German War.

So, in the case of the Franco-German War, the growth of and the Franco- Prussia and Germany has already been noted as the most direct of the causes. But to this cause must be added the alleged intervention of France, in nominating Hohenzollern as successor to the Spanish Crown, the real or imputed political schemes of the Emperor Napoleon, the antipathy existing between the French and German people, the territorial acquisitiveness on both sides, the enormously developed military institutions on both sides, and the alleged illtreatment, or at least contemptuous treatment, of the French Ambassador at Berlin. Probably the first of these causes was the strongest, namely, the determination of Bismarck to secure a united Germany, under the military leadership of Prussia, and to put a final close, if it were possible, to the scarcely intermittent invasions by France of German territory. It may well be doubted whether the appropriation by the Treaty of Peace of territory so long attached to France will diminish, rather than increase, the probability of recurrent War.

War are becoming obsolete between European States.

There are some causes of War which, though they have figSome causes of ured conspicuously in past times, are now becoming extinct, at least among States enjoying an equal amount of civilization. Such are Wars of religion; Wars waged in order to extort commercial privileges; Wars waged in defence of colonies, or of the advantages of colonial trade; Wars of dynastic succession; and Wars proceeding from nothing else than chronic international hatred or jealousy, as were many of the Wars between England and France. That some of these causes of War are by no means obsolete when a civilized State has to deal with one less civilized, or at least with a State at once weak and physically remote from the operation of public opinion in Europe, the incessant Wars which England has waged with China, and which she is constantly waging with the Asiatic potentates whose

territories border on her Eastern possessions, are sufficient proofs. But the principle of free trade, the modern policy of colonial independence, the general and steady advance of notions of religious toleration, and the lessened influence of dynastic families in political, and especially in international affairs, are quickly bringing to an end some of the most notorious causes of War in the past.

CHAPTER III.

OF SOME POLITICAL REMEDIES FOR WAR.

SECTION I.

OF THE NATURE AND POSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL AND OTHER REMEDIES FOR WAR.

No one remedy of universal efficacy.

IN the invention of remedies for the evils which beset the natural body, it is well known to be a source of fallacious treatment, and consequent disaster, to rely upon any single and definite medicament as always and everywhere applicable to a malady, the symptoms and causes of which are manifold, and differ widely for almost every individual case. This is equally true in devising remedies for special political evils; and is most conspicuously so when the evil to be grappled with is the product and expression of a vast variety of independent facts, each of which, in itself, is of a most complex kind, and connected with past events by a long chain of historical sequence. War is eminently an evil of this nature, and the complexity of the evil is sufficiently manifest from the brief review in the last chapter of some of the principal causes of modern European Wars. But each one of the causes there enumerated would admit of further analysis, the result of which would be to indicate that there is scarcely a human passion, or a folly, or a political error, and still less a political wrong, which has not contributed, in its measure and degree, to swell the great aggregate of causes of which War is

Is it reasonable to seek remedies for War?

the inevitable effect. Hence, when it is purported to investigate remedies for War, it might be held that, in the strict sense of the word remedy, the enterprise would be not merely ambitious, but puerile. It is, then, matter for consideration in what sense of the word remedy the search for remedies for War can be held to be a reasonable and legitimate object of serious political inquiry.

Though it is quite true that the grounds of War and of its perpetuation must be sought deep down in the nature of man, and in the general historical evolution of political society, yet it has been endeavored, in the last chapter, to establish that the consideration of the more general causes of War can, for modern times, and for the special circumstances of the civilized States of Europe and America, be reduced and narrowed to that of a limited number of groups of circumstances, which in part predispose States to War with each other, and in part directly originate Wars. These groups might, no doubt, be arranged in a variety of ways, and the groups themselves variously constructed; nor can any merit in the way of originality be tained and mod- claimed for one mode of classification as contrasted with another. All that has been here attempted has been to show that modern War between civilized States is an effect of a limited number of definite and clearly ascertainable antecedents; and that the antecedents are, each of them, to some extent at least, modifiable-always supposing there is a desire present to modify them.

Causes of War can be ascer

ified.

A desire to abolish War must be assumed.

For it must be assumed, in such an inquiry as this, that it is sincerely desired to get rid of War; an assumption which, however, very imperfectly corresponds with facts. The desire to get rid of War exists to a very different extent among different nations, though there is, probably, at the present moment, no one civilized nation that loves War for its own sake, or which would not encounter some sacrifice in order to keep it at a distance. Nevertheless, there

are many States, and many persons in all States, to whom War seems by no means a considerable evil. To some persons and to some Governments occasional War seems, on the whole, to be more to be desired than the prospect of perpetual Peace, partly because of the coveted prizes which successful War may bring with it; and partly because of the enervating influences which unusually pacific pursuits are supposed, by some, to exercise on the national life.

This desire not universally strong.

It is not necessary to do more here than advert to these views as phases of current opinion, though the weight they carry in the conduct of international politics is immense. If it is held that War is all but the greatest of disasters, for the occurrence of which no mere positive gain can ever compensate, albeit the desire to avoid imminent loss might justify the encountering of it, then the sharers in such an opinion may lend an attentive ear to the suggestion of measures which aim at the abolition of War, as a proper object for the concentration of political effort. But if War is looked upon as only a moderate evil, of an equal magnitude with a number of others, and one which may properly be regarded as a ready instrument, ever at hand, for the achievement of ulterior designs, or the satisfaction of a finely wrought national sensibility, then the consideration of remedies for War must be a fruitless inquiry. It would imply nothing less than an exact calculation, repeated for each State in succession, of the value of the different objects which modern civilized States may now, or at any future time, set before themselves, and an indication of the general line of policy which each State must adopt, so that, by a reconciliation of all the various lines, conflicts and disputes may become infrequent or impossible. Such an inquiry would involve a complete scheme of general European policy, stretching into the far future; and though the preparation of such a scheme would not in itself be impracticable-as the majestic efforts of M. Auguste Comte and his Eng