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ministration of criminal justice, as by a corruption of the laws themselves. The personal character of a man ought to be examined by very severe tests, before the

important duties of a judge be committed

to his charge. Indeed, the whole course of his professional life ought to be reviewed, and more particularly all the intermediate offices which ne has filled, ought to be considered as so many probationary stations on which he is exalted, that the predominant bias of his mind may be more distinctly seen. If a man had at any time, from the innate meanness or depravity of his mind, manifested a disposition to sacrifice the sacred principles of justice to considerations of base expediency, or to fashion or accommodate them to the varying appearance of existing circumstances; if he constantly discovered an inclination to protect in its Inost wanton excesses, that species of power, which in its natural station is the solid foundation on which the pillars of government must ultimately rest; so which, in its perversion and abuse, leads directly to the establishment of open despotism; if all his sympathies and predilections were alien from the nature of a free constitution ; if there were beside, other infallible indica

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tions on the side of virtue, which power cannot awe into a base acquiescence in its usurpations, and which, even in its corrup. tion or abuse, never can be rendered di. rectly instrumental in tyrannising over the meanest individual of the human race. Is it not, Sir, by a series of mistakes of this nature, that courts of justice fall at last from their natural elevation, and instead of fos. tering an attachment to liberty, and to all those manly virtues by which the genuine disciples of liberty are ever distinguished, degenerate at last into nurseries of servility, where men are trained to be the supple tools of their superiors? we cannottom a correct estimate of the virtues or vices of those eminent personages, who havo flourished in different ages of the work, unless we take into our consideration, the influence of the education which they ho received, the manners of the age in which they have lived, and the circumstances in which they may have been placed; unles we also make a due allowance for the effect of other accidental causes, in checking 0s calling forth those elementary passions, by whose peculiar combination the prominer cies of any character are formed. It is ol, by clearing men's actions of the extrins; encumbrances with which they are connel. ed, by stripping them in a manner, of sh:

husk in which they are involved, that we art

enabled to penetrate clearly into their to: nature, and to mark those in whom the di. tinctive lineaments of tyranny are faithful preserved. It would, for instance, be ves unjust to fasten on the memory of Charles J. the odious charge of despotism, because o eutertained notions of the regal prerogati" inconsistent with a free constitution, witho reflecting that the station in which he wo placed, disposed him to receive strong Pro possessions in favour of the royal powe's

and, that the education which he receive

instead of weakening the force of those so nicious prejudices, rivetted them mo strongly on his mind. But there is a to cal depravity of heart, an obstinate tendo' in the mind to doinineer and dragoon, who baffles the correcting influence of accideo causes. It is the pure spirit of mischio transmitted in its prinitive malignity throo" all the successive changes in the manno" laws, and customs of society, like the rio which was fabled by the ancients to so through the sea without imbibing the slight est tincture from the surrounding elemento ——Had Henry the VIIIth been destined" live in happier times, and to fill an insen” station, he never could have been guilty of those sanguinary excesses into which he wo

hurried by the unlimited indulgence of his they are the most formidable. They take passions; but, he would, notwithstanding their aim from a cover ; they walk about . have exhibited decisive marks of his true with concealed arms; they are the odious character. His system of government would reptiles of arbitrary power, who lurk amid have been founded on force, not on conci. the ruins and rubbish of the political edifice, liation; he would have been disgusted with from who nee they issue out to harrass and the deliberate circuitous movements of civil pollut, the land with their filthy ravages.judicatories, and would have recommended, These general speculations, I shall conclude on the slightest occasions, the direct and ra- with the following quere. If those who pid march of military law. When questoned publish seditious doctrines are cond-mned to as to the nature of his office, fondly cast ng a long exile, whost punishment is adequate back a retrospective glance to an age more to the off nee of those, who are guilty of a suitable to his genius and character, he practical satire on the ble-sings of a free go

would have carefully picked up all the scat- vernment ---A Speculato R. tered fragments of tyranny which he could Edinburgh, Jan. 2, 1805. find; these, after being patched together, - - - he would have exhibited to the astonished PUBLIC PAPERS beholders as a faint image of his authority. WAR with Spain. - Decaration on the When any of his excesses had drawn upon Part of the King of England, laid before. him general odium, he would have sheltered Parliament, and published on Thursday, his shivering nakedness from the storm of the 24th of January. 1805 Popular indignation; not in the durable From the moment that hostilities had

