Now, that which all these writers have been doing partially and incidentally has been made by M. de Montgaillard the direct and principal topic of his book. He is a kind of wholesale-dealer in eulogiums on Bonaparte, and in invectives on his enemies. All that proceeds from the Cabinet of the Thuilleries originates, according to him, in a most disinterested sollicitude for the happiness of mankind; while the British, the opposers of his beneficent sovereign, are found to have no other object than self-aggrandizement at the expence of ruin and desolation to all around them. M. de Montgaillard is not a novice in this loyal and dutiful species of composition; since the books announced in the title-page before us shew that he was equally clear in his conviction of Napoleon's right to the dominion of Rome and Italy. So zealous a writer and so warm an admirer ought not, in justice, to go unrewarded; and we accordingly expect to hear soon of the promotion of M. de Montgaillard from the station which, we understand, he at present holds in the War-office at Paris.

For the immediate cause of the present work, we are inclined to look in that derangement of our exchanges which has excited so much speaking and writing among ourselves. M. de M.'s arguments tend, as far as it is possible to assign a general character to a desultory mass, to impeach the validity of our money-system, the stability of our trade, the duration of our revenue, and, by consequence, the permanency of our naval superiority. Attributing the existence of our embarras ments to Bonaparte's hostile decrees, he exhorts the whole continent to persevere in the execution of them, and to renounce the use of our commodities, as long as we remain obstinately averse to peace, and persist in what he calls a war of extermination. A wish for peace, from whatever quarter, is intitled to respectful attention; and had this author confined himself to a condemnation of the conduct of our ministers in particular points, such as the rupture of Lord Lauderdale's negotiation in 1806, and the still more abrupt refusal of the Austrian mediation in 1807; or, had he pointed his censure against the capture of Copenhagen and our Orders in Council; he might have told our countrymen much that has not yet reached their ears, and have flattered himself with making no inconsiderable number of converts to his pacific views, His tone, however, is much more calculated to offend than to per suade. He makes no appeal to our reason, but seeks to frighten us by necessity; he has no medium in argument, but all is abuse towards one side and praise towards the other; so that this publication, though executed by a man of talents, is so far from being calculated to soothe the violence of national aniREV. JAN. 1812. mosity,

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mosity, that it may be considered as an instrument of additional exasperation.

The first specimen which we shall give of M. de MontgailJard's composition is of rather a more philosophical cast than the rest of his labours. It consists of a disquisition on the nature of commerce, and of an argument to prove that British commerce is not of a character to confer permanent prosperity on a state.

Commerce does not constitute the real strength and prosperity of a state; it only developes and augments them. Commerce, indeed, gives all the appearances of wealth; but it does not constitute the real riches of an empire. This power and wealth reside essentially in the population and the fertility of the soil. We see, in fact, commerce removing incessantly both from regions and people: the sands and deserts of the East, formerly covered with palaces and temples, Bow exhibit nothing but ruins; while the Gauls still display that fertility and wealth which, in ancient times, rendered their territory so important to the Roman power. In short, it is commerce which first represented amongst the Phoenicians, Fortune, under the blind attri bute of Inconstancy!

• Commerce is attended with results which are infinitely advan tageous; but its spirit of enterprize is frequently injurious, because the love of gain tends to obliterate sentiments of liberality, and always ends by substituting self-interest in the place of honour; so that amongst people essentially or generally commercial, riches obtain too much consideration and influence, to the detriment of honour and good faith. The Parents of Commerce are Industry and Labour: the offspring, in return, produces Riches, and consequently Luxury and Avarice; that is to say, the wants which Lux ury requires, in order to be supported. From these causes originate Cor. ruption, Fraud and War.'

The more a state whose prosperity is radically or essentially founded on commerce, extends its political influence, the less that state can promise itself the enjoyment of a long period of peace. The Venetians, the Portuguese, the Spaniards, the Dutch, the English, and in fact, all modern nations, which have successively pretended to a monopoly of commerce, have been exposed to continual wars, and have "terrorised" the globe by their cruelties and devastations. Economists, philanthrophists, and philosophers, have wished to give dignity to commerce, and to raise it, by their scientific eulogies, to a level with the nobleness of military distinctions! But the very nature and spirit of commerce, namely, experience, and the necessity of things, gives the lie to all their panegyrics. Voltaire has spoken of commerce like a poet; while Fenelon, Rousseau, and Raynal, have treated it like sophists and rhetoricians.'

It is not easy to misconceive the advantages, though they are often not to be estimated, which a state may derive from commerce; still less are we inclined to withhold a constant esteem for the profession of the real merchant. He deserves the respect and gratitude of his fellow-citizens, as long as probity, industry, a love of peace,

obedience

obedience to the laws of his country, and fidelity to his sovereign, govern his operations and regulate his intercourse.' Hence, by showing the fatal effects which are caused by commerce, we speak, in the present article, only of the commercial spirit which applies to a nation or government."

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This is

The commerce which is really useful to a state, the commerce which never ends, but always procures new riches for a nation, is that which consists in the exchange of the superfluities of its own soil and industry, for objects of necessity or luxury of which that nation is destitute; or else for gold and silver, which in all times and places represent those objects. Thus a state which has a great excess or superflux of raw or wrought materials, the produce of its own soil, may carry on an active and very advantageous commerce. the present, and will be the eternal situation of the French Empire. A nation whose exchanges bear in a great degree upon foreign com modities, which are beyond its reach, cannot, on the contrary, have any other than a precarious commerce, subordinate to political circumstances; and subject, in consequence, to a ruin which must hap pen at a longer or shorter period of time, but in a manner that is inevitable. Such is the situation of Great Britain.'

