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take its meaning by its proportion to the neighbouring words. But who desires satisfaction in this, may read the observation verified in St. Gregory's morals upon Job; and the instances he there brings, are excellent proof, that this way of interpretation does not warrant any man to impose his expositions upon the belief and understanding of other men too confidently and magisterially.

2. Secondly: another great pretence or medium is the conference of places, which Illyricus calls "ingens remedium et felicissimam expositionem sanctæ scripturæ ;" and indeed so it is, if well and temperately used; but then we are beholden to them that do so; for there is no rule that can constrain them to it; for comparing of places is of so indefinite capacity, that if there be ambiguity of words, variety of sense, alteration of circumstances, or difference of style among divine writers, then there is nothing that may be more abused by wilful people, or may more easily deceive the unwary, or that may more amuse the most intelligent observer. The anabaptists take advantage enough in this proceeding; and indeed so may any one that list; and when we pretend against them the necessity of baptizing all, by authority of "nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aquâ et Spiritu," they have a parallel for it, and tell us, that Christ will " baptize us with the Holy Ghost and with fire," and that one place expounds the other; and because by fire is not meant an element, or any thing that is natural, but an allegory and figurative expression of the same thing; so also by water may be meant the figure signifying the effect or manner of operation of the Holy Spirit. Fire in one place, and water in the other, do but represent to us that Christ's baptism is nothing else but the cleansing and purifying us by the Holy Ghost. But that which I here note, as of greatest concernment, and which in all reason ought to be an utter overthrow to this topic, is a universal abuse of it among those that use it most; and when two places seem to have the same expression, or if a word have a double signification, because in this place it may have such a sense, therefore it must; because in one of the places the sense is to their purpose, they conclude that therefore it must be so in the other too. An instance I give in the great question between the Socinians and the Catholics. If any place be urged in which our blessed Saviour is called God, they show you two or three where the word God is taken in a depressed sense, for a "quasi-Deus," as when God said to Moses, "Constitui te Deum Pharaonis;" and hence they argue, because I can show the word is used for a "Deus factus," therefore no argument is sufficient to prove Christ to be "Deus verus" from the appellative of "Deus." And might not another argue to the exact contrary, and as well urge that Moses is "Deus verus," because in some places the word "Deus" is used "pro Deo æterno:" both ways the argument concludes impiously and unreasonably. It is a fallacy posse ad esse affirmativè;" because breaking of bread is sometimes used for a eucharistical manducation in Scripture; therefore I shall not, from any * Lib. 5. c. 22.

b De Doctrin. Christian. lib. 3.

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testimony of Scripture affirming the first christians. to have broken bread together, conclude that they lived hospitably and in common society. Because it may possibly be eluded, therefore it does not signify any thing. And this is the great way of answering all the arguments that can be brought against any thing, that any man hath a mind to defend; and any man that reads any controversies of any side, shall find as many instances of this vanity almost as he finds arguments from Scripture; this fault was of old noted by St. Austin, for then they had got the trick, and he is angry at it; "neque enim putare debemus esse præscriptum, ut quod in aliquo loco res aliqua per similitudinem significaverit, hoc etiam semper significare credamus."b

rest.

3. Thirdly oftentimes scriptures are pretended to be expounded by a proportion and analogy of reason. And this is as the other; if it be well, it is well. But unless there were some "intellectus universalis" furnished with infallible propositions, by referring to which every man might argue infallibly, this logic may deceive as well as any of the For it is with reason as with men's tastes; although there are some general principles, which are reasonable to all men, yet every man is not able to draw out all its consequences, nor to understand them when they are drawn forth, nor to believe when he does understand them. There is a precept of St. Paul directed to the Thessalonians before they were gathered into a body of a church, "To withdraw from every brother that walketh disorderly." But if this precept were now observed, I would fain know whether we should not fall into that inconvenience, which St. Paul sought to avoid in giving the same commandment to the church of Corinth; "I wrote to you that ye should not company with fornicators ;" and "yet not altogether with the fornicators of this world, for then ye must go out of the world." And therefore, he restrains it to a quitting the society of christians living ill lives. But now, that all the world hath been christians, if we should sin in keeping company with vicious christians, must we not also go out of this world? Is not the precept made null, because the reason is altered, and things are come about, and that the οἱ πολλοὶ are "the brethren," ådeλøoì ovoμalóμevo, "called brethren," as St. Paul's phrase is? And yet either this never was considered, or not yet believed; for it is generally taken to be obligatory, though, I think, seldom practised. But when we come to expound scriptures to a certain sense by arguments drawn from prudential motives, then we are in a vast plain without any sufficient guide, and we shall have so many senses as there are human prudences. But that which goes farther than this, is a parity of reason from a plain place of Scripture to an obscure, from that which is plainly set down in a text to another that is more remote from it. And thus is that place in St. Matthew forced, "If thy brother refuse to be amended, dic ecclesiæ.'" Hence some of the Roman doctors argue, if Christ commands to "tell the church" in case of adultery or private injury, then c 2 Thess. iii. 6. d 1 Cor. v. 9.

