III. The Difference between the Removal of Pain and Pos IV. Of Delight and Pleasure, as opposed to each other 101 102 VI. Of the Passions which belong to Self-Preservation IX. The Final Cause of the Difference between the Passions belonging to Self-Preservation, and those which re- XIV. The Effects of Sympathy in the Distresses of Others 113 114 115 116 I. Of the Passion caused by the Sublime 130 II. Terror 130 XVI. Color considered as productive of the Sublime XVII. Sound and Loudness 158 159 XXII. Feeling. — Pain. 161 XXI. Smell and Taste.-Bitters and Stenches II. Proportion not the Cause of Beauty in Vegetables IV. Proportion not the Cause of Beauty in the Human Species V. Proportion further considered VI. Fitness not the Cause of Beauty VII. The Real Effects of Fitness VIII. The Recapitulation IX. Perfection not the Cause of Beauty 165 166 170 X. How far the Idea of Beauty may be applied to the XI. How far the Idea of Beauty may be applied to Virtue 190 XII. The Real Cause of Beauty. 191 I. Of the Efficient Cause of the Sublime and Beautiful. 208 209 210 212 214 215 216 VII. Exercise necessary for the Finer Organs . VIII. Why Things not Dangerous sometimes produce a IX. Why Visual Objects of Great Dimensions are Sublime XIII. The Effects of Succession in Visual Objects explained 222 INTRODUCTION. ON ON TASTE. Na superficial view we may seem to differ very widely from each other in our reasonings, and no less in our pleasures: but, notwithstanding this difference, which I think to be rather apparent than real, it is probable that the standard both of reason and taste is the same in all human creatures. For if there were not some principles of judgment as well as of sentiment common to all mankind, no hold could possibly be taken either on their reason or their passions, sufficient to maintain the ordinary correspondence of life. It appears, indeed, to be generally acknowledged, that with regard to truth and falsehood there is something fixed. We find people in their disputes continually appealing to certain tests and standards, which are allowed on all sides, and are supposed to be established in our common nature. But there is not the same obvious concurrence in any uniform or settled principles which relate to taste. It is even commonly supposed that this delicate and aerial faculty, which seems too volatile to endure even the chains of a definition, cannot be properly tried by any test, nor regulated by any standard. There is so continual a call for the exercise of the reasoning faculty; and it is so much strengthened by perpetual contention, that certain |