robe of immutable justice, but in the filthy | commenced between Great Britain and tags and remnants of usurped power. In France, a sufficient ground of war against carrying into practical effect an important Spain, on the part of Great Britain, necesalteration in any political constitution, it re- sarily followed from the treaty of St. I dequires a comprehensive, discriminating mind, phonso if not disclaimed by Spain – hat skilfully to adapt new institutions to the treaty in fact identified Spain with the Pesystem of which they are intended to form a publican Government of France, by a vir-. Part; to work them in a manner into the tual acknowledgment of unqus ified vassalcontexture and constitution of the original age, and by specific stipulations of unconfabric. In all those changes and improve- ditional offence.—— By the articles of that ments, which tend to give additional energy tie ty Spain covemanted to furnish a stated to a government by concentrating its scatter- contingent of naval and motary force for the ed parts into greater simplicity of construc- prosecution of any war in who hthe French, tion, a variety of inferior and collateral de- Republic might think proper to engage. She positaries of authority, must necessarily be specifically surrendered any right or prerendered useless, and the relations of subor- tension to inquire into the nature, oridination must be partially broken. One gin, or justice of that war he stiPoincipal object with those who preside and pulated, in the first instance, a contingent direct, ought therefore, to be, to establish of troops and ships, which, of itsel', comthose relations on the same footing as for. prised no moderate proportion of the means *tly, and to guard against the growth of at her disposal; but in the event of this conany unnatural, anomalous tyranny in the tingent being at any time foun..! insufficient state, by fixing a regular channel of com- for the purposes of France, she further "unication between the source of autho. bound herself to pnt into a state of activity "W, and its most remote ramifications. If the utmost force, both by sea and land, that any of the mutilated fragments of power be it should be in her power to coli.ect. She allowed to lie scattered about, great confu- covenanted that this force shood be at the **nd uncertainly will immediately ensue, disposal of France, to be employed conjointand they will be scrambled for and seized by ly or separately for the annoya, ce of the

*Petty tyrants, who lie in wait for every common enemy; thus submitting her en"PPortunity to increase their authority, and tire power and resources to be used as the so draw to themselves a variety of useless and instruments of French a bition and aggresP*ious 'prerogatives. Hence they are sign, and to be applied in whatever propor*4 to give the semblance of law and |tion rance might think proper. for the }*tice, to acts of the basest oppression, and avowed purpose of endeavouring to subvert "Protect themselves with a strong line of the government and destroy the national **nd privileges from the consequences existence of Great Britan ---The charactor o their misconduct and delinquency. Of of such a treaty gave Great Britain, an incon, * the enemies to the liberties of the people, testible right to declare to Spain, that unles

she decidedly renounced the treaty, or gave assurances that she would not perform the obligations of it, she would not be considered as a neutral power. This right, however, for prudential reasons, and from mo. tives of forbearance and tenderness towards Spain, was not exercised in its full extent: and, in consequence of assurances of a pacific disposition on the part of the Spanish government, his Majesty did not, in the first instance, insist on a distinct and formal renunciation of the treaty. It does not appear that any express demand of succour had been made by France before the Month of July, one thousand eight hundred and three; and on the first notification of the war, his Majesty's minister at Madrid was led to beJieve, in consequence of communications which passed between him and the Spanish government, that his Catholic Majesty did not consider himself as necessarily bound by the mere fact of the existence of a war between Great Britain and France, without subsequent explanation and discussion, to fulfil the stipulations of the treaty of St. Iłdephonso, though the articles of that treaty would certainly give rise to a very different interpretation. In the month of October a convention was signed, by which Spain agreed to pay to France a certain sum monthly in lieu of naval and military succours which they had stipulated by the treaty to provide, but of the amount of this sum, or of the nature of any other stipulations which that convention might contain, no official information whatever was given.——It was immediately stated by his Majesty's minister at Madrid to the Spanish government, that a subsidy as large as that which they were supposed to have engaged to pay to France, far exceeded the bounds of forbearance: that it could only meet with a temporary connivance, as if it was continued it might prove

in fact a greater injury than any other hos

tility. In reply to these remonstrances, it was represented as an expedient to gain time, and assurances were given which were confirmed by circumstances, which came to his Majesty's knowledge from other quarters, that the disposition of the Spanish government would induce them to extricate them selves from this engagement, if the course of events should admit of their doing so with safety.——When his Majesty had first reason to believe that such a convention was concluded. he directed his minister at Madrid to declare that his forbearing to consider Spain as an enemy must depend in some degree upon the amount of the succours, and upon her maintaining a perfect neutrality in

- but that it would be imo

between his Majesty's minister and the So

possible for him to consider a permanent payment, to the amount of that which was stated to have been in agtation, in any other light than as a direct subsidy of war. His Majesty's envoy was directed, therefore, first to protest against the convention, as a violation of neutrality, and a justifiable cause of war; secondly, to declare, that our abstaining from hostilities must depend upon is being only a temporary measure, and that we must be at liberty to consider a perseve. rance in it as a cause of war; thirdly, that the entrance of any French troops into Spain must be refused; fourthly, that any naval preparation must be a great cause of jea. lousy, and any attempt to give naval assist. ance to France an immediate cause of war; fifthly, that the Spanish ports must remain open to our commerce, and that our ships of war must have equal treatment with those of France. His Majesty's minister was also instructed, if any French troops entered Spain, or if he received authentic information of any naval armaments-preparing for

the assistance of France, to leave Madrid, .