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keep the analogy of faith, that is, to expound Scrip-
ture so as not to do any violence to any fundamen-
tal article, he shall be sure, however he errs, yet not
to destroy faith; he shall not perish in his exposi-
tion. And that was the precept given by St. Paul,
that all prophesyings should be estimated kar' ȧva-
Xoyiav iσTεws; and to this very purpose, St.
Austin, in his exposition of Genesis, by way of pre-
face sets down the articles of faith, with this design
and protestation of it, that if he says nothing against
those articles, though he miss the particular sense
of the place, there is no danger or sin in his expo-
sition; but how that analogy of faith should have
any other influence in expounding such places, in
which those articles of faith are neither expressed
nor involved, I understand not. But then if you
extend the analogy of faith farther than that which
is proper to the rule or symbol of faith, then every
man expounds Scripture" according to the analogy
of faith;" but what? his own faith: which faith, if
it be questioned, I am no more bound to expound
according to the analogy of another man's faith,
than he to expound according to the analogy of
mine. And this is it that is complained of on all
sides, that overvalue their own opinions. Scripture
seems so clearly to speak what they believe, that
they wonder all the world does not see it as clear as
they do: but they satisfy themselves with saying,
that it is because they come with prejudice; where-
as, if they had the true belief, that is, theirs, they
would easily see what they see.
And this is very
true: for if they did believe as others believe, they
would expound scriptures to their sense; but if this
be expounding according to the analogy of faith, it
signifies no more than this, "Be you of my mind,
and then my arguments will seem concluding, and
my authorities and allegations pressing and perti-
nent:" and this will serve on all sides, and there-
fore will do but little service to the determination of
questions, or prescribing to other men's consciences
on any side.

much more in case of heresy. Well, suppose this to | tion to any article in the creed, than they have to be a good interpretation: why must I stay here?" Tityre, tu patulæ ?" Indeed, if a man resolves to why may not I also add, by a parity of reason, if the church must be told of heresy, much more of treason: and why may not I reduce all sins to the cognizance of a church-tribunal, and some men do directly, and Snecanus does heartily and plainly? If a man's principles be good, and his deductions certain, he need not care whither they carry him: but when an authority is intrusted to a person, and the extent of his power expressed in his commission, it will not be safety to meddle beyond his commission upon confidence of a parity of reason.-To instance once more: when Christ in "pasce oves, et tu es Petrus," | gave power to the pope to govern the church, (for to that sense the church of Rome expounds those authorities,) by a certain consequence of reason, say they, he gave all things necessary for exercise of this jurisdiction; and therefore in "pasce oves" he gave him an indirect power over temporals, for that is necessary that he may do his duty: well, having gone thus far, we will go farther upon the parity of reason; therefore he hath given the pope the gift of tongues, and he hath given him power to give it; for how else shall Xavier convert the Indians? he hath given him power also to command the seas and the winds, that they should obey him, for this also is very necessary in some cases. And so 66 'pasce oves" is "accipe donum linguarum," and "impera ventis, et dispone regum diademata, et laicorum prædia," and "influentias cœli" too, and whatsoever the parity of reason will judge equally necessary in order to "pasce oves."-When a man does speak reason, it is but reason he should be heard; but though he may have the good fortune, or the great abilities, to do it, yet he hath not a certainty, no regular infallible assistance, no inspiration of arguments and deductions; and if he had, yet because it must be reason that must judge of reason, unless other men's understandings were of the same air, the same constitution and ability, they cannot be prescribed unto by another man's reason; especially because such reasonings as usually are in explication of particular places of Scripture, depend upon minute circumstances and particularities, in which it is so easy to be deceived, and so hard to speak reason regularly and always, that it is the greater wonder if we be not deceived. 4. Fourthly others pretend to expound Scripture by the analogy of faith, and that is the most sure and infallible way, as it is thought: but upon stricter survey it is but a chimera, a thing in "nubibus," which varies like the right hand and left hand of a pillar, and at the best is but like the coast of a country to a traveller out of his way; it may bring him to his journey's end though twenty miles about; it may keep him from running into the sea, and from mistaking a river for dry land; but whether this little path or the other be the right way, it tells not. So is the analogy of faith, that is, if I understand it right, the rule of faith, that is, the creed. Now were it not a fine device to go to expound all the Scripture by the creed, there being in it so many thousand places, which have no more rela

