ness; which does with more advantage serve the interest of holy living, and which is more apt to patronize carelessness and sin: these are the measures of wise and good men; the other are the measures of fairs and markets; where fancy and noise do govern.

SECTION VI.

An Exposition of the Ninth Article of the Church of England concerning Original Sin; according to Scripture and Reason.

27. AFTER all this, it is pretended and talked of, that my doctrine of original sin is against the ninth article of the church of England; and that my attempt to reconcile them was ineffective. Now although this be nothing to the truth or falsehood of my doctrine, yet it is much concerning the reputa tion of it. Concerning which, I cannot be so much displeased that any man should so undervalue my reason, as I am highly content that they do so very much value her authority. But then to acquit myself and my doctrine from being contrary to the article, all that I can do is to expound the article, and make it appear, that not only the words of it are capable of a fair construction, but also that it is reasonable they should be expounded so as to agree with Scripture and reason, and as may best glorify God, and that they require it. I will not pretend to believe that those doctors who first framed the article, did all of them mean as I mean; I am not sure they did or that they did not, but this I am sure, that they framed the words with much caution and prudence, and so as might abstain from grieving the contrary minds of differing men. And I

:

find that in the "Harmony of Confessions" printed in Cambridge 1586, and allowed by public authority, there is no other account given of the English confession in this article, but that "every person is born in sin, and leadeth his life in sin, and that nobody is able truly to say his heart is clean. That the most righteous person is but an unprofitable servant that the law of God is perfect, and requireth of us perfect and full obedience: that we are able by no means to fulfil that law in this worldly life that there is no mortal creature which can be justified by his own deserts in God's sight." Now this was taken out of the English confession inserted in the “General Apology" written in the year 1562, in the very year the articles were framed. I therefore have reason to believe, that the excellent men of our church, bishops and priests, did with more candour and moderation opine in this question; and therefore, when by the violence and noises of some parties they were forced to declare something, they spake warily, and so as might be expounded to that doctrine which in the General Apology" was their allowed sense. However, it is not unusual for churches, in matters of difficulty, to frame their articles so as to serve the ends of peace, and yet not to endanger truth, or to destroy liberty of improving truth, or a further

reformation. And since there are so very many questions and opinions in this point, either all the dissenters must be allowed to reconcile the article and their opinion, or must refuse her communion; which whosoever shall enforce, is a great schismatic and an uncharitable man. This only is certain, that to tie the article and our doctrine together, is an excellent art of peace, and a certain signification of obedience; and yet is a security of truth, and that just liberty of understanding, which, because it is only God's subject, is then sufficiently submitted to men, when we consent in the same form of words.

The Article is this,

Original Sin standeth not in the following of Adam, as the Pelagians do vainly talk.

28. "The following of Adam," that is, the doing as he did, is actual sin, and in no sense can it be original sin; for that is as vain as if the Pelagians had said the "second" is the " first;" and it is as impossible that what we do should be Adam's sin, as it is unreasonable to say that his should be really and formally our sin; imitation supposes a copy, and those are two terms of a relation, and cannot be coincident, as "like is not the same." But then if we speak of original sin as we have our yet cannot our imitation of Adam be it, may be an effect of it, or a consequent. fore Adam's sin did not introduce a necessity of sinning upon us for if it did, original sin would be a fatal curse, by which is brought to pass, not only that we do, but that we cannot choose but, follow him: and then the following of Adam would be the greatest part of original sin, expressly against the article.

share in it,

possibly it But there

29. "But it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man."

"The fault:" "vitium naturæ:" so it is in the Latin copies, not a sin properly, non talia sunt vitia, quæ jam peccata dicenda sunt," y but a disease of the soul, as blindness, or crookedness; that is, it is an imperfection or state of deficiency from the end whither God did design us: we cannot with this nature alone go to heaven; for it having been debauched by Adam, and disrobed of all its extraordinaries and graces whereby it was, or might have been, made fit for heaven,-it is returned to its own state, which is perfect in its kind, that is, in order to all natural purposes, but imperfect in order to supernatural, whither it was designed. The case is this. The eldest son of Crœsus, the Lydian, was born dumb, and by the fault of his nature was unfit to govern the kingdom; therefore his father, passing him by, appointed the crown to his younger brother; but he in a battle seeing his father in danger to be slain, in zeal to save his father's life, strained the ligatures of his tongue, till that broke which bound him; by returning to his speech, he returned to his title. We are born thus imperfect, unfit to reign with God for ever, and can never return to a title to our inheritance, till we by the grace y S. Aug.

