sovereign, and asking for a small increase of revenue, the Imperial Sultan replied by instantly drawing his sword, and dissevering the head from the body of the impolitic petitioner ! When the same sovereign was returning from his questionable triumph in Egypt, riding side-by-side with his Grand Vizier through the Syrian plains, and triumphing in the recollection of the glories he had won, the Vizier ventured to differ with his master on the policy of the campaign. Another instant, and the trunk of the Turkish Prime Minister alone remained upon his horse-his head was rolling in the sand! Such was the character of a Government, whose barbarity was scarcely exceeded by any Court either of Africa or of Asia.

And if it be replied that all this barbarity is now a thing gone by, what shall be said for the civilisation of a people, who, deprived of every other means for a manifestation of public feeling, have resorted to a regular course of Political Incendiarism? Since the hideous slaughter of the Janissaries abolished the most formidable check upon the absolutism of the Crown, the people of Constantinople and other cities can find no more just or rational method of evincing their animosity to an existing administration, than by setting on fire the dwellings, not of the obnoxious ministers, but of the poorer classes of the population, who probably had been more often the sympathisers with these raving incendiaries, in their abhorrence of the tyranny of the Civil Power. What oblique Justice-what eccentric Retribution is here! This is perhaps the natural result of a conflict of hostile force, between one element striving by the worst crimes to retain its authority, and another endeavouring by the most hideous vices to regain its power.

It is surprising to observe how little the ordinary laws of nations, controlling their relations in peace and the asperities of war, appear to have found a place in the East of Europe, during those centuries which are supposed, in the most contracted signification of the term, to constitute modern history. Both in Turkey and in Hungary it appears to have

an Ambassador to death. This, if surprising on the one hand, through the Christianisation of the Magyars, is also surprising on the other, through the reputed courtesy of the Turks. By the Sultans, the Laws of War appear to have been yet more grossly outraged. That which our international jurisprudence terms the "Rights of War against Enemies," appears never to have found a place in the Turkish Code. Let us only consider the treatment of the French prisoners taken in battle by Bajazet I. We will quote Mr. Creasy's description of the carnage some days after the battle :

"Shildberger saw his comrades cut down in heaps by the scymetars of the Turkish executioners, or battered to death by the maces of the Janissaries who were called forward to join in the bloody work. He was himself saved by the intercession of Bajazet's son, who was moved to pity by the evident youth of the captive. The Sultan sat there from day-break till four in the afternoon, enjoying, with inexorable eye, the death pangs of his foes; when at last the pity or the avarice of his grandees made them venture to come between him and his prey, and implore that the Christians who yet remained alive might be made slaves of, instead of being slain."—(ii., 65.)

From this brief review, our readers may be in a position to judge in some degree of the social and political constitution of the Turkish Empire, as it has existed since the period of the fifteenth century. Much of what we have here stated is applicable to existing times. The barbarity which formerly characterised the international policy of that State has now, of course, in a great degree vanished. In other points of view, Christianity is attaining its final triumph by answering the boast which had threatened to Mahometanise Europe, in gradually Europeanising Turkey. Up to this point, however, we are at least able to understand the character of the Turkish system, which (when the age of Mahomet the Second and the fifteenth century had passed away) was required to sustain the mighty projects of Solyman the Magnificent for the humiliation of Central Europe.

Let us now briefly review the

the first half of the sixteenth century, which nearly comprised the reigns of Selim I. and Solyman the Magnificent. Selim had succeeded by the deposition of his father, in 1512, at the age of forty-seven. He reigned only during eight years. But this brief dominion served greatly to consolidate the Turkish empire. His character exhibited this strange paradox, that the man who could exceed all his predecessors in the bloodthirstiness of his nature, could yet surpass all contemporary sovereigns in his respect for men of literature. A poet or a historian could administer to him a plain rebuke, for which the heads of all his generals, statesmen, and admirals, might have been simultaneously forfeited. But the historical importance of his reign chiefly rests in the religious authority which he was the first to arrogate to his dynasty. Mahometanism was