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5. Lastly consulting the originals is thought a great matter to interpretation of scriptures. But this is to small purpose: for indeed it will expound the Hebrew and the Greek, and rectify translations. But I know no man that says that the Scriptures in Hebrew and Greek are easy and certain to be understood, and that they are hard in Latin and English: the difficulty is in the thing, however it be expressed, the least, is in the language. If the original languages were our mother-tongue, Scripture is not much the easier to us; and a natural Greek or a Jew can with no more reason, or authority, obtrude his interpretations upon other men's consciences, than a man of another nation. this that the inspection of the original is no more certain way of interpretation of Scripture now, than it was to the fathers and primitive ages of the church; and yet he that observes what infinite variety of translations of the Bible were in the first ages of the church, (as St. Jerome observes,) and never a one e Rom. vi. 12.

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like another; will think that we shall differ as much in our interpretations as they did, and that the medium is as uncertain to us as it was to them; and so it is: witness the great number of late translations, and the infinite number of commentaries, which are too pregnant an argument, that we neither agree in the understanding of the words nor of the sense.

6. The truth is, all these ways of interpreting of Scripture, which of themselves are good helps, are made, either by design or by our infirmities, ways of intricating and involving scriptures in greater difficulty; because men do not learn their doctrines from Scripture, but come to the understanding of Scripture with preconceptions and ideas of doctrines of their own; and then no wonder that scriptures look like pictures, wherein every man in the room believes they look on him only, and that wheresoever he stands, or how often soever he changes his station. So that now what was intended for a remedy, becomes the promoter of our disease, and our meat becomes the matter of sickness; and the mischief is, the wit of man cannot find a remedy for it; for there is no rule, no limit, no certain principle, by which all men may be guided to a certain and so infallible an interpretation, that he can with any equity prescribe to others to believe his interpretations in places of controversy or ambiguity. A man would think that the memorable prophecy of Jacob, that "the sceptre should not depart from Judah till Shiloh come," should have been so clear a determination of the time of the Messias, that a Jew should never have doubted it to have been verified in Jesus of Nazareth; and yet for this so clear vaticination, they have no less than twentysix answers. St. Paul and St. James seem to speak a little diversely concerning justification by faith and works, and yet to my understanding it is very easy to reconcile them; but all men are not of my mind; for Osiander, in his confutation of the book which Melancthon wrote against him, observes, that there are twenty several opinions concerning justification, all drawn from the Scriptures, by the men only of the Augustine confession. There are sixteen several opinions concerning original sin; and as many definitions of the sacraments, as there are sects of men that disagree about them.

7. And now what help is there for us in the midst of these uncertainties? If we follow any one translation, or any one man's commentary, what rule shall we have to choose the right by ? or is there any one man, that hath translated perfectly, or expounded infallibly? No translation challenges such prerogative to be authentic, but the vulgar Latin; and yet see with what good success; for when it was declared authentic by the council of Trent, Sixtus put forth a copy much mended of what it was, and tied all men to follow that; but that did not satisfy; for Pope Clement revives and corrects it in many places, and still the decree remains in a changed subject.-And, secondly, that translation will be very unapt to satisfy, in which one of their own men, Isidore Clarius, a monk of Brescia, found f In Commonit.

