occasions would be a proclamation of international apathy, and I need not tell you that international apathy does not mean either Peace or progress."

This exposition of doctrine, even if it be valid as an expression of the current tendency of politics in England, is at best only negative, and leaves the question of the time, the occasion, and the manner of the Intervention of any sort to be settled in reference to some general principle, if such a principle, or such principles, could be found.

Rules now

recognized.

It may be considered that, so far as direct and forcible InterIntervention in vention in the internal affairs of a Foreign State internal affairs. is concerned, the positive as well as the negative side of the doctrine is now pretty clearly established; that the mere strength, extent, or organization of an insurrectionary movement furnish no justification for interference either on one side or the other; the duration of an anarchical condition, coupled with the apparent improbability of order ever being restored, may justify interference on the ground of the interest which all States are presumed to have in the stability and integrity of each State; and gross acts of inhumanity persisted in on either side may, on grounds of humanity, properly precipitate Intervention.

But, even if this statement were admitted to be as fairly exact as any doctrine could be rendered in a few brief sentences, still, it is obvious that there are a number of indeterminate elements still left open,

Cases for which they do not provide.

the arbitrary determination of which, by a single interested State in any given case, may lead to serious abuses. The hesitating reluctance of the United States to interfere in the struggle in Cuba,* and the grounds alleged by Servia for declaring War with Turkey—that is, the inhuman efforts made to suppress the insurrection in the neighboring Turkish provinces-exhibit

* See the extract from President Grant's speech, in Manning, p. 97.

the complication of private interest with public duty which perplex, or usually seem to perplex, the motives for Intervention. It is in the highest degree desirable that the element of private interest should be entirely removed-an object which can best be secured, in respect of such cases as these, by habits of combined policy among as great a number of States as possible, and those States especially who are above the suspicion of having

Advantage of combined action.

an interested motive lower than that of promoting Peace, order, and general well-being. Thus, so far as this sort of Intervention is concerned, it is, above all, desirable that the purity of the motives should be conspicuous, and, for this end, the more States that join, the better the reputation for public honesty of the Government of those States; and the greater the publicity of the grounds of Intervention alleged, the less likely is the Intervention to be inexpedient, unjust, and provocative of general War.

Intervention in foreign disputes of other States.

The case of the other sort of Intervention, that of taking a public part on one side or the other in a dispute, or War, between two Foreign States, presents, at present, far greater difficulties than the former kind, because none but the roughest principles of action have Difficulty of as yet met with any general acceptance, and the interests at stake are usually of a far wider and more intricate kind.

the subject.

It is certainly not by mere abstinence from siding with one party or the other, any more than by precipitate

Every War a

eral concern.

matter of gen- ly meddling with the quarrels or feuds of other States, that a just and pacific State will always best promote the cause of Peace and order, or even succeed long in keeping War at a distance from its own borders. If it be true that the States of the civilized world, however various in character, magnitude, or temporary influence, together constitute a true political community, of which the component members owe moral duties, and have moral rights, in respect of one an

other, then the breach of order and social continuity which War presupposes cannot but be a matter of the most urgent moment to every member of the community.

The bare fact that, as soon as War breaks out, every State not a party to the War acquires the rights, and is liable to the duties, of Neutrality, of itself makes the occurrence of War a matter of universal concern. But, apart from this change in legal position, and also apart from the social and commercial losses which War between any two States occasions in all directions, the imminent danger to the national existence of one or both the States concerned, and the open substitution of a reign of force for the current reign of law and right, is a deep moral injury and offence to every State which is a member of the great community of civilized States. The earnest diplomatic efforts which are often made, even as things are, in a truly unselfish spirit, to prevent the outbreak of a War, even between two remote States, are a token of this moral claim on the part of every State to pacific methods of settling differences at the hands of all other States.

If these efforts fail, and War breaks out, all the Neutral States have, in truth, a common cause. The object of a pacific policy should be to remove all occasions of divided and self-regarding interests from these

Duties and policy of Neutrals.

States, so that, free from all prejudice, mutual suspiciousness, and vacillation of purpose, they may combine, either to keep clear of the struggle or to throw their weight into one scale or the other, or insist that the matter in dispute shall be settled by arbitration, at the risk of the recusant party being treated as the general enemy.

Though it is easy to point out the direction which policy should take in the matter of Intervention, the mutual distrust, not to say rivalries and animosities, which now prevail among European States, might well seem such as to render vaticinations of this sort chimerical. Nevertheless, it only needs two

Peace could be maintained by united action of leading States.

or three leading States to be united on the score of maintaining general Peace, to make any other War than a purely insurrectionary one almost impossible. Should France and Germany, for instance, forget the past, except for its instruction, and persist hereafter in desiring permanent Peace as sincerely as England does, European Peace might be almost absolutely secured. So with other possible combinations between States now accidentally estranged, as, for instance, Italy and Austria; the probability of such a combination seems, at present, so extremely small as, perhaps, to be hardly worth adverting to, even for the sake of pointing out that, if it were to occur, the variety of strong and otherwise opposed interests that would then be enlisted on the side of Peace would be able conclusively to insure it.

SECTION III.

OF MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION.

AMONG political remedies for War, either apprehended or existing, the friendly Intervention or aid of States not directly concerned in the dispute properly occupies a high place. To many, indeed, this sort of remedy appears the most hopeful of all, and one of immediate applicability; and an enumeration of recently successful cases of friendly Intervention, or judicial aid, no doubt seems to give color to these hopes. But it has already been explained that War is the last expression of every other malady which disturbs the relations of States, and that it can only be removed by a series of remedial processes which address themselves to all these maladies at once. Nevertheless, the function of friendly service on the part of other States, whether taking a diplomatic form or not, deservedly ranks high among the agencies for keeping War at a distance, and finally, perhaps, providing a substitute for it.

Mediation.

It is not necessary, in this place, to say much about that form of friendly intervention which is known as Mediation. Its true character is well understood, from the close analogy presented in the circumstances of private life. Its success must always depend on the known integrity and disinterestedness of the mediating State, and the higher the reputation of a State for public honesty and impartiality, the more likely are its services to be put in requisition for this purpose. But the success of Mediation must depend upon the alleged grounds of dispute being the real grounds, and, therefore, upon the existence of a certain amount of genuineness and honesty of purpose in the Governments of the States which are verging on War, or already actually engaged in it. It thus appears that the province of Mediation will become larger and larger as national and international morality improves, and the desire of general Peace becomes everywhere more urgent and sincere. Any single State of conspicuous integrity, and still more, any group of two or three States, fortified by a strong, intelligent, and conscientious diplomatic service, may thus confer inestimable benefits in averting, at an early stage, the possibilities of War.

But the form of friendly intervention on which public attention has been especially fixed of late, is that Arbitration. known by the name of Arbitration. The essential elements of Arbitration consist in-(1) An agreement on the part of States having a matter, or several matters, in dispute, to refer the decision of them to a tribunal believed to be impartial, and constituted in such a way as the terms of the agreement specify, and to abide by its judgment; and in—(2) Consent on the part of the person, persons, or States, nominated for the tribunal, to conduct the inquiry and to deliver judgment. On the mere face of this description, it is obvious that there are certain conditions which must be satisfied in order to render Arbitration even so much as possible. In the first place,