Leger. War feast, and speech to the Indians at the river Bouquet. Manifesto. Royal army inveft Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. Council of war held, and the forts abandoned by the Americans. Boom and bridge cut through. Purfuit by land and water. American gallies and batteaux deftroyed near Skeneberough Water falls. Americans fet fire to, and abandon their works. Rear of the Americans overtaken by General Fṛazer near Hubberton. Colonel Francis defeated and killed. General St. Clair, with the remains of his army, take to the woods; and arrive at length at Fort Edward. Enemy bravely repulfed by Colonel Hill, and the 9th regiment, who are obliged to engage under a vaft fuperiority of force. Americans fet fire to, and abandon Fort Anne. Extraordinary difficulties encountered by the royal army in the march to Fort Edward. American Army retires to Saratsga. vernor's conftant refidence in his province, could not fail of being fenfibly felt, and could fcarcely be. fuppofed not to give umbrage, to General Carleton, to whofe abilities, and refolution, this nation in general acknowledge, and the world attributed, the prefervation of Canada. It was faid, that his powers had been diminished in proportion to the greatnefs of his fervices. His military command extended before to every part of America, whither he might find it fitting to conduct the army under his direction. It was now fuddenly reitrained |