The object of this passage appears to be two-fold; first, to undervalue foreign commerce generally, and, in the next place, to depreciate that particular description of it which the author asserts is followed in this country. On the former argument we shall make no comment, because we have long been of opinion that the advantages of foreign commerce are over-rated both by our countrymen and by our government. The second point, however, we mean the notion that our foreign commerce is more precarious than that of France, and consists chiefly of the export of the commodities of other countries, is an error of too serious a character to be overlooked. In our official statements of exports, it is common to distinguish the foreign goods from the British; and whoever will inspect the returns, for example, from 1799 to 1806, will find that the value (real, not official) of the former was under eleven millions sterling a-year, while that of the British goods exceeded forty millions annually. Not only is the amount of foreign merchandise much less, but the ratio of profit is also smaller, the carrying trade being in fact the least profitable of any; though to those who, like M. de Montgaillard, are fond of judging from appearances, it seems the most lucrative. The distinction drawn in the last paragraph of the extract, between the foreign commerce of France and that of England, has therefore very little foundation; since three-fourths of the exports of England consist in the produce of its soil and industry, or, which is the same thing, of the soil and industry of its colonies. One-fourth only of our foreign trade can be said to be carried on in com

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modities liable to be placed, as the author imagines, beyond our reach.' This misapprehension, however, of the nature of our foreign trade, is of much inferior consequence to an error which pervades the whole of the present.performance, and which we believe to be very generally diffused among the writer's countrymen; we mean a notion that it is almost wholly to foreign trade that England is indebted for her political greatness. Our revenue, our naval power, our individual wealth, are all attributed to this source; and the favorite inference is that, could our enemies once sap the foundation, the proud superstructure would not fail to give way. How often and how anxiously this idea is repeated, our readers will be enabledto judge by the following detached extracts:

How has the Cabinet of London obtained the confidence and the influence necessary to form those coalitions which have over turned all the Governments of Europe? And how has it happened that the British Nation has not fallen under the weight of its own taxes, the enormous amount of its National Debt, and the suspension of redeeming its Paper Money with specie? These phenomena are all explained, by attributing them to the profits that have arisen from British commerce, while that commerce was suffered to banish the trade and industry of all other nations.

If it be observed that the power of this nation is nothing more than an excessive and unreasonable expansion of industry, of commerce, and of the riches of the Bank, we may conceive to what a degree the political influence of Britain is vacillating and artificial. In fact, it is only necessary that the products of its industry should no longer find consumers on the Continent of Europe. We repeat, that it is only necessary for the outlets for its commerce and colonial goods to be obstructed in Europe, in order for the public credit, the Bank paper, and the whole government to meet its catastrophe!'

I must once more observe, that the wealth and power of Great Britain arise from commerce, and the profits of commerce constitute three-fourths of the public revenues of that kingdom; it is this considerable part of the riches of Great Britain that the Berlin Decrees have attacked and impoverished. All the expedients which the British Government may hit upon, to prevent so serious a calamity, will prove unavailing; they will even aggravate the distress, if the prohi bitory system announced by those Decrees, against English commerce on the Continent, is rigorously executed by all the governments of Europe.

Under whatever view we survey the political power of Great Bri tain, we always find that it depends almost entirely on the advantages, and consequently on the revolutions of Commerce. We observe that this power has increased in proportion as its commerce has extended, because all the European Governments had permitted England to import into their States, and to sell there, her colonial merchandise and manufactured goods.'

England exports from her possessions, and derives her merchandise from America and India: she imports into Europe a quantity of

goods

goods infinitely greater than is required for the consumption of the United Kingdom: it follows, from absolute necessity, that threefourths of this quantity of merchandise must be poured upon the Continent of Europe: there only are the markets, in which Great Britain can sell her commercial products.'

At present, whole bodies of mechanics are seen, unable to procure employment, in most parts of the United Kingdom; the manufactories have been compelled to stop, and trade has experienced such distress, such protracted distress, that the State has been obliged to come forward and assist the merchants and manufacturers of the kingdom. Parliament has granted them a loan of six millions sterling, that they may be enabled to fulfil at least a part of their engagements! This assistance may, indeed, palliate the evil for a short time; but it is very far from curing it. It is not the amount of six millions more, added to the circulation, which will re-establish the commercial credit of Britain. Not fifty, or even an hundred millions sterling would produce that effect, provided it were possible for the Government to advance such a sum without giving the death-blow to public credit. It is the markets of the Continent which are necessary to England, in order to preserve motion and life within that country! Nothing but the re-opening of the old markets of Europe can save Great Britain from the alarming crisis to which she is at present brought; and it is in this light that we may justly say, that the fate of Great Britain is at the disposal of the Emperor Napoleon.'

The most extraordinary circumstance, in this accumulation of bold assertions and hasty repetitions, is that it should never occur to the author to entertain doubts of the solidity of his reasoning. He had set out by laying it down as a principle, (p. 7.) that power and wealth reside essentially in population and fertility of soil,' in neither of which he knew us to be deficient; and he proceeds, notwithstanding, on the assumption that, in our case, the origin of this power and wealth' is in foreign commerce. He piques himself on arguing from British authorities; and he has arrived, we perceive, at the knowlege (p. 39.) that the amount of income subject to the ten per cent. tax is about one hundred and fifty millions. Now, had he taken the average of our trade with the continent of Europe for a number of years back, and calculated a fair mercantile profit on both imports and exports, he would have found that the share of national income, arising from a quarter in his eyes of such mighty consequence, bore a very small proportion to the whole; a proportion scarcely exceeding three millions a-year, or about a forty-fifth part of the total amount ;-and if we go a step farther, and calculate the home-capital employed by our foreign trade at twice the collective amount of our annual imports and exports, we arrive at the conclusion that nine or ten millions, say one-fifteenth of our national income, will form the profit arising directly and indirectly from our commerce

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