ing all our other moral duties, thus identifying its objects with that of ethics or moral philosophy. That part of his work which treats of International Law, properly so called, comprises the five last chapters of his eighth book, consisting of little else than a mere compilation from Grotius and his commentators; unenlightened by a single ray of original genius or sound criticism, and in which we seek in vain for those complete and precise details which are justly regarded by more modern publicists as essential to the practical application of general principles. These defects would seem almost to justify the severe judgment of Leibnitz, who calls Puffendorf " Vir parum jurisconsultus, et minime philosophus ;" and who has left on record a masterly refutation of the fundamental principles of natural law which form the basis of Puffendorf's work. According to this great philosopher, it fell far short of its aim as a systematic treatise of Natural Jurisprudence. "Inspexi opus, quod a multo tempore non consueleram, deprehendique principia defectibus non exiguis laborare. Quam tamen pleræque sententiæ in progressu non admodum principiis cohereant, neque ex iis tamquam causis deducantur, sed potius aliunde ex bonis auctoribus mutuis sumantur; nil prohibet, libellum multa bona frugis continere, et vicem compendii doctrinæ de jure naturæ iis præstare, qui, levi aliqua tinctura contenti, scientiam solidam non adfectant, quales sunt nimis multi auditores. Optarem tamen exstare aliquid firmius et efficacius, quod lucidas fæcundasque definitiones exhibeat, quod ex rectis principiis conclusiones veluti filo deducat, quod fundementa actionum exceptionumque naturæ validarum omnium ordine constituat, quod denique scientiæ alumnis certam rationem præbeat pretermissa supplendi, oblatasque quæstiones per se decidendi, determinata quadam via. Hæc enim a scientia absolute et rite tradita exspectari debent." In looking about him for those capable of achieving such a work he saw but two minds which might seem equal to the mighty task. "So great an enterprise might have been executed by the deep

searching genius of Hobbes if he had not set out from evil principles; or by the judgment and learning of the incomparable Grotius, if his powers had not been scattered over many subjects, and his mind distracted by the cares of an agitated life."u

This opinion is strikingly contrasted with the extravagant praises bestowed upon the works of Puffendorf by some of his cotemporaries, whose admiration was excited by the novelty of his extension of the province of Natural Jurisprudence to the science of Morals, with which it soon came to be identified. As such these works became the text books of the professors of ethics in some of the most enlightened universities of Europe, and were regarded as indispensable manuals in every system of accomplished edu cation. But an impartial comparison of his writings with those of his predecessors obliges us to say, that he left the science of International Law in the same state in which he found it, so far as it respects any positive improvement in its principles. Still the indirect influence of the works of Puffendorf, and the other publicists formed in the school of Grotius, however defective as scientific expository treatises, was unquestionably very powerfully felt in the increasing respect for these private teachers of justice whose writings breathed the spirit of humanity, justice, peace, and mutual forbearance. Protestant Germany was the field where the mixed science of public law and natural jurisprudence was first cultivated with most success. The scientific writers of that intellectual land had not yet learned to use freely their rich, copious, and expressive tongue. They wrote in the dead language of Rome to instruct the living men of their own age and country. In Germany more than any other country, scientific and active life stood, as they still stand, detached from each other like two separate worlds. Their mutual intercourse was kept up at this

period through the medium of the learned language common to both. Thomasius first used the German for instruction in public lectures, and Leibnitz the French for philosophical discussions.

b. 1646, d.

Leibnitz, so justly compared by Gibbon to those con- § 6. Leibnitz, querors whose empire has been lost in the ambition of uni- 1716. versal conquest, comprised both the philosophy of jurisprudence and the details of practical law within the vast circle of his attainments. Yet he left no great complete work on these subjects, and his views respecting them are to be found scattered in his correspondence and other publications. His views of the true principles on which the law of nature and nations ought to be founded are very concisely stated in the preface to his Collection of Treaties published in 1693. "Right" says he "is moral power; obligation moral necessity. By moral power, I understand that which with a good man prevails as much as if it were physical. A good man is he who loves all men so far as reason allows. Justice, therefore, which rules that affection which the Greeks term Philanthropy, may be appropriately called the benevolence of a wise man. Wisdom is the science of happiness. From this fountain flows the law of nature, of which there are three grades; strict law, or commutative justice; equity, or distributive justice; and piety, probity, or universal justice. Besides the rules of justice flowing from this divine fountain called the Natural Law, there is a voluntary law established by usage or by the command of a superior. Thus within a commonwealth the civil law receives its sanction from the supreme power of the state; without the commonwealth the voluntary law of nations is established by the tacit consent of nations. Not that it is necessarily the law of all nations and of all ages, since the Europeans and the Indians often differ in their notions of International Law; and even among us it may be changed by the lapse of time, of which there are numerous examples. The basis of international law is the law of nature itself,

b.

