Between the 5th and the 6th of September, when Prince Radzevil took his departure, discussions which took place, were regularly communicated to Sir S. Canning, and by him transmitted home.

Now before the documents were published, and when the English Government was taking credit for having supported Turkey, a credit irreconcileable with the concession of internal surveillance which the Porte had made, it boldly extricated itself by a falsehood and a charge-it charged the Turkish Government with concealing from it these communications.

Prince Radzevil came to demand a "Yes," or a "No," in eight and forty hours: he adopted towards the Sultan forms the most offensive, language the most haughty. The Porte. extricated itself from the dilemma with that dexterity which it always evinces when forced into action: it told the Envoy that the answer would be given at St. Petersburgh, to which place an Ambassador of the Sultan was already on his way. An autograph letter from the Sultan to the Emperor was presented to him, which he declined to take charge of.

The Porte had now definitively taken its stand in its "isolation,' "without the support of England and France,” and consequently, whether that support did, or did not arrive, it equally had to bear the consequences. It hastily called up its reserves, and an army of 65,000 men was assembled at the capital. Throughout the country, as I can testify, (travelling as I was through it at the time), far from the doubts or apprehensions which appear to have prevailed in higher quarters and to have divided the Ministry, there was but one feeling of indignation and confidence: “every male, from sixteen to sixty;" such was the reply received in a village when I asked them how many men they would send to the Danube. Nor was the Sovereign behind his People: when it was told the Sultan that this demand was about to be made, he started up and exclaimed: "Shall I, who am Master of the Empire, be denied the right of refuge, which I cannot refuse to the meanest of my subjects, in the

case even of a culprit? Sooner let the Empire itself perish!"

The die was now cast; the honour or disgrace of the course rested alone with the Porte: no despatch had arrived from England. Here is the view of the case as stated by Sir Stratford Canning on the 17th of December:

"Allow me to add, my lord, that in proportion as I admire the courageous firmness with which the Sultan and his Government have determined to make this stand in the cause of humanity and of the fair rights of honour and dignity, against a demand alike objectionable in substance and in form, I feel a deepening anxiety for the result of their resistance, and for the degree of support which Her Majesty's Government and that of France may find themselves at liberty to afford, not only in the first instance, but in still graver circumstances, should the present partial rupture unfortu nately assume a more serious and menacing character."

Under this alarm for Turkey and doubts of England, Sir S. Canning writes to Admiral Parker, to know whether any portion of Her Majesty's squadron was "available for any purposes of demonstration," and whether he was "at liberty, without bringing attention on the real object, to place it

"It ought never to be forgotten that the peremptory refusal of the Sultan to deliver up these gallant defenders of a righteous causo to the base and merciless vengeance of Austria and Russia, was given before he knew whether he should be supported in that refusal by the Western Powers of Europe or not. It must be also remembered, that the conduct of those Western Powers had not always been such as to lead him to the conclusion that they would be sure to assist him. Yet he waited not for the arrival of a British fleet in the waters of Turkey, nor for any intimation of its approach, but at once, without hesitation, decided that the brave sons of liberty who craved the protection of Turkish hospitality, should receive it at whatever cost. But for this noble act, so worthy of a great Sovereign, and of that character which the Turks have always maintained, Kossuth would, beyond all doubt, have been consigned to the same ignominious death as his fellow-patriot, Louis Batthyanyi.”—Letter of Lord Dudley Stuart.

at once in somewhat nearer communication with Her Majesty's Embassy ?" but on this communication the impulsive admiral did not think fit to move.

Fuad Effendi arrived at St. Petersburgh, with the autograph letter from the Sultan, and had his audience on the 16th of October. The glacial bearing assumed at Constantinople has thawed in the more genial climate of the North, and as anticipated by Lord Ponsonby, the adjustment of the matter experiences no difficulty.

