gret we feel is, that we should be compelled to mix up Southey's honourable name with ungracious comments. The chief blame, we repeat, belongs to Mr. Warter. A lifeearned character may be written away in a single moment of thoughtlessness or spleen, if every opinion which an eminent man lets fall of another in his private correspondence is to be given to the world; and no censure can be too strong for those who, by printing the casual ebullitions of the hour, convert the confidences of intimacy into a public libel upon the dead. ART. VII.-1. Turkey and its Inhabitants. The Moslems, Grecks, Armenians, &c.the Reformed Institutions, Army, &c., described. From the French of M. A. Ubicini. Translated by Lady Easthope. 2 vols. post 8vo. 2. Eastern Papers, Part XVII., Firman and Hatti-sheriff by the Sultan relative to Privileges and Reforms in Turkey. Presented to Parliament. London, 1856. WHEN in the month of December Austria again undertook to propose terms of peace to the Russian Government, there was scarcely a statesman or a politician who entertained either the belief or a hope that they would be accepted. These terms, generally known as the Five Points, were presented in the form of an ultimatum, and a distinct answer, Yes or No, was demanded within the space of fourteen days, any modified acceptance being declared inadmissible. The manner of making the overture was consequently offensive enough to a great and haughty power which had hitherto defied the rest of Europe, and had refused to descend from that position of superiority and arrogant contempt for international law assumed in its dealings with Turkey and the Allies. The matter could scarcely be less distasteful and humiliating to Russia than the manner in which it was submitted to her. She was called upon to make palpable sacrifices-sacrifices which, whether suffered with an intention to adhere to them, or with the determination to seize the first opportunity of compensating herself for them, were at any rate sufficient ly evident to affect her influence in the East, and to shake that prestige to which she owed so much of her power and success. Notwithstanding this serious blow to her national character, abandoning the pretensions she had put forward the previous year at the conferences of Vienna, and from which she then declared nothing but complete defeat and disaster would compel her to recede, she accepted the conditions offered to her through Austria, by the Allies, as a basis for the negotiation of a treaty of peace. We examined at some length in our last Number the nature of those conditions, and we pointed out how far, in our opinion, they attained the objects the Allies had in view when they entered into the war. We admitted that in many respects those immediate objects would be gained if Russia unreservedly accepted the terms offered to her with an honest intention of adhering to them. At the same time we expressed a doubt, shared by those best acquainted with the policy of Russia, as to whether she would even entertain the proposals The cession of a considemade to her. rable part of Bessarabia, although the new frontier line appears to be ill defined, and to be in a military and political point of view far less advantageous than the river boundary of the Dniester, which the Allies, it appears to us, ought to have been in a condition to demand, nevertheless removed Russia from the banks of the Danube, and gave the free and uninterrupted control over the mouths of that great river to Turkey and its dependent principalities, Wallachia and Moldavia. The destruction of the Russian fleet at Sebastopol, together with the stipulation that it should not be rebuilt, and that the arsenals and great naval depôts in the Black Sea should be destroyed, secured the Turkish capital from a coup de main, which, if successful, would shake the empire to its foundation, and probably end in the complete overthrow of the Ottoman dominion in the East. The abolition of Russian protectorate in the Danubian Principalities would remove from those important provinces the chief cause of incessant internal commotion, and would deprive Russia of one of those excuses for interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman empire which have so frequently led to a rupture, and of which she was always ready to avail herself when the moment for acquiring fresh influence or territory was considered opportune. The proposed solution of the difficulties involved in the relations of Russia with the Christians of Turkey, professing the Greek faith, was less satisfactory. We have already shown that concessions made by the Sultan in favour of his Christian subjects, upon the demands of foreign powers, and communicated officially to those powers, if they be of any value, must be to a certain extent guaranteed. As Russia is to be admitted, on the conclusion of peace, to the same position as regards Turkey as the Allies, she virtually becomes a guaranteeing power, and regains her old rights and influence, with this important difference, however, that she will now exercise them in virtue of a treaty, and with the sanction of England and France. With regard to the fifth point, not being acquainted with the precise objects which it contemplated, we were unable to express any opinion upon it, although of great importance, and indeed deeply affecting several vital questions, which had been left undefined. Although calling upon Russia to make the sacrifices we have described, the terms in which the Five Points were drawn up were such as to cause as little offence as possible to her pride, to soften the nature of the concessions, and to render them as palatable as they could possibly be rendered under the circumstances. As long as essential principles were maintained, this course was equally wise and dignified. Nevertheless, however much her susceptibility may have been considered, she has been compelled to make concessions which last year she declared utterly inadmissible and humiliating to her position as a great power. What, then, has led to this sudden chance in the national policy, and to the giving up of pretensions which she declared it to be an inviolable political and religious duty to