AMONG those smaller offences against society, that hold an intermediate rank between folly and vice, I know of no one, more despicable in itself, or more vexatious to others, than that inquisitive turn of mind, which excites the restless curiosity of the frivolous and impertinent,to pry into the affairs of their neighbours. Since no man, as some one observes, is respectable in the eyes of his valet de chambré, so no man would wish to have the little arrangements of his domestick economy scrutinized by the eye, and misrepresented by the tongue of the officious and malignant, around the scandalous teatables of male and female gossips.

A man's house is his castle; and whatever passes within its walls should be considered as saered as the mysteries of Eleusis. Though a good man will say or do nothing, at any time, for which he may have reason to blush, yet, in the unguarded confidence of social conversation, he may discuss the characters of men, and the tendency of measures, in a manner, that might incur the resentment of the parties concerned, should it reach their ears. Whoever, therefore, betrays conversation of this kind, may create a serious misunderstanding between worthier men than himself; and should he escape the chastisement of the spirited, yet will be be shunned, in future, as a dangerous companion, by the prudent.

PLUTARCH.

PLAUTUS.

But though this treachery to social confidence may be productive of serious consequences, yet, as it often proceeds rather from want of consideration, than from premeditated mischief, so is it commonly less vexatious, than the prying inquisitiveness of wanton curiosity. The one may occasionally lead you into a scrape, but the other obliges you to be perpetually on your guard. The former may cause you uneasiness for a day, but the latter may harrass you during the whole course of your life.

Curio is acquainted with the circumstances of almost every man in town; can tell precisely how many pounds of coffee Mr. Tradewell expects from abroad, and the exact amount of Mr, Hoardwell's property, in farms, wharves, houses, and bank-stock, at home. From this kind of knowledge, he has been enabled to predict with accuracy the moment of a failure; and hence, at one time, acquired a distinguished character for sagacity and penetration. with a face of wisdom, which concealed the meanness of his intellectual powers, gave him, at one time, considerable importance in the eyes of politicians. But, by bis tergiversation, he soon lost credit with both parties, as he had deserved the confidence of neither. Admiration gradually degenerated into contempt; and he now lives, neglected and despised, a bankrupt in property and in fame, with the

This,

reputation of a meddler in the affairs of others, whilst he neglected his own, of a Jew without riches, and of a politician without principles.

Miss Prywell is a maiden lady, unhappily tormented with an insatiable thirst, to know every event that takes place, in the parlour and kitchen of her neighbours. As the habitable part of her house unluckily does not face the street, she is obliged to have recourse to a small closet, with a single window, where she gratifies her favourite passion, by watching the important occurrences of the day. There she sits, in all the delightful agony of expectation, to observe, who goes in or out of the houses within her view; and sometimes, by the aid of a pocket telescope, is fortunate enough to identify an individual, amidst the company of a neighbour's parlour. Should any domestick duty call her off from this laudable occupation, Betty is immediately summoned to relieve guard, with strict injunctions to have all her eyes about her, and to suffer no individual, male or female, to pass unobserved. Should a coach stop within eye-shot of Miss Prywell, the willing Betty, who has caught the inquisitive infection from her mistress, is instantly dispatched for intelligence... Here, Betty, Betty, run over to Mr. B.'s, and see who is in that coach. And, Betty, ask the girls in the kitchen, what gentleman, in a blue, surtout, dined there yesterday. And, Betty, be sure, and observe, what they have for dinner to-day.' Away runs Betty, and, after due time, returns almost breathless, with the important intelligence, which she pours circumstantially into the greedy ear' of her delighted mistress.

Miss Prywell is as well, and sometimes better, acquainted with

the circumstances of her neighbours, than they are themselves. She knows the exact cost of the furniture in each parlour, and can enumerate, with precision, every article in the kitchen. Even the contents of your servant's marketbasket cannot escape the vigilance of this argus-eyed lady, and she can generally ascertain the arrangement for the dinner of the day, as accurately as those who provide it.

Miss Prywell delights in reporting the important facts, of which, at the expense of so much time and trouble, she has made herself mistress. But as the motto of my paper observes that, every inquisitive person is malicious,' she always adorns her narrative with some poetical embellishment, not strictly conformable with the truth of authentick history. Miss Prywell is very lively and very silly, and affords a striking proof, how much knowledge may be acquired, even by persons of the meanest capacity, if they will but apply the whole force of their faculties to its acquisition.

There are others, who sometimes mix with the first circles, who run to one house to collect intelligence, and to another to report it; who, with despicable talents, sometimes create considerable mischief, since their very silliness screens them from suspicion. Some one compares these communicative people to leaden pipes, which serve to convey fresh streams of

intelligence from house to house. This basest of metal answers for this servile office, whilst we reserve gold and silver for more valuable employments.