then divided into two hostile sectsthe Shiites and the Sunnites. The Mameluke Sultans of Egypt had until that period been regarded as the heads of the Mahometan world, in right of the Great Prophet of whom they were accounted to be the legitimate representatives. These Sultans were now vanquished and extinguished by the Egyptian wars of Selim. A religious question now arose in reference to the rightful devolution of the powers of the Caliphate thus voided by the Mameluke Sultans.* The Sunnites ultimately acquiesced in the assumption of this spiritual and temporal supremacy by the House of Othman. The Shiites, on the contrary, who appear to have been the Protestants of Mahometanism-this term being used in its original and etymological sense-without formally asserting where this supremacy ought to rest, opposed the arrogations of the Turkish Sultans. These Shiites were chiefly Persians. At the present day, indeed, this distinction is still observable-the Per

sians and the bigoted or Tory Turks retaining their historically distinctive creeds. From this original difference we find a key to much of the hostility which has prevailed between Turkey and Persia during the last three centuries.

Solyman the Magnificent accordingly succeeded Selim in an enlarged dominion and an exalted spiritual authority. The nearly contemporaneous accessions of the two greatest sovereigns of Europe, in that age, may furnish comment to the lovers of coincidence. Charles V. was elected to the throne of the Germanic empire in 1519-Solyman to that of Turkey in 1520. Professor Creasy ascribes the election of Charles V. to the common apprehension of the Turkish power in Central Europe. It does not appear to us, we confess, that the record of intrigues by which the House of Austria retained their Germanic authority warrants the assumption, that the Seven Electors were actuated by such a far-seeing and enlightened policy. Be this, however, as it may, the fact at least remains, that the destinies of the centre and east of Europe hung upon the nearly-balanced power of this duumvirate of Imperial Monarchs.

The terror inspired by the Turks in this age of their glory may be best appreciated by the consideration that the numbers of their feudatory troops and irregular levies exceeded 200,000; their artillery, in an age before cannon had been brought largely into use, to 300 heavy guns; and their navy to 300 ships of war. This military force was accounted the best equipped and the most powerful of Europe. In artillery and engineering the Turks exceeded the science of the Christian States. The instances which Mr. Creasy quotes from Thornton of the military care of Solymansuch as his institution of a corps of water-carriers to supply water to the soldiers, not only in a march but on

the field of battle-attest the excellence of the system introduced_by that sovereign into his army. The humble and cringing manner in which he was more than once addressed by the proud House of Austria--and the arrogant tone of superiority with which he affected to treat those Princes whom he termed "the Kings of Vienna"-indicate the primacy he had attained in the list of Sovereigns.

The first year of Solyman's reign was inaugurated by the fall of Belgrade -the second by that of Rhodes. In that island fortress the knights of St. John were yet established, on his accession, in dangerous proximity to the Turkish capital. It may be interesting to quote from Professor Creasy's narrative of the siege, as illustrative of the power and policy of the Turks :

"On the 18th of June, 1522, the Ottoman fleet of 300 sail quitted Constantinople for Rhodes. Besides its regular crews and immense cargoes of military stores, it carried 8,000 chosen soldiers, and 2,000 pioneers. At the same time Solyman led an army of 200,000 men along the western coast of Asia Minor.

"The Grand Master of Rhodes at the time of Solyman's attack was Villiers De Lisle Adam, a French knight of proved worth and valour. The garrison consisted of 500 regular troops, 600 of whom were knights.

Solyman landed in the island of Rhodes on the 28th of July, 1522, and the siege began on the 1st of August. It was prolonged for nearly five months by the valour of De Lisle Adam and his garrison, by the skill of his engineer, Martinengo. The war was waged almost incessantly underground by mines and countermines, as well as above ground by cannonade and bombardment, desperate sallies, and still more furious assaults. A breach was effected, and some of the bastions of the city were shattered early in September; and four murderous attempts at storming were made and repulsed during that month. The Turkish commanders at length resolved to lavish no more lives in attempts to storm the city, but to trust to their mines and artillery for its gradual destruction. Advancing along trenches, according to the plan of gradual approach which has since been habitually employed, but which was previously unknown, or at least was never used so systematically, the Turks brought their batteries closer and closer to bear upon the city, and at length established themselves within the first defences," &c., vol. i., p. 261.

