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ART. IX. A Treatise on the Defence of Portugal, with a Military Map of the Country; to which is added a Sketch of the Manners and Customs of the Inhabitants, and principal Events of the Campaigns under Lord Wellington. By William Granville Eliot, Captain in the Royal Regiment of Artillery. The Third Edition, with considerable Additions. 8vo. 12s. Boards. Egerton.

1811.

COM

OMMERCIAL views have long conferred a degree of interest on the affairs of Portugal in the minds of Englishmen, and have now united with other considerations to induce us to take a part in them which brings them more and more "home to our business and bosoms." The military operations which we are now prosecuting in the Peninsula, on a scale of almost unparalleled magnitude in comparison with our means, must not only excite the attention of the politician, but must create anxiety in almost every domestic circle: for where is the family which does not count, in our numerous host now serving on that, station, some relative or some friend, in whose glory on the field they do not participate, whose misfortunes they do not commiserate, or whose fall they do not mourn? We need not, therefore, employ many words, nor seek a variety of causes, to shew that the work of Captain Eliot, of which we are now called to take notice, is likely to attract the curiosity of readers in general; and indeed the circumstance of its having attained a second edition, before we have had an opportunity of making our report of it, is alone a proof that it has experienced this good fortune. We shall proceed, therefore, to our duty in examining its contents.

To the treatise is prefixed a military map of Portugal, taken chiefly from the Carta Militar, which was published under the authority of the French when they were in possession of that country; without including, however, the directions of the principal Serras or mountains, and the small rivers; which defect, the author informs us, he has endeavoured to supply partly from the best maps that he has been able to procure, and partly from his own observations. He has not, however, attempted to give any scale for his map, which is a circumstance rather unusual; though he has inserted the distances between places, in leagues, by means of numbers from the computations of the inhabitants: but these distances are so discordant and unequal in different parts, that it is impossible to derive from them any scale even tolerably correct.

Captain E. observes that the topography of this country in a military point of view, its strength, and its resources, have been but slightly discussed in all publications respecting it, except the tract of General Dumouriez, which was written in

1766. The truth is that, neither in that work nor in the one which is now before us, is the absolute force or strength of Portugal ascertained, or compared with that of any other kingdom in Europe; and it does not even appear that either that General or the British officer, when composing their treatises, had the most distant conception of the proper mode of determining this point with any accuracy. Had the latter given a tolerably correct statement of the absolute force of France, compared with that of Portugal, when a French army entered it in 1807, he might have rendered an essential service to his own country, and have enabled us to judge with some degree of certainty in regard to the issue of the present_contest.Captain Eliot seems to be apprehensive that the first part of his performance will appear tedious and irksome to such of his readers as are not military men, on account of the monotony and sameness of the language which, for the sake of perspicuity, he has found it necessary to use in his topographical descriptions; and he cautions them against expecting from him a complete statistical or commercial view of the country.

The first, second, third, and fourth chapters treat on the topography of Portugal, respecting which the author is sufficiently particular; and they occupy 95 pages. He allows that we cannot depend on Oporto as a port for the embarkation of troops; and that, if an enemy be in possession of that town, no vessels can be anchored so as to remain in security for an opportunity of sailing. He is of opinion that no attempt will be made, but in the way of a diversion, from the district north of the Douro, on the central district lying between that river and the Tagus; which he seems to consider as the only part of Portugal that is in reality capable of being defended, and towards which his notions of defence are chiefly directed. He observes:

The Douro, in the rainy season, frequently rises to such a height, and so suddenly, as to inundate a great part of the town of Oporto. At these periods, vessels have been carried over the bar, no cable and anchor being strong enough to hold them. The usual method of securing them is by a large boom, one end of which is made fast on board the vessel, and the other to the shore. Of these booms there are abundance on the wharfs. In case of an attack on Oporto, they' might be made very serviceable for barricading the streets; as they are very long, about nine inches square, and if well bound with old iron hoops in a serpentine form, from end to end, and likewise driven full of old nails, nothing but cannon brought up close to them would be able to break down so formidable a barrier. During the rainy season, and sometimes as late even as the month of June, when the freshes occasioned by the melting of the snow from the mountains in Spain come

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down the river, a convoy will frequently wait five or six weeks for an opportunity of getting to sea, at which time the roaring of the bar is tremendous. Oporto therefore cannot be depended upon as a port from whence to embark troops, nor can vessels be anchored in any situation so as to enable them to wait an opportunity of sailing, should an enemy be in possession of the town. The bar is moreover commanded by the castle or fort of Saō Joaō, about half a league from the town.

I have been thus circumstantial in the description of the foregoing provinces, in order to demonstrate, by pointing out its impracticability, how little an invasion of Portugal by the north is to be feared, if well defended. For even admitting an enemy to succeed in making himself master of these provinces, which is at least extremely problematical, he has still the Douro to cross, which might be rendered next to impossible, provided proper precaution was taken to secure the boats. It is true, others might be constructed, but that would be a work of time and labour, in numbers sufficient for the purpose of transporting an army across. It is therefore probable, that an attack in this quarter would be undertaken as a diversion, in order to draw off a certain portion of troops from the main poist, the defence of the provinces of Béira and Estremadura, or for the purpose of obtaining money and supplies from Oporto.