and to give immediate notice to our naval commanders, that they might proceed to hostilities without the delay that might be occasioned by a reference home.——The execution of these instructions produced a variety of discussions; during which his Majesty's minister told Mr. Cevallos, in air swer to his question, whether a continuance of such pecuniary succours to France would be considered as a ground of war, and who ther he was authorised to declare it 2 that he was so authorised, and that war would beth" infallible consequence, It was, however, still thought desirable by his Majesty to protract, if possible, the decision of this ques. tion; and it was therefore stated in the instructions to his minister at Madrid, that * the subsidy was represented by the Spanio government to be merely a temporary me.” sure, his Majesty might still continue to ovo look it for a time; but that his decision in

this respect must depend upon knowing the

precise nature of all the stipulations between Spain and France, and upon the Spanish go. vernment being determined to cause tho' neutrality to be respected in all other part" culars. That until these questions were * swered in a satisfactory maimer, and tht convention communicated to him, he “” give no positive answer whether he wo"

make the pecuniary succours a cause of wo or not.——Before the receipt of these * structions, dated January 21, 1804, the stport of some naval armaments in the Po"

Spain had occasioned a fresh correspon”


nish government. In one of the notes preseriod by the former, he declares, that if the King was forced to begin a war, he would want no other declaration than what he had already made. The answers of the panish government were at first of an evasive nature; his Majesty's minister closed the correspondence on his part by a note delivered on the Eighteenth February, in which he declares that all further forbearance on the part of England must depend upon the cessation of all naval armaments, and a prohi bition of the sale of prizes in their ports; and unless these points were agreed to without modification, he had orders to leave Madrid. On the second of these points a satisfactorv answer was given, and orders issued accordingly ; on the first a reference was made to former declarations. To the question about disclosing the treaty with France no satisfactory an-wer was cver given. As however no naval preparations appeared to be proceeding at that period in the ports of Spain, the matter was allowed to remain there for a time.——In the month of July, one thousand eight hundred and four, the governinent of Spain gave assurances of faithful and settled neutrality, and disavowed any orders to arm in their ports; yet in the subsequent month, when these assurances were recent, and a confident reliance reposed in them, the British Chargé d'Affaires received advice from the admiral commanding his Majesty's ships off the port of Ferrol, that reinforcements of soldiers and sailors had arrived through Spain for the French feels at Toulon and Ferrol. On this intelligence two notes were presented to the Spanish ministers, but no answer was received to either of them. Towards the end of the Month of September, information was received in London from the British admiral stationed off Ferrol, that orders had actually been given by the court of Madrid, for arm*g, witnout loss of time, at that port, four ships of the line, two frigates, and other omaller vessels; that (according to his intelligence) similar orders have been given at Carthagena and Cadiz, and particularly that three first rate ships of the line were direct. “dio sail from the last mentioned port; and **n additional proof of hostile intentions, that orders had been given to arm the pac*ts as in time of war.—-Here then apPoted a direct and unequivocal violation of **rms on which the continuance of peace been acquiesced in ; previou, notice "g been given to the Spanish govern**, that a state of war would be the im*ediate consequence of such a measure, his **, on this event stood almost pledged

to an instant commencement of hostilities; the King however preferred a persevering adherence to the system of moderation so congenial to his disposition: he resolved to leave still an opening for accommodation, if Spain should be still allowed the liberty to adopt the course prescribed by a just sense of her own interests and security. It is here worthy of remark, that the groundless and ungrateful imputations thrown out against his Majesty's conduct in the Spanish manifesto, are built upon the foundation of this forbearance alone: Had his Majesty exercised, without reserve, his just rights of war, the representations so falsely asserted, and so insidiously dwelt upon, could not have been even stated under any colourable pretext: the indulgence, therefore, which postponed the actual state of war, was not only misrepresented, but transformed into a ground of complaint, because the fosbearance extended to the aggressors was not carried to a dangerous and inadmissible extreme. In consequence of intelligence above stated, directions were sent to his Majesty's minister at Madrid; to make representations and remonstrances to the Sparish court, to demand explanations relative to the existing conventions between Spain and France; and, above all, to insist that the naval armaments in their ports should be placed on the same footing as they were previously to the commencement of hostilities between Great Britain and France: And he was further directed, explicitly to state to the Spanish government, that his Majesty felt a duty imposed upon him of taking, without delay, every measure of precaution; and, particularly, of giving orders to his admiral off the port of Ferrol to prevent any of the Spanish ships of war sailing from that port, or any additional ships of war from entering it.—No substantial redress, no satisfactory explanation, wa afforded in consequence of these repeat representations; whilst, under the cover of his Majesty's forbearance, the enemy had received considerable reunittances of treasure together with the facility of procuring other supplies,—Every circumstance of the conduct of Spain was peculiarly calculated to excite the attention of the British government—the removal of Spanish ships out of their docks, to make room for the accommodation of the men of war of France – the march of French troops and seamen through the Spanish territory—the equipment of naval armaments at Ferrol—thc consideration that the junction of this armament with the French ships already in that harbour, would create a decided superiority