It is interesting at once to compare

and to contrast this account with the detail of the siege of Sebastopol. It will be seen that, whatever may be the improvements introduced into engineering by three centuries and a quarter, alternately of peace and of war, the general principles of military operation which were recognized in the early part of the sixteenth, are applicable to the middle of the nineteenth age. The same mining and countermining-the same reciprocal sallies and assaults-the same bombardment upon either side-the same effecting of breaches-the same strategy of approaching gradually along trenches that decided the fate of Sebastopol in 1855, had decided also the fate of Rhodes in 1522. The age of Solyman was the first age of modern warfare.

That period appears to have been also the first to mark an approaching civilization in the Turkish rulers. The ultimate fall of Rhodes before adequate succour could reach it being now inevitable, De Lisle Adam and his knights seized the moment which further delay might have lost for an honourable capitulation. They were thus enabled to retire to Malta, where they at once again displayed their valour and retrieved their glory some forty years afterwards, when again besieged by the great Solyman in the last years of his eventful reign. "How much heroism," says the Professor with great truth, "would the world have lost if the knights of St. John had obstinately sought in Rhodes the fate of Leonidas!"

Let us hear the Professor's account of the capitulation, indicative as it is of the first approach of the Turks to an acquiescence in the Modern Laws of War:

"By the terms of capitulation (25th December, 1522) which Solyman granted to the knights, he did honour to unsuccessful valour; and such honour is reflected with double lustre on the generous victor. The knights were to be at liberty to quit the island with their arms and property within twelve days in their own galleys; and they were to be supplied with transports by the Turks if they required them. The Rhodian citizens, on becoming the Sultan's subjects, were to be allowed the free exercise of their religion their churches were not to be profaned no children were to be taken from their parents; and no tribute was to be required from the island for five years. The

:

insubordinate violence of the Janissaries caused some infraction of these terms; but the main provisions of the treaty were fairly carried into effect. By Solyman's request, an interview took place between him and the Grand Master before the knights left the island. Solyman addressed through his interpreter words of respectful consolation to the Christian veteran; and turning to the attendant Vizier, the Sultan observed-' It is not without regret that I force this brave man from his home in his old age.' Such, indeed, was the esteem with which the valour of the knights had inspired the Turks, that they refrained from defacing their armorial bearings and inscriptions on the buildings. For more than three hundred years the Ottomans have treated the memory of their brave foemen with the same respect; and the escutcheons of the knights of St. John, who fought against Sultan Solyman for Rhodes, still decorate the long-captured city." Vol. i., pp. 262-3.

Contrast such conduct as this with that of preceding sovereigns; and can we resist the conclusion that, with the age of Solyman the Magnificent, a new era had dawned upon the opinions and the ideas of the Turkish rulers?

This was but the beginning of Solyman's triumphs. Four years later, in 1526, he invaded Hungary with 100,000 men and 300 guns, and there fought the memorable battle of Mohacz, in which the chivalry of Hungary and the House of Jagellon perished together. On that field 24,000 Hungarians fell. Three years afterwards, in 1529, he again invaded Hungary with the view of dispossessing Ferdinand, brother of the Emperor Charles V., of the crown of Hungary, and of asserting the rights of Zapolya, the rival candidate to the throne. He was now at the head of 250,000 men. His expedition succeeded. Master of Hungary, he now threatened Germany. That country, split into religious divisions, was tardy in action. Meanwhile Solyman was in Austria, and the capital of the House of Hapsburg was in a state of siege. Had not continual rains rendered it impossible for the Turkish army to bring up their heavy artillery, it is almost certain that Vienna must have fallen. As it was, the contest was long and nicely poised. Near midnight on the 14th of October, the last assault failed; the Ottoman tents were struck; and the Turks retreated into Hungary. Solyman for

once disgraced the moderation that had hitherto characterised his reign. A general massacre took place of thousands of Christians whom the three weeks of the siege had brought into the Turkish camp. He chose still to regard himself as a conqueror ; although, as Mr. Creasy reminds us, he is said to have laid a curse on any descendant who should renew the siege of Vienna. After a glorious reign of forty-five years, he commenced his memorable siege of Malta in 1565, then in his seventy-second year. But the success of the Christian arms, in this instance, asserted the final justice of Providence; and the sun of his reign that rose upon the triumph of his armament at Rhodes, set upon the glory of the knights of St. John, then headed by Lavallette, in the sea-girt isle of Malta.

