[Powell vs. Harman.]`

476, in this, that the defendant who sets up a possession of seven years in bar of the plaintiff's title, endeavours to connect himself with a grant. The sale and conveyance however, by which this connexion is to be formed, are admitted to be void. The conveyance being made by a person having no authority to make it, is of no validity, and cannot connect the purchaser with the original grant. We are therefore of opinion that the law is for the plaintiff, and that this be certified as the opinion of this Court.

This cause came on to be heard on a certificate of division of opinion of the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the district of west Tennessee, and on the questions and points on which the said judges of that court were divided in opinion, and which have been certified to this Court; and was argued by counsel: on consideration whereof, this Court is of opinion, that under the statute of limitations of Tennessee, of seventeen hundred and ninety seven, a possession of seven years is a protection only when held under a grant or under valid mesne conveyances, or a paper title, which are legally or equitably connected with a grant; and that a void deed is not such a conveyance, as that a possession under it will be protected under the statute of limitations; all which is directed and ordered to be certified to the said circuit court of the United States, for the seventh circuit and district of west Tennessee.

JOHN T. RITCHIE, APPELLANT vs. PHILIP MAURO AND JOSEPH FORREST, APPEllees.

The value of the interest a guardian has in the minor's estate, is not the value of the estate, but that of the office of guardian. This is of no value, except so far as it affords a compensation for labours and services; and in a controversy between persons claiming adversely as guardians, having no distinct interest of their own, it cannot be considered as amounting to a sufficient sum to authorise an appeal to this Court, from a circuit court of the district of Columbia.

THIS was an appeal from the circuit court of the county of Washington; in which court the proceedings of the orphans' court of that county, appointing a guardian to the estate of a minor, had been reversed on appeal, and the court had proceeded to pass such a decree as it adjudged the orphans' court should have passed. From this decree of the circuit court, the appellant came before this Court, and he sought to sustain the decision of the orphans' court.

The appellant, under an order of the orphans' court, had been appointed the guardian of John W. Ott; and had, in pursuance of the same order, entered into a bond, as guardian of the said John W. Ott, in the penal sum of $10,000, with sureties.

As

The case was argued upon the whole of the matter contained in the decree, by Mr C. C. Lee and Mr Chambers, for the appellant; and by Mr Bradley for the appellees. the Court did not decide but upon one of the points in the case presented by the counsel, the arguments upon the others are omitted.

An objection was made by the counsel of the appellees, that the amount in controversy was not sufficient to authorise an appeal from the circuit court of Washington county to this Court. The whole question to be decided. on this appeal was, whether the appellant or the appellees were legally entitled to the guardianship of the person and estate of John W. Ott, a minor; whose estate, it was admitted, was of considerable value. It was also admitted,

[Ritchie vs. Mauro & Forrest.]

that neither the appellant nor the appellees had any interest in the estate, except that which would be obtained from the compensation they might derive for their labours and responsibilities, as guardians of the minor.

The counsel for the appellant contended, that the right of appeal was complete, as the property which would come into the hands of the guardian exceeded two thousand dollars; and the bond given by him, by order of the orphans' court, was in the sum of ten thousand dollars.

The law is well settled, that a trustee may appeal when the property under his charge is of sufficient amount, although he has no interest whatever in the trust estate. A guardian is a trustee, and should be considered in the same relations to the property of his ward.

Mr Bradley, for the appellees, submitted the question of the right of appeal to the Court, presenting only the suggestion that the pecuniary benefit of the appellant from the estate, could not, under any circumstances, amount to one thousand dollars. Whatever claims on the estate of his ward the appellant might have, for services to be rendered hereafter; in the state of things at the time of the appeal, as he had never acted as guardian, he had no pecuniary claims whatsoever.

Mr Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

In the present case, a majority of the Court are of opinion that this Court has no jurisdiction in the case; the value in controversy not being sufficient to entitle the party by law to claim an appeal. The value is not the value of the minor's estate, but the value of the office of guardian. The present is a controversy merely between persons claiming adversely as guardians, having no distinct interest of their The office of guardian is of no value; except so far as it affords a compensation for labour and services thereafter to be earned.

own.

