ceive the donations of the passengers, who kissed the case, crossed themselves, and dropped their alms in the box; not a shop, coffeehouse, or stall, was free from their intrusion. My curiosity tempted me, the first opportunity that occurred, to inquire to what purpose the amount of this voluntary contribution was applied. The man who carried the box replied, Para comprar pao, para Santo Antonio, Senhor Official, da hum bocadinho pelo amor de Deos*.

Of all the religious ceremonies, the procession of the Corpus Christi is the most magnificent. On this day the streets are hung with silken drapery, embroidered with gold; the monks of the different orders join the procession, bearing the silver candelabra of their convents, and at the head marches the statue of St. George on horseback, in complete armour, attended by the generals and their suite bare-headed. The military line the streets; the convents are illuminated in the evening by tar barrels and large wax tapers; a profusion of rockets are seen in the air from all parts of the town; the garrisons and shipping fire in honour of the day; and the whole is conducted with the utmost pomp and grandeur.

The procession of the host is continually passing to and fro in the city of Lisbon: on its entrance into any of the streets, one of the ecclesiastical attendants who precedes it, tolls a hand bell which he carries for the purpose; upon this the whole of the passengers, male and female, drop on their knees, and remain in that position, crossing themselves, and repeating their Ave Maria's and Paternosters till it has passed. The inhabitants run to the balconies and windows of their houses, and perform the same ceremonies; the military guards turn out bare-headed and kneeling, with the point of the bayonet to the ground. The officers and soldiers of the British army halt and take off their hats, but do not kneel.

The Inquisition, formerly the scourge of the land, has now lost its terrific horrors. According to the best accounts, this detestable tribunal was established during the reign of D. Joao III. about the year 1536, for the punishment of heretics. After maintaining its baneful influence and power for centuries, it received its death-blow during the administration of the Marquis de Pombal. The principal tribunal, which is at Lisbon, stands in the square of the Roscio, and is now little more than a place where the Regency meet to transact the affairs of the nation, and where they sit in judgment on political offenders. Evora and Coimbra formerly had their inquisitorial tribunals; these have also lost their power, or have ceased to exercise it.'

Chapters VIII. IX. and X., on travelling, arts and manufactures, Lisbon and its environs, are entertaining, but convey little information that is important, or that has not been already supplied. Chapter XI. refers to the emigration of the Royal family of Portugal, and the principal events which occurred before the debarkation of the British army under Sir Arthur Wellesley.

To purchase bread for Saint Antonio, Signior Officer; bestow

a little for the love of God.

REV. APRIL, 1812.

When mentioning the entrance of the French army in 1807, which gave rise to that emigration, the author observes that the invaders made the well known aversion of the Spaniards to the Portuguese subservient to their own views, and not only marched a part of the Spanish army into that country but placed it under the direction and controul of French Generals. That antipathy still subsists; and we fear that the time is not far distant when a similar use may be made of it: especially as the French have acquired possession of the fortresses and strong holds, that are best calculated for enabling them to command the supplies and resources of Spain, and add them to their own. They have lately, too, become masters of Saguntum and Valencia; the neighbourhood of which, to a very considerable distance, is distinguished above all the other parts of that country for its natural richness and fertility. So convinced was the great Annibal of the importance of the first of these posts, in various respects, and particularly for keeping in submission the Spaniards on the coast of the Mediterranean, that he would not set out on the invasion of Italy till he had made himself master of that town, though he was under the necessity of investing it for eight months; the Saguntines being so firm in their attachment to the Romans, that they rather chose to perish in the place than submit to the Carthaginians.