We must now pass to more modern times; we have not space to expatiate upon the character of the political institutions of this sovereign, by which he is (as we well know from our own experience of Turkey), as well remembered in the East of Europe, as by the triumph of his arms and by the splendour of his reign. The accession of his son Selim II. in 1566, marks the first degeneracy of the Ottoman State. He was the first Turkish sovereign of the race of Othman who shrank from the dangers of the field of battle. His reign lasted during only eight years: and had it been prolonged, in a military commonwealth like that of Turkey, it is hardly possible to doubt that the Ottoman Government would have fallen into irretrievable disorganization. From this period, though the powers of Turkey with certain alternations survived, the glory of its dominion passed away.

Without chronicling further the annals of these distant periods, there are some considerations which they suggest of serious application to present times, which it is hardly possible to pass without notice. Turkish history, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, certainly presents contrasts so rapid and so signal, that as they perplex the historical student in his apprehension, at this day, of the character and elements of Turkish Power, much more must they have baffled the penetration of contemporary politicans. In the life

time of one generation of men, the Ottoman arm is wholly irresistible; it makes progress wholly unexampled by any other State, and threatens promptly to overwhelm the whole Christian Power of Europe. In the lifetime of the next generation, without having meanwhile sustained any considerable reverses in war, it is reduced so low, that we have no doubt that Western Europe was filled with political prophets predicting its almost immediate extinction. In one age there is nothing but glory and triumph in another, nothing but licentiousness and civil war. How, then, are we to account for these rapid extensions and retrocessions of political power?

How

are we to reconcile the elasticity which admits of this rapid revival of international consideration, with the apparent absence of all elasticity which immediately, and without external causes, precipitates the Turkish State from glory to inaction-from overwhelming might to proximate dissolution?

The answer, we believe, to this question is to be found in the individual character of the reigning sovereign. This, we should add, is a cause to which Professor Creasy does full justice. You must either have a corrupt people and a good government, or a corrupt government and an energetic people-when you cannot have both-if your State is to be prosperous and great. It is undeni

able that in the heart of the Turkish people there have never existed those high conditions of political greatness, which have enabled other nations to make head against the folly or inactivity of the Central Power. That

people, in past ages, rather presented the mere elements of such greatness, which it required the energy of great rulers to develope. The condition of the Central Power determined therefore for the most part the condition of the Turkish State: and when we add to this dependency of the people on the government, the frequency of civil war which not seldom almost shattered the very basis of the Ottoman power, we shall be at no loss to account for the rapid oscillations of political importance to which the history of successive centuries has subjected the Turkish name.

We now pass to modern times.

We have lingered, perhaps, too long over the first volume of Mr. Creasy's history, and over the period to which it relates. The second and concluding one is thus far distinct from the other, that it exhibits nearly the same international relations and interests on the part of Turkey with those which now exist. But as we have passed alike from the period which witnessed the establishment of the Turkish power, and the age of its glory, we shall henceforth rather review the last two hundred years of the Ottoman annals, in reference to the influence which they have effected on the present relations of the Porte with the different states of Europe.

The three principal questions of the present day which are historically illustrated in the records of these two centuries, are-first, the rise and progress of the historical relations of the Turkish Government with Russia and the other states of Eastern Europe; secondly, the successive changes which have taken place in the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and in the rights and liberties of the Christian Principalities; and thirdly, the growth of Trade and of commercial relations, which have served to consolidate the interests of Turkey with those of Western Europe.

The earliest diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey date from the year 1492. Ivan III. and Bajazet II were then respectively ruling the two empires. The initiative of the proposal for these relations appears to have been on the side of the Czar.

"Three years afterwards, "writes Mr.Creasy, "Michael Pettscheieff, the first Russian Ambassador, appeared at Constantinople. He was strictly enjoined by his master not to bow the knee to the Sultan, and not to allow precedence to any other ambassador at the Ottoman Court."-[page 203.] The character of this embassy has seemed to symbolise the whole course of the Russo-Turkish relations up to the present time.

It was not until the seventeenth century, however, that the Russian name made itself formidable in Europe. The rapid extensions of power which the Princes of Moscow had obtained a hundred years previously, were succeeded by civil wars. The accession of the House of Romanoff-the proudest and nearly the