contains nothing improbable; the conduct of the Romans, who respected their treaty with the Samnites, until the Campanians made a formal cession of their territory, is natural and intelligible, however little it may consist with the modern law of nations:(10) and the military successes of the Romans in the campaign, though rapid and decisive, are not incredible, and they agree with the subsequent history. On the other hand, we are ignorant of the sources from which the detailed narrative of Livy could have been derived, and only know that it was not taken from any native contemporary historian. Another century must still elapse before we reach the birth of the earliest native author of Roman history. We are not therefore in a condition to criticize the details of Livy's narrative, or to prefer one part of it to another. Niebuhr however reforms the story, in several material points, according to his own views of internal probability. Thus he holds that the treaty of the Samnites was made not only with Rome, but also with the Latins, as a separate contracting party :(1) that the Romans did not at first refuse the application of the Campanians for assistance, and that the latter did not surrender themselves to Rome:(12) that the Roman

Campani sanctius et prius omnium suorum deditione fecerant. Sic ergo Romanus bellum Samniticum tanquam sibi gessit; i. 16. Livy's narrative implies that there was no treaty between the Romans and the Campanians; the statement of Florus is probably the result of carelessness.

(10) It was not obligatory on the Romans, even upon their own principles, to accept the surrender of the Campanians: they subsequently refused to accept that of the Sidicines, as made too late, and wrung from them by extreme necessity; Livy, viii. 2.

(11) Hist. vol. iii. p. 115. In his Lectures he says: Under these circumstances, the Campanians applied to Rome, or probably to the diet of the Romans, Latins, and Hernicans. This is evident from statements derived from L. Cincius; in Livy we perceive the intentional obscurity of the Roman tradition about it;' vol. i. p. 307. The meaning of the allusion to Cincius does not appear.

(12) Ib. p. 116. Niebuhr's reasons for rejecting the account of the Campanian surrender are first, because if they had been subjects, they would have been punished more severely for their defection after the Latin war. Secondly, because the Romans would not have granted an equal treaty to dediticii. With regard to the first reason, it may be observed that the Romans are described, after the revolt of the Campanians, as calling them subjects by title of surrender; Livy, viii. 2; and that the same punishment, viz., the loss of territory, is inflicted on the Campanians as on the Latins, ib. c. 11. With regard to the second reason, it is to be

Senate sent an embassy to the Samnites not of their own independent authority, but because Rome, and not Latium, had the presidency in that year:(13) that the consul Valerius was driven to Mount Gaurus by previous defeats and reverses, which have been suppressed, or at least left unrecorded, by the Roman historians;(14) and that both consular armies took part in the battle of Suessula. (15) These emendations of Livy's version of the events rest upon mere conjecture: and where our knowledge of the origin of the extant account is so slight, all conjecture is perilous. (16)

noted that Livy, xxiii. 5, represents the consul in 216 B.C., as distinctly reminding the Campanians that, although they had surrendered their country to the Romans, they had received an equal treaty, and were permitted to retain the use of their own laws. Dr. Arnold agrees with Niebuhr in rejecting Livy's account of the Campanian surrender. Every step in the Samnite and Latin wars (he says) has been so disguised by the Roman annalists (?) that a probable narrative of these events can only be given by a free correction of their falsifications;' vol. ii. p. 112.

(13) Hist. ib. p. 118.

(14) Ib. p. 119. In Lect. vol. i. p. 309, it is said: 'The Romans must have been pressed by the Samnites into that corner, and having the sea and the Vulturnus in their rear, their victory would have been the result of despair. This would clearly show that at first the Romans sustained losses which are passed over by Livy, or the annalists (?) whom he followed; but at all events the battle restored the balance. It was obviously the greatest of all that had yet been fought by the Romans; for though previous battles may have been bloody, yet they were not carried on with perseverance.'

(15) Hist. ib. p. 122. In the Lectures, ib. p. 310, the battle of Suessula is represented as taking place a few days after the battle of the Gaurus. The Samnites are supposed to make a fresh stand at a distance of a few miles. But this is not consistent with Livy's account, who separates the two battles, and supposes that the Samnite army received reinforcements in the interval; vii. 37. The account of the seizure of the height by which Decius saved the army of Cossus, given by Livy, vii. 34-6, is not very intelligible, but the version of Niebuhr cannot be reconciled with it; Hist. p. 121.

