How far this work will proceed, and how rapidly, can only be a matter of conjecture, and opinions in respect of it will differ widely. But there can be no doubt that such projects for reducing national distinctions to the smallest point are becoming more and more conspicuous, and are assuming a very practical shape, while their general tendency to promote lasting Peace is unquestionable.

Permanent

al aim for International lawyers.

From the review of some of the phenomena of modern society as exhibited among the States of Europe, it Peace a ration must at least be gathered that it is not an irrational faith to hold that some day War between civilized States must become obsolete, and that there are sufficient novel indications, even at the present day, to justify the hope that, in spite of the most glaring symptoms to the contrary, the day may not be very remote. Of course, it is not here for a moment pretended that there are no reasons for fearing that War may yet have a long tenure of existence before it; or that a solution can be given off-hand to all the difficult problems which may be suggested as likely to arise when the differences of States have to be settled otherwise than by War; or, still less, that any one State can, at the present moment, righteously or expediently resolve never to go to war again. All these matters, deserving as they are of the most serious attention in the proper place, are irrelevant here. The only purpose in this place is to establish the very moderate proposition that the object of hastening the day when War shall become extinct is a rational and legitimate end (among others) for the reformer of International Law; and as every writer on International Law becomes, often unconsciously, a reformer of it, then every International Lawyer and Law Student is bound to comprehend this object of ultimately securing permanent Peace among the purposes he has in view.

CHAPTER II.

OF SOME OF THE CAUSES OF MODERN EUROPEAN WARS.

Causes of War too numerous and complicated for complete investigation.

An account of the causes of War might be held properly to include a research into a large portion of human history, accompanied by some curious processes of psychological analysis. The word "cause," however, is one of those words which must await its explanation from the surrounding subject-matter, as, in itself, it implies any one of a long train or large assemblage of antecedents, which, with or without the presence of other favoring causes, and in the absence of counteracting causes, is invariably, and therefore, as it is said, necessarily, followed by a definite consequence, which is spoken of as the "effect" of the cause. Thus, when the word cause is used in reference to any event, or class of events, any one of a number of invariable antecedents will satisfy the meaning of the word; and it is of no import how numerous such antecedents are, how complicated they are with one another, or how remote they are in the order of time and sequence from the happening of the event.

Thus an account of the causes of War in Europe, if unlimited by the purpose in hand, might include all such facts as the temper and manners of the tribes which founded the States of Europe, the geographical situation of the territory of those States, all the past relations of the several States to each other, and all the leading events of European history. It might be safely predicted that the character of the populations being such as it was and is, the territory of the different States being assigned to them as it came to be, the reciprocal relations and general

events and ideas being of the kind they have been for the last thousand years and more-the occurrence of occasional Wars must be a certainty, unless some counteracting cause, or assemblage of counteracting causes, intervene to prevent it.

Interesting as the inquiry might be, it would be quite beside Principles of the present purpose to enter upon the investigaselection. tion, curious rather than profitable, into all the antecedents of the indeterminate class just mentioned, from which modern War results. There are, however, some antecedents which seem to stand apart from the rest, on the ground both of their more general and comprehensive character, and of their being open to the direct influence of International Law. There must, necessarily, be something arbitrary in this process of selection; but, inasmuch as the purpose is to fix attention upon facts which are not so much denied as accidentally overlooked, and not to enforce questionable theories about facts, there is little room for serious differences of opinion. The argument will proceed rather by the collection and arrangement of thoroughly admitted phenomena, and not by hunting out of their ambush facts of obscure and ambiguous import.

The true reason for declaring War seldom alleged.

In speaking of the causes of War, an essential distinction has to be made at the outset between the real and the apparent causes of any particular War. It is very seldom that the real ground of a War-that which has brought matters to the state at which War seems the only and inevitable solution-is that which is publicly alleged to be so by the diplomatists and statesmen who are concerned with it. Indeed, these persons, on one side at least, are always interested in glossing over the reasons which seem to have compelled their State to take the final step of declaring War. If the assertions of the diplomatists of a Belligerent State were to be believed, such an event as the occurrence of an unjust or needless War would be impossible. Each War, they say, is waged

either in defence of a threatened right, or in order to avenge and punish a violated right; and the existence of the right, and the fact of actual or apprehended violation, are matters upon which they are prepared to offer evidence to all the world. This evidence may seem more or less cogent to different persons or Governments; but respect for European opinion, and the hope of obtaining sympathy, if not co-operation, are always potent enough to lead to the evidence being prepared as skilfully as possible.

Thus there is almost always an ex post facto element in the causes of War as alleged by the contemporary diplomatists of the Belligerent States. It usually happens that on one side, at least, if not on both sides, the resolution to go to War has been long formed and, indeed, matured, a suitable occasion only being waited for; or it may be that it has only been foreseen that a War is probable, or no more than possible, and yet this probability or possibility may involve quite as much preparation as a War actually determined upon, and it will only depend upon very minute accidents whether the occasion for actual War is really held to have arrived or not.

In order, then, to understand the causes of modern War, it will not suffice to rely exclusively upon the despatches of diplomatists and the speeches of responsible statesmen, as illustrated by the abstract doctrines of International Law that no War can be lawfully entered upon, except in defence of an ascertained right, either violated or menaced. This doctrine, valuable as it is, is rather a standard and a limiting rule, to which it has been attempted to make warlike States conform, than an expression of a subsisting practice. The doctrine, no doubt, has considerable influence, and, at least, cuts away the possibility of waging War on palpably unjust grounds, while it obliges statesmen always to shape their public apologies in conformity with the requirements of a legal rule. This is, no doubt, a gain in the direction of substituting legal methods for mere

violence, and so deserves every encouragement. But the real causes of modern War are usually far deeper than the assigned ones, and are of a strictly political or moral, and not of a legal character.

All States are regarded as legally equal.

It is well known that the established doctrine of International Law is that all States are equal. This is a doctrine which can only be made intelligible by tracing its actual legal consequences, as exhibited, for instance, in the identical rights of the smallest and the largest States to exemption from foreign interference, to the free use of the open sea, to the observance of treaty engagements, to the fair treatment of its citizens when abroad, to the immunity of its ambassadors, and to due ceremonial courtesy and respect. The validity of these rights is confessed on all hands, though momentous discussion often arises on two questions: first, whether a particular State claiming its claims to equal exercise of these rights is, for all purposes, a true rights. sovereign and independent State; and, secondly, whether the admitted right does or does not comprehend certain specific claims, alleged on any particular occasion to be contained in it.

Nevertheless, discussion arises upon

The first of these questions is suggested by the various aspects which a State is apt to present, according as it has bound itself temporarily to another State by conventional ties, or has entered into a permanent league with other States; or, as in the case of Hungary and Austria, Prussia and the German Empire, Turkey and Egypt, is associated with another State through anomalous dynastic or constitutional relations. It is also presented in the case of a portion of a State becoming detached from the parent State, whether by successful insurrection or colonization, or, as in the case of Greece and Turkey, Belgium and Holland, by more or less voluntary separation. In all these cases difficult problems are apt to arise as to the condition of