The canons of Sardica, referred to, are the third, fourth, and fifth, which we give from Du Pin, and are as follows: In the third canon Hosius proposes, first, that it should be forbidden to appeal to judges of a neighbouring province; and, secondly, he says, that for the honour of the memory of St. Peter, he judged it convenient, with the leave of the council, to ordain, that if a bishop, condemned in his own country, thought himself innocent, those who had judged him should write to the bishop of Rome, to inquire whether the cause of the bishop accused should be examined anew. That if he and the judges he should name were of this opinion, they must proceed to a new decision upon the place; but if he did not think fit that the cause should be examined anew, then the sentence already past must stand good.” “Gaudentius adds in the fourth canon, that a bishop deposed by the synod of the province, who desires this new decision, must not be expelled his see till the bishop of Rome has determined whether the cause ought to be examined anew." "Lastly, in the fifth canon, according to the Greek, and the seventh, according to the edition of Dionysius Exiguus, Hosius says, that when the bishop of Rome thinks fit that the cause of a bishop should be examined a second time, he ought to write to the bishops next adjoining to his province, that they examine the whole matter with care and exactness; that he must also be empowered to send legates in his own name to this new synod, unless he think it more convenient to leave the judging of the case to the neighbouring bishops of the province only, without sending thither his legates. The bishops of the council approve these propositions of Hosius and Gaudentius."* Against the conclusions drawn from these canons, we furnish the following reasons :— (1.) These canons were not formed as the canons of other councils, in the form of laws; but they are propositions made by Hosius and other bishops, which are approved by all the synod. (2.) The discipline which the fathers of Sardica establish in these canons is new; for it is contrary, both to the decisions of the Councils of Nice and Antioch. It is contrary to the two following canons of the Council of Antioch, held in 341 or 342, about six years before the Council of Sardica. "Canon 14. In case the bishops of one province cannot agree about judging of a bishop, the metropolitan may call the bishops of the neighbouring province, to judge and decide this controversy. "Canon 15. But if a bishop is condemned unanimously by all the bishops of the province, he cannot be judged anew, and the sentence of the synod of the province ought to remain firm." The canons of Sardica were contrary to those of Antioch; and the latter were entirely conformable to the ancient practice and discipline of the church, as is manifest from the decisions of the Council of Nice, which have been already cited and frequently referred to. (3.) The fathers of Sardica do not give the bishop of Rome power to judge the cause of a bishop in his own tribunal at Rome; but they only give him authority to inquire whether it were well or ill deter * Du Pin, Eccl. Hist., vol. i, p. 606. mined; and in case he find that it was determined wrong, to order a new decision of it in the country, and by the neighbouring bishops of the province where it was determined, whither he might send legates in his own name to be present, if he thought it convenient. This power of receiving appeals, with respect to the judging and deposing of bishops, has been extended by the popes to all cases, even the most trivial. Alexander III. extended the power of appeal to all matters, even the most trivial.* After times seem also to have added the following to the decisions of the council, and foisted it into their letter to Pope Julius :-" It is very meet or reasonable that all bishops should acquaint their head, that is, the see of St. Peter, with what passes in their respective provinces." But this is manifestly a forgery, because it stands unconnected in the letter, and is contrary to the canons of Sardis themselves. (4.) The canons of Sardis are contrary to the canons of the Council of Constantinople, held in 381. The second canon of this council renews and confirms the ancient law of the church, authorized by the fourth, fifth, and sixth canons of the Council of Nice, commanding the bishops of each province to be ordained by those of the same province, and such of the neighbouring provinces as they should think fit to call in; directing all ecclesiastical matters to be settled by a council composed of the bishops of the province; or at least of the diocess composed of all the provinces under the same vicar, and strictly forbidding the bishops of one diocess to interfere with the business of another diocess. By this canon the decisions of the Council of Sardica are revoked, or rather disowned, and all appeals from the council or synod of the diocess are forbidden. By the third canon the see of Constantinople is declared first in rank and dignity after that of Rome. The council gave rank to the see of Constantinople, but no jurisdiction. It was the Council of Chalcedon that gave authority and jurisdiction; for by that council they were authorized to ordain the metropolitans of the diocesses of Pontus, Asia, and