On the 16th October, the British Minister at St. Petersburgh, however, was without instructions; things are so close run that on that day he has to announce to Count Nesselrode, that he has none, the orders had been sent to Admiral Parker to sail to the Dardanelles ten days before. Now observe the dates: the Russian demand of Extradition was dated Warsaw, 14th of August: the Austrian, was made at Constantinople, on the 25th of August; the Despatch announcing it arrived in London on the 9th of September: the whole case was detailed in Sir Stratford Canning's Despatch of the 3d September, and its enclosures: the final proceedings, including the application of the Turkish Government, both through its own Ambassador, and through Sir Stratford Canning, together with the rupture of diplomatic relations with Austria and Russia, reached London on the 1st of October; on the 3d, Lord Palmerston was in possession of the departure of Fuad Effendi for St. Petersburgh. If time and distance interfered to prevent his action at Constantinople, nothing prevented the transmission of his decision to St. Petersburgh. He now further delays for six days. A thundering Despatch is then written so as to arrive the day after the settlement, and, of course, never to be presented. These are his explicit words in the House" It is due, however, to the Russian Government to say, that the day before our friendly representation reached St. Petersburga, the Russian Government had stated, that it

re

* "I can assure you that there will be nothing worse than dissatisfaction on the part of Austria. No strong measure will be taken."-Lord Ponsonby, 2d October.

no longer insisted on the demand for Surrender, but consented to the alternative of Expulsion."

Now clearly the matter was ended. Why then despatch the squadron? If not settled with Fuad Effendi, then the question lay between England and Russia, and a declaration of war must have followed; and the squadron would have to be recalled home for the Baltic. The fact, however, of the sailing of the squadron was not communicated, ostensibly, to St. Petersburgh on the 6th of October.

Now supposing any mischance had occurred, and the arrival of the Despatch on the 6th of October had been hastened a few hours, or the arrangement of Fuad Effendi retarded; and the parties had thus been brought up with doubled fists, a show of something more than "bottleholding" would have been required. How convenient to have the squadron got out of the way! This would not have been the first time when the sacrifice of professed purposes and important interests has been excused on the pretext of the employment elsewhere of the disposable British naval force. This naval demonstration enabled Russia to regain her haughty position, compromised by her apparent surrender, and Count Nesselrode overwhelmed the trembling English

7th February, 1850.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

"Foreign Office, November 2, 1849. "MY LORD,-With reference to your Excellency's Despatch of the 21st ultimo, reporting the feelings entertained by the Austrian Ministers with respect to what they term the menace made by England and France, I have to point out to your Excellency that a movement of Her Majesty's squadron to the upper end of the Mediterranean cannot be considered as a threat against Austria. If the squadron had moved up the Adriatic and had taken post opposite to Venice or Trieste, the case might have been different.

I am, &c.

The Despatch to which this is a reply is not given.

PALMERSTON,"

Representative at St. Petersburgh with words of contumely and scorn, restraining his laughter, he said:

I

"I am an old man. I hope to end my days in peace : have laboured to preserve it for Europe; never did I expect that it would be the Government of England, which by an insolent violation of solemn compact, should again cast upon the world the Torch of Discord. But Russia is prepared; strong in her position and rights, strong in her power and in her conscience, she accepts a defiance, and lays upon your head the responsibility and the consequences."

It was this demonstration that paralysed the willing efforts of General Lamoricière, and forced Fuad Effendi to surrender the advantages of the growing indignation throughout Europe against Russia, and admiration for Turkey.

Sir Stratford Canning, who under different circumstances had suggested that the squadron should have been brought to the neighbourhood of the Embassy, no sooner learns that Admiral Parker has violated the atrocious Treaty of July 13, 1841, by entering the Dardanelles, than he implores him to depart. He addresses him in the strain of a Guebre, depreciating Ahriman :—

"With the deference which is due to your superior judg ment, I would venture to suggest as the more advisable course, that you should leave your present anchorage, unless requested by the Porte to stay, and transfer the squadron to some neighbouring station, whence it may return, should its valuable services be wanted again, without any inconvenient delay."

This is on the 4th of November, but is not given in the "Blue Book" at that date. Before it is introduced his Despatch of the 5th, mentioning simply the removal of the squadron from the exposed situation of Bisika Bay to a preferable anchorage. Next comes one to Lord Blomfield rather more explicit, mentioning that the Russian Minister