4. Because our nature is inclined to good and not to evil in some instances, that is, in those which are according to nature, and there is no greater endearment of virtue, than the law and inclination of nature in all the instances of that law. 5. Because that which is intended for the occasion of virtue and reward, is not naturally and essentially the principle of evil. 6. In the instances in which naturally we incline to evil, the inclination is naturally good, because it is to its proper object, but that it becomes morally evil, must be personal, for the law is before our persons; it cannot be natural, because the law by which that desire can become evil is after it.

33. "So that the flesh lusteth against the spirit."This clause declares what kind of inclination to evil is esteemed criminal; that which is approved, that which passeth to act, that which is personally delighted in, in the contention which is after regeneration or reception of the Holy Spirit; for the flesh cannot lust against the spirit in them that have not the Spirit; unless both the principles be within, there can be no contention between them, as a man cannot fight a duel alone: so that this is not the sin of nature, but of persons; for though potentially it is sin, yet actually and really it is none, until it resist the Spirit of God, which is the principle put into us to restore us to as good a state at least, as that was which we were receded from in Adam. By the way, it is observable that the article makes only concupiscence or lusting to be the effect of Adam's sin, but affirms nothing of the loss of the will's liberty, or diminution of the understanding, or the rebellion of the passions against reason, but only against the Spirit, which certainly is natural to it, and in Adam did rebel against God's commandments when it was the inlet to the sin, and therefore could not be a punishment of it.

"And therefore :"-The illative conjunction expressly declares, that the sense of the church of England is, that this corruption of our nature, in no other sense, and for no other reason, is criminal, but because it does resist the Holy Spirit: therefore it is not evil till it does so, and therefore if it does not, it is not evil. For if the very inclination were a sin, then when this inclination is contested against,-at the same time, and in the same things, the man sins and does well, and he can never have a temptation but he offends God; and then how we should understand St. James's rule, that "we should count it all joy when we enter into temptation," is beyond my reach and apprehension. The natural inclination hath in it nothing moral, and therefore as it is good in nature, so it is not ill in manners; the supervening consent or dissent makes it morally good or evil.

34. "In every person born into the world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation."

Viz. When it is so consented to, when it resists and overcomes the Spirit of grace. For we, being divested of the grace given to the first Adam, are to be renewed by the Spirit of grace, the effect of the second Adam; which grace when we resist, we do as Adam did, and reduce ourselves back into the

ours, but this is our sin and not his; both of them deserve God's wrath and damnation, but by one he deserved it, and by the other we deserve it. But then it is true, that this corrupted nature deserves God's wrath, but we and Adam deserve not in the same formality, but in the same material part we do. He left our nature naked, and for it he deserved God's wrath; if we divest our nature of the new grace, we return to the same state of nature, but then we deserve God's wrath; so that still the object of God's wrath is our mere nature so as left by Adam; but though he sinned in the first disrobing, and we were imperfect by it, yet we sin not till the second disrobing, and then we return to the same imperfection, and make it worse. But I consider, that although some churches in their confessions express it, yet the church of England does not: they add the word "eternal" to " damnation;" but our church abstains from that: therefore "God's wrath and damnation" can signify the same that "damnation" does in St. Paul;-all the effects of God's anger. Temporal death, and the miseries of mortality, were the effect of Adam's sin, and of our being reduced to the natural and corrupted, or worsted state: or secondly, they may signify the same that "hatred" does in St. Paul, and in Malachi; Esau have I hated," that is, "loved him less," or did not give him what he was born to: he lost the primogeniture, and the priesthood, and the blessing. So do we naturally fall short of heaven. This is hatred or the wrath of God, and his judg ment upon the sin of Adam to condemn us to a state of imperfection, and misery, and death, and deficiency from supernatural happiness, all which I grant to be the effect of Adam's sin, and that our imperfect nature deserves this, that is, it can deserve no better.

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35. "And this infection of nature."-

Viz. This imperfection,—not any inherent quality that by contact pollutes the relatives and descendants, but this abuse and reproach of our nature, this stain of our nature, by taking off the supernatural grace and beauties put into it, like the cutting off the beards of David's ambassadors, or stripping a man of his robe, and turning him abroad in his natural shame, leaving him naked as Adam and we were. But the word "infection," being metaphorical, may aptly signify any thing that is analogical to it: and may mean a natural habitude or inclination to forbidden instances; but yet it signifies a very great evil, for in the best authors, to be such "by nature," means an aggravation of it. Carion in Aristophanes: "Ανθρωπος οὗτός ἐστιν äλios púσεL. This man is very miserable," or "miserable by nature:" and again;

Πάντως γὰρ ἄνθρωπον φύσει τοιοῦτον εἰς τὰ πάντα Ἡγεῖσθέ μ' εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν νομίζεσθ ̓ ὑγιὲς εἰπεῖν;

So

"Do you believe me to be such a man by nature, that I can speak nothing well?”

