state of affairs "by combined negotiations founded upon the principles of a just Balance of Power and division, discussed and agreed upon at the Congress of Vienna."

In 1850 a Conference was held at London relative to the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, in which the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Great Britain, Denmark, France, Russia, Sweden, and Norway adopted a protocol on the 4th of July, which recited that the several Powers, "considering that the maintenance or integrity of the Danish Monarchy, bound to the general interests of European equilibrium, is of great importance for the preservation of Peace, have resolved, at the invitation of His Majesty the King of Denmark, to establish the perfect accord which exists between the Cabinets relative to the maintenance of that principle."

Again, the Treaty of the 21st of November, 1855, signed at Stockholm by the Representatives of Great Britain, France, and Sweden and Norway, recites that these several Powers, "being anxious to avert any complication which might disturb the existing Balance of Power in Europe, have resolved to come to an understanding with a view to secure the integrity of the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway."

In the Treaty of the 12th of March, 1854, by which Great Britain, France, and Turkey agreed on the principles of their alliance against Russia, the Preamble recited that the Parties to the Treaty were fully persuaded "that the existence of the Ottoman Empire in its present limits was essential to the maintenance of the Balance of Power among the States of Europe.”

The same principle was appealed to in the Austrian Manifesto of War with Prussia and Italy, on the 17th of July, 1866; in the French Manifesto of 19th of July, 1870, alleging the causes of War with Prussia; and in the Russian Note of the 31st of October, 1870, denouncing the Stipulations of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and inviting a revision of some of them. Numberless other references to the same principle have been

contained in the preambles of conventions and the protocols of conferences, in reference to the various settlements of the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, which have been made or attempted to be made.

It will thus be seen that the principle of what is variously styled the Balance of Power and the Equilibrium of States, was openly announced as the ground of the resettlement of Europe, broadly delineated in the Treaty of Paris of the 30th of May, 1814, and carried out by the Vienna Congress Treaty of the 9th of June, 1815. The same principle has been since incessantly appealed to in the language of Treaties, Conventions, and Protocols, by which the independence of the smaller or weaker States, as Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Turkey was guaranteed. The principle has also occasionally been appealed to in disputes between the larger States, even when the interests of the smaller States have been only remotely and indirectly concerned. These observations, as illustrated by reference to the actual circumstances in which the principle of a "Balance of Power" has been, on each occasion, appealed to, lead to the following conclusions:

Conception of the Balance of Power in the past.

The notion of a Balance of Power is not obsolete in European politics, though it wears a very different shape now from what it once wore. The older conception wavered between two principles; one, that of supporting an existing status quo, and resenting any redistribution of power-however otherwise equitable and generally beneficial-which might seem to assail it; the other, that of bringing general pressure to bear-whether diplomatic or belligerent—against any single State which, by acquisitions of territory, or political annexations in Europe, seemed likely to be able to set at defiance the restraints of public law. Each principle was effective for preventing War, or for determining alliances at the commencement of a War, or during a War; and was, in fact, the basis of the political combinations against Spain

in the sixteenth century, and against France in the seventeenth century.

But if a War had lasted some time, and territory had been occupied and conquests made on both sides, there could no longer be any thought of maintaining an absolute status quo. The best hope, then, was to supervise the provisions of the Treaty of Peace, and readjust the map of Europe in such a way as might carry into effect the second of the above-mentioned principles. The Treaty of Münster, in 1649, by which, at the close of the Thirty Years' War, among a vast number of territorial and political rearrangements, the independence of Switzerland and the United Provinces was formally acknowledged; and the Treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, by which it was provided that the Crowns of France and Spain should never be united, afford the most signal instances of the true purport and practical application of the doctrine of the Balance of Power in one of its forms.

There can be no doubt that the prevalence of the Doctrine Its tendency to did, on the whole, tend to preserve the existence promote Peace. of the smaller States, and, in the end, to promote the Peace of Europe. Of course the principle, when it was professed most loudly, mingled with, and was often subordinated to very different considerations, such as those due to the chances of successful War, elaborate diplomatic contrivances, and traditional systems of policy. But the principle was undoubtedly a real, as well as an apparent, influence of the greatest moment, and the habit of recognizing and deferring to it kept the States of Europe in close relations of intimacy with one another, and made the Wars that were actually waged of a less purely selfish kind, and more profitable in their results, than they might otherwise have been.

It is usually said that the doctrine of the Balance of Power was first publicly proved to have lost its efficacy on the first division of Poland in 1772; and the progress of Napoleon's conquests, as well as the nature and grounds of the opposition

Present inefficacy of the doctrine.

to him, certainly showed that the doctrine of the Balance of Power could, at the commencement of the present century, no longer be relied upon as a principle of cohesion among the States of Europe, nor trusted as an instrument for securing Peace and order. The doctrine was still customarily adverted to in public documents, but rather as a euphonious supplement to more potent considerations than as possessing any inherent vitality of its own. It is, in fact, now little more than a convertible expression for the policy of maintaining the territorial integrity and independence of the smaller States.

Causes of its waning influ

ence.

If it be asked how this weakening of the doctrine of the Balance of Power has been brought about, the answer must be found in the gradual disintegration of the society of European States, which has been long operating—and, recently, at a rapid rate-through an assemblage of causes-political, religious, and commercial-which are mostly of a novel kind. States no longer are bound together in large groups by widespread dynastic ties, or even by uniformity of political constitutions. They can no longer be broadly classed as Protestant or Catholic States. The doctrine of Free-trade, though in a very true sense it promotes the sense of national inter-dependence, does none the less also tend to isolate States from one another, and make them indifferent to the value of accidental alliances or casual ties. Thus, a period is now intervening during which the old traditional connections between States are being broken up, and new and, it is hoped, more extended and permanent, relationships are forming themselves.

In the mean time it cannot be a matter of surprise if a doctrine such as that of the Balance of Power, which, for its general application, demanded an habitual and intimate co-operation of all the States of Europe, should have fallen into desuetude. This is, no doubt, what has happened, and the exaggerated form which the English principle of "Non-Interven

tion" at one time took, is an exhibition of the change. But there is good reason to believe that effective substitutes for that which has passed away are discovering themselves, and that ambitious schemes will be effectually repressed, and small States protected in the name of large principles-less timid, selfish, and provocative of War than that of the Balance of Power.

SECTION VI.

OF THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES, SEAS, AND CANALS.

THE practice of insulating certain of the smaller States, as well as territories, navigable rivers, and inland seas, and giving a guarantee of their Neutrality in time of War, has been one much resorted to during the present century. The meaning, the value, and the true use of this practice, as a means of preventing War, must here be examined, and the most convenient mode of conducting the examination will be by recurring to the leading instances of actual or suggested Neutralization in modern times.

The main purpose of Neutralization is the rescuing from the field of possible conflict some State or place Object of Neutralization. which, from its situation or peculiar advantages, is likely either to be a perpetual object of competitive struggle on the part of covetous, strong, and military States, and therefore to generate Wars, or to be incidentally drawn into any War which may occur, thereby extending its area and complicating its issues.

It may be

There is no doubt that a collective guarantee of Neutrality of itself affords some novel occasions for War; as a breach, or apprehended breach, of the Neutrality by any single party to the engagement not only is a casus belli which imparts to each of the other States the

come an occasion of War.