enforce? We believe the truth to be, that Russia had greatly over-estimated her means even of defence against so formidable a coalition as that arrayed against her. It now appears that the immense efforts made by the Emperor Nicholas to meet the necessities of the war had exhausted the population and the productive | resources of the empire. Levies after levies had decimated the provinces, and produce of every kind had been collected and absorbed in the attempt to supply the unlimited demands of many armies defending a vast line of frontier open to attack on all points. Disease and war consumed, almost as soon as they arrived, those who were sent to recruit the shattered divisions. It would be difficult to estimate the number of human lives which have been sacrificed to the inordinate ambition and unscrupulous policy of one man. The secret will, probably, never be known; if it were to transpire it would, we believe, far exceed even the largest calculations hitherto made. To this drain upon the population must be added the exhaustion of the financial resources of the empire. Unable to raise a loan, even on the most unfavourable terms, in the markets of Europe, or to turn to his own subjects for increased taxes and forced or voluntary contributions, the Emperor could no longer find the means absolutely necessary for carrying on the war. We believe that the one great and overwhelming difficulty which at last compelled the Emperor to yield, and even disheartened that party in Russia which was ready to make every sacrifice to carry on the struggle, and looked upon any concession as a national dishonour, was the absolute destruction of all the means of transport throughout the south of Russia. Had the war been continued, it would have been impossible, we are informed on the best authority, either to maintain or to recruit an army in the Crimea, or in any of the southern provinces of the Empire. The rapidity with which men and provisions were supplied to the Russian army during the early part of the siege of Sebastopol excited the surprise of the Allied Commanders. Large bodies of troops were known to have been transported from Odessa to the seat of war in carts. We remember too well how the uniforms of regiments supposed still to be on the Pruth were found scattered over the bloody field of Inkermann, and how the very existence of the Allied armies was threatened by divisions which were officially reported to be defending the frontiers of Bessarabia against an imaginary enemy, our Austrian ally. Day by day, those who watched on the heights overhanging the Tchernaiya marked the long trains of wagons which, slowly issuing from the narrow gorges and winding through the valley, bore abundant supplies of food and clothing to our enemies, whilst our own gallant countrymen were perishing from cold and hunger. tinual stream of such convoys crossing the dreary steppes of the Crimea carried to the besieged city the produce of the plains of Southern Russia-no longer exported to the markets of Europe. But few, if any, of these innumerable carts ever returned to the place from whence they came; they had been seized in the towns and villages, and their wretched owners had fled to avoid being driven away with them. When they had served their immediate purpose, time could not be lost in sending them back, and they were consequently abandoned. The horses, left without food, soon died, the oxen were killed for meat, and the carts were broken up for fuel. Thus, we are credibly assured, has the whole of Southern Russia been stripped of its land transport, so essential to its agricultural prosperity. Not only could those provinces A con no longer supply the army in the field with their produce, but a blow has been inflicted upon their former prosperity, from which it will be long ere they can recover. Several years must elapse before they can again furnish the means of sending to the shores of the Black Sea those vast supplies of grain which were formerly poured into the markets of Europe, and formed the riches of one of the most important and flourishing portions of the dominions of the Czar a result of the war which may be eminently beneficial to the corn-growing districts of Turkey. tain in itself the seeds of decay, and offer by its own weakness and misgovernment continual excuses for interference, and, if necessary, for open rupture? Did she not possess after all the real influence in Turkey, the influence based upon the sympathy of the greater part of the Christian population, arising out of community of religion, of language, and of race? Could she not by intrigues, bribes, and threats recover her lost position in the Principalities, where venality is almost the universal rule, and honesty and patriotism rare qualities, and where an Austrian occupation It is not surprising that, such being the had taught the unfortunate inhabitants to real condition of the empire-hitherto look even to Russia for protection? Could carefully concealed from the knowledge of she not evade her engagement not to rebuild Europe-and considering the vast prepa- her navy destroyed at Sebastopol? Had rations which had been made by England not those very war-steamers which had and France for a third campaign, together threatened Constantinople and the Turkish with the refusal of any direct assistance coasts been constructed in England and from Austria and the German States, the been brought into the Black Sea through Emperor Alexander should at last have the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, in defiance perceived that he was engaged in a hopeless of a treaty, as merchant or postal vessels? struggle, and should have accepted the Such being the advantages offered by really moderate terms offered to him by the the acceptance of the terms of peace, whilst Allies, before he was called upon to make inevitable defeat and humiliation, followed concessions which would have seriously even by a dismemberment of the empire, curtailed his power and prevented the ulti-awaited her if she persevered in the war, it mate accomplishment of the objects of could only have been that haughty pride Russian policy. As yet Russia was not and exaggerated reliance upon her great