of numbers over his Majesty's squadron cruiz

tions, and the consequent increase of expense which this conduct of Spain necessarily imposed upon Great Pritain, All these together required those precautions, both of representation and action, to which his MaFesty had immediate recourse. While official notice was given of his Majesty's intention to adopt those necessary measures, the Spanish government was at the same time assured, that his Majesty still felt an earnest desire to main ain a good understanding with Spain; but that the continuance of such a state of things must be subject to the condition of abstaining, on their part, from all hostile preparations, and on making without hesitation or reserve, that full and explicit disclosure of the nature and extent of the subsisting engagements with France, which had hitherto been so frequently and so fruitlessly demanded.—The precautions adopted by his Majesty were such only as he deemed indispensably necessary to guard against the augmentation by Spain of her means of naval preparation during the discussion, and against the possible consequences of the fafe arrival of the expected American treasure in the Spanish ports; an event which has more than once, in former times, become the epoch of the termination of discussions, and of the cornmencement of hos

tility on the part of Spain —The orders is

sued by his Majesty, on this occasion, to the admirals commanding his fleets, aford the most striking example of a scrupulous and indulgent forbearance; the most strict limitation was given, as to the extent and object of the measures proposed; and the execution of those orders was guarded with the strongest injunctions to avoid, by every means consistent with attainment of their object, any act of violence or hostility. ag inst the dominions or subjects of his Catholic Majesty. The hostile preparations in

the harbour of Ferrol rendered it necessary,

in the first instance, that a reinforcement should be added to the squadron cruizing off that port; and orders were at the same time conveyed to the British admirals, to send into mation to the Spanish government of the instructions they had received, and of their

determination in consequence to resist, un

der the present circumstances, the sailing either of the French or Spanish fleets, if ary attempt should be made by either of them. His Majesty's pleasure was at the same time signified, that they were not to detain, in the first instance, any ship belonging to his Catholic Majesty, sailing from a port of Spain; but to require the

contmander of such ship to return directly

ing off that port—the additional naval exer- )

to the port from whence she came, and only, in the event of his refusing to comply with such requisition, to detain and send her to Gibraltar or to England.—Further directions were given not to detain any Spanish homeward-bound ships of war, unless they should have treasure on board, nor merchant ships of that nation, howeverla. den on any account whatsoever. That in the prosecution of those measures of precaution, many valuable lives should have been sacrificed, is a subject of much regret to his Majesty, who laments it as an event produced alone by an unhappy concurrence of circumstances, but which can in no degree affect the merits of the case. The question of the just principle and due exercise of his Majesty's right, rests upon every foundation of the laws of nature and of nations, which enjoin and justify the adoption of such measures as are requisite for defence and the prevention of aggression. It remains only further to observe, that if any additional proof were requisite of the wisdom and necessity of precautionary measures, that proof would be found even in the declaration relied upon in the manifesto of Spain, in which its government new states itself to have contemplated from the beginning of the war, the necessity of noking itself a party to it, in support of the prete sions of France, expressly declaring, that “Spain and I lookand, who treated com. “jointly with France at Amiens, and whose interests and political relations were so closely connected with her, must have with difficulty refrained from taking part against the injuries and insults offered to their ally.”— It will further appear, by a reference to the dates and results of the several representations made by his Majesty's Chargo d'Affaires at the court of Spain, that the detention of the Spanish treasure-ships never was in question during the discussions which preceded his departure from Madrid. That ground of complaint therefore, which has since been so much relied upon, formed no part of the motive of the previous hostile character so strongly manifested by the Spä" nish court in their mode of treating the points in discussion, nor (as will appear in the sequel) of the final rupture of the negotiation at Madrid. On the twenty-sixth of October, one thousand eight hundred and four, his Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presented a note to the Spanish minister, in which the following conditions were insisted upon, as preliminary to the appointment of a minister from Great-Britain, who might treat of the adjustment of other matters which remaine

for discussion. The conditions were three

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