and mended eight thousand faults, besides innumerable others which he says he pretermitted.—And then, thirdly, to show how little themselves were satisfied with it, divers learned men among them did new translate the Bible, and thought they did God and the church good service in it. So that if you take this for your precedent, you are sure to be mistaken infinitely; if you take any other, the authors themselves do not promise you any security; if you resolve to follow any one, as far only as you see cause, then you only do wrong or right by chance; for you have certainty just proportionable to your own skill, to your own infallibility. If you resolve to follow any one whithersoever he leads, we shall oftentimes come thither, where we shall see ourselves become ridiculous; as it happened in the case of Spiridion, bishop of Cyprus, who so resolved to follow his old book, that when an eloquent bishop who was desired to preach, read his text, "Tu autem tolle cubile tuum et ambula;" Spiridion was very angry with him, because in his book it was "tolle lectum tuum," and thought it arrogance in the preacher to speak better Latin than his translator had done: and if it be thus in translations, it is far worse in expositions: "Quia scilicet Scripturam sacram pro ipsâ sui altitudine non uno eodemque sensû omnes accipiunt, ut penè quot homines, tot illic sententiæ erui posse videantur," said Vincentius Lirinensis. In which every man knows what innumerable ways there are of being mistaken,-God having in things not simply necessary left such a difficulty upon those parts of Scripture which are the subject-matters of controversy, "ad edomandam labore superbiam, et intellectum à fastidio revocandum," as St. Austin gives a reason, that all that err honestly, are therefore to be pitied and tolerated, because it is or may be the condition of every man, at one time or other.

8. The sum is this: since Holy Scripture is the repository of Divine truths, and the great rule of faith, to which all sects of christians do appeal for probation of their several opinions; and since all agree in the articles of the creed as things clearly and plainly set down, and as containing all that which is of simple and prime necessity; and since, on the other side, there are in Scripture many other mysteries, and matters of question, upon which there is a veil; since there are so many copies with infinite varieties of reading; since a various interpunction, a parenthesis, a letter, an accent, may much alter the sense; since some places have divers literal senses, many have spiritual, mystical, and allegorical meanings; since there are so many tropes, metonymies, ironies, hyperboles, proprieties, and improprieties of language, whose understanding depends upon such circumstances, that it is almost impossible to know its proper interpretation, now that the knowledge of such circumstances and particular stories is irrevocably lost; since there are some mysteries which, at the best advantage of expression, are not easy to be apprehended, and whose explication, by reason of our imperfections, must needs be dark, sometimes weak, sometimes unin8 Lib. 2. de Doctr. Christian. c. 6.

telligible; and, lastly, since those ordinary means of expounding Scripture, as searching the originals, conference of places, parity of reason, and analogy of faith, are all dubious, uncertain, and very fallible, -he that is the wisest, and by consequence the likeliest to expound truest in all probability of reason, will be very far from confidence; because every one of these, and many more, are like so many degrees of improbability and uncertainty, all depressing our certainty of finding out truth in such mysteries, and amidst so many difficulties. And therefore, a wise man, that considers this, would not willingly be prescribed to by others; and therefore, if he also be a just man, he will not impose upon others; for it is best every man should be left in that liberty, from which no man can justly take him, unless he could secure him from error: so that here also there is a necessity to conserve the liberty of prophesying, and interpreting Scripture; a necessity derived from the consideration of the difficulty of Scripture in questions controverted, and the uncertainty of any internal medium of interpretation.

SECTION V.

Of the Insufficiency and Uncertainty of Tradition to expound Scripture, or determine Questions.

1. In the next place, we must consider those extrinsical means of interpreting Scripture, and determining questions, which they most of all confide in, that restrain prophesying with the greatest tyranny. The first and principal is tradition, which is pretended not only to expound Scripture, " (Necesse enim est propter tantos tam varii erroris anfractûs, ut propheticæ et apostolicæ interpretationis linea secundum ecclesiastici et catholici sensûs normam dirigatur,)"h but also to propound articles upon a distinct stock, such articles, whereof there is no mention and proposition in Scripture. And in this topic, not only the distinct articles are clear and plain, like as the fundamentals of faith expressed in Scripture, but also it pretends to expound Scripture, and to determine questions with so much clarity and certainty, as there shall neither be error nor doubt remaining, and therefore no disagreeing is here to be endured. And, indeed, it is most true, if tradition can perform these pretensions, and teach us plainly, and assure us infallibly of all truths, which they require us to believe, we can in this case have no reason to disbelieve them, and therefore are certainly heretics if we do, because, without a crime, without some human interest or collateral design, we cannot disbelieve traditive doctrine or traditive interpretation, if it be infallibly proved to us that tradition is an infallible guide.

