supposing it could possibly be reconciled with the constitution. of things and with what we experience, were not also reconcilable with Religion: for upon this supposition, it demonstrably is so. NOTE E. IMMUTABLE MORALITY. Butler's note on § 12 of the preceding chapter contains in brief space a discussion of a subtle question at one time much debated by the schoolmen. It was urged on the one hand by the Nominalists that the ultimate standard of morality was the arbitrary Will of God. Good was that which was commanded by God, evil that which He discountenanced. A reductio ad absurdum of such a doctrine was furnished by the thesis of the famous English Nominalist, William of Ockham, that "If God had commanded His creatures to hate Himself, the hatred of God would have been praiseworthy." The prevailing view in the Church, however, was that of Aquinas, viz. that while God always wills what is just, nothing is just solely because He wills it. He held that the ideas of right and wrong are eternally and immutably resident in the Divine Intellect. And the English philosophers whom Butler followed, for the most part, had taken the same line. The title of Cudworth's Eternal and Immutable Morality explains itself. "There is," said Clarke, “such a thing as Fitness and Unfitness, eternally, necessarily, and unchangeably in the Nature and Reason of things" (On the Attributes, Prop. xii.). And, again, "Originally and in reality, 'tis as natural and (morally speaking) necessary, that the will should be determined in every action by the reason of the thing, and the right of the case; as 'tis natural and (absolutely speaking) necessary that the understanding should submit to a demonstrated truth" (Evidences, Prop. i. § 3). Even Shaftesbury declared that "whoever thinks there is a God and pretends formally to believe that He is just and good, must suppose that there is independently such a thing as Justice and Injustice, Truth and Falsehood, Right and Wrong; according to which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true. If the mere Will, Decree, or Law of God be said absolutely to constitute Right and Wrong, then are these latter words of no significancy at all. For thus if each part of a contradiction were affirmed for truth by the Supreme Power, they would consequently become true" (Inquiry, Book I. iii. § 2). Butler unhesitatingly adopts this view. He assures us elsewhere that he believes in "the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever" (Part II. viii. 11); he uses the phrase "immutable morality" (Part II. iii. 13); and speaks of "the eternal rule of right" (Part II. v. 6). So, too, in the Dissertation on Virtue (§ 5) he applies the epithets "incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious"; as in the Sermons (xiv. § 13) he had already spoken of "the conformity of the Divine Will to the Law of Truth in which the moral attributes of God consist." The point is here only alluded to by Butler in passing; but it is of the highest importance when viewed in relation to his doctrine of conscience and of virtue. CHAPTER VII. Of the Government of God, considered as a Scheme or Constitution, imperfectly comprehended.1 answer to against the of Divine government; no direct answer to objections wisdom and goodness; [1] THOUGH it be, as it cannot but be, acknowledged, Analogy an that the analogy of Nature gives a strong credibility to the objections general doctrine of Religion, and to the several particular credibility things contained in it, considered as so many matters of fact; and likewise that it shews this credibility not to be destroyed by any notions of necessity: yet still, objections may be insisted upon, against the wisdom, equity, and goodness of the Divine government implied in the notion against its of Religion, and against the method by which this government is conducted; to which objections analogy can be no direct answer. For the credibility, or the certain truth, of a matter of fact, does not immediately prove anything concerning the wisdom or goodness of it: and analogy can do no more immediately or directly, than shew such and such things to be true or credible, considered only as matters of fact. But still, if, upon supposition of a moral constitution of Nature and a moral government over it, analogy suggests and makes it credible, that this government must be a scheme, system, or constitution of govern- is a scheme ment, as distinguished from a number of single unconnected imperfectly acts of distributive justice and goodness; and likewise, that [The general idea of this chapter had been already put forth by Butler in his sermon "On the Ignorance of Man" (No. xv. at the Rolls). In nothing is he more conspicuously superior to his contemporaries than in his sense of the immeasurable greatness of God and the littleness of man. Though the word had not then been invented, Butler recog. nised the truth which lies at the yet an in- direct answer that the Divine government comprehended The answer is twofold. it must be a scheme, so imperfectly comprehended, and of such a sort in other respects, as to afford a direct general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness of it then analogy is, remotely, of great service in answering those objections; both by suggesting the answer, and shewing it to be a credible one. [2.] Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case. 1. For, first, Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government over the world, the analogy of His natural government suggests and makes it credible, that His moral government must be a scheme, quite beyond our comprehension: and this affords a general answer to all objections against the justice. II. and goodness of it. And, secondly, A more distinct observation of some particular things contained in God's scheme of natural government, the like things being supposed, by analogy, to be contained in His moral government, will further shew, how little weight is to be laid upon these objections. I. The analogy of God's natural government [3] I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government over the world, the analogy of His natural government suggests and makes it credible, that His moral government must be a scheme, quite beyond our comprehension; and which implies this affords a general answer to all objections against the suggests that (a) His moral government is a scheme innumerable relations (earthly rela tions which may go beyond earth), justice and goodness of it. It is most obvious, analogy 2[Cp. Part II. viii. 8.] consequences. scheme is hensible. indeed nothing, from whence we can so much as make a conjecture, whether all creatures, actions, and events, throughout the whole of Nature, have relations to each other. But, and their as it is obvious, that all events have future unknown consequences; so if we trace any, as far as we can go, into what is connected with it, we shall find, that if such event were not connected with somewhat further in Nature unknown to us, somewhat both past and present, such event could not possibly have been at all. Nor can we give the whole account of any (¿) This one thing whatever; of all its causes, ends, and necessary ad- incomprejuncts; those adjuncts, I mean, without which it could not have been. By this most astonishing connexion, these reciprocal correspondencies and mutual relations, everything which we see in the course of Nature is actually brought about. And things seemingly the most insignificant imaginable are perpetually observed to be necessary conditions to other things of the greatest importance: so that any one thing whatever may, for ought we know to the contrary, be a necessary condition to any other. The natural world then, and natural government of it, being such an incomprehensible scheme; so incomprehensible, that a man must, really in the literal sense, know nothing at all, who is not sensible of his ignorance in it; this immediately suggests, and strongly shews the credibility, that the moral world and government of it may be so too. Indeed the natural and moral constitution and government of the world are so connected, as to make up together but one scheme: and it is highly probable, that the first is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the latter; as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized are analogous. bodies for minds. But the thing intended here is, without inquiring how far the administration of the natural world is subordinate to that of the moral, only to observe the credibility, that one should be analogous or similar to the other: that therefore every act of Divine justice and goodness may be supposed to look much beyond itself, and its immediate object; may have some reference to other parts of God's moral administration, and to a general moral plan; and that every circumstance of this His moral government may be adjusted beforehand with a view to the whole of it. Thus Example. for example: the determined length of time, and the degrees and ways, in which virtue is to remain in a state of warfare and Whether government is natural or is not subservient to moral government, the two |