Efforts after natural progress to be distinguished

from resistance to aggression,

of ambition.

This cause is often disguised by the presence of one or other of two different causes, which must be carefully distinguished from it. One of these is the natural resistance which any State makes to novel and from Wars though almost imperceptible pretensions, not to say aggressions, on the part of surrounding States. The other is the ambition and covetousness of a State which is bent on overtly claiming for itself far more than is legally or morally due to it. The prospect of the necessity of resistance, at an early date, to the pretensions either of a single State or a group of States, whether manifested in silent encroachments or in publicly maintained claims of an unjust sort, will often precipitate the commencement of a struggle from the side of a peaceable and wholly unoffending State./

In some cases, as in the Franco-German War of 1870, it is difficult even for contemporaries to decide to which of the three causes-that is, natural efforts after increased liberty and security proportioned to the growth and the consolidation of the internal resources of one of the Belligerent States, or resistance, by anticipation, to future aggressions, or direct ambition and political acquisitiveness-the War is to be attributed. Nor was it easy to say in the case of that War-though later events have thrown some light on the subject-to what extent each of these different causes was conjoined with the rest in impelling both France and Germany almost simultaneously into War.

Thus, it is one thing to separate the causes of War from each other, in thought, for purposes of analysis, and another to discriminate the actual share which each has taken in bringing about a particular War. For the present purpose, however, which is a practical and not a historical one, it is of less importance to ascertain how many causes are present in the case of any particular War, and in what degree they are mixed with each other, than to enumerate all the possible causes, and to

ascertain generally which of them are likely to prove the most lasting or the least remediable.

ousies and antipathies between States.

2. Apart from the special and temporary circumstances affectHereditary jeal- ing the political relations of two States which urge them into War, it always happens, and must happen in the case of European Wars, that the true ground of War can only be understood by conducting a lengthened and exact historical inquiry into the past relations to each other of the two Belligerent States. These relations have not only produced, in the way of direct parentage, the existing relations, for the explanation of which they must needs be adduced, but they have evolved a peculiar class of national sentiments in each State, and have, as it were, imparted to each a special aspect or characteristic moral bearing in regard to the other. The result is that each State has, in respect of every other one, a definite kind and amount of sensibility, shared in both by the citizens and the Government, which is the product of innumerable events in the past, as well as of the reciprocal influences of the national character of the two countries. This sensibility is at once a source and a kind of incubating medium of all the strong feelings of irritation, impatience, rivalry, dislike, malice, revenge, which incite to War and make it popular.

This assertion needs little proof, or it would be easy to establish it in the case of any pair of the civilized States of the world. All other circumstances being equal, the sensibility of England, and English citizens, in respect of any dispute which might present itself between England, on the one hand, and (say) Germany, France, Italy, Russia, Belgium, Switzerland, and the United States, is different for every one of these States. No doubt the mere magnitude and political importance of some of these States, and the insignificance of others, may have something to do with this feeling. But many of these States which seem small are stronger, in some points, than larger ones, through

their guaranteed independence or neutrality; and this sensibility survives many alternations of strength and weakness, and various political vicissitudes. Not that it is by any means unchangeable, as is manifested in the improved moral relations subsisting of late years between the French and English people, and the secular oscillations of sentiment which England, France, and Germany respectively undergo in respect of such a country as Russia.

Reasons for

mutual animos

States.

The national sensibility is determined by a variety of independent causes, generally of a somewhat subtle ity or amity of kind, and not always easy to explore and set forth in any particular case. Among these causes are past Wars and their consequences; harsh terms imposed in Treaties of Peace, especially such as involve the alienation of territory; habitual encroachments or political assumptions, venting themselves in chronic diplomatic discourtesy; mere partial quarrels or imbroglios between the cliques of the two States; and still less palpable or intelligible grounds of animosity, such as are implied in mere differences of manners, religion, political institutions, and even language, out of which, however, real misunderstandings are peculiarly apt to grow. On the contrary, an opposite class of causes is apt to counteract the grounds of discord, or, at least, of want of harmony, and to generate permanent sentiments of friendliness. Such counteracting causes are gratitude; the recollection of past alliances and mutual services of all sorts; a sense of common sufferings in the past, or of a common national origin or race; and identity of language, or of religion, or of political institutions. The above would generally be styled predisposing causes to War or to Peace, and their operation is too obvious to need illustration. There are some States with which it would be next to impossible to make England go to War, quite apart from all political objects or considerations. There are countries between which it has needed all the efforts

War often the direct result.

of the statesmen of both countries, for years, to maintain peace from day to day. These causes, so far as they produce War, are thus often far more than predisposing. They rank with the most direct and potent causes of War, though they are not susceptible of being openly alleged, or of becoming the basis of negotiation. They can only be indirectly met, and gradually reduced in strength, by a long line of efforts, more of a moral than of a political or legal character. Actual War, of course, only inflames and exaggerates them for the future.

These causes of War will become less active as civilization advances.

These impalpable impulses to War are apt to prevail among some classes of society more than others; and it will often depend upon the political preponderance, at the moment, of the classes which favor War, whether War results or not. It is also obvious that the general tendencies of civilization are in the direction of reducing this class of causes, by making reason take the place of blind animosity, and accustoming the whole national mind habitually to balance the evils of War against the satisfaction of a vague and brutal instinct. On the other hand, the friendlier sentiments are likely to grow in strength, based as they are on true and lasting human relationships, on constantly growing memories of the reciprocal services which States at peace must render each other, and on an advancing and widening conception of the benefits to be obtained from the closest union and co-operation.

Doctrine of

3. There is another cause of War which, in the present condition of the States of Europe, seems likely, for a Intervention. time, to attain greater proportions even than heretofore, and to outlive some of the other causes. This is the disposition, on the part of the more powerful States, to intervene, at certain emergencies, in the affairs of the less powerful, whether the occasion is presented within the limits of Europe or elsewhere.

The topic of Intervention, and the legal grounds of it, form

The Balance

of Power.

an interesting chapter in the history of International Law. The most striking form the doctrine of Intervention has taken is that of the Balance of Power, as it was understood in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and part of the eighteenth century, and according to which a certain relative and existing political situation of the States of Europe was to be definitely guaranteed to each State, and any political assumption or encroachment incompatible with this situation was ground for War to be waged by any or all of the other States. An exceptional, though very remarkable, manifestation of a

The Holy
Alliance.

tendency to intervention was the Holy Alliance,*

which resulted from the Wars of the French Revolution, and in accordance with which certain leading States allied themselves together, with the avowed purpose of making War on any State which should adopt institutions uncongenial to themselves.

England has recently advocated Nonintervention.

It is well known that a number of distinct influences-political, economical, and philosophical-have of late years been tending to discredit the practice of Intervention in the internal affairs of foreign States. England, especially, from her insular position, and her complicated commercial system, has been prominent in advocating doctrines of so-called "Non-intervention," which present a curious contrast to the intricate foreign policy which has for centuries distinguished her career. Not, indeed, that England has been entirely of one mind on this subject; and political parties differ from one another, at any rate, as to the mode of applying the novel doctrine; while, in actual practice, Engwhich England land has not shrunk from sharing the responsibility of actual Intervention as in the case of the establishment of the kingdom of Greece, of the principality of

Instances in

has neverthe

less intervened.

* See, for a full account of this, Manning's Law of Nations, p. 488 seq.