tendant on transactions with distant and hostile countries. He appears to be unconscious that by much the greater part of this productive labour is exerted on British consumption; and that a large share of it is paid by those among us, the agriculturists, whose stability he is forced to acknowlege. What would he think on being shewn that our carrying-trade, our re-export of colonial and foreign commodities, on which he dwells as the pillar of our revenue, is productive of scarcely any revenue whatever? On such occasions it is our established rule to draw-back the duties; and if in some cases the drawback be not equal to the duty, in others, as in sugar for instance, it is more than equal. Were attention paid to this simple matter, we should be spared a repetition of the blunders perpetually occurring among ourselves, and an endless series of declamation on the part of our enemies. It is curious to see with what emphasis M. de Montgaillard dwells on this favourite opinion. Three fourths of our revenue,' he says (p. 75.) are fortuitous, and dependent on the benefits of a commerce which may be checked by political revolutions abroad.' Not contented with expressing himself once in the most absolute terms, this indefatigable advocate must return to the charge, and repeat (p. 80.) that Great Britain is a kingdom of paper, where three-fourths of the public property are dependent on the profits of a monopoly burdensome to Europe;' and again, (p. 83.) the public expenditure of England must necessarily increase every year, while the public revenues, of which three-fourths are produced by export and the profits of commerce, must experience a serious diminution.' A similar thought, in somewhat different language, is expressed in the following passage: Four plants or shrubs, scarcely known in Europe a century and a half ago, have made the commercial fortune of England, and at present actually support the throne of that kingdom: they are the coffee-tree, the cotton-tree, the tea-tree, and the sugar-cane; these have superseded in a few years, a great part of the aliments and clothing which the people of Europe had used throughout a long course of centuries. With the produce of these four plants, Europe might dispense and not feel any serious privation; having such substitutes, as would prove more lucrative for her Governments and less expensive for individuals.' Though the author displays rather more precision in this than in most of his effusions, he still forgets one main point; namely, that we derive no revenue from the export of the four plants on which he lays so much stress. Like many other foreigners, M. de Montgaillard attributes the great extension of British manufacture in the present age to our commercial treaty with France in 1786. Among ourselves, also also, it has become fashionable to extol the provisions of that treaty but whoever will read Dr. Smith's observations on a still more celebrated compact, the Methuen treaty with Portugal, will be satisfied that the beneficial effects of both are greatly over-rated. Our manufactures flourished after 1786 because we were relieved from the burden of war, and the world was open to our trade; and they were benefited by intercourse with France, not in consequence of any particular stipulations, but because they always are advanced by an open exchange with an industrious and populous country.-Another favourite opinion of M. de Montgaillard is that, while the resources of France are natural, those of England are artificial : In the course of the revolution, Europe has seen France without laws, without a chief, and we may say, without wealth, support the uncashing (démonétisation) of thirty milliards of Paper Money! Europe has seen this Empire rise full of life and new vigour from the tomb in which all laws, social and political, seemed to be for ever buried. The cause of these prodigies is in the situation, in the territory, in the nature of the French Empire-of that Empire, the first and the most powerful of all states, because its wealth is founded on an order of things that is constant and imperishable. 'Let them attempt in England, or in any other State that lives by commerce, to reduce or call in their Paper Money, and we shall see that by such a measure the political constitution of that State will be overthrown. It is only those Powers which are essentially rich within their own territory, that can, under such circumstances, preserve their political existence against a bankruptcy.' There may be perceived in Britain a prosperity that seems incredible, and, at the same time, a real penury in the resources and various revenues of the State; because the greatest portion of those resources or revenues is accidental or artificial. In reality, the political fortune of this monarchy is founded on the loan and banking systems—a system and establishment which are themselves founded on the industry and commerce of Great Britain. The Bank has hitherto been the real pillar of the State; commerce supports the Bank, and both Bank and State are one and the same thing. The Bank makes a figure nominally, and not really, if we may be allowed the phrase, as a creditor of the State. The National Debt and the issuing of Bank Notes, have put all the private fortunes of the United Kingdom into the hands of the Government.' This sort of idea was brought forwards, and, in our opinion, with language by much too absolute, in the opening debate of the present Session of Parliament. No doubt, in climate and in soil, as well as in superficial extent, France is greatly superior to the United Kingdom; and she consequently is at present, and will in all probability remain, much more populous: but those who allege that the resourses of England are artificial have looked at them only on the surface. They are struck with the the interruption of our continental trade, without considering the smallness of its proportion relatively to our whole trade. They are alarmed at the depreciation of our paper-money, and, in their haste, ascribe to national weakness that which is chargeable on the impolicy of our government. If they will confine their view to natural resources, let them calculate how greatly our agriculture has been improved during the last twenty years. On directing their attention to the districts in which the best husbandry is practised, they will find that it is in these districts that improvement continues most rapidly to advance. They may then safely draw the consolatory inference that the cultivation of our natural resources is far from being at a stand; and that the next twenty years promise to add as copiously to their productive power as the last. M.de Montgaillard enlarges greatly (p. 23.) on the inadequacy of our crops to our population; and for the present he is in the right: but, were our landholders to follow the advice of Mr. Coke, and grant favourable leases, it would soon appear whether our soil be or be not equal to the maintenance of its inhabitants. Our readers must be