VOL. XIX

THE MAGAZINE OF HISTORY

WITH NOTES AND QUERIES

AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1914

THE VOLUNTEER NAVY IN THE REVOLUTION

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Nos. 2-3

HEN the War for Independence broke out but few of the colonists had ever been engaged in maritime warfare, and there was practically no one man who could be called on regarding the larger aspects of naval affairs. England had theretofore held in her own hands the entire management of her Navy, just as she does to day, its officers being consistently drawn from those portions only of the British dominions which are included in the small group of islands known as Great Britain and Ireland. Naturally, in a profession of which only the lower ranks were open to the dependent colonists, there was no opportunity, up to 1775, for those colonists to study comprehensively the art of maritime warfare. It is not to be wondered at therefore, that their leaders had at first no way of meeting the well-organized hosts arrayed against their country, save only by military force. Fortunately they had organized an Army before it was definitely determined by them to cast off their allegiance, and all legislation at Philadelphia, at the beginning of hostilities, contemplated the betterment of the Army, and did not provide for the formation of a Navy. Washington, was naturally selected to command the Armies of the United Colonies, and was given all necessary power to carry out the military policy of the country such as it was.

When, the British evacuated Boston, Washington sent his able assistant, Captain Thomas Machin, to the eight-mile strip of land uniting Cape Cod with the mainland (now severed by the Cape Cod Canal) to see if he could find a passageway through it for small vessels from Barnstable to Buzzard's Bay. He felt certain that could such a watercourse be found, his troops, embarked on small craft, could outsail the slow and overburdened ships of the enemy on their long way around Nantucket shoals to Sandy Hook, while he hastened on the shorter interior line of communication to the same destination. Ma

-Read before the D. C. Society, Sons of the Army of the Revolution.

chin, was, unfortunately, compelled, to report that while only three miles of intervening sand separated the east and west flowing streams, the barrier was enough to prevent the adoption of this route. The troops were consequently compelled to march from Boston across country to the banks of the Hudson, without the advantage of the more easy means of transportation which the enemy possessed. Their progress was naturally very slow.

Soon after taking command of the Army, Washington saw the necessity for possessing a sea force for combatting the sea-power of the enemy, and for cutting his line of communications with England. With no other authority than that contained in his commission, to "be general and Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the United Colonies, and of all the forces now raised, or to be raised by them", he purchased a number of small vessels and placed them in charge of military officers who had had some experience in seafaring matters. As early as October 16, 1775, in a letter to John Hancock, he said: "A fortunate capture of an ordnance vessel would give new life to the camp and an immediate turn to the campaign." A short time after he had written this, as if in answer to his wish one of the vessels of the so-called "Washington Navy" captured a British supply vessel filled with war material, such as could not have been manufactured in this country in a year. This fortunate capture did indeed "infuse new life into the camp and an immediate turn to the campaign.'

The chief embarrassment to the patriots was the want of munitions of war. There was an abundance of patriotic men in the country ready to rush to arms for the protection of their homes and firesides when the tocsin of war sounded, but there were no means of supplying them with the necessary arms. But for the capture of the enemy's supply ships our cause must have failed in the incipiency of the struggle for freedom.

As the war progressed, Washington became more and more impressed with the importance to the country of a Navy, and on several occasions put his views of the matter on record as he also did after he became President. But probably the most forceful expression he ever made upon this subject was in a letter to the Comte de Grasse, the Commander of the French fleet, just before the battle of Yorktown, when he put the matter thus:

"With your Excellency I need not insist on the indispensable necessity of a maritime force capable of giving you an absolute ascendency

in these seas.. You will have observed that, whatever efforts are made by the land armies, the navy must have the casting vote in the conflict."

Shortly after this pathetic appeal to his ally, the "sea-power" of France was effectually brought into action, with the result that the British fleet, which had been sent to open the way for reinforcements to join Cornwallis, was defeated and driven back, leaving Washington with a force of French and American troops, in number much greater than that of the British troops, with which to bring about their surrender, and practically to put an end to the war.

The Revolution had not progressed far before it became evident to Congress, as it had been to Washington, that the country needed a force on the sea to carry on an offensive-defensive campaign. "They could not fail to realize," says one good authority, "that, situated as the colonies were along a stretch of undefended coast nearly two thousand miles in extent, over which the enemy held indisputed possession of the sea, which enabled him to select any number of points from which to organize expeditions to sever communications between the widelyseparated armies of the colonists, he had an advantage that rendered well nigh hopeless the cause of independence unless the Americans could bring "sea-power" to their aid."