crippled beyond the means of speedy reco- resources so characteristic of the policy of very. Her vast resources, although un- Russia, which could have induced her to redoubtedly affected in some respects by the ject the conditions proposed to her through war, still remained. A few years' peace, Austria. We confess that we were amongst with a well-directed administration, the re- those who believed that that pride had not construction of her army, the encourage- yet been sufficiently humbled, and that the ment of agriculture, the development of truth was still too well kept from the Emuseful public undertakings, and the emperor to lead to a hope that he would have ployment of foreign capital, would re-establish her national character and restore her European credit. She was called upon to make no sacrifices which could really take from her the means of successful aggression upon Turkey hereafter. The territorial concession imposed upon her was, after all, of a trivial nature, and would probably be more than counterbalanced by the indirect recognition of territorial claims which had previously been disputed. She was only to be bound by a treaty, and a treaty with her has always been so much waste paper when it has suited her to evade it. She had still many chances in her favour. Was it probable that the close alliance between France and England, which had been the only cause of her defeat, would continue? Might not the States of Europe be, ere long, involved in a war, or in internal political convulsions, which would prevent them from again uniting against her? Did not the Ottoman empire con yielded, or that the national party would have been brought to renounce their extravagant designs. The condition of the empire must indeed have been serious, and the danger of a catastrophe imminent, to have brought about this sudden change in the policy of the Russian Government. We fear that it will eventually prove a source of great misfortune to Europe that the demands of the Allies were not more commensurate with the sacrifices which they have made, and with the objects of the war. No reasonable man can now doubt that, had such demands been made, they would have been conceded, or that, had they been refused, the Allies would have been in a position to enforce them. Another year's campaign might have reduced Russia to that extremity which would have compelled her to give, to use her own words, that material guarantee' which would have proved a real check upon her ambitious designs, would have removed from Europe all cause of future apprehension, and would consequently have secured, as far as human wisdom could secure, a lasting peace. Let us look at this question even as one of humanity'—the grounds upon which a certain party strive to place it, and which at all times furnish powerful arguments in dealing with those who cannot look further than the present time, and are influenced not by great considerations, but by the passing emotions of the moment. No statesman, no man acquainted, however superficially, with the history of nations, can believe that Russia will renounce in a day that which forms an essential portion of her national policy, one might almost say her national existence-the belief in her destiny to be the great Eastern Power, and to unite under one sceptre the Sclavonian race; that she will no longer think of Constantinople and the empire of the East, but will instead turn her whole energies and vast resources to the improvement of her populations and to the introtion of liberal institutions, which alone can make a people prosperous; that she will seek to render her neighbour, Turkey, wealthy, strong, and independent; in short, that she will embark in that European policy which would be the best calculated to prevent a further increase of her own territory, and to destroy her power of aggression on the side of the Ottoman empire. So far from such being the case, she will seek the very first opportunity of endeavouring to regain that which she may have lost, and of re-asserting her old pretensions to supreme influence in the East. In the meanwhile, she will devote herself to the improvement of such resources as may conduce to the increase of her military power, the means of communication, railroads, fortresses, and finances. We have taught her, during this short but bloody war, where her weak points are, what are her deficiencies, and in what manner they may be remedied and supplied. Her very first step, after the acceptance of the Austrian ultimatum, was to propose schemes for railways connecting the principal military positions of the empire. European capital will not be found wanting for their execution. As far as her military frontier is concerned, we have left her precisely in the same condition as she was before the war broke out. Although Bomarsund may not be rebuilt, she will still threaten Sweden and Denmark, and be all powerful in the North. She will still be a continual menace to Turkey on her European and Asiatic frontiers. She can still occupy Circassia and consolidate her power in Asia. She can still overawe Persia. She still commands that influence which will enable her to control by far the largest portion of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, whether of the Greek or Armenian faith. In a few years we may have to fight the battle over again. But the relative positions of Russia and England may then be very different. There may no longer be an alliance between the great powers of Europe. We may be called upon almost alone to sustain the last struggle in support of the liberties of Europe and the cause of human freedom. But even if united, France and England would find the task imposed upon them far more difficult of accomplishment than it was at the commencement of this war— the sacrifice of blood and treasure demanded infinitely greater, great as that sacrifice has already been. The means of resistance that Russia has shown afford a test of what she would be able to do if her vast resources were fully developed, and if she had prepared herself in good time for another contest. It is difficult to contemplate without a shudder the horrors of such a struggle. Would it not be more consistent