(16) The extant account of the first Samnite war is thus characterized by Dr. Arnold: "The Roman consuls in this year were M. Valerius Corvus and A. Cornelius Cossus. Valerius is the hero of that famous legend already related, which told how he had vanquished in his early youth a gigantic Gaul by the aid of a heaven-sent crow. The acts of his consulship have been disguised by a far worse spirit: they were preserved, not by any regular historian, but in the mere funeral orations and traditional stories of his own family; and were at last still further corrupted by the flattery of a client of his house, the falsest of all the Roman writers, Valerius of Antium. Hence we have no real military history of the Samnite war in this first campaign, but accounts of the worthy deeds of two famous Romans, M. Valerius Corvus, and P. Decius

§ 18 In compliance with the wishes of the Campanians, the Roman troops occupied Capua and the Campanian territory during the winter, in order to protect the country against the incursions of the Samnites. During this occupation, a design was formed in the Roman army to massacre the people, and to take possession of the city; so as to practise upon them a treachery similar to that which they had practised upon the Etruscans, the previous masters of Capua.(17) C. Marcius Rutilus, the new consul, who had charge of Campania, received information of the plot, and contrived to frustrate it by leading the army to believe that the occupation was to last for another year, and by sending home, on various pretexts, the chief leaders and promoters of the design. By degrees, however, the conspirators perceived that they were singled out, and therefore that their plans must be known to the consul; for this reason, they feared to place themselves in the power of the Senate, and one cohort, on its way to Rome, mutinied near Anxur, where it was soon joined by a large body of other soldiers in a similar situation.(18) They plundered the country on their road, and

Mus. They are the heroes of the two stories, and there is evidently no other object in either of them, but to set off their glory. It seems to me a great mistake to regard such mere panegyric as history;' Hist. vol. ii. p. 112. It will be observed that the funeral orations and the traditions of the Valerian family here alluded to, rest exclusively on the hypothesis of Dr. Arnold, as well as the additional corruptions of Valerius Antias. There is no valid ground for supposing that Valerius Antias was a client; see Suet. de Clar. Rhet. c. 3. Compare Niebuhr, ib. p. 124, who remarks, Lect. vol. i. p. 308, that this Samnite war is the first in Roman history that is worthy of being related.'

(17) This treachery is thus described by Livy: Cepere autem, prius bello fatigatis Etruscis, in societatem urbis agrorumque accepti : deinde festo die graves somno epulisque incolas veteres novi coloni nocturnâ cæde adorti;' iv. 37. The circumstances of the two cases, as regards the relations of the two parties, are very similar. A similar account of the designs of the Romans is given by Appian, ib. réλog dè ἐπεβούλευον τοὺς ξένους ἑαυτῶν ἀνελόντες ἕκαστοι τὴν περιουσίαν κατασχεῖν καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐς γάμον προσαγάγεσθαι. The Campanian mercenaries in the service of Agathocles obtained possession of Messena in a similar manner: having entered the town as friends, they killed the men, took their wives and children, and divided the land and the moveable property; Polyb. i. 7.

(18) Niebuhr, Hist. vol. iii. p. 64; Lect. vol. i. p. 314, thinks it incredible that the consul should have sent back an entire cohort to Rome. It is however impossible for us, with our imperfect knowledge, to know what were the consul's motives for sending back particular divisions of his army

to Rome.

having pitched their camp under the Alban hill, they heard that T. Quinctius was residing in the Tusculan district, cultivating his own farm.(19) It is stated that he chose this retired life because his military career had been cut short by lameness, owing to a wound in the foot. Being in want of a general, they placed him at their head, threatening him with death if he did not undertake the office. At the eighth milestone they were met by Valerius Corvus, who had been appointed dictator for the emergency, at the head of a military force. Here an amicable colloquy took place, and it was arranged that the mutineers should return peaceably to their allegiance, with a complete amnesty for their conduct. A law was likewise passed that the name of an enrolled soldier should not in future be struck out without his consent, and that no one should be a centurion who had previously been a military tribune; the latter measure being directed against a certain P. Salonius, who had opposed the design of the soldiers with respect to Capua. Livy adds that, according to some accounts, laws were passed prohibiting all interest upon money: also providing that no one should hold the same magistracy more than once in ten years, or hold two magistracies in one year, and that both consuls might be plebeians.(20)