Thrace. (5.) The canons forbidding all appeals to Rome, made about the year 426, were still quoted among the other canons of the African collection in 825, and confirmed by a council held at Carthage that year. (6.) The canons of the Council of Sardica were never received into the code of the universal church. On this we quote Du Pin, who says in his concluding remarks on this council: "These canons end with these words in the edition of Dionysius Exiguus, The whole council hath said, the Catholic Church spread over all the earth shall observe what has been now ordained. However, the canons of the Council of Sardica were never received by the Catholic Church as general laws, They were never put into the code of the canons of the universal church, approved by the Council of Chalcedon. The East never received them, neither would the bishops of Africa own them. The popes only used them, and cited them under the name of the Council of Nice, to give them the greater weight and authority." * In Decr. Greg., lib. ii, tit. 28, c. 11. Theod., v, 9; Socr., v, 8; Soz., vii, 9. + Hilar., Frag. i. Ecc. Hist., tom. iii, p. 60%. 8. The grounds on which the popes formerly asserted the right of appeal, destroys the validity of their claim. That was Pope Zosimus, in his notable contest with the Africans, though bent on exalting his see, and straining every prerogative to the highest pitch, yet did not presume to exalt it above the canons, nor claim the power of receiving appeals independently of the canons. conceding that he was equal to other bishops, except the official authority vested in him by the canons. The scandalous course which he took in the case of Apiarius, to extend his power, and curtail that of the African bishops, is a proof that he derived his claim from the canons alone. No better opportunity could be offered to urge a divine right. Therefore, as Zosimus never mentioned such a right, we may safely infer he had no idea of such a right, or did not think it sufficiently valid to be of any use in the present dispute. And yet this divine right of receiving appeals from all parts of the world is now held as an article of faith, by all true Roman Catholics; so that to dispute it would be no less dangerous, in countries where the inquisition prevails, than to dispute any article of the apostles' or Nicene creed. It is true Innocent I. claimed, by divine right, the power of deciding controversies; but he seems to have confined it to articles of faith. This pretension, to its utmost limits, was claimed in process of time by his successors. When subsequent councils repealed or contradicted the canons of Sardica, on which the popes founded all their usurpations, they revived the claim of Innocent, and challenging no longer the prerogative of receiving appeals by the canons, but by divine right, they put it out of the power of all future councils to abridge or re strain it. 9. On many occasions appeals were not made to the pope, which proves that he was not generally believed to have possessed the power of receiving them. Paul of Samosata appealed to the emperor. The Donatists did not appeal to the pope, but to the emperor." And their cause was, by the emperor, not referred to the pope singly, but to him and other judges as the emperor's commissioners. Athanasius did first appeal to the emperor. Chrysostom requested the pope's succour; but he did not appeal to him as a judge. He appealed to a general council, which Innocent judged to be necessary for a right decision in his case. Eutychės appealed to all the patriarchs, and Theodoret intended to appeal to all the western bishops. Thus appeals were made to other bishops, as well as to the popes. 10. Christian states, to prevent the mischiefs arising from appeals to the pope, have been compelled to make laws against them. The English statutes of Provisors, Premunire, &c., are notable examples of the opposition raised against papal usurpations in the exercise of appeals. In the year 878, the kingdom of France was so harassed with appeals, that Hincmar, archbishop of Rheims, was appointed to address the pope on the subject. Hincmar, after showing that such a practice, if encouraged, would entirely subvert all ecclesiastical discipline, quotes the canons of Sardica, on which the popes grounded their right of receiving appeals, and proves from these very canons, that bishops + Soz., viii, 26. * August., ep. 162. are to be judged only on the spot, and that priests are only allowed to appeal to their metropolitans. 11. Indeed, anciently there were properly no appeals in the church. They were first introduced by Cyril of Jerusalem, who, as Socrates says, "first appealed to a greater judicature, against ecclesiastical rule and custom.' This proves that about that time, or the middle of the fourth century, diocesan synods were established, and were the last resort; as the provincial synods were the last resort previous to the erection of diocesses. In proof of the want of regularity in ecclesiastical appeals in the early ages of Christianity, appeals were often made to the emperors. Paul of Samosata appealed to Aurelianus.† So the Donatists appealed to Constantine. Egyptian bishops, to the same.§ Athanasius, and the Priscillian appealed to Maximus, and Idacius to Gracian. Hence canons were made to restrain bishops from having recourse to the civil tribunals. 