already satisfied that M. de Montgaillard belongs to that numerous class of writers who delight in pushing arguments to extremes. He expatiates on the reign of King William as the origin of all kinds of political evil to England; and the more considerate among us will not be slow to acknowlege that the loan-system, which then commenced, has been carried to a pernicious and extravagant length: as well as that we have interfered in war after war for the maintenance of the balance of Europe, when our policy should have been to leave its adjustment to the continental powers themselves. The author, however, will not be satisfied with qualified admissions; he must insist that we have brought ourselves to the verge of fuin; and that the gloomy predictions of Lord Bolingbroke, whom he perpetually quotes, have been verified. The most amusing thing is that, amid all this invective, M. de Montgaillard professes a friendly disposition towards us, I seek not,' he says, (p.5.) to revive antient animosities between two nations, which ought to honour and esteem each other; on the contrary, may antient enmities and jealousies be forced at last to yield to interests better understood, and to that spirit of liberality, activity, and industry, which has spread itself over Europe. From so complaisant a courtier, our readers will not be surprized to hear a panegyric on Bonaparte's usurpation of Holland. Holland,' he says, (p. 16.) ought to view the honourable incorporation of her Provinces with the French empire as a great benefit. When the liberty of the seas shall have been regu lated lated, in the name of all the nations of Europe, the departments of Holland will be able to judge of the importance, commercial as well as political, which they have acquired by their incorporation with the empire. That period is not far distant." Among all his effusions and transitions, however, on one point he is wary of touching, viz. Spain. Knowing how sore his Imperial master feels on that topic, he makes an invariable rule to "shun it through all the dire debate." It suits him better to inveigh (p. 109, 111.) against the negligence of the French cabinet for a century back in matters of trade, and to ascribe to that cause the flourishing commerce and naval preponderance of England. Not feeling confident, after all, that Bonaparte will succeed in depriving us of our superiority at sea, M. de M.'s alternative is to undervalue the utility of naval greatness. 'The most decisive nautical combats, and even the uncontested command of the ocean, have never,' he says, 'decided the fate of a great war. Maritime power always remains in a secondary state, and subjected to a secondary influence. When the poet said, "Le trident de Neptune est le sceptre du monde," he put a fine thought into very fine verse: but he advanced an absurdity, and abused the privilege granted to poetry in order to embellish and perpetuate illusions. It is no doubt by pursuing this happy vein of reasoning, that M. de Montgaillard has made the pleasing discovery that to France a great naval disaster is only an accident!' This publication, hasty and imperfect as it is, must evidently have been composed several months ago. The body of the book appears to have been sent to press in the month of August; at which time the bill brought forwards by our ministers, on Lord Stanhope's proposition, again called the author's attention to the state of our bank-paper, and gave occasion to the addition of a long Postscript, on the ruin about to overtake as in consequence of the forced currency now imparted to the notes of the Bank of England. M. de Montgaillard here enters into various details on the subject of our paper; and though in several passages he is less intemperate than in the preceding part of the book, we can find nothing in this money-discussion that is of sufficient novelty or magnitude to engage the attention of our readers. The substance of his reasoning consists in what we cannot avoid to acknowlege, viz. that a forced paper-currency very soon falls below gold, and that the expences of a government must become greater in the former, shan in the latter. With these reflections, the author finishes a tract which, had it been carefully digested, might have been :' been compressed into half its present size. I perceive,' says he, (p. 80.) that I fall into frequent repetitions: but I am forced to do so by the nature and importance of the subject under discussion as if the importance of a subject were not a reason for weighing it maturely, and avoiding those repetitions which are generally the effect of haste. Verbal errors we have also remarked in the course of our reading, but we are uncertain whether to attribute them to the author or to the translator. The duty of the latter, however, seems to be executed with spirit; though of its accuracy we have not the means of judging, the original work not being before us; nor, as we understand, in this country, with the exception of the copy which has served for the translation. We see no reason to adopt the opinion entertamed by some persons, that it is a demi-official publication on the part of the French government. Much as it may accord with Bonaparte's views, several of whose acts respecting civil administration proceed, we believe, on notions as crude and erroneous as those of M. de Montgaillard,—it is by no means likely that any public paper would have been permitted to go abroad in so loose and imperfect a shape. - It remains that we add a few words explanatory of our sentiments on the important discussions which M. de Montgaillard has touched with so bold a pen. With every disposition to lend a favourable ear to an argument for peace, we have found it difficult to dwell with satisfaction on any part of his book, or to dismiss it otherwise than in terms of reprobation. In passing this condemnation, we are not aware of being actuated by an unconsciousness of the existence of our national embarrassments. Our commerce, we are sensible, is in a state of interruption and languor; our expenditure is disproportioned to our means; the depreciation of money continues; Ireland is in disorder; and America, our best customer, is at variance with us. It is to be hoped, however, that the tranquillization of Ireland is not remote, and we may hail with satisfaction some recent symptoms in our councils of a conciliating policy towards the United States. Were this double difficulty removed, our situation would wear a very different aspect in the eyes of our continental enemy; and the improvement in our affairs would fortunately be coincident with the lesson which Spain has administered to him, of the folly of attempting the conquest of an independent people. To judge from late accounts, neither Russia nor Sweden is likely to become a passive follower of his anti-commercial edicts; and he will find at last that the wants of mankind are sufficiently strong to burst even Imperial fetters. We presume not to calculate either the time at which these |