Appian, whose account of the origin of the mutiny, and the march of the mutineers to Rome, nearly agrees with that of Livy,(21) differs entirely in his account of the terms which they

(19) This must be T. Quinctius Pennus Capitolinus, dictator in 361, and consul in 354 and 351 B.C. Ten years had elapsed since his last consulship.

(20) If Livy's account of the Licinian rogations is correct, the law already permitted both consuls to be plebeians, though it did not permit them both to be patricians. See above, p. 392. Both consuls were not plebeian until 172 B.C. The election of Marcellus in 215 B.C. was invalid. See Becker, ii. 2, p. 104.

(21) See Samn. 1. The consul who succeeds to the charge of Campania is called Μάμερκος, which is probably an error for Μάρκιος. The mutineers are represented as τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς δεδεμένους KλuoaνTES, by which is meant that they released the slaves who worked in the fields in fetters; there is no reason for supposing, with Niebuhr, Hist. vol. iii. p. 68, and Dr. Arnold, ib. p. 120, that debtors working as slaves VOL. II.

EE

obtained; for he states that a general remission of debts took place:(22) which seems to be another version of the prohibition of interest upon money, mentioned by Livy. A statement similar to that of Appian, is likewise made by the author of the work de Viris Illustribus.(23) Zonaras, on the other hand, enumerates all the measures mentioned by Livy, except the prohibition of interest; and he says nothing of a remission of debts.(24) The divergence therefore between his account and Appian's is as wide as possible. The conflict of testimonies, however, does not stop here; for, according to Livy, other histories represented all the details of the transaction in an entirely different manner. They related that the mutiny broke out among the soldiers after they had arrived at Rome, and not when they were upon the road;(25) that they forced their way at night into the house of C. Manlius, in the town, (26) and not into the house of T. Quinctius, in the country; that Manlius was the person whom

on the possessions of their patrician creditors,' are meant. See Blair's Inquiry into the State of Slavery among the Romans, p. 109. The compediti are mentioned among the rural slaves by Cato de R. R. c. 56, 57. Appian says that the insurgent army numbered 20,000 men, and that Corvinus met them at a day's march from Rome. The account is doubtless taken from Dionysius, as Niebuhr remarks, Lect. vol. i. p. 312.

(22) οἷς ἡ βουλὴ πεισθεῖσα τὰς μὲν τῶν χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς ἐψηφίσατο πᾶσι Ρωμαίοις, ib.

(23) Hic quum ingens multitudo ære alieno oppressa Capuam occupare tentasset, et ducem sibi Quinctium necessitate compulsum fecisset, sublato ære alieno seditionem compressit; c. 29. Livy represents the soldiers at Capua as complaining of the pressure of usury as one of their grievances at Rome, c. 38, but says nothing about any remission of debts.

(24) vii. 25, ad fin.

(25) Niebuhr, Hist. vol. iii. p. 72, represents this account as differing more widely from the other, than Livy's words bear out. According to this other account (he says) the insurrection did not at all begin with the army, but broke out in the city, and formed into a secession.' This view is followed by Dr. Arnold, vol. ii. p. 118. Livy's meaning seems to be that the mutiny occurred among the troops who had returned from Capua, but that it broke out after they had reached the city. See his expressions lacrimantes milites,' militum animos; he evidently represents the secession as confined to the soldiery. Niebuhr, ib. p. 73, rejects altogether the account of the plot against Capua, as a false and malicious charge.' See his treatment of the entire story of the mutiny; Hist. ib. p. 63-73; Lect. ib. p. 312-7.

(26) The only C. Manlius about this time, of whom we know anything, is C. Manlius Capitolinus, who was consular tribune in 379 B.C.