2. But here I first consider that tradition is no repository of articles of faith, and therefore the not following it is no argument of heresy; for besides that I have showed Scripture in its plain expresses h Vincent. Lirinens. in Commonitor.

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to be an abundant rule of faith and manners, tradition is a topic as fallible as any other: so fallible that it cannot be sufficient evidence to any man in a matter of faith or question of heresy.

Such

3. For first, I find, that the fathers were infinitely deceived in their account and enumeration of traditions: sometimes they did call some traditions such, not which they knew to be so, but by arguments and presumptions they concluded them so. as was that of St. Austin, "Ea quæ universalis tenet ecclesia nec à conciliis instituta reperiuntur, credibile est ab apostolorum traditione descendisse." i Now suppose this rule probable, that is the most, yet it is not certain; it might come by custom, whose original was not known, but yet could not derive from an apostolical principle. Now when they conclude of particular traditions by a general rule, and that general rule not certain, but, at the most, probable in any thing, and certainly false in some things, is it wonder if the productions, that is, their judgments and pretence, fail so often. And if I should but instance in all the particulars, in which tradition was pretended falsely or uncertainly in the first ages, I should multiply them to a troublesome variety: for it was then accounted so glorious a thing to have spoken with the persons of the apostles, that if any man could with any colour pretend to it, he might abuse the whole church, and obtrude what he listed under the specious title of apostolical tradition; and it is very notorious to every man, that will but read and observe the Recognitions or Stromata of Clemens Alexandrinus,-where there is enough of such false wares showed in every book, and pretended to be no less than from the apostles. In the first age after the apostles, Papias pretended he received a tradition from the apostles, that Christ, before the day of judgment, should reign a thousand years upon earth, and his saints with him in temporal felicities; and this thing proceeding from so great an authority as the testimony of Papias, drew after it all or most of the christians in the first three hundred years. For besides, that the millenary opinion is expressly taught by Papias, Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Origen, Lactantius, Severus, Victorinus, Apollinaris, Nepos, and divers others famous in their time; Justin Martyr, in his Dialogue against Tryphon, says, it was the belief of all christians exactly orthodox, kai ɛi τινές εἰσὶ κατὰ πάντα ὀρθογνώμονες Χριστιανοὶ; and yet there was no such tradition, but a mistake in Papias: but I find it no where spoke against, till Dionysius of Alexandria confuted Nepos's book, and converted Coracian the Egyptian from the opinion. Now if a tradition, whose beginning of being called so began with a scholar of the apostles, (for so was Papias,) and then continued for some ages upon the mere authority of so famous a man, did yet deceive the church: much more fallible is the pretence, when, two or three hundred years after, it but commences, and then by some learned man is first called a tradition apostolical. And so it happened in the case of the Arian heresy, which the Nicene fathers did confute by objecting a contrary tradition apostolical, Epist. 118. ad Januar. De Bapt. contr. Donat. lib. 4. c. 24.