In describing the affair of Vimiera, Captain Eliot does not give any account of the effects produced by the small number of Shrapnell's spherical shells that were used on that occasion; nor attempt to explain by what unfortunate mis-management it happened that only nine rounds of that destructive species of ammunition were sent out for each gun. He finds great fault with Sir Harry Burrard for assuming the command on his arrival at the field of battle, and ordering our troops to desist from following the French after they were repulsed. He takes it for granted that the representation made by Sir Arthur Wellesley, in his letter to Lord Castlereagh, with regard to the advantages that might have been obtained if the command had remained in his own hands, is well founded, and unscrupulously adopts it as his own but this is mere matter of opinion; and it was natural for Sir Arthur to magnify those supposed advantages. Captain Eliot tells us that our want of a sufficient body of cavalry was severely felt; the English amounting only to 200 and the Portuguese to 260; while the enemy had from twelve to fourteen hundred. Sir Harrymight have regarded this bodyof French cavalry as well calculated for covering their retreat, which it was, and which it actually did; and he might have been apprehensive of our infantry being drawn into some ambuscade, or into ground favourable for the enemy's cavalry to act against them with

:

advantage

advantage and effect. Indeed, it may be added, too, that the French were not in the situation of an army that was panicstruck, or thrown. by sudden incidents into such a state of confusion as sets all tactics, order, and discipline at defiance: they were only retreating after having made an unsuccessful attack; and their retreat (as we have just stated) was covered by a great superiority of cavalry.

The author informs us (page 211.) that one half of our army were not engaged :' but he surely cannot mean to adduce this fact as a proof of Sir Arthur's generalship. Every person of military knowlege will naturally ask the question, why were not more of our troops engaged?for an able and skilful General will always contrive to bring the greatest part of his force into action, let the ground, which is the theatre of it, be what it may. It appears from his own account of this affair that it must have partaken very much of the nature of a surprise: for he expressly tells us that our position was "a camp taken up only for one night," and that we were ignorant of the enemy's intention.till he actually appeared and made the attack.

. As to the armistice, which led to the convention of Cintra, we will: barely observe that it seems odd that Sir Arthur Wellesley should sign it after the command had been taken from him; because, strictly speaking, such an act was the duty of the Commander in Chief. At any rate, it could not have been imposed as a duty on the second in command, without his own consent.

Captain Elior states that Sir Arthur approved the convention; and he is himself also decidedly of opinion that it was proper, though he acknowleges that the French were in want of supplies, and that, during the armistice, fresh troops continued to arrive from England: circumstances which must have rendered the situation of their army relatively to ours daily worse and worse. Had no such convention taken place, it is therefore more than probable that a few days would have produced the unconditional surrender both of Junot's army and of the Russian squadron in the Tagus.

In chapter XIII. the author introduces the battle of Talavera, though it was not fought in Portugal, and gives an account of it at considerable length. This affair, also, seems to have partaken more of the nature of a repulse than a set engagement, since the French were the assailants, and, after having been repulsed in several attacks, retired to their own position, unmolested; leaving a rear-guard of 10,000 men, for three days, on the heights behind the Alberchi; and none of those advan tages accrued to us from the action which usually attend a de cisive victory. Three days after that rear-guard was withdrawn, Sir Arthur Wellesley marched the British army from Talavera Dd 2

on

on the road to Oropesa, in order to attack that of Marshal Soult; leaving General Cuesta with the Spaniards to protect our sick and wounded, and to cover our rear. Captain Eliot reflects on that General, for abandoning his post on the very next morning, and marching with all his army by the same route which we had taken. This step, however, on the part of Cuesta, appears to have been necessary: for it is evident from the author's own account that the enemy would probably have succeeded in penetrating our line, had it not been for the 18 pieces of cannon, which Colonel Robe brought to bear ob liquely on the flank of one of their principal columns, with Colonel Shrapnell's spherical case shot; and if it was with the utmost difficulty that the whole allied army could repulse the attacks of the French, and retain possession of that position, how could it be supposed possible for Cuesta with his Spanish troops alone to do this? Yet, had he remained, he would have been exposed to Joseph Buonaparte's army in front, and to that of Soult in the rear; and the loss of all the troops entrusted to his care must have been the consequence.