with 'humanity' that we should be saved from them by a comparatively small sacrifice, whilst we are still able to deal with Russia, so as to render their occurrence almost impossible? neither humane nor wise by evading a present evil to provoke the almost inevitable risk of a far greater hereafter. It is as We willingly admit that the present Administration has had great difficulties to contend with. Our position, both regards our enemy and our Allies, owing to the fundamental error committed by Lord Aberdeen's Government, has from the beginning been a false one. We commenced by losing sight of the great principles which were at stake, and aiming at a compromise, which, in great questions, can never be effected with safety or honor. Our vacillating and timid policy encouraged Russia to cross the Pruth, and to embark in that course which rendered war inevitable. We were then compelled to accept such terms as France chose to exact as the price of her alliance, and from that time to this we have been endeavouring to conciliate her, and, in order to consult her weakness or her vanity, have been forced to abandon that honourable and independent position which it has been England's glory to hold. The war has never been, strictly speaking, popular in France, although we do not believe with ever some that it has been repugnant to the | and for great ends. It only remained for feelings and sympathies of the whole us to make the most favourable terms that French nation. With the Emperor, how- were possible under the circumstances. ever, it was almost a necessity. Some We believe that Lord Clarendon and Lord military success or renown was essential to Cowley have struggled to the utmost of his anomalous position; as was his alliance their power against the adverse influences with England on account of the support and interests brought to bear against them; he would consequently receive from public that they have done their best for the opinion in this country, previously out- honour of England and for the security of raged by acts which, whether necessary or Turkey; and that we owe to them the not in France, could not but be viewed few really important concessions that have with indignation by a free people. From been obtained from Russia. this side of the Channel would emanate, both from the British press and from those who had taken refuge amongst us, the most dangerous attacks upon his policy the most damaging criticisms upon his public conduct. They were stifled by his well-timed reputation of a faithful ally. Those parties in France which unite in themselves all the ability and true patriotism of the nation make it a reproach to England that she has established the Emperor on his throne. He has now, however, substantial claims to the gratitude of France.. He has maintained, if he has not increased, her ancient military glory, and he has had the ability to minister to the vanity of the nation by bringing the war to a close at the moment when the military and naval glory of England had grievously suffered, and when another campaign would in every probability have again raised it to its ancient superiority. Such a termination is doubly unfortunate, and may sow the seeds of serious differences hereafter between this country and her present ally. During the contest the Emperor was faithful to his engagements and punctual and honourable in discharging them-we will not dwell upon the consideration that it was his best policy thus to deal with us. But he alone could be trusted. Few princes have been compelled to seek for ministers amongst more corrupt, unscrupulous, and dishonest men. Unable to draw towards him and to engage in his service one statesman of character, position, and capacity in France, he could not for ever struggle against those_upon whom alone he relied for support. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that in the end he should have yielded to men whose only policy was probably founded upon the fluctuations of the Bourse, and whose patriotism consisted in the most mean and selfish of personal considerations. Deserted by the Emperor, it would have required a Chatham or a Pitt to have brought this country to carry on this war alone, and in support of great principles As yet Europe has been kept in complete ignorance of the terms of the Treaty of Paris. No preliminaries, as in former instances, were presented to Parliament. Even the Five Points, which might have been considered in the light of preliminaries, have never, as far as we can remember, been officially communicated to the country. Until the Treaty be ratified by all parties to it-a process which cannot be completed before the end of the monthits provisions are to be kept a profound secret. Then the nation may express its opinion freely upon them. Whatever they may be, we doubt, notwithstanding Lord Palmerston's assertion, whether they will give satisfaction, and be considered, by England at least, as in any way equivalent to the vast sacrifices which have been made, or as fulfilling the real objects of the war. The mystery and secrecy which have hitherto prevailed lead to the suspicion that the Government have feared to challenge public opinion until it can be defied. As we are unable, in this posture of af fairs, to discuss the precise terms of the Treaty, we propose to examine how far the professed objects of the war have been attained, supposing those terms to be mainly based upon the Five Points as we are acquainted with them. The immediate end of the war was the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, with a view to the balance of power in Europe. This object, then, could only be gained in one of two ways1st, by territorial changes or by other substantive measures so far weakening the aggressive means of the neighbours of Turkey, and increasing her own means of defence, as to render almost impossible a successful invasion before she could receive assistance from her allies; or, 2nd, by laying the foundations of such internal strength and prosperity as would warrant the hope that ere long, and before Russia could recover from the effects of the war, Turkey, depending upon her own resources and upon her own population, would be of |