36. "Doth remain, yea, in them that are regenerated.”—

That is, all the baptized and unbaptized receive

37. "Called in Greek, opóvηua oaρкóç.”Here it is plain that the church of England, though she found it necessary to declare something in the fierce contention of the time, in order to peace and unity of expression, yet she was not willing too minutely to declare and descend to the particulars on either side, and therefore she was pleased to make use of the Greek word, of the sense of which there were so many disputes, and recites the most usual redditions of the word.

38. "Which some do expound, the wisdom, some the sensuality, some the affection, some the desire, of the flesh, is not subject to the law of God."—

These several expositions reciting several things, and the church of England reciting all indefinitely, but definitely declaring for none of them, does only in the generality affirm, that the flesh and spirit are contrary principles, that the flesh resists the law of God, but the spirit obeys it, that is, by the flesh alone we cannot obey God's law, naturally we cannot become the sons of God, and heirs of heaven, but it must be a new birth by a spiritual regeneration. The "wisdom of the flesh," that is, natural and secular principles, are not apt dispositions to make us obedient to the law of God: "sensuality," that signifies "an habitual lustfulness." "Desires signify" actual lustings." "Affections" signify the "natural inclination:" now which of these is here meant the church hath not declared, but by the other words of the article, it is most probable, she rather inclines to render opóvnua oapróç, by "desires and sensuality," rather than by "affection or wisdom," though of these also, in their own sense, it is true to affirm that they are not subject to the law of God there being some foolish principles, which the flesh and the world are apt to entertain, which are hinderances to holiness: and the affection, that is, inclination to some certain objects, being that very thing which the laws of God have restrained more or less in several periods of the world, may, without inconvenience to the question, be admitted to expound φρόνημα σαρκός.

39. "And although there is no condemnation to them that believe and are baptized :"

That is, this concupiscence, or inclination to forbidden instances, is not imputed to the baptized nor to the regenerate, that is, when the new principle of grace and of the Spirit is put into us, we are reduced to as great a condition, and as certain an order and capacity, of entering into heaven, as Adam was before his fall; for then we are drawn from that mere natural state where Adam left us: and therefore although these do die, yet it is but the condition of nature, not the punishment of the sin. For Adam's sin brought in death, and baptism and a Lib. 1. de Nup. et Concup. c 23.

the formality of it, it is not a punishment to such, but a condition of nature, as it is to infants; for, that even to them also there is no condemnation for their original concupiscence, is undeniable and demonstratively certain upon this account. Because, even the actual desires and little concupiscences of children are innocent, and therefore, much more their natural tendencies and inclinations. For if a principle be criminal, if a faculty be a sin, much more are the acts of that faculty also a sin, but if these be innocent, then much more is that.

40. "Yet the apostle does confess, that concupiscence or lust hath of itself the nature of sin."

"Of itself:" That is, it is in the whole kind to be reproved, it is not a sin to all persons, not to unconsenting persons: for if it be no sin to them that resist, then, neither is it a sin to them that cannot consent. But it hath the "nature of sin," that is, it is the material part of sin, a principle and root from whence evil may spring, according to St. Austin's words : "Modo quodam loquendi vocatur peccatum quod peccato factum est, et peccati, si vicerit, facit reum."a Just as if a man have a natural thirst, it may tempt him and is apt to incline him to drunkenness; if he be of a sanguine disposition, it disposes him to lust; if choleric, to anger; and is so much a sin as the fuel is a part of the fire; but because this can be there, where damnation shall not enter, this nature of sin is such as does not make a proper guiltiness; for it is a contradiction to say, the sin remains and the guilt is taken away; for he that hath a sin, is guilty of punishment, that is, he is liable to it, if God pleases: he may pardon if he pleases; but if he pardons he takes away the sin: for in the justified, no sin can be inherent or habitual; "Quomodo justificati, et sanctificati sumus, si peccatum aliquod in nobis relinquitur ?" If concupiscence be an inherent sin in us before baptism, it must either be taken away by baptism, or imputed to us after baptism: for if the malice remains, the guilt cannot go away; for God will by no means justify the remaining sinner.