In a word, there cannot be a more despicable turn of mind,than this frivolous curiosity about trifles, and restless anxiety to know what

lature have had recourse to the same measure of making annual or temporary additions to the salaries granted and established by the act of Feb. 27, 1790. Thus again holding the judges dependent upon the will and pleasure of the legislature, as to a considerable portion of their salaries.

The late attempt to reinstate them on firm constitutional ground, by a bill reported to the house of representatives by their committee, having failed, it has become more expedient than ever to give the question a thorough consideration.

In favour of temporary grants it has been said, the words, "ascertained and established by standing laws," may be satisfied by a grant of salaries of a fixed value, by any law, though temporary; because a temporary law is a standing law during its continuance, as much as a law without limitation of time, or a perpetual law, which may be repealed at any time. It is conceived, the legislature may have proceeded upon such ground in making a portion of the judges' salaries to depend upon their temporary grants, or, in other words, upon their mere will and pleasure, whether such portion thereof shall be continued by another law, when the last temporary grant shall have expired by lapse of time. But the term "established" cannot be so satisfied. For to establish, according to the best lexicographers, is "to settle firmly, to fix unalterably." The effect is essentially different; the one places the judges in a state of dependence, the other in a state of independence conformably to the duties imposed upon them by the constitution, as well as its express declarations.

Besides, the meaning of the term "established" seems to be

cleared of all doubt in the 2 chap. sect. 1. art. 13, which declares "PERMANENT and honourable salaries shall be established by law for the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court."

Some light may be thrown upon this question by adverting to the history of the judicial department of England, previous and subsequent to the revolution of 1688. Before that period, it is well known, that the commissions of the judges of Westminster Hall were generally" durante bene placito," during the king's pleasure, and that they were likewise dependent upon him for their salaries. These were grievances deeply felt. And to rid the judges of that dependence upon the king, and the nation of the evils they had suffered under the undue influence of the crown over them, it was enacted by 12 & 18 W. 3. c. 2, “That judges' commissions be made quamdiu se bene gesserint, and their salaries ascertained and ESTABLISHED."

The meaning of the term established in that act cannot now be doubtful, when it is an unquestionable fact, that their salaries have ever since the passing of that act (now more than a century) been considered as thereby fixed and secured to the judges, in such a manner as to leave them wholly independent of the king or crown in that particular.

Now, the terms made use of in the 29th art. of our Declaration of Rights being precisely the same, viz. "The judges of the Supreme Judicial Court shall have honourable salaries ascertained and ESTABLISHED," it is presumed they were adopted for a similar purpose, and that they ought to receive the same construction in both cases or instruments. And as the judges

in England were thereby rendered independent of the crown with respect to their salaries, as well as their continuance in office, so the judges of the Supreme Judicial Court, by fair construction, are and ought to be, in virtue of our constitution, equally independent, in that respect, of the legislative department of our government. That article indeed subjoins the words "by standing laws.' These surely cannot weaken the former, but if they operate at all, they can operate only to strengthen our construction, and so to explain them, as to banish every idea of temporary grants, in whole or in part.

Further, the abovementioned article provides, "If it shall be found that any of the salaries so established, are INSUFFICIENT, they shall from time to time be ENLARGED, as the General Court shall think proher."

May it not be asked, why the General Court were authorised only to enlarge the salaries so established, unless the constitution intended the judges should be independent of the legislature, with respect to their salaries, when once granted? And why was it not left, as in the case of other officers, to the legislature to make such grants from time to time, as they should think fit, to reduce, as well as to enlarge them?

Is it then consistent with the freedom and independence of the judges contemplated, as I expect to shew, by the constitution, that the legislature should grant a portion of their salaries permanently, that is, without limitation of time, and when this portion is found to be insufficient, to enlarge it by annual or temporary grants?

Such, however, has been the state of dependence in which, if I

may be allowed the expression, the jealousy of the legislature (perhaps, countenanced by the people themselves) has thought fit to hold this feeble and unprotected branch of our government.

But even this dependence of the judges upon the will of the legislature, for the continuance or the renewal of their temporary grants, when expired by the lapse of time, is not the worst of their present condition.

A recent instance (the first of the kind) of the removal of a Judge of the Supreme Judicial Court, (Bradbury) by the Governour, with the consent of the Council, upon the address of both houses of the Legislature, because, by the act of GOD, he was rendered incapable of discharging the duties of his office; will change (if permitted to stand as a precedent) the tenure of the office, from an office during good behaviour, that is, an office for life, determinable on misbehaviour only, to an office at the will of those great branches of our government. -Now,

Whether this state of dependence of the supreme judicial department is consonant to the constitution of the commonwealth, or established legal decisions upon offices holden during good behaviour, is the question remaining to be considered, and demands a deliberate consideration. The subject not only affects the interest of the judges, but, if the declarations of our constitution are to be taken as true, involves in it the highest and most important rights of every citizen.

On the ground of good behaviour a judge ought always to stand; and I still believe that to be strong, legal, and constitutional ground.

Legal ground, because an office,