III. The Difference between the Removal of Pain and Pos

IV. Of Delight and Pleasure, as opposed to each other
V. Joy and Grief

111

VI. Of the Passions which belong to Self-Preservation
VII. Of the Sublime

VIII. Of the Passions which belong to Society

IX. The Final Cause of the Difference between the Passions

belonging to Self-Preservation, and those which re-
gard the Society of the Sexes

113

XIV. The Effects of Sympathy in the Distresses of Others

118

XXI. Smell and Taste.-Bitters and Stenches

II. Proportion not the Cause of Beauty in Vegetables
III. Proportion not the Cause of Beauty in Animals
IV. Proportion not the Cause of Beauty in the Human

166

170

X. How far the Idea of Beauty may be applied to the
Qualities of the Mind.

188

XI. How far the Idea of Beauty may be applied to Virtue
XII. The Real Cause of Beauty .

190

191

I. Of the Efficient Cause of the Sublime and Beautiful .

VI. How Pain can be a Cause of Delight
VII. Exercise necessary for the Finer Organs.
VIII. Why Things not Dangerous sometimes produce a

IX. Why Visual Objects of Great Dimensions are Sublime
X. Unity, why requisite to Vastness

XI. The Artificial Infinite

XII. The Vibrations must be Similar

208

209

210

215

216

217

217

219

220

222

XIII. The Effects of Succession in Visual Objects explained 222

XIV. Locke's Opinion concerning Darkness considered

II. The Common Effect of Poetry, not by raising Ideas

INTRODUCTION.

ΟΝ

ON TASTE.

Na superficial view we may seem to differ very widely from each other in our reasonings, and no less in our pleasures: but, notwithstanding this difference, which I think to be rather apparent than real, it is probable that the standard both of reason and taste is the same in all human creatures. For if there were not some principles of judgment as well as of sentiment common to all mankind, no hold could possibly be taken either on their reason or their passions, sufficient to maintain the ordinary correspondence of life. It appears, indeed, to be generally acknowledged, that with regard to truth and falsehood there is something fixed. We find people in their disputes continually appealing to certain tests and standards, which are allowed on all sides, and are supposed to be established in our common nature. But there is not the same obvious concurrence in any uniform or settled principles which relate to taste. It is even commonly supposed that this delicate and aerial faculty, which seems too volatile to endure even the chains of a definition, cannot be properly tried by any test, nor regulated by any standard. There is so continual a call for the exercise of the reasoning faculty; and it is so much strengthened by perpetual contention, that certain