As to relinquishing also the defence of Algarve, and the parts south of the Tagus, he remarks:

The only part of the province of Estremadura situated to the south of the Tagus, which can be of any importance to the general defence of the kingdom, is on the bank of the river, from Almada to Trafaria; but even this is not of material consequence, as the shipping may be anchored in such a situation as to be out of the reach of cannon shot; and Lisbon has little to fear in an attack from that point. Should it, however, be deemed necessary to retain this part of the shore opposite as long as possible, an extent of country of about four leagues should, in the first instance, be occupied, from Aldea Galega to Setuval. This country is mostly woody, covered with strong heath or underwood. Setuval, or St. Ubes, a sea-port of considerable trade, is already fortified, but is not a place of any great strength. Palmela is a strong post, and might be rendered still stronger. A morass on the road to Elvas, about one league and a half from Aldea Galega, may be turned to advantage. There is a long causeway crossing it, on which a battery has been erected. The line may, when necessary, be thrown farther back on the left, to Coina, behind a rivulet running into the Tagus at that point. -Lastly, the heights above Almada may be strengthened by redoubts, or other field works. I have mentioned these posts, but if I may be allowed to give an opinion, unless they can be occupied in considerable force, it would be more advisable to evacuate this part of the province in toto, than to hazard the loss of a small corps in the de-. fence of them, if opposed to one more numerous; and I think I may venture to affirm, that the danger of being cut off would deter an enemy from advancing with a small one to this point, especially if

the province of Beira and the eastern part of Estremadura remained unconquered.

In addition to the before-mentioned places, there are numberless other ancient fortresses and walled towns, some of them situated beyond the Guadiana, at the present day of little consequence in a military point of view; and although this district may be said to be covered with them, yet it is the weakest and least defensible of any. That power which can bring into the field the greater body of cavalry, supported by a proportion of infantry, will most decidedly remain masters of it. Be that as it may, with respect to its influence on a campaign, it is not worth the time required for its subjugation. The strength of Portugal lies in the central district, well protected on either flank by the Tagus or the Douro. This important part of the country presents a front of the most rugged aspect, in the rear of which are chains of posts innumerable.'

Confining, therefore, his schemes and measures of defence to the district which lies between the Douro and the Tagus, Captain E. thus specifies the lines which he would man and occupy for that purpose :

The best line of positions that can be taken up for the defence of the most important part of the kingdom, may be drawn from the Douro along the Serra de Estrella, commencing on the left at Lamego, passing by Momenta de Beira, Trancozo, and Celorico to Guarda, all of which are excellent stations, and the passes in their vicinities should be more or less strengthened by field works. From Guarda the line may be thrown back behind the Zezere, and extended to the Tagus, having the strong posts of Castello Branco and Abrantes in front of the right flank. An advanced line may be drawn from Castel Melhor, on the Coa, by Almeida, Castello Bom, Alfaiates, and following the frontier line to the Tagus. These corps should be composed chiefly of light troops and cavalry sufficient to keep up the communication with the main body of the army. Guarda and Viseu should be the two principal stations; Coimbra, Thomar, and Leiria, stations for bodies of reserve, and the latter a principal magazine. Peniche, situated on a small peninsula on the coast, is already fortified. Its defences might be improved, and it would af ford an excellent spot for a depôt of stores and ammunition, from whence they may be conveyed in small cutters or other vessels to either flank. The isthmus, which connects Peniche with the main land, is overflowed at high-water. Santarem is a good post, and, as long as the army is in advance, a proper station for a small corps to watch the Tagus, should an enemy be in possession of Alemtejo. In addition to these, a strong position may be taken up for the defence of Lisbon, the right at Sacavem, passing by Lumiar, and the left at Alcantara. Against an enemy advancing from Leiria, the heights near Alhandra, the passes of Roliça, Bucellas, Cabeça de Montachique, and Mafra, are of importance, and form a strong line of defence farther in advance.'

Any person, however, who is acquainted with the nature of military operations, will perceive, by barely casting his eye on

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the map, that ten times the force of that district would hardly suffice to defend it properly against the penetration of even a small well disciplined army.

In the 6th chapter, the author tells us that twenty thousand of the Portuguese troops are payed by Great Britain; and, as a proof of their bravery, he refers us to that part of Lord Wellington's dispatch relative to the affair of Busaco, in which his Lordship mentions the circumstance of having had "a favourable opportunity of shewing the enemy the description of troops of which his army was composed," as a consolation to him under the mortification of being obliged to retreat precipitately after he found that Massena had unexpectedly turned one of his flanks.

In speaking of the customs of the Portuguese, p. 121. Capt. Eliot says that the sulphureous particles arising from the charcoal-fires, which they make in large copper-pans, occasion a constant coughing and consequent spitting; a custom to which the natives are much addicted, even females of the first rank

but this is the first time that we ever heard of charcoal emitting sulphureous particles, or vapours, as pitcoal commonly does. His account of the wonderful influence of superstition, on all descriptions of persons, is not much calculated for giving us a high opinion either of the country or its inhabitants; though their abolition of that horrible tribunal, the Inquisition, may lead to improvement and happiness :

It has been for some time a subject of discussion with various authors, whether the almost uncontrouled sway maintained by the clergy over the minds, I might perhaps say, over the persons and property of the lower orders of society, has been mostly effected by the force of enlightened education and superior intellect, or by. means of low cunning and superstitious infatuation. I am inclined to think that the former may have their due weight, but that the latter certainly preponderate; for when we consider the number of religious ceremonies, conducted with the utmost pomp and grandeur, handed down from generation to generation, and some of them so truly absurd, we may infer, that they themselves are equally the dupes of their own credulity. As an instance of the absurdity of some of these ceremonies, I shall mention one which I was an eye-witness to in Lisbon. For more than a week I observed a party of six stout fellows parading the streets, dressed in a kind of scarlet robe, one of whom carried an image in a little glass case, underneath which was a money-box, with a strong padlock; he was preceded by two of the party, one playing the drum, the other the bagpipes. On the left of the man with the image, was another of the party carrying a board, on which was painted a representation of the sufferings of souls in purgatory: the rear was brought up by the other two, with flags hearing some other devices, which, from their dirty and tattered state, I could not decypher. The party frequently stopped to re

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