THOMPSON WILLSON AND OTHERS, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR vs. THE BLACK BIRD CREEK MARSH COMPANY, DEFENDANTS.

This Court has frequently decided, that to sustain its jurisdiction in appeals and writs of error, it is not necessary to state, in terms, upon the record, that the constitution, or a law of the United States was drawn in question. It is sufficient to bring the case within the provisions of the 25th section of the judicial act, if the record shows that the constitution or a law of the United States must have been misconstrued, or the decision could not have been made; or that the constitutionality of a state law was questioned, and the decision was in in favour of the party claiming under such law. [250]

The act of the assembly of the state of Delaware, by which the construction of the dam erected by the plaintiffs was authorised, shows plainly that this is one of those many creeks passing through a deep level marsh, adjoining the Delaware, up which the tide flows for some distance. The value of the property on its banks, must be enhanced by excluding the water from the marsh, and the health of the inhabitants probably improved. Measures calculated to produce these objects, provided they do not come in collision with the powers of the general government, are, undoubtedly, within those which are reserved to the states. But the measure authorised by this act, stops a navigable creek, and must be supposed to abridge the rights of those who have been accustomed to use it. But this abridgement, unless it comes in conflict with the constitution, or a law of the United States, is an affair between the government of Delaware and its citizens; of which this Court can take no cognizance. [251]

If congress had passed any act, in execution of the power to regulate commerce, the object of which was, to control state legislation over these small navigable creeks, into which the tide ebbs and flows, and which abound throughout the lower country of the middle and southern states; we should feel not much difficulty in saying, that a state law coming in conflict with such act would be void. But congress has passed no such act. The repugnancy of the law of Delaware is placed entirely on its repugnancy to the law to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states; a power which has not been so exercised as to affect this question. [252]

THIS was a writ of error to the high court of errors and appeals of the state of Delaware.

The Black Bird Creek Marsh Company were incorporated by an act of the general assembly of Delaware, passed in February 1822; and the owners and possessors of the marsh, cripple, and low grounds in Appoquinimink hundred, in New Castle county, and state of Delaware, lying on both sides of Black Bird Creek, below Mathews's landing, and extending to the river Delaware; were authorised and empowered to

[Willson and others vs. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Company.] make and construct a good and sufficient dam across said creek, at such place as the managers or a majority of them shall find to be most suitable for the purpose; and also, to bank the said marsh, cripple, and low ground, &c.

After the passing of this act, the company proceeded to erect and place in the creek a dam, by which the navigation of the creek was obstructed; also embanking the creek, and carrying into execution all the purposes of their incorporation.

The defendants being the owners, &c. of a sloop called the Sally, of 95 9-95ths tons, regularly licensed and enrolled according to the navigation laws of the United States, broke and injured the dam so erected by the company; and thereupon an action of trespass, vi et armis, was instituted against them in the supreme court of the state of Delaware, in which damages were claimed amounting to $20,000. To the declaration filed in the supreme court, the defendants filed three pleas; the first only of which being noticed by the Court in their decision, the second and third are omitted. This plea was in the following terms:

1. That the place where the supposed trespass is alleged to have been committed, was, and still is, part and parcel of said Black Bird Creek, a public and common navigable creek, in the nature of a highway, in which the tides have always flowed and re-flowed; in which there was, and of right ought to have been, a certain common and public way, in the nature of a highway, for all the citizens of the state of Delaware and of the United States, with sloops or other vessels to navigate, sail, pass and repass, into, over, through, in, and upon the same, at all times of the year, at their own free will and pleasure.

Therefore the said defendants, being citizens of the state of Delaware and of the United States, with the said sloop, sailed in and upon the said creek, in which, &c. as they lawfully might for the cause aforesaid: and because the said gum piles, &c. bank and dam, in the said declaration mentioned, &c. had been wrongfully erected, and were there wrongfully continued standing, and being in and across said navigable creek, and obstructing the same, so that without pulling up,