12. Instances of appeal are few, and not primitive. Nevertheless, several cases are quoted by the Roman Catholic writers; but, on examination, it will be found that they are few compared to the occasions for them: they are mostly late, when papal encroachments had advanced: some of them are impertinent: others of them may be retorted on them with advantage: and all of them fall short of establishing papal appeals. If the popes had originally a known, unquestionable right of receiving appeals, there could be produced many ancient, clear, appropriate, and undoubted instances of it. The following are the principal ones alleged by their writers: (1.) Marcian, in 142, is represented as appealing to the pope. But the truth was, that Marcian, for having corrupted a maid, was, by his own father-bishop of Sinope, driven from the church. He then fled to Rome, and there begged admittance to communion, but none granted it. On his expostulating, the pope replied, "We cannot, without the permission of thy honourable father, do this; for there is one faith, and one concord; and we cannot cross thy father, our good fellow-minister."T This was the case, and is it not strange that it should be produced as an instance of an appeal, when it was only a supplication of a fugitive criminal to be admitted to the communion of the church? This instance may be retorted with great advantage against Roman appels. (2.) The case of Felicissimus and Fortunatus, in 252, is adduced s an instance of appeal to Pope Cornelius. But this was only the irregl lar application of desperate and wicked men, on whom a definite se: tence had already passed by their proper judges in Africa, from whor there could be no appeal.** (3.) The case of Basilides, in the year 253, to Stephen, is als alleged. But his application to the pope was resisted by Cyprian, and proved ineffectual.†† * Socr., ii, 40. + Apol. ii, p. 804. iv, 4. + Ad imperatorem appellaverunt.--Aug. de Unit. Eccl., C. 16 Ad principem provocavit.-Sulp. Sev. ii, 63, 64, Concil. Antioch.; De Marca, ¶ Epiph. Hær. 42. These are all the instances which they can collect from the first three hundred years; so that during all this time the power of receiv ing appeals by the pope was either unknown, or was not exercised. (4.) Other cases might be introduced, which would go to prove that for several centuries after Christ there were no regular appeals to the pope. Here our limits do not allow us to enlarge, though we might adduce numerous cases, and select those that contain the greatest show of reason on the side of the Romans; and yet they would not prove the practice of regular appeals to the pope. We would examine the case of Athanasius to Julius, in 350; of Chrysostom, in 403, to Innocent I.;* of Pelagius and Celestine to Innocent I., in 416;† of Antony, in 422; of Apiarius, in 426, to Celestine ;§ of Cyril, in 430, to Celestine of Flavianus of Constantinople to Leo I., elected in 440; of Theodoret to the same Leo; of Eutyches to the same Leo, in the time of the Council of Chalcedon, in 451; of John of Lappa, in 669, to Vitallianus. T Also of Maurus, in the same year. See also the cases of Wilfrid of England, in 678;tt of Hincmar, in 864.‡‡ In connection with the references to Mr. Bowers, and the authorities he adduces, Barrow may be advantageously consulted.§§ If the reader examine these cases, he will be able to trace the grounds on which Romans found their doctrine of appeals to the pope. Indeed no enlightened and candid Roman Catholic will examine these cases without taking the ground, that the cases of apparent appeals, for more than eight hundred years after Christ, furnish no good reason in favour of the power of receiving appeals, since practised by the popes of Rome. XII. Whether the pope can be CALLED TO AN ACCOUNT, JUDGED, or DEPOSED, has been differently believed and as variously decided. 1. The popes generally pretend to this privilege, according to those maxims contained in their canon law, drawn from the decisions of popes which have obtained authority in their courts; whether the decisions were forged or genuine, it makes little difference to the close adherents to the supremacy. 2. But early antiquity decided differently. For it considered the pope as no less obnoxious to correction than other bishops, if he should deviate notoriously from the faith, or violate canonical discipline. This was not questioned in former times. 3. There are many instances in which popes have been called to an account, and sometimes deposed. Some popes, in accordance with the usages of the times, have found it necessary to purge themselves by oaths. Mention is made by Gratian,¶¶ how Leo, bishop of Rome, in the church of St. Peter, in the presence of the emperor Charles, the clergy, and the people, purged himself by oath. Pelagius being accused that he was accessary to the death of ++ Id., vol. iii, pp. 130-138 and 211-213. Só Barrow on Supremacy, pp. 376-383. Bellar. de Pontif. ii, c. 26; de Conc. i, c. 17; Gratian. Dist. xl, c. 6; Dist. xxi, c. 7; Caus. ix, qu. 3, c. 10; Extrav. Comm., lib. i; Tit. viii, c. i; Pope Leo IX., ep. i, c. 10-17; Pope Nich. I., ep, 8; Pope Joh. VIII., ep. 75; Pope Gelas., p. 4, 13; Pope Greg. VII., ep. 8, 21. TT Conc. Herdens. decrct. 3, ex Grat. |