§ 7. Spinosa 1632-d.

1677.

b.

§ 8. Zouch,

1660.

to which various modifications have been superadded at different times and places."v

Spinosa adopted maxims very different from the mild and beneficent principles of Leibnitz. He agrees with Hobbes that the natural state is a state of war; that all men have a natural right to all things; and that every independent community has a right to do whatever it pleases to other commonwealths, they living in a condition of perpetual war. He even avows the absurd and detestable maxim that nations are not bound to observe their treaties longer than the interest or danger which formed the treaties continues.w

Dr Zouch, an eminent English civilian, professor of the 1590-d. Roman law at the university of Oxford and judge of the High Court of Admiralty published about two years after

Leibnitz, Præfat, Cod. Jur. Gent. Diplomat.

Si altera civitas bellum inferre et extrema adhibere media velit, quo eam sui juris faciat, id de jure tentare licet; quandoquedem ut bellum geratur, ei sufficit, ejus rei habere voluntatem. Ac de pace nihil statuere potest nisi connivente alterius civitatis voluntate. Ex quo sequitur, jura belli uniuscujusque civitatis esse, pacis autem non unius, sed duarum minimum civitatum esse jura, quæ propterea confœderata dicuntur. Hoc fœdus tam diu fixum manet, quamdiu causa fœderis pangendi, nempe metus damni, seu lucri spes, in medio est; hoc autem aut illo civitatum alterutri adempto manet ipsa sui juris, et vinculum, quo civitates invicem adstrictæ erant, sponte solvitur, ac proinde unicuique civitati jus integrum est solvendi fœdus, quandocunque vult, nec dici potest, quod dolo vel perfidia agat, propterea quod fidem solvit, simul atque metus vel spei causa sublata est. Si quæ ergo civitas se deceptum esse queritur, ea sane non confœderatæ civitatis fidem, sed suam tantummodo stultitiam damnare potest, quod scilicet salutem suam alteri,—qui sui juris, et cui sui imperii salus summa lex est, crediderit. Ceterum fides, quam sana ratio et religio servandam docet, hic minime tollitur. Nam cum scriptura non nisi in genere doceat fidem servare, et casus singulares, qui excipiendi sunt, uniuscujusque judicio relinquat, nihil ergo docet, quod iis, quæ modo ostendimus, repugnat. (Spinosa Tract. Theol. Polit. cap. iii.)

This is the very counterpart of Machiavelli's maxim that "a prudent prince will not, and ought not to observe his engagements when it would operate to his disadvantage and the causes no longer exist which induced him to make them." (Il Principe, cap. xviii.)

the peace of Westphalia a compendium of the science. which the writings of Grotius had contributed to render so popular among European statesmen and scholars. This little work entitled Juris et Judicii fecialis sive Juris inter Gentes et Quæstionum de eodem Explicatio, abridged from Grotius with apt illustrations principally taken from Roman law and Roman history, would not deserve special notice among the innumerable writings of the public jurists, were it not for the more characteristic designation first given by the author to that rule which governs, or ought to govern, the intercourse of independent communities. This rule he calls Jus inter Gentes to distinguish it from the Jus Gentium of the Roman lawyers, who applied that term to what in modern times has been called natural law, being that rule of conduct prescribed by God the author of nature to all his rational creatures. This new term of Droit entre les Gens was afterwards adopted by Chancellor D' Aguesseau, (Oeuvres, tom. iv. p. 267,) and has since been converted into the term Droit International (International law) as adapted "to express in a more significant way, that branch of law which commonly goes under the name of law of nations; an appellation so uncharacteristic that, were it not for the force of custom, it would seem rather to refer to internal jurisprudence."x

Zouch makes the same distinction as Grotius between the natural law and the law obtaining between nations, the first being a sound deduction from the principles of natural justice, the latter from general consent established by the general usage of nations. "The law between nations," says he, "is that which among the Romans received the special denomination of Jus Feciale, a knowledge of which Cicero. calls præstabilem scientiam, quee in conditionibus regum, populorum, externarumque nationum, in omni denique jure

* Bentham, Morals and Legislation, Works, Part i. p. 149. Note, Bowring's edition.