On October 3, 1775, Silas Deane, John Adams and John Langdon were appointed a committee by Congress to fit out two swift sailing vessels, one of 10 and one of 14 guns, to cruise to the eastward for the purpose of intercepting two British transports which were reported to have sailed from England for Quebec a short time before laden with arms and ammunition. It may be said that this date was the "birthday" of the American Navy. As soon as the committee got down to its work and had begun to study the subject, they realized that this force was not sufficient for the needs of the country, and recommended an increase, with the result that soon thereafter Congress passed a law allowing the purchase or construction of a number of other vessels. This was followed by the appointment of Esek Hopkins, of Rhode Island, as Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, a position designed to correspond to that held by Washington as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. As, however, we are to deal with the Volunteer Navy only, I shall not take your time to tell the story of the Regular Navy.

The country at the time was menaced by over one hundred British efficient ships(carrying about 2000 guns) which lined our coasts. The number of vessels that Congress was able to provide for out of the national treasury for building up a regular naval force was insignificant, so far as ability to combat the enemy's navy was concerned. On March 23, 1776, under these discouraging circumstances, Congress enacted a law permitting the inhabitants themselves to fit out armed vessels. The law is as follows:

"RESOLVED, That the inhabitants of these colonies be permitted to fit out armed vessels to cruise on the enemies of these United Colonies."

By this law a purely volunteer service for cruising on the enemies of the colonies was permitted, and I feel, therefore, that I am warranted in styling this special volunteer service "The Volunteer Navy of the Colonies.' It is unfortunate that the term "privateer" was ever used in connection with this service, because in the early history of maritime affairs, when European countries were engaged in struggles for the possession of the Americas, and were resorting to acts of piracy in their efforts, "privateer" was considered synonymous with "pirate" or "buccaneer", and this fact tainted the record of this sort of service ever afterwards; but this stigma was in no wise warranted by the conditions which prevailed among us in 1775-83. The prevailing impression that individuals engaged in carrying on this special service at private expense during the Revolutionary War, were actuated by less patriotic motives than those serving against the enemy on land, is erroneous. To be sure "prizemoney" was made the basis for recruiting its personnel, but the same may be said regarding the enlistments in the colonial and state navies, and to a greater extent in the British Navy, where all of the prize was given to the captors, and not one-third or one-half of it as in the American service. The principle involved in allotting prizemoney to its authors does not differ a particle from that of granting bounties to our soldiers as an inducement to enlist in the army; this being a common practice, not only during the Revolution, but in every armed conflict in which we have been engaged. It was the independent action in carrying on their work that appealed to the commanders of private armed ships, and to the subordinates who looked forward to speedy promotion in the service, and not the mere possibility of gaining prizemoney, which might or might not come to them.

The officers who commanded the volunteer vessels were generally men far above the average in intelligence, who had followed the sea for a livelihood, or who as residents of our seaports were interested in maritime affairs; and in a seafaring life they found opportunities to serve their country with good effect in its dire extremity. Their vocation made these officers natural leaders of men, and living ever in the presence of danger, they became habituated to quick action and deeds of daring.

The crews of the vessels composing the Volunteer Navy were, as a rule, made up of two distinct classes. First, there was the younger set, who came from the towns along the coast, and who, in taking up this calling, were following the dictates of heredity, or were drawn to the service by those fascinating stories relating to the sea which were often repeated to them by fathers, brothers or friends, and which always appeal to the imagination of sturdy boyhood. These young men, representatives of the best families of New England, acted on board the ships as a sort of marine guard, drilling as infantry and artillery and forming what might be called the combatant force of the crew. Their general intelligence gave character to the calling. The service soon became known as "The Gentlemen's Service", and young men of good endowments and pedigree flocked to its ranks.

The second part of the crews was made up of 'long shore men, found in our sea port towns, who were naturally good seamen, though not so well educated or so well appointed as the upperclass men. This combination produced an organization somewhat of the same order as that which existed in the British Navy almost up to that time. Soldiers were then sent to sea to fight the enemy in warships, while the seamen proper handled the gear and peformed the drudgery of keeping the vessel clean. So popular became the Volunteer Navy that on several occasions during the war, Congress and the State Councils placed an embargo on its enlistments until the quota required of the different colonies to fill the ranks of the Army could be made up.

The small State Navies that were organized during the Revolution were governed so much like the private armed service that I shall treat them as a part of the Volunteer Navy.

It would be impossible for me to give in the small space allowed to an article of this character, a comprehensive idea of the valuable work