41. These things I have chose to say and publish, because I find that the usual doctrines about original sin are not only false, and presumed without any competent proof, but because, as they are commonly believed, they are no friends to piety, but pretences of idleness, and dishonourable to the reputation of God's goodness and justice, for which we ought to be very zealous, when a greater indifference would better become us in the matter of our opinion, or the doctrine of our sect; and therefore it is not to be blamed in me, that I move the thoughts of men in the proposition; for it is not a useless one, but hath its immediate effects upon the honour of God, and the next, upon the lives of men. And therefore this hath in it many degrees of necessary doctrine, and the fruits of it must needs do more than make recompence for the trouble I put them to, in making new inquiries into that doctrine, concerning which they were so long at ease. But if men of a contrary judgment can secure the b Hieron. ad Oceanum.

interests and advantages of piety, and can reconcile their usual doctrines of original sin with God's justice and goodness and truth, I shall be well pleased with it, and think better of their doctrine than now I can but until that be done, they may please to consider that there is in Holy Scripture no sign of it, nor intimation, that at the day of judgment Christ shall say to any, Go, ye cursed sons of Adam, into everlasting fire, because your father sinned; and though I will pardon millions of sins which men did choose and delight in, yet I will severely exact this of you, which you never did choose, nor could delight in this, I say, is not likely to be in the event of things, and in the wise and merciful dispensation of God, especially since Jesus Christ himself, so far as appears, never spake one word of it, there is not any tittle of it in all the four Gospels; it is a thing of which no warning was or could be given to any of Adam's children; it is not mentioned in the Old Testament (for that place of David in the fiftyfirst Psalm, Clemens Alexandrinus and others of the fathers snatch from any pretence to it); and that one time where it is spoken of in the New Testament, there is nothing said of it, but that it is im- | puted to us to this purpose only, that it brought in

death temporal: and why such tragedies should be made of it, and other places of Scripture drawn by violence to give countenance to it, and all the systems of divinity of late made to lean upon this article, which yet was never thought to be fundamental, or belonging to the foundation, was never put into the creed of any church, but is made the great support of new and strange propositions, even of the fearful decree of absolute reprobation, and yet was never consented in, or agreed upon what it was, or how it can be conveyed, and was (in the late and modern sense of it) as unknown to the primitive church, as it was to the doctors of the Jews, that is, wholly unknown to them both; why, I say, men should be so fierce in their new sense of this article, and so impatient of contradiction, it is not easy to give a reasonable account.

For my own particular, I hope I have done my duty, having produced scriptures, and reasons, and the best authority, against it. Qui potest capere, capiat."

For" I had a good spirit: yea, rather being good, I came into a body undefiled." Wisd. viii. 19, 20.

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SECTION I.

1. ALL mankind hath for ever complained of their irremediable calamity, their "propensity to sin." For though by the dictates of nature all people were instructed in the general notices of virtue and vice, right reason being our rule; insomuch that the old philosophers, as Plutarch reports, said that virtue was nothing else but rou hyɛμovikov τῆς ψυχῆς διάθεσίς τις καὶ δύναμις γεγενημένη ὑπὸ λόγου, a disposition and force of reason." And this reason having guided the wisest, was formed into laws for others; yet this reason served to little other purposes, but to upbraid our follies and infelicities, and to make our actions punishable, by representing them to be unreasonable; for they did certainly sin, and they could no more help it, than they could prevent their being sick, or hungry, or angry, or thirsty. Nature had made organs for some, and senses for others, and conversation and example brought in all. So that if you reproved a criminal, he heard and understood you, but could not help it as Laius in the tragedy;

Λέληθεν οὐδὲν τῶν δέ μ', ὧν σὺ νουθετεῖς, Γνώμην δ' ἔχοντά μ' ἡ φύσις βιάζεται. ΕURIP. • Περὶ ἠθικῆς ἀρετ.

"Reason taught him well, but nature constrained him to the contrary; his affections were stronger than his reason."

2. And it is no wonder that while flesh and blood are the prevailing ingredient, while men are in the state of conjunction, and the soul serves the body, and the necessities of this are more felt than the discourses of that, that men should be angry and lustful, proud and revengeful, and that they should follow what they lust after, not what they are bidden to do. For passions and affections are our first governors, and they being clearly possessed of all mankind in their first years, have almost secured to themselves the soul of man, before reason is heard to speak: and when she does speak, she speaks at first so little and so low, that the common noises of fancy and company drown her voice. This, I say, is "the state of nature." And therefore Lactantius brings in a pagan complaining, "Volo equidem non peccare, sed vincor. Indutus enim sum carne fragili, et imbecillâ. Hæc est quæ concupiscit, quæ irascitur, quæ dolet, quæ mori timet. Itaque ducor incertus, et pecco non quia volo, sed quia cogor. Sentio me et ipse peccare; sed necessitas fragilitatis impellit, cui repugnare non possum:" "I would fain avoid sin, but I am compelled. I am invested with a frail and weak flesh: this is it which lusteth, which is angry, which grieves, which