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as Theodoret reports; and yet if they had not had better arguments from Scripture than from tradition, they would have failed much in so good a cause ; for this very pretence the Arians themselves made, and desired to be tried by the fathers of the first three hundred years, which was a confutation sufficient to them who pretended a clear tradition, because it was unimaginable, that the tradition should leap so as not to come from the first to the last by the middle. But that this trial was sometime declined by that excellent man, St. Athanasius, although at other times confidently and truly pretended, it was an argument the tradition was not so clear, but both sides might with some fairness pretend to it. And therefore, one of the prime founders of their heresy, the heretic Artemon," having observed the advantage might be taken by any sect that would pretend tradition, because the medium was plausible, and consisting of so many particulars, that it was hard to be redargued,-pretended a tradition from the apostles, that Christ was λòs ǎropos, and that the tradition did descend by a constant succession in the church of Rome to Pope Victor's time inclusively, and till Zephyrinus had interrupted the series and corrupted the doctrine; which pretence, if it had not had some appearance of truth, so as possibly to abuse the church, had not been worthy of confutation, which yet was with care undertaken by an old writer, out of whom Eusebius transcribes a large passage to reprove the vanity of the pretender." But I observe from hence, that it was usual to pretend to tradition, and that it was easier pretended than confuted, and I doubt not but oftener done than discovered. A great question arose in Africa concerning the baptism of heretics, whether it were valid or no. St. Cyprian and his party appealed to Scripture; Stephen bishop of Rome, and his party, would be judged by custom and tradition ecclesiastical. See how much the nearer the question was to a determination, either that probation was not accounted by St. Cyprian, and the bishops both of Asia and Africa, to be a good argument, and sufficient to determine them, or there was no certain tradition against them; for unless one of these two do it, nothing could excuse them from opposing a known truth, unless peradventure, St. Cyprian, Firmilian, the bishops of Galatia, Cappadocia, and almost two parts of the world, were ignorant of such a tradition, for they knew of none such, and some of them expressly denied it. And the sixth general synod approves of the canon made in the council of Carthage under Cyprian upon this very ground, because in "prædictorum præsulum locis et solum secundum traditam eis consuetudinem servatus est;" they had a particular tradition for rebaptization, and therefore there could be no tradition universal against it; or if there were, they knew not of it, but much for the contrary: and then it would be remembered

* Lib. 1. Hist. c. 8.

1 Vide Petav. in Epiph. her. 69.

* Καὶ γὰρ εἰσὶ τίνες ὦ φίλοι, ἔλεγον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμετέρου γένους ὁμολογοῦντες αὐτὸν Χριστὸν εἶναι, ἄνθρωπων δὲ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενόμενον ἀποφαινόμενοι, οἷς οὐ συντίθεμαι, οὐδὲ

that a concealed tradition was like a silent thunder, or a law not promulgated; it neither was known, nor was obligatory. And I shall observe this too, that this very tradition was so obscure, and was so obscurely delivered, silently proclaimed, that St. Austin, who disputed against the Donatists upon this very question, was not able to prove it but by a consequence which he thought probable and credible, as appears in his discourse against the Donatists. "The apostles," saith St. Austin,P" prescribed nothing in this particular: but this custom, which is contrary to Cyprian, ought to be believed to have come from their tradition, as many other things which the catholic church observes." That is all the ground and all the reason; nay, the church did waver concerning that question, and before the decision of a council, Cyprian and others might dissent without breach of charity.9 It was plain then there was no clear tradition in the question; possibly there might be a custom in some churches postnate to the times of the apostles, but nothing that was obligatory, no tradition apostolical. But this was a suppletory device ready at hand whenever they needed it; and St. Austin confuted the Pelagians, in the question of original sin, by the custom of exorcism and insufflation, which St. Austin said, came from the apostles by tradition; which yet was then, and is now, so impossible to be proved, that he that shall affirm it, shall gain only the reputation of a bold man and a confident.

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4. Secondly I consider, if the report of traditions in the primitive times, so near the ages apostolical, was so uncertain, that they were fain to aim at them by conjectures, and grope as in the dark, the uncertainty is much increased since; because there are many famous writers whose works are lost, which yet if they had continued they might have been good records to us, as Clemens Romanus, Hegesippus, Nepos, Coracion, Dionysius Areopagite, of Alexandria, of Corinth, Firmilian, and many more and since we see pretences have been made without reason in those ages, where they might better have been confuted than now they can,—it is greater prudence to suspect any later pretences, since so many sects have been, so many wars, so many corruptions in authors, so many authors lost, so much ignorance hath intervened, and so many interests have been served, that now the rule is to be altered: and whereas it was of old time credible, that that was apostolical whose beginning they knew not, now quite contrary, we cannot safely believe them to be apostolical, unless we do know their beginning to have been from the apostles. For this consisting of probabilities and particulars, which put together make up a moral demonstration,

the argument which I now urge, hath been growing these fifteen hundred years; and if anciently there was so much as to evacuate the authority of tradition,-much more is there now absolutely to ἂν πλεῖστοι ταῦτα μοὶ δοξάσαντες ἔποιεν.-JUSTIN MART. Dial. ad Tryph. Jud. Euseb. T. 5. c. ult. • Can. 2.

P L. 5. de Baptism. contr. Donat. c. 23. 9 Lib. 1. de Baptism. c. 18.

De peccat. original. 1. 2. c. 40. contra Pelagi. et Cælest.

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