as early as the year 1751, in a private correspondence with Mr Hume, by an intimate friend of his own, for whose judgment, both on philosophical and literary subjects, he seems to have felt a peculiar deference*. I mention this, as a proof that the doctrine in question was the natural result of the state of science at the period when Reid appeared; and, consequently, that no argument against his originality in adopting it, can reasonably be founded on its coincidence with the views of any preceding author.

A still more satisfactory reply to the charge of plagiarism may be derived from this consideration, that, in Buffier's Treatise, the doctrine which has furnished the chief ground of accusation is stated with far greater precision and distinctness than in Dr Reid's first publication on the Human Mind; and that, in his subsequent performances, after he had perused the writings of Buffier, his phraseology became considerably more guarded and consistent than before.

If this observation be admitted in the case of Dr Reid, it will be found to apply with still greater force to Dr Beattie, whose language, in various parts of his book, is so loose and unsettled, as to afford demonstrative proof that it was not from Buffier he derived the idea of his general argument. In confirmation of this, I shall only mention the first chapter of the first part of his Essay, in which he attempts to draw the line between common sense and reason; evidently confounding

• See Note (C.)

(as many other authors of high reputation have done) the two very different words, reason and reasoning. His account of common sense, in the following passage, is liable to censure in almost every line: "The term common sense hath, in mo"dern times, been used by philosophers, both French and British, to signify that power of the mind which perceives "truth, or commands belief, not by progressive argumenta"tion, but by an instantaneous, instinctive, and irresistible impulse; derived neither from education nor from habit, "but from nature; acting independently on our will, when"ever its object is presented, according to an established law, "and therefore properly called SENSE *, and acting in a similar

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* The doctrine of the schoolmen (revived in later times under a form somewhat modified by Locke), which refers to sensation the origin of all our ideas, has given rise to a very unwarrantable extension of the word sense, in the writings of modern philosophers. When it was first asserted, that "there is nothing in the intellect which does "not come to it through the medium of sense," there cannot be a doubt that, by this last term, were understood exclusively our powers of external perception. In process of time, however, it came to be discovered, that there are many ideas which cannot possibly be traced to this source; and which, of consequence, afford undeniable proof that the scholastic account of the origin of our ideas is extremely imperfect. Such was certainly the logical inference to which these discoveries should have led; but, instead of adopting it, philosophers have, from the first, shown a disposition to save, as much as possible, the credit of the maxims in which they had been educated, by giving to the word sense so great a latitude of meaning, as to comprehend all the various sources of our simple ideas, whatever these sources may be." All the ideas (says Dr Hutche"son) or the materials of our reasoning and judging, are received by some immediate "powers of perception, internal or external, which we may call senses." Under the title of internal senses, accordingly, many writers, particularly of the medical profession, continue to this day to comprehend memory and imagination, and other faculties, both intellectual and active.—(Vid. Haller, Element. Physiologiæ, Lib. xvii.) Hence also the phrases moral sense, the senses of beauty and harmony, and many of the other pe

"manner upon all, or at least upon a great majority of mankind, and therefore properly called COMMON SENSE

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"Reason," on the other hand, (we are told by the same autor) "is used by those who are most accurate in distinguishing, to signify that power of the human mind by which we "draw inferences, or by which we are convinced that a relation "belongs to two ideas, on account of our having found that "these ideas bear certain relations to other ideas. In a word, "it is that faculty which enables us, from relations or ideas that are known to investigate such as are unknown; and without " which we never could proceed in the discovery of truth a single step beyond first principles or intuitive axioms †." "It is in this last sense (he adds) that we are to use the word “reason in the course of this inquiry."

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These two passages are severely, and, I think, justly animadverted on, in the preface to the English translation of Buffier's book, where they are contrasted with the definition of common sense given by that profound and original philosopher. From this definition it appears, that, far from opposing com

culiarities of Dr Hutcheson's language; a mode of speaking which was afterwards carried to a much more blameable excess by Lord Kaimes. Dr Beattie, in the passage quoted above, has indirectly given his sanction to the same abuse of words; plainly supposing the phrase, common sense, not only to mean something quite distinct from reason, but something which bears so close an analogy to the powers of external sense, as to be not improperly called by the same name.

* Essay on Truth, p. 40. 2d edit.

Essay on Truth, pp. 36, 37, 2d edit.

mon sense and reason to each other, he considers them either as the same faculty, or as faculties necessarily and inseparably connected together." It is a faculty (he says) which appears ❝in all men, or at least in the far greater number of them, "when they have arrived at the age of reason, enabling them "to form a common and uniform judgment, on subjects essen"tially connected with the ordinary concerns of life."

That this contrast turns out greatly to the advantage of Buffier*, must, I think, be granted to his very acute and intelli

* It is remarkable how little attention the writings of Buffier have attracted in his own country, and how very inadequate to his real eminence has been the rank commonly assigned to him among French philosophers. This has perhaps been partly owing to an unfortunate combination which he thought proper to make of a variety of miscella neous treatises, of very unequal merit, into a large work, to which he gave the name of a Course of the Sciences. Some of these treatises, however, are of great value; particularly that on First Truths, which contains (along with some erroneous notions, easily to be accounted for by the period when the author wrote, and the religious society with which he was connected,) many original and important views concerning the founda. tions of human knowledge, and the first principles of a rational logic. Voltaire, in his catalogue of the illustrious writers who adorned the reign of Louis XIV. is one of the very few French authors who have spoken of Buffier with due respect. "Il y a dans ses traités de métaphysique des morceaux que Locke n'aurait pas désavoués, et c'est "le seul jésuite qui ait mis une philosophie raisonnable dans ses ouvrages." Another French philosopher, too, of a very different school, and certainly not disposed to overrate the talents of Buffier, has, in a work published as lately as 1805, candidly acknowledged the lights which he might have derived from the labours of his predecessor, if he had been acquainted with them at an earlier part of his studies. Condillac, he also observes, might have profited greatly by the same lights, if he had availed himself of their guidance in his inquiries concerning the human understanding. "Du moins est "il certain, que pour ma part, je suis fort fâché de ne connoître que depuis très peu de temps ces opinions du Père Buffier; si je les avais vues plutôt énoncées quelque part,

gent translator. But while I make this concession in favour of his statement, I must be allowed to add, that, in the same proportion in which Dr Beattie falls short of the clearness and logical accuracy of his predecessor, he ought to stand acquitted, in the opinion of all men of candour, of every suspicion of a dishonourable plagiarism from his writings.

It is the doctrine itself, however, and not the comparative merits of its various abettors, that is likely to interest the generality of philosophical students; and as I have always thought that this has suffered considerably in the public estimation, in consequence of the statement of it given in the passage just quoted from the Essay on Truth, I shall avail myself of the present opportunity to remark, how widely that statement differs from the language, not only of Buffier, but of the author's contemporary and friend, Dr Reid. This circumstance I think it necessary to mention, as it seems to have been through the medium of Dr Beattie's Essay, that most English writers have derived their imperfect information concerning Reid's philosophy.

"There is a certain degree of sense (says this last author, in "his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man,) which is necessary to our being subjects of law and government, capa

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"elles m'auraient épargné beaucoup de peines et d'hésitations.""Je regrette beaucoup que Condillac, dans ses profondes et sagaces méditations sur l'intelligence hu"maine, n'ait pas fait plus d'attention aux idées du Père Buffier," &c. &c.—Elemens d'Idéologie, par M. Destutt-Tracy, Tom. III. pp. 136, 137.