Capt. E. gives the following short description of what is commonly called the battle of Busaco, and of the subsequent retreat of the allied army:

At six in the morning of the 27th of September, the enemy nade two desperate attacks on the position of the allied army, the one on the right, the other on the left, of the highest point of the Serra. The attack on the right was made by two divisions of the second corps on that part of the Serra occupied by the third division of infantry. One division of the French infantry arrived at the top of the ridge, when it was attacked by the 88th, 45th British, and 8th Portuguese regiments, directed by Major-General Picton, who commanded the third division. These corps attacked with the bayonet and drove the enemy from the advantageous ground he had gained. The other division of the second corps attacked further on the right on the road leading by Santo Antonio de Cantaro, also in front of the third division. This attack was repulsed before the enemy could reach the top of the ridge by the 74th regiment and the Portuguese brigade, commanded by Colonel Champlemor d, directed by Colonel Mackinnon. Major-General Leith also moved to his left, to the support of Major-General Picton, and aided in the defeat of the enemy on this post, by the third battalion of the Royals, first and second battalions 38th regiment.

On the left, the enemy attacked with three divisions of infantry of the sixth corps, that part of the Serra occupied by the left division, commanded by Brigadier-General R. Craufurd, and by the brigade of Portuguese infantry, commanded by Brigadier-General Pack. One division of infantry only made any progress towards the hill, and they were charged with the bayonet by the light brigade and third Portuguese caçadores under Brigadier-General R. Crau

furd,

furd, and driven down with immense loss. Brigadier-General Coleman's brigade of Portuguese infantry, which was in reserve, moved up to support the right of Brigadier-General Craufurd's division; and a battalion of the 19th Portuguese regiment, made a gallant and successful charge upon a body of another division of the enemy, which was endeavouring to penetrate in that quarter. Besides these attacks, the light troops were engaged throughout the day of the 27th. The loss of the combined army was-British, 5 officers, 104 men killed; 35 officers, 458 men wounded; I officer, 30 men missing-Portuguese, 6 officers, 84 men killed; 25 officers, 487 men wounded; 20 men missing. The loss of the enemy was reported to be enormous; 2000 men were buried on the field; 1 general officer, 3 colonels, 33 officers, 250 men taken prisoners.

Massena, finding it impossible to force the position of Busaco, did not renew his attack on the 28th, except by the fire of his light troops, evidently intended to cover the march of a large body of infantry and cavalry, which he had moved from the left of his centre, and were seen on the road leading from Mortagao over the mountains to Oporto. Colonel Trant had been ordered to possess himself of this road, which turned the position of the Serra de Busaco, and to take post at Sardaō; but unfortunately he was sent round by Oporto by the general officer commanding in the north, in consequence of a small detachment of the enemy being in possession of Sao Pedro de Sal; and notwithstanding the efforts he made to arrive in time, he did not reach Sardaō till the night of the 28th, after the enemy was in possession of the ground. In consequence of this movement made by the enemy, Lord Wellington recrossed the Mondego, and continued to retreat to the position he had previously determined on, with his right at Alhandra, passing by Torres Vedras, and his left on the

sea.'

It may fairly be deduced from this account that the attack, which Massena directed to be made on the allied troops posted on this Serra, was planned chiefly with a view to keep Lord Wellington's attention engaged in that quarter; while, with the main body of his army, Massena should turn the British left flank by the pass of Sardaō, which he accomplished; and it is not unlikely that the natural impetuosity of the French led them to make a more serious attack than was intended, and thus subjected them to a greater loss than was necessary. Our troops, as well as the Portuguese, who on that occasion co-operated with them, displayed great steadiness and intrepidity but where was the generalship of fuffering the key to our position to remain unoccupied, or leaving the non-occupation of it even to a possible contingency?

From Captain E.'s account of the battle of Albuera, each side appears to have sustained a great and nearly an equal loss: but the Captain has omitted one material fact, which we have heard stated by several officers of veracity and accuracy of observation, who were in the action; namely, that Marshal

Dd 3

Beresford