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CONTENTS.
Page
OF REASON, OR THE UNDERSTANDING, PROPERLY SO CALLED; AND THE
VARIOUS FACULTIES AND OPERATIONS MORE IMMEDIATELY CONNECT-
ED WITH IT,
&
Preliminary Observations on the Vagueness and Ambiguity of the common
Philosophical Language relative to this part of our Constitution.-Reason
and Reasoning,-Understanding,-Intellect,―Judgment, &c.
CHAP. I. Of the Fundamental Laws of Human Belief; or the Primary
Elements of Human Reason,
II. Continuation of the same Subject,
SECT. II. Of certain Laws of Belief, inseparably connected with the
exercise of Consciousness, Memory, Perception, and Reasoning,
SECT. III. Continuation of the Subject.-Critical Remarks on some
late Controversies to which it has given rise. Of the Appeals which
Dr Reid and some other Modern Writers have made, in their Phi-
losophical Discussions, to Common Sense, as a Criterion of Truth,
CHAP. II.-Of Reasoning and of Deductive Evidence,
SECT. I.
I. Doubts with respect to Locke's Distinction between the
Powers of Intuition and of Reasoning,
ib.
27
28
45
50
66
91
100
106
SECT. II.-Of General Reasoning,
I. Illustrations of some Remarks formerly stated in treating
of Abstraction.
II. Conclusions obtained by a Process of Deduction often
mistaken for Intuitive Judgments,
II. Continuation of the Subject.-Of Language considered as
an Instrument of Thought,
III. Continuation of the Subject.-Visionary Theories of some
Logicians, occasioned by their inattention to the Essential
Distinction between Mathematics and other Sciences,
IV. Continuation of the Subject.-Peculiar and supereminent
Advantages possessed by Mathematicians, in consequence
of their definite Phraseology,
129
138
147
SECT. III. Of Mathematical Demonstration,
150
I. Of the Circumstance on which Demonstrative Evidence
essentially depends,
II. Continuation of the Subject.-How far it is true that all
Mathematical Evidence is resolvable into Identical Pro-
positions,
164
III. Continuation of the Subject.-Evidence of the Mechani-
cal Philosophy, not to be confounded with that which is
properly called Demonstrative or Mathematical.-Op-
posite Error of some late Writers,
SECT. IV. Of our Reasonings concerning Probable or Contingent
Truths,
I. Narrow Field of Demonstrative Evidence.-Of Demon❤
strative Evidence, when combined with that of Sense, as
in Practical Geometry; and with those of Sense and of
Induction, as in the Mechanical Philosophy.-Remarks
on a Fundamental Law of Belief, involved in all our
Reasonings concerning Contingent Truths,
178
203
II. Continuation of the Subject.-Of that Permanence or
Stability in the Order of Nature, which is presupposed
in our Reason ngs concerning Contingent Truths,
III. Continuation of the Subject.-General Remarks on the
Difference between the Evidence of Experience, and
that of Analogy,
IV. Continuation of the Subject.-Evidence of Testimony
tacitly recognized as a ground of Belief, in our most cer-
tain Conclusions concerning Contingent Truths.-Dif-
ference between the logical and the popular meanings
of the word Probability,
CHAP. III. Of the Aristotelian Logic,
209
228
239
244
SECT. I. Of the Demonstrations of the Syllogistic Rules given by Aris-
totle and his Commentators,
SECT. II.-General Reflections on the Aim of the Aristotelian Logic,
and on the Intellectual Habits which the study of it has a tendency
to form. That the improvement of the power of Reasoning ought
to be regarded as only a secondary Object in the culture of the Un-
derstanding,
SECT. III. In what respects the study of the Aristotelian Logic may
be useful to Disputants.-A general acquaintance with it justly re-
garded as an essential accomplishment to those who are liberally
educated. Doubts suggested by some late Writers, concerning Aris-
totle's claims to the invention of the Syllogistic Theory,
CHAP. IV. Of the Method of Inquiry pointed out in the Experimental or
Inductive Logic,
SECT. I.-Mistakes of the Ancients concerning the proper object of Phi-
losophy.-Ideas of Bacon on the same subject.-Inductive Reason-
ing.-Analysis and Synthesis.-Essential difference between Legiti-
mate and Hypothetical Theories,
270
289
308
SECT. II. Continuation of the Subject.-The Induction of Aristotle
compared with that of Bacon,
338
SECT. III. Of the Import of the words Analysis and Synthesis in the
Language of Modern Philosophy,
353
I. Preliminary Observations on the Analysis and Synthesis of
the Greek Geometricians,
354
II. Critical Remarks on the vague Use, among Modern
Writers, of the Terms Analysis and Synthesis,
365
382
SECT. IV. The Consideration of the Inductive Logic resumed,
-
I. Additional Remarks on the distinction between Experi-
ence and Analogy. Of the grounds afforded by the lat-
ter for Scientific Inference and Conjecture,
II. Use and Abuse of Hypotheses in Philosophical Inquiries.
-Difference between Gratuitous Hypotheses, and those
which are supported by presumptions suggested by Ana-
logy. Indirect Evidence which a Hypothesis may derive
from its agreement with the Phenomena.-Cautions
against extending some of these conclusions to the Phi-
losophy of the Human Mind,
402
III. Supplemental Observations on the words Induction and
Analogy, as used in Mathematics,
427
SECT. V. Of certain misapplications of the words Experience and In-
duction in the phraseology of Modern Science.-Illustrations from
Medicine and from Political Economy,
435
SECT. VI. Of the Speculation concerning Final Causes,
I. Opinion of Lord Bacon on the subject.-Final Causes
rejected by Des Cartes, and by the majority of French
Philosophers.-Recognized as legitimate Objects of re-
search by Newton.-Tacitly acknowledged by all as a
useful Logical Guide, even in Sciences which have no
immediate relation to Theology,
II. Danger of confounding Final with Physical Causes in the
Philosophy of the Human Mind,
Conclusion of Part Second,
NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS,
453
478
484
495
5
ELEMENTS
OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND.
PART SECOND.